We had proposed to the Yugoslav comrades some considerable time before that we send a top-level government delegation, headed by me, to Yugoslavia. Through the visit of this official delegation there we aimed to take another important step towards further strengthening the relations of mutual friendship between our countries, peoples and parties and towards raising the prestige of our countries in the international arena, and to utilize the possibilities which would be created to hold top-level discussions on various problems of a political, economic and other character, which presented common interest.

    The Yugoslav leadership replied that it agreed in principle

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to welcome the top-level delegation at the appropriate moment, but months went by and the answer remained positive only in <<principle>>. They justified this delay with the many problems and difficulties they had, and without doubt, there was a real basis for this excuse. At the same time, however, we noticed something else: on the one hand, the Yugoslav comrades were <<extremely busy>> with work and problems, and <<could not receive>> the delegation headed by me <<quickly>>, while on the other hand, Djilas, Kardelj and Tito himself found the time to welcome and hold long talks with our youth delegations or working groups which went there and even found time to receive Liri Gega! Here I am not speaking about Koçi Xoxe, Nako Spiru or Sejfulla Malëshova (before he was condemned), who, when they went to Belgrade, were given such welcomes that Koçi <<could not find words to describe them>>!

    Nevertheless, we continued to justify their failure to receive me on the grounds that Nako Spiru put forward, that perhaps <<the high rank>> of the delegation required a great deal of preliminary preparation(!); perhaps such a visit should be made at an important national or international moment, perhaps. . .

    Many other <<surmises>> similar to these (each of them has a basis) could be listed, but I think that the main reason for the delay in accepting the visit of our delegation to Belgrade lay elsewhere: perhaps the Yugoslav leadership did not want the first top-level official delegation to be headed by me! After the mines which they laid at Berat they expected that I would be quickly eliminated from the leadership (they knew that in the Bureau which emerged from Berat I was one against four, if not one against six comrades), and consequently, they were awaiting my replacement, so the delegation would be headed by the person who was to take my place, their greatest friend Koçi Xoxe.

    I base this hypothesis not only on the countless facts which proved that the Yugoslav leadership wanted to eliminate me at Berat. and since this was proved impossible there,

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afterwards. I base this hypothesis on a whole mass of other facts, amongst which the feverish efforts of Tito and company to hinder and, if possible, to sabotage the visits of a delegation of ours at the same level to Stalin in Moscow, to Dimitrov in Bulgaria, etc.

    As I said, at that time there were many things we did not know, therefore, we could only wait. And precisely when we had begun to discuss in the Bureau <<The theses for the re-examination of the 2nd Plenum of the CC of the CPA>>, the news came that the road to Belgrade had been opened to us.

    We left off all the work we had in hand, and since the time before our departure was very short, we once again went over the matters which we would discuss with the Yugoslav leadership and Tito.

    At those moments we, like all the other countries of people's democracy, were faced with the question that our economy should not be spontaneous, but organized, that is, a planned socialist economy. Despite our great poverty inherited from the past and from the war, we had commenced such a thing by carrying out a series of major transforming socio-economic reforms on the correct Marxist-Leninist course. We knew that for the construction of socialism we had to base ourselves, first of all, on our internal forces, but, especially in that initial phase, the co-operation and aid of foreign friends was necessary and indispensable for us.

    Apart from other things, in this cardinal field which required endless forces and energies, we lacked not only means and funds, but also experience. We studied the Marxist-Leninist literature, the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, the written experience of the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union, though, understandably, this could not be learned from books alone. We had even taken the first steps in practice, but this was still only the very beginning. In the 5th Plenum of the CC of the Party, in particular, the necessity of defining and consistently pursuing a correct policy for the socialist transformation of the country was stressed

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with the greatest force. It was decided that the economy should be developed according to a plan which must be carefully prepared with our own forces, but we felt it necessary to consult with our friends about the drafting of the plan. These things, then, were to constitute one of the main questions which our delegation was to discuss with the Yugoslav leadership and Tito. As I said, Nako had been summoned there in April and he had held some talks with Yugoslav comrades specialized in the economy and so certain preliminary work on this problem had been done. The aim of our delegation in regard to this problem was to seek the aid of the Yugoslav comrades to build up an economic plan with a perspective of at least two years, for the time being, in order to proceed towards a five-year plan.

    We had reached agreement with the Yugoslavs to hold discussion and decided first of all, on the signing of a treaty of friendship and mutual aid between the two countries, a thing which we considered a major success for our policy, economy and defence. On this question our preparations had been made with great seriousness because of the great interest which the friendly relations of our two allied socialist countries presented, on account of our further economic development, and the joint defence of our two socialist countries bordering to the west and the south on enemy states and being, at the same time, two states of people's democracy, members of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.

    We were going abroad for the first time as representatives of a people's government, of course, to a friendly country, and we had considered it our first duty to express to our friends, both the Yugoslav people and their leadership, the pure feelings of sincere friendship of our people, and tell them of our objective reality. On the basis of this reality, as well as their real situation, which they would have to present to us just as we would, we would put forward our requests and possibilities, would discuss them openly and sincerely, and take decisions in the common interest.

    In the very close and sincere relations which (as we

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thought at that time) existed between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and between Stalin and Tito, we saw another reason which rejoiced us about the meeting we were to have with Tito. We had the impression and belief that <<Tito reaches agreement and consults with Stalin over everything>>, etc., an impression which was strengthened by the Soviet people who were in Tirana, let alone the Yugoslavs themselves. Therefore, at that time we thought that everything which we discussed and decided with Tito would be known to Stalin and he would be in agreement with us. Since it was impossible to have any contact with Stalin at that time (through the Soviet legation, which as far as I remember had just been opened in Tirana, and through no fault of ours, direct Soviet-Albania relations were very weak), we thought that the meeting with Tito would be, you might say, a transmission and an elaboration of the view of Stalin, too.

    What Hysni had written in his radiogram that <<Tito has reached agreement with Stalin who had welcomed a visit of our delegation to Belgrade>>, further fostered the hope that through the mouth of Tito we would hear the opinions and advice of Stalin.

    Of course, on all the problems which we were going to discuss and decide we had our own line, our own views, our own opinions, and we were convinced of their correctness. We were not begging even for the treaty of friendship and mutual aid, which we sought, and would not permit the slightest infringement of the vital interests of our socialist Homeland. We had shed our blood precisely so that there would be no repetition of the past. At that time, we believed that the Yugoslavs, too, had the same stand.

    We had prepared ourselves, also, to portray to the Yugoslav comrades the international situation seen from our standpoint in the circumstances of that time, especially in regard to the situation and inimical subversive activities which the Greek monarcho-fascists were carrying out on our southern borders and the Italian neo-fascists, assisted by the Anglo-Americans, were carrying out on our maritime border

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and in our airspace. We wanted to give the Yugoslav friends a clear picture of the very sound internal political situation, of the steel links of the Party with the people, and of the successes and shortcomings which we had in our work. Any fog or unclarity caused by the biased reports in a non-objective spirit, which those who did not want the development of the friendship between our two countries to proceed on the right course had certainly made, should be cleared from the minds of the Yugoslav comrades. Naturally, we were prepared to gain as much as possible from the organizational experience of the councils, the Party, the economy, and the army in Yugoslavia, experience which at that time we considered necessary. The comrades who had to prepare themselves especially on these questions and who were to take part in the delegation were appointed and, as far as I remember, apart from me, the delegation was made up of Nako Spiru, Myslim Peza, our ambassador at Belgrade, Hysni Kapo, and others.

    Finally, we thought we should take a gift to Tito. We racked our brains about what to take, because we did not want to be disgraced, but we could find nothing suitable. I suggested to the comrades we might take him one of the old silver-chased Albanian pistols. This would do very well and the comrades approved the idea. We summoned Sterio Gjokoreci and charged him with finding one. He told us that during the confiscation of the property of a quisling criminal they had found three beautiful pistols from which we could chose. We told him to bring them to us and when he brought them, the representative of Yugoslavia, Josip Djerdja, was in my office. They really were beautiful pistols. I chose one and told the Yugoslav why I wanted it. He looked at it, liked it immensely and without the slightest shame said:

    <<Tito will be immensely pleased, send him the three!>>

    What could we say to this greedy collector?! We accepted his proposal. (In this way Tito got the three silver-chased pistols and put them in his arsenal of gifts.)

