[Part 5 -- Chapters IX and X]
THE <<NAIM FRASHERI>> PUBLISHING HOUSE
TIRANA, 1982
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C O N T E N T S | ||
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IX | ||
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OUR FINAL BREACH WITH TITO AND THE TITO- |
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THE PUBLIC DENUNCIATION OF TITOISM . . . . . . . | |
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The public denunciation of Titoism * On the relations of the CPA with the CPSU and the parties of the other countries until 1948 * An incognito journey to Rumania in connection with Tito's betrayal. A meeting with Andrey Vyshinsky. The meeting with Vyshinsky and Dej. Irrefutable arguments of the CPA on Tito's traitorous activity. Vyshinsky: <<The Bolshevik Party approves the correct activity and struggle of the CPA in defence of Marxism-Leninism.>> A visit to Bucharest. Back home * Desperate manoeuvres of Koçi Xoxe and company to escape exposure and rendering account * Profound analyses in our Political Bureau. Kristo Themelko and Pandi Kristo testify * The 10th and 11th Plenums of the CC of the CPA. <<The line of the CPA has been correct. It has been attacked but has not wavered, has been threatened but has not been damaged>> * The historic 1st Congress of the CPA. Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo in the dock * The end of our relations with Tito and the Titoites. |
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IX | ||
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IN OPEN STRUGGLE WITH THE TITOITES . . . . . . . . |
567-633 | |
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THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TITOITES -- AN HISTO- | |
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The struggle against Titoism -- an historical imperative * Our first clash with the Khruschevites over the <<Yugoslav question>> * On the Tito-Rankovic <<democracy>> * The Belgrade leadership throws into action the anti-Albanian scum, criminals and saboteurs * Khrushchevite betrayal assisting the Titoite betrayal. Smashing the Titoite-Khrushchevite plot at the Party Conference of Tirana (April 1956) * Mehmet Shehu -- a multiple agent of the imperialist-revisionist secret services * Mehmet Shehu's juggling from the Berat Plenum (November 1944) to the 1st Congress of the CPA (November 1948) * The year 1960. Mehmet Shehu together with Tito, Randolph Churchill and Fultz on the transatlantic liner <<Queen Elizabeth>>. Whom was this servant of many bosses to please and whom to displease? * In the 70's. The Western and the Titoite secret agencies order Mehmet Shehu into action. Three conspirators' groups foiled * Demonstrations in Kosova force the UDB to sacrifice the card on which they had <<placed great hopes>> in Albania. Why did Mehmet Shehu commit suicide? * The hope on terrorist bands * Socialist Albania has been and remains a granite rock. | ||
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leadership and the whole of our Party. The defeat of the plotters of Belgrade was at the same time a total defeat for their agents who had operated for years, sometimes openly, sometimes in secrecy, within our Party. The time had come for a final settling of accounts with both groups.
It is interesting to observe a permanent characteristic of Titoites: while in <<normal>>, <<quiet>> periods they are wily, past masters of manoeuvres with a thousand and one disguises, tricks and plots, completely the opposite occurs when their trickery is revealed. They completely lose their heads. On such occasions they are seized by utter confusion and loss of reason, their chauvinist fury and megalomania make them lose all sense, they become utterly brutal and allow themselves actions and stands which simply discredit them and expose them even more thoroughly. This is what occurred with them in 1948, and again in 1981 and in 1982.
When they saw that they had <<lost>> Albania, quite without cause or reason, they recalled their ambassador, the Albanian-speaking Titoite Josip Djerdja, to Belgrade at the beginning of June.
Meanwhile, they sent us an official invitation to the 5th Congress of their party, although, before they sent us the invitation, they were quite clear that our reply would be a curt <<No>>.
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Apparently, Tito wanted us to hear with our own ears directly from him, Tempo and others the base accusations and insinuations which they were to make publicly in Belgrade against our Party. But the stench of their slanders reached us. At the congress Tito presented the absurd claim <<about the role of Miladin Popovic and Dusan Mugosa in the formation of the CPA>>, while Tempo, to win promotion and satisfaction in public, vested himself with the merits of the <<critic>> and <<guide>> of our Party and our war in the years 1943-1944!
It was clear to us why this was done.
Tito was making another attempt to <<forestall the evil>>. He knew that sooner or later we would raise our voice and publicly bring out all the evils which he had tried to inflict (and did inflict) on our Party and country. Our facts and arguments would tear him to shreds. This being the case, he threw the first stone to find an excuse and to <<defend>> himself on the grounds that <<the Albanians attack us because we said something about them at the congress>>!
However, these <<new>> manoeuvres would neither nonplus us nor make us hang our heads. On the contrary, we were to raise our voice even more sternly and with greater adherence to principle against his filthy allegations. It was our turn to have our say. The time had come for the public denunciation of Tito and Titoism.
Meanwhile, we had received the second and third letters of the CC of the CPSU to the Yugoslav leadership (one dated May 4, the other dated May 28) and the Resolution of the Information Bureau of June 1948, in which, after correct Marxist-Leninist analyses, the anti-Marxist deviation of the revisionist leadership in Belgrade was publicly denounced. The leadership and our whole Party, like the entire Albanian people, expressed immediate and unanimous solidarity with these important documents and at the proper moment we openly and publicly expressed our stands and decisions in regard to the Belgrade traitors. In particular, the 9th Plenum of the CC of the CPA, which met from June 27-30, 1948, dwelt on the analyses of the letters of the Bolshevik Party and the
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Resolution of the Information Bureau, and all the comrades, in complete unanimity, expressed their solidarity with the denunciation and exposure which was being made of the CC of the CPY for its distortion of Marxism-Leninism, for its slipping into Trotskyism, national chauvinism, etc. During the same days we decided to denounce and reject all the enslaving treaties which had been signed with Yugoslavia, and in particular, all the accords that had to do with the notorious Economic Convention. Our People's Assembly, which took these decisions, left in force only the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid signed in July 1946. Our public announcement about these important decisions was received with joy and enthusiasm by the whole people. In particular, the communiqué of the CC of the CPA about our unanimous solidarity with the letters of the Bolshevik Party and the Resolution of the Information Bureau, which was published on July 1, 1948, aroused great enthusiasm and made a profound impression inside and outside of Albania.
I shall say something more, later, about how these documents were received and analysed in our Party, but here I want to point out something else.
On account of our immediate expression of solidarity with the letters of the Bolshevik Party and the Resolution of the Information Bureau, Tito and company made the accusation that we <<had fallen under the influence of the Soviets>>, while others, including some comrades of the communist parties of that time, together with their great joy, also expressed. . . their great surprise! We could not agree with either of these two kinds of reactions towards our lawful and natural stand, because neither of them expressed the truth. On the contrary, they were insulting and disparaging estimations of our Party. Why?
In regard to Tito's accusation about our <<falling under the influence of the Soviets>>, for us Albanian communists this was quite absurd and ridiculous. Indeed, in our case there could be no talk of any sort of interference by the CPSU, but rather the opposite.
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The stand of the CPSU towards our Party in those years had been correct, reasonable, extremely cautious, indeed cautious to the point of a certain <<neglect>>. With the exception of the unforgettable days when we went to Moscow in the summer of 1947 and met the great Stalin, with the exception of the warm, fraternal and internationalist welcome which he accorded us, the wise words and advice he gave us, it must be admitted that on other occasions, up until the spring of 1948, we did not feel the word and the hand of the CPSU towards our Party and our problems to the due extent, or as we expected. Here I am referring to direct aid on cardinal questions of the life and the central line of the Party, and especially in regard to our relations with the CP of Yugoslavia.
Making a detailed analysis in the light of all the important events that occurred during these decades, we can say that from the end of the Second World War the Soviets did not display any interest in Albania, did not know many things, either about the history of our people through the centuries or about our National Liberation War. Even though about the end of our people's National Liberation War a Soviet military mission headed by Major Ivanov came to our country, as I said earlier, Ivanov was not able to see and understand the majesty and depth of the war of our people and our Party. He did nothing but transmit gossip gathered here and there and eventually, at the time of the backstage plot of Berat, he became a good ally and collaborator of Velimir Stojnic.