    But another detail had escaped us: I did not have a

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proper general's uniform! I said I would go in civilian clothes, but the comrades insisted that as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, I must also take the military uniform of a general. I had an ordinary uniform, but we had not such things as <<dress uniforms>>. Hence, we had to invent one, from the shiny boots to the braided cap. We had the boots and the blue trousers made with a wide red stripe, but how were we to manage the jacket! I summoned Sokolov (the Soviet military attache in Tirana) to my office and asked him:

    <<Do you have a spare jacket?>>

    <<Why?>> he asked me.

    <<Don't ask,>> I said, <<but let me try on your jacket!>>

    When I put it on I saw that it was too tight, then I explained the fix I was in. Sokolov said to me:

    <<I've a piece of material for a uniform. I'll send it to you, and if you like it, make a jacket and a cap.>>

    And so the question of the <<dress uniform>> was settled, too. We awaited the date which we had set for our departure and from the <<unlimited>> number of aircraft which were put at our disposal, I asked for only one. Indeed, I said to Djerdja, <<If it's difficult for you, five to six seats in the regular plane will do.>>

    <<What are you talking about!>> said Djerdja. <<You can have as many planes as you like. A special aircraft will come.>>

    The aircraft came and the first delegation of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania set out for Belgrade on a friendly visit.[1]

    Looking down from the aircraft on the territory of Montenegro and other regions of Yugoslavia I thought with deep grief and great respect of the hundreds of my partisan comrades who were killed in these parts while fighting the German nazis. On the order which I issued from Berat on the

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eve of the complete liberation of Albania two divisions of young men and women of Albania crossed the border and won fame in those parts for their heroism, self-sacrifice, discipline, internationalism and fighting skill, in fierce battles with the occupiers. Sitting in the aircraft I thought about those dear Albanian mothers who unhesitatingly sent their sons and daughters to join in the war for the liberation of the Homeland, a war which required these sons and daughters, educated by the Party of communists, to think about and go to shed their blood for the freedom of the neighbouring peoples, too. Thousands returned from these heroic battles, but hundreds fell on the battlefield in the territory of Yugoslavia, and at those moments I thought about the hundreds of Albanian mothers who were waiting for us to bring the sacred remains of their sons and daughters home. <<We shall do it!>> I said to myself, <<It is our duty! They will lie in the most beautiful places in the Homeland where the generations will sing to their glory and heroism throughout history.>>[1]

    The aircraft reached Belgrade and we were looking down on the capital. Josip Djerdja tried to point something out to me, but I could not distinguish anything clearly, because it was not easy to recognize things in a city which I was visiting for the first time. Besides this, we were especially excited in anticipation of meeting Tito and the other comrades of the Yugoslav leadership for the first time. Then, we were over the airport and came down on the runway, the aircraft taxied to a halt and the door was opened. We saw that there were many people there to meet us, soldiers, and a military band. We had never been through such ceremonies; these things were unknown to us, and we would have to take care to make no mistakes in the so-called rules of protocol. We walked forward and Tito came towards us. He held out his

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hand and gripped ours firmly. We thought that we would embrace as is our custom. But no. Different rules and customs. These things made no impression on us. I introduced all the comrades in turn to Tito and we heard the strains of our national anthem. We stood at attention and after our national anthem, the Yugoslav anthem was played, too. Then, Tito took me to his right and we reviewed the guard of honour. <<The soldiers are like ours,>> I said to myself, <<brave former partisans.>> Their uniforms were better than ours and their weapons newer, Soviet ones. Ours had been captured from the enemy. Then, Tito introduced us to the Yugoslav personalities who had come out at the airport, and at the other meetings also introduced me to other personalities of the Yugoslav party and government. Most of them (with the exception of Djilas who had once passed through Albania in transit) we were seeing for the first time: Kardelj, Vlahov, Rankovic, Simic, Pijade, Popovic, Jovanovic, Kidric, etc. Passing through Belgrade, our column of cars arrived at Dedinje which was to be our residence.

    <<An exceptionally great honour!>> murmured Djerdja. <<This is Dedinje where Tito himself has his main residence!>>

    As they told us, and as we saw later, he lived and worked in the main palace of the former kraljs of Serbia. As the column of cars drove slowly through the streets of the park, Djerdja pointed out a building.

    <<There,>> he said, <<that's the White Palace, the palace of the former kings. Now we have it, Tito has it!>>

    The cars went a little further through the park and stopped.

    <<The palace of the former prince regent!>> Djerdja told me. <<Now you are going to stay there.>>

    I did not place any great importance on these details or on many other courtesies which were paid to our delegation, but which Josip Djerdja described as <<important, exceptional>>, and so on. With this he wanted to convince us and give the impression that <<exceptional care and affection>> was being displayed for Albania and that, allegedly, these

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things and the measures which were taken for our delegation were not intended for other delegations. Naturally, the Yugoslav ambassador in Tirana had been charged with this task of adding to the lustre of things.

    After we had rested (I don't remember clearly whether it was the same day or the next), they told us that we were to pay a courtesy visit to Tito in the White Palace. For the Yugoslavs who were constantly hovering around us the question was extremely complicated: How were we going to dress for this visit to Tito? Don't dress in this suit, nor in that suit. Even then protocol had begun its work in <<Tito's court>>. For us, however, the problem was quite simple. We had two suits each: the famous military uniform, of which I spoke earlier, and a civilian suit. Therefore, we dressed in civilian suits. After all, we were going to visit a comrade who was a communist as we were! And we set out to walk through the park.

    Guards dressed in spick and span uniforms, and armed with automatic rifles were placed all round the palace. <<Why all these guards?>> I asked myself, when I recalled that only two partisans guarded my house and at that time people went freely up and down the street in front of it. However, I quickly found the <<reason>>: <<It's a big country, Tito is a great personality and they are quite right to guard him like this.>> In front of the palace there was a guard of honour, in the halls of the palace everything had been foreseen, from a clothes brush down to a man who wiped the dust from our shoes gathered during the walk through the park. <<Apparently you have to be all 'dolled up' to see Tito!<< I said to myself. <<Just think, all these heroes who are wiping your shoes and bowing and scraping all round you, were waging the war and living as partisans up till a year or so ago!>>

    We entered the great chamber of the palace. Luxurious. Tito was standing alone under a picture at the head of the chamber, dressed in his white marshal's uniform, with gold embroidered collar and cuffs, with stars on his epaulettes, and a considerable number of medal ribbons on his chest. To the left of him came a series of comrades, one after the other,

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members of the Political Bureau of the CPY and ministers; antique French armchairs of 17th and 18th century style lined both sides and there were beautiful Persian carpets in the middle of the chamber. From the door of the chamber to its head, till we reached and shook hands with Tito, who did not move from his position, we seemed to walk a kilometre.

    After he sat down, they brought in cigarettes and drinks. Tito proposed a toast to the friendship between our two peoples, and to our health, asked some general questions about our country, the weather, the crops, the olives and the oranges. We thanked him, delivered the greetings of our people, Party and army and said good-bye. The first protocol audience with Tito did not last more than half an hour. Josip Djerdja did not fail to tell us that it <<went off very well>> and kept up his refrain with such words as <<marvellous>>, <<exceptionally cordial>>, <<audiences with Tito rarely go like this>>, etc.

    Of course, protocol required that Tito should return the visit to us, but he did not do this. Other comrades came in his place, telling us that Tito <<begged our pardon because a very urgent and important matter had cropped up,>> etc., etc. But at that time these things made no impression on us, and we had no knowledge of protocol. Besides, we had Josip Djerdja with us and he found the <<reason>> for everything. The important thing for us was when we were to hold the working discussions with the Yugoslav comrades to solve a series of problems and get things moving.