Such a fact does not indicate simply the lack of capacity of this Soviet Major, who had come from Greece with one companion, with a radio on his back, to make contact with the Albanian partisans, but, in the first place, it implies a lack of proper interest in our war on the part of the Soviet leadership. As can be judged, it was interested in and very well informed about the Yugoslav National Liberation War, and must have had more faith in this at a time when it had no confidence in the Greek National Liberation War,
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while we never came within its reckoning at all. It did not know us in the least and defended us only because it had to adhere to principles! Apparently, the Titoites gave them very little information about us and in the way it pleased them, and the Soviet leadership must have arrived at the practical conclusion: <<Let the Yugoslavs deal with the Albanian partisans.>> This idea prevailed even after Liberation, to the extent that Molotov personally said, <<We give Albania economic aid through Yugoslavia.>> And since the <<Yugoslav aid>> was nothing at all, we can conclude that the Soviet aid did not exist up until the moment when our relations with Titoite Yugoslavia were broken off. Until then the Soviets had ignored Tito's undermining work against our country and Party and done nothing to restrain the Yugoslavs who were operating against us, apart from the direct intervention of Stalin when I sought his opinion to repulse the dispatch of the Yugoslav division to Albania.
Up until this time, our relations with the Soviet Union and the CPSU were realized mainly through the Soviet embassy. From our point of view, the employees of this embassy were good people, but they, for their part, were only <<employees>> who never said a word, let alone act without permission from Moscow. They themselves had no initiative and we could hold no serious discussion with them. When I say serious, I am referring to important questions of principle, as for example, many unjust stands which we saw on the part of the Yugoslavs. They shied away from these conversations as the wolf shies away from the fire. Why? They had to receive orders from Moscow! They could not take any step without orders from Moscow, like the real chinovniki * they were. They were ready to listen to us when we told them anything and to transmit to us the answer we sought. In general, this is how ideological and political questions were dealt with between us and the people of the Soviet embassy. However, as much as they did, we, for our
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part considered it great assistance and everything they told us we considered as coming from Moscow, from the Soviet leadership, from Stalin! It was a different matter with the Soviet advisers who helped us in the sectors of the economy and culture. They helped us greatly, gave us advice and concrete aid, discussed problems with us and our specialists, because they knew they were helping a socialist country, a party and a people that loved them. They did not have the complexes of diplomats, or the fear about their <<careers>> or the spirit of bureaucrats and chinovniki.
Of course, this made an impression on us, and we mulled it over in our minds, but proceeding from the highest and indisputable regard in which we held the glorious Party of Lenin and Stalin, we never formed reservations or the slightest shred of discontent towards it. On the contrary, we justified this stand of the CPSU with a series of arguments and reasons which were not wrong in principle, either then or now.
During those years, our relations with the other sister parties of the countries of people's democracy were even weaker, if not totally non-existent. We never considered this situation correct or acceptable, although we were convinced that this would not go on for long and we worked to create direct links with the other sister parties, in the first place, with the CPSU. Our persistence about sending a top-level delegation to Moscow (which was realized in July 1947), to Bulgaria (in December 1947), etc. was precisely a well-considered and weighed-up step on our part, which speaks about our concern to create the most extensive bilateral and multilateral links with the sister communist and workers' parties and the fraternal countries of people's democracy. If, however, up till the spring of 1947 we had not been able to achieve anything more, the fault for this was by no means ours. The main and deliberate culprit for this was the leadership of Belgrade, headed by Tito. As has been fully proved, they tried to keep us under their wing, isolated from the sister communist parties, from the Soviet Union and the
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other socialist countries, with the idea that we were only <<an appendage of the CPY>>, at the most, a part of what they subsequently called <<the League of Communists of Yugoslavia>>. Taking advantage of the slight experience of the CPA in its relations with the sister parties, and exploiting the request we made in 1942 that they intervene on our behalf with the Comintern, Tito and company turned our request into a kind of <<mandate>> which they used for years on end in the most villainous and anti-Marxist way.
We do not have detailed documents about how Tito and company dealt with the problem of our Party with the sister parties in the years 1944-1947, but about one thing we are convinced: the Belgrade leaders with cunning and evil intent had cast a shadow of doubt, to a greater or lesser extent, over the ability of the CPA to be a separate independent party capable of determining its own line, of applying this line and leading the Albanian people with mastery and adherence to principle on the road of socialism. That is, the Yugoslavs had created the absurd and alien idea that it was they that kept us going, and fed us, that the existence or non-existence of the Communist Party of Albania depended on them! To what extent this dirty, false propaganda had become implanted in the other parties is another matter, but the fact is that Tito and his emissaries had developed this propaganda to a system. There is no need, nor is this the place to go into detailed arguments, but I shall mention only two or three instances. In 1946 the Information Bureau of the communist parties of Europe was created with the participation of 9 parties, including all the parties of the then socialist countries, as well as the CP of France and that of Italy. Only one party of a socialist country of Europe was left out: the Communist Party of Albania! I do not wish to express any sort of dissatisfaction over why our Party was not included in this important forum, but the fact that only one communist party of a socialist country was left out made one suspect that there was something wrong about this. Whether this came about from the lack of knowledge
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or misinformation from others -- this problem will be explained with the passage of time. Our conviction is that the black hand of the Titoite agency was hidden in this. They did not want the CPA to be acknowledged in the international communist movement as a separate party, as the party of a sovereign country, of a valiant and unyielding people, because otherwise, their plans and the underhand work they were doing for the annexation of Albania as the 7th Republic of the Yugoslav state would have come to nothing!
The very fact that in this whole period from 1945 to the spring of 1947 we were not aware of any initiative, let alone visible efforts, on the part of the sister parties to establish sound permanent links with our Party, for consultations, exchanges of opinions and experience, is another argument which speaks about the shadow which the Yugoslav Trotskyites had cast over the prestige of our Party as a whole. Likewise, it is a fact that among a number of leaders of several sister parties, Tito and company had created, if not the opinion, at least the suspicion that the CPA was a creation subject to the line of the CPY! This was a very unpleasant observation for us. I well remember when one of our comrades, who had just returned from a festival (organized in Czechoslovakia, if I am not mistaken), came to me with tears in his eyes and told me:
<<Our national flag was the only one missing from among those of the participating countries!>>
<<And what did you do about it?>> I asked him. <<Did you ask your hosts why?>>
<<Yes!>> the comrade told me. <<We told them about it and they were nonplussed and embarrased and, while begging our pardon, replied: 'We thought that the flag of Yugoslavia represented Albania too.'>>!
I cannot forget, also, the letters of many of our students and specialists who were being trained in the former people's democracies, letters in which they spoke with indignation about occasions when the ministers or the authorities of one or the other country, before their eyes, <<sought the permis-
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sion>> of the Yugoslav ambassador to establish trade relations. . . directly with Albania!
We never bore grudges against our friends over this, nevertheless, the truth remains the truth, whether bitter or sweet! Precisely in the fact that Tito's anti-Albanian plot had not failed to have an effect, to a greater or lesser extent, lies the explanation also for the <<surprise>> and <<joy>> of a number of leaders of the sister parties at that time when. . . unexpectedly (!) they learned of the sound, valiant and courageous Marxist-Leninist stand of the CPA against the Yugoslav revisionists! Quite openly, without any embarrassment they asked themselves, one another and even us:
<<How is it possible that the CPA takes such a resolute and principled stand?! How is it possible that you denounce and expose the leadership of the CPY?!>>
In this case, however, not they, but we had the justified right to be astonished at their <<astonishment>>. Not they, but we had the justified right to ask them:
<<Why this astonishment on your part, comrades?! Why these opinions about a communist party?!>>
We had the right to ask them these questions because, as is known, genuine Marxist-Leninists never evaluate and must not evaluate sister parties on the basis of what <<others>>, <<third parties>>, <<intermediaries>>, say about them. Even less should this occur when nobody had authorized or charged such <<intermediaries>> to play this role or, even worse, when this role was placed in error upon such evil intermediaries as the Titoite leaders were.
Nevertheless, now that matter had turned out well, we had the legitimate right to be proud, because even in such difficult and complex conditions, not only internally, but also externally, we were able to emerge successful, even alone were able to get over the difficult paths, traps and plots wisely, through adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles.
Hence, while doing battle alone with the revisionist leadership of the CPY, we arrived at the same opinions and conclusions as the sister parties, without any knowledge that
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others, in the first place, the Bolshevik Party, headed by the great Stalin, were engaged in the same struggle.
This was and remains a great and incontestable merit of our Party, a source of honour and pride for us!
After these moments, the hand of the sister parties was quickly extended to us and we seized their hand in friendship, because we had been waiting for and expecting this for years. We considered this not only a duty, but also a legitimate right.
Now, shoulder to shoulder with the sister parties and, first of all, with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, we would work and fight better for the progress of socialism in our country, for the further strengthening of the prestige and authority of our Party and our country in the international arena.
Now, shoulder to shoulder with the sister parties we would make our contribution more vigorously to a more profound knowledge, to the exposure and condemnation of Titoite revisionism to its very roots. Because of the special conditions of our relations with the Titoite leadership over those 6-7 years, this was a field in which we felt we had much to tell them land to prove.