    The day for the discussions was set.

    As I said above, we were prepared for these discussions. From the Yugoslav side, Tito headed the delegation. In my speech, which we had prepared in Tirana, I tried to be as concise, objective and realistic as possible. The problems of our country at that time were very grave and difficult to solve, but in themselves the problems were not complicated. We were aware that everything could not be solved with a wave of the magic wand and that we could not make demands on Yugoslavia beyond its possibilities. The economic questions were what concerned us, first of all, and here we wanted

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them to give us aid on credit. We needed the credits we requested for the development of agriculture and industry. In agriculture we were in a bad way even for the simpliest agricultural tools, from iron plough-shares to harrows and cultivators. Naturally, we asked them also to give us some tractors and other agricultural machinery, from those they received from the Soviet Union, from UNRRA and elsewhere, to supply us with some seeds of grain and industrial crops and other such things. As can be seen, our requests were modest requests of the poor, but what else could we do!

    In regard to industry, we told the Yugoslavs about our truly deplorable situation. Our country had inherited nothing apart from some backward handicraft workshops which we still kept going. Those few small, old factories, worn out and damaged by the war, we repaired to the extent we could, but it is understandable how short we were of spare parts for those old machines, for those old vehicles, in those conditions when we did not have even one plant that could really be called an engineering plant. Everything that existed in the country we had got working with our own forces and now it all had to be kept going, patched up and supplemented, because our needs were increasing.

    The problem of the further development of the mines was important for our economy and we had to rely heavily on the development and exploitation of them. Therefore, we sought the aid of the Yugoslavs for the further development of industry, for the extraction of oil, bitumen, chromite, copper, etc. We sought aid, of course within the possibilities, for the setting up of some small factories of light industry to fulfil the urgent and essential needs of our country.

    While outlining the international situation and telling them what was happening on our southern borders, I put before the Yugoslav comrades and Tito our view about the need to sign a treaty between our two countries, a treaty of friendship and mutual aid such as Yugoslavia had signed with the other countries of people's democracy. I argued that this treaty was very necessary, especially for the defence of the freedom, independence and sovereignty of the PRA from the permanent ambitions of the imperialists, the Greek monarcho-fascists and Italian neo-fascists. I stressed that this treaty would further temper the sincere friendship between our two peoples and, like the other treaties of the countries of people's democracy with the Soviet Union and with one another, would serve to strengthen our countries. I also told the Yugoslav comrades and Tito about the great love and loyalty which our people, Party and army nurtured for the Soviet Union and the great Stalin.

    While I was speaking Tito took some notes on a note book and smoked cigarettes continuously, using a cigarette holder in the form of a pipe. He wore glasses and always sat serious, with furrowed brow as though deep in thought. It seemed that he was listening with attention. From time to time he filled the glass he had in front of him and drank mineral water. When I had finished, we took a break and went to a room where a buffet was richly spread with every thing, from cakes and sandwiches to Slivovica and soft drinks. There Tito began to talk, to crack jokes and laugh with his comrades about unimportant things to pass the time; the interpreters translated to us. Later I found these jokes and talks of Tito with Mosa Pijade identical with those of Khrushchev with Mikoyan, who went on and on with such things when they were together.

    After the break the meeting recommenced and Tito took the floor. He outlined the international situation at that period, attacking the imperialists and reactionary governments. He put great stress on the <<major>> role which socialist Yugoslavia played, not simply in the Balkans, but also in Europe and especially in the countries of people's democracy, of course, <<after the Soviet Union>>, as he stressed. We noticed nothing suspicious in what he said, apart from the <<majestic>> tone in which he said it, the <<authoritarian>> words and the special importance he gave matters by saying, <<I said this to one>> and <<I said that to another>>.

    He also briefly outlined the history of the war against

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the Germans and against General Draza Mihailovic and the government in exile in London. Here he did not fail to point out <<the skill and cunning of Churchill>> with whom he had clashed over the question of Venezia Giulia which was still under discussion.

    He did not dwell at length on the economic problems of Yugoslavia, saying only, <<we have many difficulties>>, and went on to our question, in regard to which he said: <<Despite these difficulties, we must assist you to the limit of our possibilities.>> Tito said that from their side they would appoint Comrade Boris Kidric.

    <<Appoint your comrade,>> he said, <<and let them examine your economic problems one by one and present them to us to take a decision.>>

    We agreed that Nako Spiru, who had come to Yugoslavia precisely on such problems in April, should continue this work. At that time we had Nako Spiru as minister of the economy and chairman of the State Planning Commission and, by appointing him to take part directly in the talks with the Yugoslavs on the economic problems, we showed what great importance we gave these problems.

    After we talked about the development of education and culture in our country and I put forward some requests in this direction, too, especially about sending a number of Albanian students to the University of Belgrade, Tito asked me what I thought about the solution of the problem of Kosova and the other Albanian regions in Yugoslavia. After a moment's silence to sum up our views on this important problem so that I could present them in the most complete and concise way, I said:

    <<You know about the historical injustices which the various imperialists and Great-Serb reaction have done to Albania. You also know the principled stands of our Party during the National Liberation War and the desire of our people for friendship with the peoples of Yugoslavia.>>

    I went on to express to Tito the opinion of the Albanian side that Kosova and the other regions in Yugoslavia, inhabited

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by Albanians, belonged to Albania and should be returned to it.

    <<The Albanians fought,>> I told him, <<in order to have a free and sovereign Albania with which the Albanian regions in Yugoslavia should now be united. The time has come for this national problem to be solved justly by our parties.>>

    President Tito replied:

    <<I am in agreement with your view, but for the time being we cannot do this, because the Serbs would not under stand us.>>

    After this Tito went on to another problem, that of the so-called <<Balkan Federation>> and sought my opinion on this matter.

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fulla Malëshova returned from exile he talked in theory about the problem of the 'Balkan Confederation' or 'Federation'.

    <<In principle we considered this idea correct and now the prospect for it was not so hopeless. But it required a great deal of work and, first of all, required victory in the war against the nazi-fascist occupiers.

    <<We still have this opinion, but the situation has to mature, we have to do a great deal of work to overcome the old enmities and we would like you to explain this important question to us more clearly, because we do not know your view or that of the Bulgarians or the Greeks. . .

    Tito listened to me very attentively and, when I had finished, said:

    <<I understood you very well, Comrade Enver, and agree with what you said. We, too, have been and are in agreement that this federation should be formed, have made and will make concrete efforts, but, as you said, the problem is difficult, cannot be solved immediately and does not depend only on us. For our part, at the proper time we shall come out with concrete proposals and will examine all the possible ways, but in our hearts we want to build the federation. The example and experience of the new Federal Yugoslavia will assist greatly in this direction. However, let us leave this problem for today. I mentioned it more because we were talking about the future of Kosova. Within the 'Balkan Federation' the question of uniting Kosova with Albania would be very much easier.>>

    <<Undoubtedly!>> I said. <<But we always stand by what we mentioned at the outset: Whether or not the possibilities for a 'Balkan Federation' are created is one problem, while the solution of the question of Kosova is another problem entirely. As you yourself said, work must be done to solve the question of Kosova justly.>>

    <<We shall work in this direction,>> Tito <<gave me his word>>.

    However, all Tito's words and pledges were a bluff. He

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misled and deceived us over the truth about the idea of the <<Balkan Federation>>. As time and the facts proved, Tito was a savage anti-Marxist, a nationalist, chauvinist and agent of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. He was a <<Trojan horse>> in the socialist camp, in the international communist movement and, more especially, in the Balkans. By seizing on the idea of the <<Balkan Federation>> he aimed and struggled to annex the whole of the Balkans, including Albania, to Yugoslavia.