Throughout the whole communist and workers' movement and public opinion world-wide, in the summer of 1948 it became known that Tito and his associates had betrayed Marxism-Leninism and the socialist camp. The contradictions between us and the Yugoslav Titoites in this period were so great that they could easily develop into dangerous conflicts. The Soviets, being well-acquainted with Tito over a
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whole period, and thinking that we were geographically isolated from them and surrounded by enemy states, wanted to discuss as intimately and directly as possible with us about the measures which we should take in this situation. Likewise, they felt it necessary to hear what we had to say and our opinions directly and in detail about the long conflict we had had with the Yugoslav leadership. This would assist the further analysis which the Information Bureau was to make of the anti-Marxist stands and line of the chiefs of Belgrade.
Precisely for these reasons, in the summer of 1948 a meeting was organized in Bucharest in which Vyshinsky, Gheorghiu-Dej and I took part.
With the greatest pleasure I accepted the invitation to go to Bucharest which the Soviet ambassador Chuvakin brought me. Dimitri Stepanovich Chuvakin, the first ambassador of the USSR to Albania, was a straight-forward man with whom we had generally got along well, although, as I said above, the range of problems which we discussed left something to be desired. I spoke to Chuvakin in French, a language which he, too, understood and spoke. I have very rarely met Soviet leaders who spoke French, as those who knew the language did not speak it because they did not want to speak it. Why? They reserved the right to listen when one spoke and gain time to think about their reply while the interpreter was completing the translation in Russian. Or perhaps for precise diplomatic behaviour. But even if the latter were the reason, it seems to me that such a thing should not have existed amongst us. Many times I have met Molotov and Gromyko and talked with them, I in French, whereas they, always, in Russian and never in French. They knew French, but certainly for the reasons I mentioned, they did not speak it.
One morning we set out for Bucharest by Soviet aircraft. We were to travel through Yugoslav airspace, although we had become enemies with them. A hero of the Soviet Union flew the aircraft. The Soviets had sent this pilot to get me, because he knew the route over which the
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aircraft was to pass and there was greater security for me, if the Yugoslav secret service were to learn of my journey. Only Chuvakin and I were on board the aircraft. We were not obliged to stop in Belgrade, indeed at that time the aircraft was not allowed to fly via Belgrade at all, but left it to the north. Not only this, but later, for a period of several years, when the relations between the Titoites and the Soviet Union and our socialist states were very tense (until Khrushchev came to power), the Yugoslavs did not allow the regular aircraft of the Soviet line to fly over their territory. Thus, to spend eight days travelling by Soviet cargo ships, which were not big and tossed one about a great deal, to Odessa and another two days from Odessa to Moscow by train, or more rarely by aircraft, was a minimum for us.
On this trip the weather was fine and sunny, with no clouds and from the aircraft we saw the land of Yugoslavia with the plains which were never to be collectivized, the land unsystemized, as ours was in the first years of Liberation, and as the land of Rumania over which we flew was.
At the airport of Bucharest we were met by Dej, Anna Pauker, the Soviet ambassador and some other comrades. As far as I remember, we still did not have an embassy in Bucharest, nor the Rumanians in Albania. The formalities had not been completed and the relations between our countries of people's democracy in the first period of Liberation were still not fully subject to diplomatic rules, but continued in an informal way. In our country everything was in order, the people's power had been established on sound constitutional foundations, while in Rumania no. It took Rumania some time to liquidate the monarchy and King Michael, the powerful capitalist relations which still existed, the remnants of Antonescu's fascist <<Iron Guard>>, which were still active at the time of my stay at Bucharest, etc. The decisive factor in the liberation of Rumania and the liquidation of these dangerous remnants was the Soviet army. All the rest was just tales and boasting of Gheorghiu-Dej, as I shall relate
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later in connection with the talks I had with him during my stay there.