    From 1947, when the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia developed, apart from the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid, we also signed the Economic Convention and a series of other economic agreements in connection with it about which I shall speak in detail later, a number of comrades of our Political Bureau, especially Kristo Themelko, Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, on the urging of the Yugoslavs who were in or came to Albania, exerted continuous pressure on me to seek to enter into the <<Balkan Federation>> which, in their heads, meant that we should unite with Yugoslavia. I did not encourage this idea in them, but one day, about the beginning of 1948, they came to me and said: <<The 'Balkan Federation' is being formed between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria!>> I thought this problem had been talked over between Stalin, Dimitrov and Tito, irrespective of the fact that no opinion had been sought from us. In this situation we decided to write a letter to the CC of the CPY and Tito in which we asked them, among others, to make the matters clear to us because it was inconceivable that the <<Balkan Federation>> should be created with Bulgaria and Albania remain outside it.

    We never received any reply or explanation. What was at the back of it became clear to us. Tito's Yugoslavia wanted to kill two birds with one stone: to annex Albania under the abortive so-called Balkan Federation and to extend its state power over this part of the Balkans, too.

    Stalin who had devined Tito's expansionist plans, drew Dimitrov's attention to them and at the beginning of 1945 the latter declared publicly that he had been wrong in his

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views about the Federation of Yugoslavia with Bulgaria.

    Before I continue with the description of the visit, however, I want to say that Tito's words and the promises he made us about the question of Kosova were just as much a fraud as his words about the <<Balkan Federation>>.

    This Tito, who expressed his agreement with me over the problem of Kosova so <<suavely>>, never allowed himself to say: <<Comrade Enver, I propose that you ought to go to visit Kosova besides other parts of Yugoslavia. We ought to show the Albanian people of Kosova that the time of true friendship with the peoples of Yugoslavia has come,>> and so on and so forth. Tito and company were afraid to do such a thing. Time was soon to reveal the deception and the great Serbo-Croat chauvinist savagery of Tito, not only against the Albanians who inhabited their own territories in Yugoslavia, but also against the People's Republic of Albania. Tito's secret plan was not that Kosova should be united with Albania, but that Albania should be united with Kosova and, together with it, be gobbled up by Titoite Yugoslavia. However, the Titoites were unable to achieve this diabolical aim. The year 1948 was a fatal year for them.

    The falsity of Tito and company went so far that in regard to Kosova and all the Albanians who lived in Yugoslavia, they maintained a hostile stand even when these <<acts of friendship>> were taking place between our two republics, let alone after the year 1948, when they adopted a savage anti-Marxist, chauvinist stand of police persecution which was no different from that of the Serb kraljs. The relations of the PRA with Kosova in the period of de jure <<friendship>> were almost non-existent; they did not allow us to send people to Kosova allegedly because there were Ballists there, etc., etc. The terror imposed on the Albanians steadily mounted. Masses of people were imprisoned, killed, tortured and thrown into the terrible concentration camps of Rankovic, always under the pretext of the fight against remnants of the <<Ballist bands>>. This was a real genocide carried out with all means and in every way. In order to depopulate

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Kosova, the Titoites, like the former reactionary regimes, forced hundreds of thousands of Albanians to emigrate to Turkey and elsewhere. In Kosova, not to mention Macedonia, the poverty was extreme, there were no Albanian schools and for this Tito and Rankovic found many pretexts. Although the land of Kosova was fertile and had great underground riches such as are rarely found in any other zone of the Balkans, nothing was invested there and its agriculture was the most backward in Europe. This was the policy Tito pursued there. He told us one thing, but did another.

    During the days of our visit in no meeting or reception, either in Belgrade or elsewhere, did I see or meet any of the Albanian communist leaders of Kosova, although some of them like Fadil Hoxha, Ymer Pula, the Nimanajs and others I knew personally. The only <<representative>> of Kosova whom I met was the mother of Miladin Popovic. . .

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corations. Tito, standing at the head of the room where he received us, was dressed in full uniform, with his chest stuck out and covered with decorations; on one finger he wore a ring with a great sparkling diamond. We were completely out of our depth! We made our way among the people who looked us over curiously from head to foot and applauded to the extent required by protocol. Only when we reached Tito and shook hands with him did we say to ourselves that we had escaped that ordeal and in fact we had. We were no longer subjected to the stares of the <<nobility>> of Belgrade. The central point again became Tito from whom we had stolen the limelight for no more than five minutes. The public of the White Palace no longer took any notice of us and we were relieved.

    Tito wandered here and there, talking with one group after another, took me along and introduced me to some of them, but their names went in one ear and out the other. For me it was indescribable torture until we sat down at the table. Tito stood up, produced a sheet of paper which he read in his haughty tone, eulogized us to some extent, was applauded and sat down. After him I stood up, brought out my speech *, read it, received some laconic applause and sat down. This ordeal, too, was over but our tortures at this <<majestic>> dinner had not ended. To take coffee, Tito stood up and all of us followed suit. He took some of us, the Soviet ambassador Lavrentyev and some of his comrades out into the park. It was dark, but the lights were on and Tito led us. Where were we going? We came to a grotto and went inside. There everything was shining in the brilliant lights -- the carpets, the easy chairs, the tables loaded with drinks, with fruit, with cakes and soft drinks. We sat down without protocol at one table with Tito, Lavrentyev, Mosa Pijade, Kardelj and some others. Naturally, Tito conducted the conversation. We listened more than we spoke; Lavrentyev and Pijade spoke several times. I recall that at one moment when Tito was talking <<top-level policy>> with Lavrentyev,

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Pijade, who knew that I had been to school in France, began to speak about the literature and history of France. The talk came round to Cardinal Richelieu. Pijade defended the thesis that he was a savage and cunning statesman. I agreed with him, but I added that the cardinal was also a great statesman and we should judge his work dialectically, taking account of the period. The work of Richelieu in the creation of the unity of the monarchy and the blows which he struck at the great feudal lords is considered in the history of France as revolutionary. Mosa Pijade agreed; we also talked about the literary currents in France. Meanwhile Tito did not want to stay in the grotto although he took us there.

    <<Shall we get up and return to the hall?>> he said, <<because the rain has stopped.>> While we were in the grotto a light rain had fallen, just enough to make the path muddy and to my distress, since the legs of my trousers were long, the cuffs of my trousers and the heels of my shoes became smeared with mud. When I glanced at them at the entrance to the chambers which were packed with people because the Marshal was coming, I blushed with shame. There was nothing I could do about it except that I should not move much, but this depended on Tito. I had to drag my feet so that the heels of my shoes would not be seen. And that is what I did. But I went through real torture. It was a blessing that the eyes of all were on the Marshal.

    The room was so hot that we were sweating, people encircled the Marshal and us, but the heat dried me mud on my trousers and shiny shoes and made it more obvious. Finally, Tito said:

    <<Come along, my friends, I'll show you round the palace where I live and work.>>

    We thought we were saved! But there in front of us, with a crowd of women with low-cut dresses and jewels sparkling on their necks and fingers and men in formal evening dress following us, appeared a stair <<en colimaçon >>*.

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    We had to go up it and this time the trick of dragging my feet would not work. What was I to do? Against my desire and allegedly out of politeness I climbed seven or eight steps without turning my back so that people did not look at my feet, but went up backwards facing them and waving to them. I got through this final torture, too.

    After climbing the stairs, we reached a balcony surrounded by a wooden balustrade; the guests were in the chambers below while we walked around the gallery off which opened a series of doors. The walls were hung with various paintings. Who among us knew anything about them? No one. Tito, as the host, proudly told us one by one the names of the artists, their artistic values. . . and, their monetary worth. We feigned astonishment, but we were thinking about the problems of our people. Tito opened a door, went through it and we followed him.

    <<This is the room where I work,>> he said. It was a beautiful room with big windows, with paintings on the walls, and in a corner a desk furnished with everything necessary to write, everything on it valuable, but no book, no notebook. On one side of the table was a plated metal stand on top of which sat a model aeroplane, likewise beautifully plated; Tito pressed a button and the aeroplane began to spin round and round. It was a toy!

    <<A gift to me from the workers,>> said Tito.

    From the working office we passed into another room with beautiful armchairs, a big radio-gramophone and very modern furniture.

    <<This is the ante-room to my bedroom. I have my breakfast here,>> said Tito. <<<Gottwald[1] gave me this radio gramophone.>>

    From here he invited us to look at his bedroom with a big luxurious bed, lace-edged sheets, silk-pyjamas lying on the bed and then he opened his wardrobe to show us his many

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suits, shirts, etc. He did not fail to show us the <<sparkling>> bathroom, too.

    When all this was over, Tito told us that he was going to show us the room of the party which, as he put it, <<not everyone enters, I keep the key in my pocket.>> We said to ourselves: <<He is doing us a great honour. Let us see what this 'sacred room' is like.>> It was a room like all rooms. On the wall there was a chart.

    <<This,>> said Tito, <<is secret. It is the scheme of the organization of the party. The Congress, the Central Committee, the regional committees, their apparatuses and the basic organizations.>>

    On one wall there was a small shelf with books by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and in another corner a safe. This was the <<secret room>> and with the visit to this secret room, we ended the grand soirée, wishing the Marshal good night.

    The day after this dinner Josip Djerdja arrived in our residence, dressed as always in his dark suit, laughing and speaking that Albanian of his with his unpractised accent. It was a habit of his after each phrase to grip his nose between two fingers and bend it left and right as if to emphasize his words. He had come together with the chief of protocol to present to us the program of visits and sight seeing in Belgrade and in the other republics. Amongst other things, they proposed that we should visit Croatia and Slovenia and we agreed readily. In Belgrade we made no visits on foot; naturally, we laid a wreath at Avala on the grave of the unknown soldier of the Serbian army of the kraljs, adopted as an altar by the regime of Tito, too. There a Yugoslav general, a hero of the peoples of Yugoslavia, explained to us the development of the fighting for the liberation of Belgrade by the Soviet army and the Yugoslav National Liberation Army.

    Later we visited a number of factories and a plant where trucks were assembled from imported parts. Naturally we rejoiced over what we saw. They were fine things, and the

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Yugoslavs were much ahead of us. They had inherited some thing from the past and received very large reparations for the damage caused by the war, whereas we inherited nothing but poverty and want, and from reparations received a few very old lathes with which not even one engineering plant could be set up. From reparations we also received a worn-out ship which we named <<Borova>> in honour of the martyred Borova village of Kolonja which the German nazis totally destroyed, killing all the men, women and children they found in it as a reprisal against the partisans. The Yugoslavs did not fail to take the ship <<Borova>> from us under the pretext that we had no way to use it and when we fell out with them they seized it and did not return it to us, seized it as <<spoil of war>>, like all the other assets they took from us, because they took more from us than they gave.

    During one of the days we stayed in Belgrade, which we visited going everywhere by car, they put on a reception for us at the House of Officers to which, if I am not mistaken, Tito came, too. The Soviet military attaché as well as other Soviet officers attended, too. The House of Officers was a multi-storeyed building put up specially for the officers. They welcomed us well, joyfully, with sympathy, like anti-fascist fighters of the great common war which we had waged. The Yugoslav officers had very good clothing and boots, beyond any comparison with what our officers had, but they did not outdo us in courage, daring and determination.

    One evening after these visits Josip Djerdja came all smiles and, squeezing his nose between his two fingers, told us:

    <<Tomorrow you are to go to the Presidium of the Skupstina, because Ribar sr. (the president of the Presidium, and father of Lola Ribar, killed during the war) is going to decorate you. You, Comrade Enver,>> said Djerdja, <<are to be decorated with the highest order that Yugoslavia has.>>

    At the ceremony on the following day at the Presidium of the Skupstina, which was like a bourgeois parliament, because, in fact, it had been built by the Serb-Croat kraljs,

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Dr. Ribar decorated all of us. He hung around my neck the Order of Hero of the Peoples of Yugoslavia, which was a gold medallion hung on a red ribbon with two black lines in the middle. Kardelj, Pijade, Djilas, Popovic and others were present at the decoration ceremony. I expressed thanks on behalf of the comrades and, among other things, I pointed out that this decoration belonged to the Albanian people and to their sons and daughters who gave their lives for the liberation of Yugoslavia, too. A few months after Liberation, the Presidium of Yugoslavia had decorated a number of our comrades with the Partisan Star. Thus, I had two Yugoslav decorations. After the breach with them and after all the evil things which the Titoites did against our country and our Party, we returned these decorations to them in protest.

    We set out for Croatia and Slovenia. We were happy that we were to see new places and friendly people. Every where people like Bakaric and his comrades in Croatia and Miha Marinko and his comrades in Slovenia welcomed us warmly. We visited Zagreb and Ljubljana and other cities of these two Republics, visited factories, combines and museums. The people were well dressed, the country was more urbanized, and there were few wartime ruins to be seen. Slovenia was even more advanced, Ljubljana was almost undamaged by the war, the Austrian style of the Austro-Hungarian empire predominated, the standard of living was higher than that of the other places we visited those days, and the bourgeoisie more unharmed. We visited a metallurgical plant there and this impressed us. A thing that struck the eye was the fact that the church exercised great influence in these places and there were icons and crosses to be seen in the city streets and outside the towns.

    They also took us to Bled, to a luxurious hotel beside the beautiful lake with the same name. They told us that foreign tourists came there and this was a source of hard currency.

    Later, not on an official visit, I had a meeting with Tito on the shores of this lake, I think it was when I was on my way to the Peace Conference in Paris. I went via Belgrade, but

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Tito was in Slovenia in a villa on the shores of Lake Bled. They took me by aircraft to meet him there. We talked on the verandah about the possible development of the problems which were to be discussed in Paris. Naturally we were in agreement. Tito kept me for lunch. It was a beautiful luxurious summer villa set amongst trees and flowers. At the edge of the lake below the villa white motor-boats were anchored. Lying at Tito's feet in the room was his big dog (the successor to the unfortunate <<Lux>>), which seemed to be asleep, snoring sometimes, and sometimes releasing a loud fart. In the end Tito could put up with it no longer and told General Todorovic, a former partisan who had also been in Albania: <<Put him out!>>

    After we finished our talk, before we had lunch Tito proposed to me and Zujovic, whom he liquidated later together with Hebrang as Stalinists, that we take a trip on the lake. I did not refuse, although I did not know how to swim if the boat should capsize.

    The motor started and the boat began to move. Tito's dog followed us swimming. <<At least,>> I thought to myself, <<this will cool his backside.>> From the edge of the lake men, women and children shouted:

    <<Heroj Tito, druze Tito, nas Tito! >>*

    This impressed itself on me because we had heard this slogan from the Italian fascists when they shouted, <<Duce a noi! >>** I was astonished how they could permit it. On the way back Tito said:

    <<The dog's tired.>> And he called to him, <<Climb in!>>

    The dog scrambled into the boat and since it was the size of a calf, the boat rocked a bit, but we came to no harm, except that when the dog shook himself the suit which I had for the Peace Conference was soaked.

    <<We will dry it when we get back to the villa,>> said Tito.

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    <<It doesn't matter,>> I said to him, giving the dog a hard look.

    However, all this was a later occurrence, from which, apart from what I have just mentioned, I remember almost nothing, because in fact we did not discuss any weighty problem. As I said, Tito was on holiday and could not exchange his pleasures for anything else. Let us return again to the first visit, the official one.

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panies to us, when we finally met to sign the documents, saying:

    <<We have similar companies with the Soviet Union which are going very well, give results and are helping us in the construction of socialism!>>

    We agreed to the formation of these companies in regard to which we subsequently drafted the constitutions, defined the procedure, payments, shares and the nature of participation. As to the truth in regard to these companies, too, I am not going to enlarge at the moment, but will content myself by pointing out that the aim of the Yugoslavs to plunder us meant that on paper these companies would exist as joint companies, but would be run by them. While all the material would be ours, they would not contribute or bring in anything, but would dominate them and take their production. Of course, the deception did not go on for long. The deception about the <<joint companies>>, which Tito advertised to us so vigorously, was unmasked like all the others.

    When all the official documents were ready we signed them at a solemn meeting. Champagne was drunk. In the evening we were to put on the farewell dinner and of course Tito was invited. The dinner was to be given in our embassy.