We embraced with Dej, Anna Pauker and the other comrades. My first impression when I met Gheorghiu-Dej at the airport was good, not only because I had heard good things said about him by the Soviets, but also because he had a reputation as a veteran communist who had <<suffered>> in the dungeons of Doftana. Later we learned an incident from his life. During the time he was imprisoned in Doftana an earthquake struck Bucharest[1], and guards and prisoners, ordinary and political, ran away in fright. Only Gheorghiu-Dej did not budge from the prison and when the gendarmes returned and found him inside they asked him in astonishment: <<You did not run away?>> <<No,>> replied Dej, <<I respect the law.>>
Dej was a tall man, with black eyes, black brows and hair, well dressed and cheerful, who gave the impression of a perifani as we say in Gjirokastra about those people who are vigorous and energetic and speak with a sort of pride in themselves, self-satisfied with what they say and do. Anna Pauker was a woman of a quieter nature than Dej, although she seemed energetic, too. She was a big, heavy-featured woman who looked as if she had suffered more in prison than Dej, her hair was gray and cut short as they say à la garçonne.
I got into a big Soviet ZIS car together with Dej. The others got into cars, too. When I was to enter the car the driver opened the door for me and I did not notice that it was an armoured car. I saw this when I got out and opened the door from inside. Never before had I had the occasion to see such a thing, although I had read in newspapers and books that such cars were used by kings and dictators to protect themselves from attempts on their lives, and by gangsters to protect themselves from the attacks of the police. Once in the car, it seemed to me I was not in a car, but in
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a real arsenal: both on my side and Dej's side we had a German twenty-round automatic pistol, each with two spare magazines, under our feet we each held another German twenty-round pistol with spare magazines and, of course, the guard and the driver had the same.
I said to Dej as a joke:
<<We can fight for 20 days with these weapons, it seems as though we were in the house of Oso Kuka,>>[1] and I quickly explained who Oso Kuka was. But to myself I said, <<Whatever they say about Oso Kuka the fact is that he fought like a man and did not surrender.>> My impression was not good, not because Dej had thought about taking measures for defence, but because those measures were excessive. They showed either that the Rumanian comrades were as frightened as rabbits, or that the situation in their country was by no means as calm as they tried to make out.
When I commented on the <<arsenal>> Dej replied:
<<We must be vigilant!>>
<<Of course, we must be vigilant,>> I said to myself, <<but not let the enemy terrify us. We must terrify him and make him tremble.>> As far as I could see the enemy in Rumania had not been dealt with firmly as in our country.
On the way from the airport to Bucharest, Dej said to me:
<<We are not going into the city, but will turn off to a house on the plain outside Bucharest, where we have taken measures for you to stay since you are incognito and Vyshinsky has not yet arrived. We expect him tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, at the latest. There where we're going,>> continued Dej, <<is a very reliable family, an old base where I have stayed before Liberation. The son of the house is a communist and his mother is a very dear old lady who
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keeps her mouth shut. You will be very well looked after there.>>
<<It has not the slightest importance for me,>> I told him. <<I shall be quite all right wherever you have decided I shall stay.>>
Nevertheless, these things surprised me and I asked myself the question: <<Is the situation so bad for them in the city that they cannot take me to some apartment there? Either they are so insecure that are unable to protect me, whom nobody knows, or is it that they want to keep the meeting strictly secret?>> However, these latter ideas did not convince me.
We arrived at the house. It was a peasant home amid the fields, small but pleasant, both inside and out. It was surrounded with trees and flowers. At the door mother and son welcomed us. They were both very handsome, the mother above sixty years old and the son in his forties. We went inside where everything was clean, the walls painted white, a well-furnished house in Rumanian style. Dej told my hosts that I was a very close friend of his and would be their guest for a very short time, etc. They were happy and replied to Dej in their own language which I understood a little from its similarity to Italian and French. When Dej was about to leave, Chuvakin also asked me to excuse him, saying that he had to go to the Soviet embassy to discuss with the ambassador what had to be done and that he would come back to inform me.
Thus, I was left alone with my hosts and the French interpreter whom Dej left me.
After lunching together with our hosts I went to take a rest. Everything in this village home was clean, quiet and attractive. This helped me overcome my boredom from remaining alone and would allow me, in the quiet of the night, to classify the materials and opinions which I would present in the meeting with Vyshinsky and Dej. During lunch and in the afternoon, after my rest, I took the opportunity to talk with my hosts and to learn about the situation in the country
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to the extent that they knew it and were able to answer my questions.
<<The situation is not yet completely clear,>> said the mother, <<but we are masters of it. We drove out the king and liberated the country thanks to Stalin's Red Army. Another advantage from this was that the country was not burnt and devastated except for a few things; our industry is running. Our country is fertile, but from now on it will become more fertile and more prosperous. To tell you the truth,>> continued the old lady, <<the economy is still not in the hands of our state, the capitalists are still very much alive, the big and medium merchants have their property, exploit it freely and live well, even though our state levies taxes on them.