    Josip Djerdja arrived, not smiling this time. He begged us to excuse Tito who could not come allegedly for security reasons, because the embassy was in this and in that street, was amongst other houses, and we would understand the problem, etc., etc.! We were sorry, but there was nothing we could do. The others came.

    The day for our departure for our Homeland arrived. At the airport they farewelled us with all the ceremony with which they had welcomed us. We climbed into the aircraft and returned to Tirana.

    The joy with which I set out had evaporated. I returned with an inexplicable feeling, a mixture of trust and disillusionment over the haughtiness and scandalous luxury of Tito which was clearly obvious even at that time. I asked myself: How are we going to get on and work with Tito?

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    The picture of the relations between our two parties and countries in the initial period after Liberation would not in any way be complete if we did not touch on our relations in the economic field, too. This is a very extensive field which has always attracted our attention and the attention of Tito's men as well. However, in dealing with the economic relations of the same period, the stands and assessments of them by the two sides are diametrically opposed.

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    While Tito, during his lifetime, and the whole of Yugoslav propaganda arsenal, before and after Tito's death, have praised to the skies the Yugoslav-Albanian economic relations in the years 1945-1947 as an example of <<fraternal relations>>, of the <<sacrifice>> and the <<generous spirit>> of the Titoites towards us, we, for our part, have always said the opposite.

    Our conclusion, drawn not today, or even in 1948 (when Tito and Titoism were publicly denounced), but earlier, when in public declarations we were still describing each other as <<friends>>, has been and is this: the field of economic relations between our two parties and countries has been one of the fields in which the features of Titoite revisionism, as a whole, and all their anti-Albanian, nationalist and chauvinist intentions, in particular, have been displayed in a most obvious and unscrupulous way. In the <<theorizing>> and the first practical steps of Tito and company on the problem of the construction of socialism in Yugoslavia we distinguished more clearly their profound deviations from the theory and practice of scientific socialism. In their so-called economic aid for our country we very quickly saw and understood the attempts and diabolical aims of the Titoites to turn our economy into an appendage of the Yugoslav economy and one of the main ways they followed to place Albania under the chains of a new enslavement. Thus, the <<economic aid>> of the Titoites to us, if it can be called aid, had only one purpose: to help Tito to enslave Albania economically and politically more quickly.

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<<this is not the time for transformations of a socialist character>>, that <<we should go to socialism together with the bourgeoisie>>, etc., etc., and through these battles we did what Marxism-Leninism taught us. The fact is that, among the countries in which the regime of people's democracy was established after the Second World War, Albania set out more rapidly, more resolutely and consistently on the road of the socialist transformation of the country. Naturally, in this rapid progress we did not discard anything from the Leninist concept about the stages of the revolution. We discarded only the Yugoslav theorizing and the sinister aims which were hidden behind this theorizing.

    Our <<friends>> greatly hindered and misdirected us also on the question of the Land Reform. Immediately after Liberation we began to carry out our promise to give the land to the tiller, but the Stojnices, Djerdjas and others hastened to <<advise>> us that we should not <<fall out>> with the former landowners; they told us to take a bit of their land (someone even <<advised>> to pay for it with money!), and to leave them a good part of their land which, in fact, represented areas ten or twenty times larger than those of the <<poor>>!

    Under the pressure of Sejfulla Malëshova, at first, such a wrong <<orientation>> was approved, but we were soon aware of what dangerous consequences this step would have and made the necessary corrections. We set a fair limit for the area of land which would be allowed to each family (not more than 5 hectares per family) and took a series of other measures which would hinder the revival of the capitalist sector in the countryside (the buying, selling and renting of land were prohibited by law, etc.).

    As for their <<orientations>> in the sector of industry the Yugoslavs had no need to rack their brains to find <<variants>>.

    Initially, they <<advised>> us not to begin this work at all, because we were poor, we were short of food and foot wear, and we could not afford industry! <<Later>>, they said, <<we shall see what can be done with the mines and the oil, but for the time being record what you have, supply us with

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raw materials, and we shall supply you with ample finished products.>>

    <<Agriculture -- that is what you should go in for, as the backward agrarian country you are!>> they advised us.

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did not by any means come about because we accepted the Yugoslav orientation! No, we did not accept this orientation in any instance, but if we did not proceed rapidly on the course of industrialization, this was because we could go no faster, because we had no base from the past on which to rely, and at those moments, had no aid at all from the Yugoslav <<friends>> or the Soviets. As soon as any small possibility was created we exploited it immediately. This is what occurred, for example, with some old equipment for the engineering industry which managed to reach Albania as part of the minimal reparations which we were awarded. Since we ourselves <<did not know>> how to get the reparations which belonged to us, the Yugoslav <<friends>> became the <<handlers>> and <<intermediaries>>. After taking for themselves whatever looked best from what belonged to us, the Yugoslavs sent what was left over to Tirana. With the tools that came we equipped one or two workshops, put them to use and inaugurated the first engineering plant in Albania, precisely that plant which, since 1946, has borne my name, but which, over the years, has grown, been transformed and turned into one of the most powerful and modern combines of our engineering industry.

    From these early moments we adopted the same correct Marxist-Leninist stand on every other aspect of the line of the Party and the socialist construction of the country. As I said, however, in individual aspects of the application of the line, mistakes, hasty or imposed decisions could not be avoided.

    This is what happened, for example, with the orientation which we gave the peasantry in the years 1946 and 1947 about giving <<priority>> to certain agricultural crops.

    The Yugoslavs talked on and on for hours and days on end to us about making agriculture as <<productive>> as possible, <<a great source>> of income and funds to buy equipment.

    <<In your conditions, when you lack monetary or any other means to buy consumer goods or equipment abroad,>> they told us, <<the best way is to turn agriculture into a great source of funds and values. With this land and these marvellous cli-

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matic conditions you have, you can achieve whatever you want!>>

    And how concretely?

    <<Forget about growing maize and wheat!>> Josip Djerdja advised us. <<Grain will never bring much sunshine into your life. It won't ensure even half the bread you need for your people, let alone provide you with any supplementary income. Plant sunflower! Do you know what sunflower is?!>>

    The truth is we knew something about this crop, but we did not know what Djerdja knew.

    <<It's a blessed plant!>> he <<explained>> to us. <<Oil, vegetable oil, is produced from it. Not only will you satisfy all your people's needs for oil, but we in Yugoslavia have great need, too. You could also sell it on the Western markets. Sunflower will open the whole world to you, will open up hard currency markets.>>

    <<Our problem is bread,>> we opposed them. <<Our people are used to eating their meat and beans even without oil, but not without bread. And besides, most of the peasantry live solely on bread, a little cottage cheese and onions.>>

    <<We will bring grain from Vojvodina!>> said Djerdja. <<You have no idea what Vojvodina is. It's a granary for Yugoslavia and for you. The wheat grows as tall as a man. We will be pleased to supply you, and with profit for you, in exchange for sunflower. Sunflower. . .>>

    The same hymns to sunflower were sung in Belgrade, and not only the Yugoslav agricultural specialists, but also those who came on party matters, and even the militarymen, repeated the same hymns to us.

    They did not hesitate to take a pencil and work out <<so much for this and so much for that,>> until we had no alternative but to accept that we had a great blessing before our eyes which we had not discovered!

    So we gave the peasants the orientation to plant the fields with sunflower and not to worry about bread grain, because Tito would bring us plenty from Vojvodina (just as Khrushchev was going to bring it from the Ukraine 10-12 years later!).

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    To express the highest level of suffering and hardships, our people have a saying: <<To suffer the grief of the olive>>, but <<the grief of the olive>> was nothing at all compared with the <<grief>> we suffered from sunflower. Since we told them to do so, the peasants planted big areas to this crop, but the total lack of experience, the lack of conviction about the value of <<the flower>>, the deplorable conditions of the land at that time, the lack of seeds, mechanization, irrigation, etc., left us not only without <<hard currency and equipment>>, but also without bread! And when we mentioned the granaries of Vojvodina the Yugoslavs turned from <<generous>> friends into traders:

    <<We shall supply you with grain, but you must either deliver the sunflower seed, as we agreed, or pay for it in cash! It can't be supplied free!>>

    They were right! We had not carried out our <<contractual obligations>>!

    Rather than to dwell any longer on this <<history>> over which we can smile now, but which in 1946 and 1947 caused us many sleepless nights, I want to say only one thing: the <<orientation>> of the Yugoslavs to give priority to sunflower over bread grain was not a chance <<mistake>> of theirs, was not the result of some foolish and superficial judgement of our conditions and possibilities of that time! No! Everything had been carefully considered, and the <<orientation>> which seemed <<agricultural>>, above all, concealed deliberate political aims.

    In the context of the Titoites' all-round efforts to annex Albania, the imposition on us of a mistaken and wrong policy in agriculture would create the most suitable conditions for the leadership in Belgrade to realize its ambitions: our country would be threatened by famine, our Party would be discredited in the eyes of the masses as <<incapable>> of improving the life of the poor, and in the end we would be compelled to hold out our hand to our <<friends>> and they were just waiting for the moment to seize it and our whole body.

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    In short, they wanted to turn the whole of Albania into a <<sunflower>> which would turn its head and its body towards their <<sun>> -- Titoism and Titoite Yugoslavia.

    They exerted similar pressure on us also over another <<source of hard currency income>>: cotton!

    <<Cotton is gold!>> Djerdja and, later, Tito's other emissary Zlatic told us. <<Make the fields of Myzeqe, Vlora and Saranda shine with white cotton, because later your face will shine with joy!>>

    So we told the peasants to plant this, too, but as is known, neither the fields we planted to it nor anything else turned out a <<shining success>>, but on the contrary, it simply increased our difficulties and hardships.

    I by no means wish to say that even at those moments we underrated these industrial crops, or that our peasant was <<conservative>> and refused to embrace the new! Not at all. When the moment came, we planted sunflower and cotton and still do, and they are yielding ever better results. But in 1945-and 1946, when we lacked everything, when half the lowland zone was swamps and marshes, when bread had been turned into a sharp weapon which would determine our existence or non-existence, to give up growing grain in those conditions meant to set out on the road of failures and catastrophe. Soon, however, we were to be convinced that everything was wrong and anti-Marxist. The day was to come when the wheat <<as tall as a man>> of Vojvodina would hang over our heads like the sword of Damocles. However, we managed to escape the blow. The bitter experience of 1946-1947 became a great lesson. In practice, in conflicts, sometimes very dangerous ones, we were thoroughly learning the theory and practice of scientific socialism. Later, when that other Tito, Nikita Khrushchev, was to show us the way to come out in the sunshine through sheep, oranges and the orders of the fish, we were to laugh to ourselves with a mixture of irony and regret. <<History>> was repeating itself, but not our initial mistake. The <<sunflowers>> had taught us not to turn our heads either to Vojvodina or to the Ukraine,

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but only to Marxism-Leninism! We had drawn lessons about what modern revisionism is in appearance and in content.

    Meanwhile, with persistent all-round efforts we continued to seek other ways, means and possibilities to advance. Especially after the establishment of diplomatic relations at the end of 1945, we turned for aid to the Soviet Union, too.

    In the talks which I had had with the officials of the Soviet embassy in Tirana on this problem, although they welcomed our proposals and requests, they always said: <<We shall report this to Moscow.>> It was natural that they should report to Moscow, but Moscow did not give any clear reply and indirectly implied, until they told us this openly, <<We shall give you economic aid through Yugoslavia, because we give it considerable aid, including some for you. Therefore, address your request to the Yugoslavs.>> Molotov repeated the same thing to us in Paris when we were there for the Peace Conference, and moreover, he said this in the presence of Kardelj and Mosa Pijade!

    Although we did not understand this method of economic aid at all, we thought and believed that even such forms could exist between socialist countries. We could do nothing else but wait for the <<intermediaries>> to give us what they should. But if as the <<intermediaries>> for war reparations they gave us some scrap iron, as the <<intermediaries>> for the Soviet aid they gave us nothing at all.

    Such was the much advertised <<aid>> for our country from the leadership of Belgrade up till to the middle of 1946: nothing concrete, mainly <<advice>> and <<orientations>>, and the sort of <<orientations>> I mentioned above.

    After my visit to Belgrade in June 1946 it seemed as if a new, more advanced phase in our mutual economic relations was beginning. We put before Tito and company the request that they helped us with the methodology of drafting a unified plan, for the time being to cover one or two years, and gave us, according to their possibilities, some aid on credit, sent us some specialists for different sectors of the economy etc. This time our insistence on taking the first steps on the

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road of socialist industrialization of the country made the Yugoslav leaders display more prudence in their <<orientations>>. They told us that they would help us in this field, too, but <<advised>> us that, apart from the development of some mines and the extraction of oil, we should concentrate our main attention on light industry and food-processing.

    <<We shall help you with some credits, too,>> they told us, <<but we must reach agreement on the ways in which this aid will come. From our experience hitherto,>> they continued, >>we see that a very effective way for collaboration and aid is that of joint companies. We have created such companies with the Soviets and they are going very well. Let us create such companies with you, too!>>

    The prolonged advertisement of the <<advantages>> of these companies and the repeated mention of the fact that such companies had been created with the Soviet Union, too, led us to agree in principle, at the time when I was in Yugoslavia, to the creation of these companies in the future.

    <<Up till the end of the year,>> they told us, <<we have time to discuss them in detail, about how they will be set up, how they will function and how they will be run. But this is not a problem to be discussed in the leadership. Let the specialists of the respective sectors deal with this.>>

    So we returned to Tirana with a series of promises and with <<proposals for a wider range of relations>>, although everything was left evasive, up in the air. After some months' silence they informed us that the time had come for the experts of the two countries to meet jointly in Belgrade and decide everything precisely. It seemed that 1947 was going to start well. About the end of October 1946 we dispatched Nako with a group of comrades from the Ministry of the Economy and the State Planning Commission and could only wait for the results of the talks. From this point begins the bitter history of the signing of the Albanian-Yugoslav Economic Convention at the end of November 1946.

    The Economic Convention between Albania and Yugo-

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slavia was the concretization of the alliance between our two countries. This Convention brought with it the protocols on 1he co-ordination of plans, on the unification of prices, on the establishment of parity of currencies, on the joint companies, on the removal of tariff barriers between the two countries, etc.

    We signed these agreements but, as I shall describe later, during these negotiations over them we had doubts, questions, and serious objections. On the eve of the signing we repeated our objections and worries to the Yugoslav side once again, and they, naturally, did not like this. But they slapped us on the back:

    <<Don't worry, everything will be in your favour!>>

    It was not long before we understood clearly that the Economic Convention, with all its components, was nothing but a new savage weapon of Titoite diversion and sabotage to subjugate and gobble up Albania. As the first step, by means of this Convention the Yugoslav government aimed to further exploit and plunder our country through the well-known neo-colonialist forms; as the second step, it aimed to turn our entire economy into an appendage of the Yugoslav economy, to make our economy completely dependent on its leadership, and as the third step, to create the conditions in which we, like it or not, would accept economic and political <<union>> with Yugoslavia as the only way out!

    To go into all the details of what occurred in reality with the Economic Convention would require whole volumes, which would portray both the theoretical arguments and the deceptions committed about them by the Yugoslav side, as well as a confrontation with figures and facts between what they promised us and what they gave us, between what was sold to us and what they took from us with the crudest methods. A correct Marxist-Leninist analysis of these problems has been made in many documents and materials of the Party, commencing from the report which I delivered at the 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA in September 1948, and the reports delivered at the 1st Congress of the CPA in

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the Morices, Nekidrices and Petrovices, together with whole squads of other specialists and functionaries of medium or lower rank, welcomed and farewelled him.