<<When I have the opportunity to meet Dej,>> continued the old lady, <<I ask him, 'What are you doing? Are you still leaving these capitalists and the wealthy of the land who sucked our blood, who were supporters of the Germans and of Codreanu[1] and the Conducator * (Antonescu)[2] who sent our boys to burn Russia and be killed there?'
'Be patient,' Dej replies, 'everything will come in its own time.'>>
In this way I passed a part of the time until the evening of the following day when Dej came to take me to Bucharest; My hosts and I parted like good friends. The old lady kissed me, gave me a gift of a small wooden vase which she had made herself during the winter and said to me:
<<Come back again, don't forget us!>>
Even now, after so many years I have not forgotten these good simple people of the Rumanian countryside, whose names I do not know, because they did not tell me and I did not ask, since I observed the incognito <<rules>> which Dej had laid down.
In the car, Dej told me that Vyshinsky would come the
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following day and that Chuvakin and I were to stay in the former king's palace.
<<This is like the characters from the Grimm brothers'[1] fairy tales, going from the peasant's cottage to the king's palace!>> I told Dej. <<Please, don't take me there. I don't like such places. I prefer to stay in an apartment in the middle of the city, amongst the people, because no one knows me and there is no danger for me.>>
<<No,>> said Dej. <<You will stay there, because we were embarrassed yesterday, leaving you outside the city, and then that is where the meeting will be held. All the facilities are there.>>
I repeated my protest and told him:
<<For me it was a great honour to stay with that simple pleasant family and you have no reason to be embarrassed.>>
However, I had to go, like it or not.
We arrived at one of the <<famous>> palaces of the Rumanian kings. This was not one of the major palaces. It was a building of considerable size with long colonnaded corridors. It was encircled with walls and had a number of small plots of grass, amongst which flowers appeared here and there, as though planted by some hand that knew nothing about this work. They took us to some bare rooms which could not be called either large or small; to reach the bathroom you had to go out through the corridor. Clearly, the palace was neglected, especially the upper rooms. Not only did the building get little sunshine, but it had no electric light or water. On the lower floor there were some rooms in rather better order, which had apparently been given more attention because Vyshinsky was to come there for the meeting.
During the day we had nothing to do. We asked Dej if we could go out and see Bucharest. He agreed and proposed that we made an excursion to the city and returned to the Central Committee.
<<There,>> said Dej, <<you will meet a comrade of our
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Political Bureau, one of our best comrades, Kishinevsky. Kishinevsky is a Soviet citizen from Bukovina. He fought in Rumania and helped us and after liberation I asked Stalin to allow Kishinevsky to give up his Soviet citizenship and take Rumanian citizenship and let us keep him in Rumania,>> Dej told me. <<Stalin agreed and that's what was done.>>
Passing through the streets of Bucharest, from the speed of the car and from being obliged to listen to what Dej's interpreter said, of course, I was not able to see much, however, from what I saw, the streets seemed clean, with trees and gardens, with no apparent ruins or war damage; with many well-stocked shops, the windows full of goods. And as always occurred when I was far from the Homeland, here, too, my mind went to my own country which was burned and devastated by the war; when I saw the shops of Bucharest full of goods, I thought of the empty shops of our cities, but never fell into despair. <<We shall have everything, too; we shall make them ourselves, new and beautiful. We are proud that we fought the enemies heroically and won our freedom by shedding blood and did not wait for anyone to give it to us.>>
When we arrived at the premises of the Central Committee, Dej, without knocking, opened a door and led me into a room. Writing at a small table in one corner of the room was a person who stood up, came towards us, held out his hand and introduced himself. This was Kishinevsky. He was a small man with a thin face and body, and with dark glasses which, when he removed them, revealed two bright intelligent eyes. It was difficult for him to find space in the room to place some chairs for us, not because the room was small, but because it was filled with countless big packages, piled on the floor like the bricks which trucks unload in front of buildings under construction. The packages contained banknotes. I said to Dej with a laugh:
<<I am continuing to experience the marvels of fairy tales. Now, I seem to be in Ali Baba's cave and not in the premises of the Central Committee.>>
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Dej explained that they had removed the notes from the bank because there they were not safe, might be stolen by the employees who, as he said, were the old ones and uncontrolled. Hence, despite their boasting, insecurity continued in this country, although Kishinevsky did not fail to tell us about the <<heroism>> of the Rumanian communists and the party which was <<strong>> and well organized. As for the <<great heroism>> of Dej, he would tell us about this himself in the evening after dinner.