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annoyed me because they told me nothing (I did not understand what was going on), but they also worried me. By urgent radiogram I sought details and explanations from Nako, but he either <<disappeared>> for whole days, or put me off with such reports: <<They insist on my attending an anniversary of liberation in a province of Slovenia stop will continue the talks after three days stop will send a detailed letter later stop Nako.>>

    And precisely when Nako was immersed in the labyrinths of the Yugoslav economists, when he was left not a single hour to rest, or to explain things to us in a detailed letter, we received more disturbing news from him: <<The comrades (he meant the Yugoslavs) tell us that no accords on deliveries or anything else can be concluded if we do not immediately present our plan of development for the year 1947!>>

    So this was what was occurring. Initially, we had reached agreement that the Yugoslavs would accord us what they could from the things we asked for and after this we would sit down to draft the plan, while now they were demanding the plan as a preliminary condition! In these conditions, Nako Spiru in Belgrade sat down and, amongst a thousand and one other jobs, worked out on his own the <<orientation plan>> for the development of Albania!

    I do not want to say that either Nako or we, who allowed Nako to act in this way, were to blame for this. No, it was a whole policy which the Yugoslavs pursued to confuse us and to force us to accept instantly and hastily whatever they said and in the way that interested them.

    This is how they acted in regard to everything else. Among the major problems which they put before us and for which they demanded immediate signature were those of the establishment of parity of the currencies, the unification of prices, etc. They overwhelmed Nako with their ideas, proposals and <<arguments>>; Nako, from the depths of the mire in which he was bogged down, appealed to me by radiogram: <<Help! Send me instructions how to act!>>

    Here there is an important fact which must not be

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forgotten. Many things in regard to the financial, technical. organizational, and other aspects we still did not know well and had no way how to know them. We were clear on the orientation that we must develop the country according to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, but in regard to how the joint companies would be organized concretely, what advantages and disadvantages they or the customs union, the unification of the currencies, etc., had, we did not have the necessary experience, and on some of them we had no experience at all. We considered Nako, for instance, as one of the most expert of us and I, in no way, wish to underrate his will or his abilities. But Nako, even as a specialist of the economy, leaving aside a series of other shortcomings he had, should be seen as he was at that time. He had not managed to complete his higher studies in economics, not to mention the fact that he was completely lacking in experience. It was like giving a young boy with two or three years of higher schooling the responsibility for handling such specialized problems of a country, no matter how small. Indeed, now the matter is simpler because even if one person, indeed a main functionary, cannot or does not know how to run things, there is a big, harmonious mechanism that the Party has created, which works like a clock, which introduces the young man to the job and management and teaches and qualifies him without causing any harm to the work in general. In 1946, however, matters were quite different: at that time the great mechanism of the socialist economy was only in embryo. Besides this, we were facing the old wolves of the Yugoslav economy. And not only that. They had long been thinking and consulting with one another and had matters worked out. They were close to one another, could meet and consult whenever and as much as they wished, and found a thousand and one tricks to outwit us.

    Hence, in these conditions Nako was obliged to appeal to me. At that time, of course, I, too, could not pretend that I knew more than Nako about the <<fine>> problems of finance, credit, investments, etc. As for Koçi, he had reached the

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limit of his capacities as an <<economist>> when he became a quartermaster of the stores at Panarit at the time of the war. Now he was concerned with <<other problems>>. Within the Party and the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs he had to apply the directives of Rankovic, had to do his evil work in secrecy.

    Nevertheless, I had by all means to send Nako instructions and directives as clear and accurate as possible. Amongst all the other work, at that period, I completed a real course for the <<intensive assimilation>> of problems of the economy. For whole days and nights I read that literature from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin that I could get hold of in French, which dealt with problems of the economy, summoned specialists in finance and other sectors (among them I shall not forget Naum Stralla), sought their opinions and, in this way, arrived at a certain conclusion and wrote to Nako:

    <<Carefully, but clearly and accurately, express to the comrades our major reservations on the question of the equalization of the currencies. Tell them that the different levels of economic development of the two countries do not provide possibilities for a fair and realistic equalization of our lek with their dinar. Such an action is made even more unrealistic by the different levels of pay of the workers of the two countries; the different prices of goods which are produced in our country and those for their products, etc. Tell them that, apart from other things, such an action will give rise to many problems of a social and political character for us amongst the people and the confidence of the masses in our currency will decline, etc.>>

    Likewise, in a concrete way I transmitted to Nako our serious and well-argued opinions about the impossibility of the immediate unification of prices, about the difficulties and dangers which might arise from the customs union, etc. I instructed him to talk dispassionately with Kidric, or if possible with Tito himself, and send us their reply immediately. However, a week went by and no news from Nako.

    During those days Koçi Xoxe had gone there by special

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invitation <<in order to honour our friends in the celebration of the 7th November>>! He, too, sent me an occasional radiogram in which he wrote about the red-carpet reception they were giving him, about the evenings when Rankovic and the others drank <<thirty toasts to the health of Albania>> (!) and even boasted to me that at one of the official dinners he had been drinking with the Yugoslav comrades until four in the morning, but he had lasted to the end like a man and had not disgraced us!

    I could not contain my anger:

    <<Are they in their right minds or not?!>> I said to the comrade who handed me the radiogram from the <<Comrade General>>. <<We are bursting our brains and they tell us about how long they have gone on drinking. Where's Nako's radiogram?>>

    <<We are decoding it,>> the comrade told me. <<We gave priority to the 'Comrade General', because it might have been urgent news for you.>>

    <<Very well,>> I said, <<but I urgently need 'Comrade Plan'.>>

    Finally, they brought me Nako's radiogram. It was late, but he had filled the first two or three paragraphs with noughts: <<Import-export 1 000 000 new francs[1]; the mines 2 000 000; the Bank 4 000 000; oil 4 000 000; electric power 2 000 000; the railways 4 000 000!!>>

    All these series of noughts there in black and white were the amounts which the Yugoslav side was offering us for the year 1947, which they promised they would invest in 6 joint companies that would be set up. Besides, they also promised 3-4 factories, consumer goods, etc., etc., and then came the conditions: all these chains of noughts on paper would be turned into shekels, or more correctly, into shackles, if we were to accept the creation of companies, the unification of prices, the customs union, etc., etc.

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given this reply: <<An expression of no confidence in the fraternal spirit of the Economic Convention>>!

    I called the comrades together again and we began to discuss what Nako had written to us. But now he was in a great <<hurry>>. The following morning they handed me another radiogram of half a line:

    <<Urgently await reply about yesterday's material>>!

    For two or three days on end (they were the last days of November) Nako continued to send brief radiograms: the <<friends>> were demanding an urgent reply, the draft communique had been prepared, moreover, Nako had been appointed to draft it (!). Even the date for the signing had been set -- November 27. Only our reply was awaited: yes or no! Meanwhile Koçi Xoxe had returned and, apart from lengthy descriptions of his valour with the slivovica, he did not hesitate to pour out all his talent in the field of profound understanding of economic problems! He swore that the signing of the convention would be the open Sesame for us like in the tale of Ali Baba and the forty robbers.

    <<Don't look a gift horse in the mouth!>> he told us. <<They say, 'Here you are -- take it!' and we are afraid!>>

    In these conditions we finally decided to say, <<Open Sesame!>> On November 27 the convention was signed. A day or two later Nako Spiru and his group of collaborators brought us bales of documents and projects and, naturally, also chains of noughts on paper.

    From the first meeting I had with Nako my worries and doubts about the step we had taken increased even further.

    Apart from some minor exultation, in general Nako's tone was gloomy and pessimistic. Like me, he, too, had the opinion that the treaties which we signed were fraught with dangers and difficulties for us. He told me openly that the <<friends>> did not allow him any time at all to reflect deeply about the things they served up to him and they replied to our objections and suggestions curtly and with frowning faces.

    <<This is only an agreement,>> I said, <<so let us proceed from the idea that it was signed by the two sides with the

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best of intentions. Now that its practical application is to begin the advantages or disadvantages of each separate part and treaty will become evident. We shall make the necessary corrections and take all proper measures to avert any danger. I believe that the Yugoslav comrades will be guided by the same spirit.>>

    <<They find it hard to accept any mistake in their opinions or actions,