After we had dinner with Dej in our new <<residence>>, amongst other things he told us how they had forced King Michael to abdicate. I knew that this king was one of the worst and most bankrupt in Europe. He was the son of Carol II, who was nothing but a king of scandals, an oppressor of the people, pro-Italian and pro-German. There was nothing Rumanian about him, either by birth or in the uniform he wore. All he had was the support of the Rumanian fascists and big landowners and one of his main courtesans, Lupescu.
His son, Michael, was completely like his father and the people's expression <<Like father, like son>> fitted him to a T. However, this carnival king did what he did and received the highest Soviet wartime order, the Order of Victory, which, at that time, Eisenhower and Tito were the only other foreigners to hold. Tito, at least had fought at that time, and the Yugoslav partisans were outstanding in the fighting. But what did the Rumanians do? They put the Ukraine, Odessa and other Soviet cities to the torch, together with the Hitlerites. And what was Michael doing at this time? Amusing himself in his palaces.
This was impermissible opportunism on the part of the Soviets. It should never have crossed their mind to award this worthless creature even the smallest medal, let alone the Order of Victory. Was he given the order because he did not resist the attack of the Red Army? What could the scum do? Raise his hands in surrender, just as he did. Is that why he was awarded the Order of Victory, because he raised his hands? This was too much to swallow.
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I mentioned these thoughts, which were hammering away in my head, to Vyshinsky while conversing with him after the meeting, when he told us how Michael had received him in audience, how Vyshinsky had gone dressed in a <<tail coat>>, how the king had decorated him and Vyshinsky, in front of the king, had taken the medal and stuck it, on the. . . tail of his coat.
After lunch, in the small garden of ex-King Michael's palace, while talking about his <<struggle>> against this king, Dej related to us the history of how he and Petru Groza, at that time prime minister, prepared his abdication and the overthrow of the Rumanian monarchy.
He told us that the king still had a part of the army, commanded by generals loyal to him. He resided in his royal palace in Bucharest together with the queen mother, and a string of courtesans. The palace was guarded by soldiers and senior officers loyal to him.
<<Although he had no power in his hands,>> said Dej, <<still he was a major obstacle for us, because we had to adhere to the rules of the Constitution in connection with him, as well as to the provisions of the agreement which had been signed with the Soviets. However, in the end we took everything into account and decided to impose abdication on him. First, I discussed the matter with Groza who agreed, except that he was in favour of avoiding any aggravation of the situation, wanting to do the thing 'gently'. I drafted the text of his abdication,>> Dej told us, <<Groza made some formal alterations and he as prime minister and I as secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party sought an audience with the king, who granted it.
<<Groza and I went by car to the palace. It was surround ed by officers in brilliant uniforms. We went inside and climbed the stairs which were lined with senior officers, their leather belts pulled tight, emblazoned with epaulets and decorations and the brilliantine on their hair gleaming in the light of the chandeliers of the palace. They were haughty and looked at us with glowering faces, but were obliged to
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respect us because they knew that we held power. We climbed the stairs with solemn mien and Groza carried the briefcase containing the document.
<<A general, the king's adjutant,>> continued Dej, <<ushered us into a waiting-room, asked us to wait, then, after a short time, took us into the throne-room, as they called it. The king was not there, but the queen mother rose to her feet and welcomed us. Groza kissed her hand, but not I,>> said Dej. <<We began to converse about the rain and the sunshine until the king, whose chair was placed higher than his mother's and, of course, higher than ours, deigned to come. The king's mother was an old whore,>> said Dej, <<but she was cunning, she knew how to manoeuvre.
<<Michael came in and gave us his hand. He was like a perfumed calf, who snorted like a bull when he spoke. Groza began the conversation in a round-about way. This was intolerable to me,>> said Dej, <<but what could I do about it? At last, Groza got round to the theme and dropped 'the bomb-shell'. Michael listened and when Groza had finished he said bluntly: 'I have no intention of abdicating. I am king by the will of the people and only the people have the right to dethrone me,' etc., etc. The queen mother listened and nodded to her son, approving his decision.
<<Groza began his 'politicking' again, but the 'bull' snorted and refused. His mother proposed we take a short break for the two sides to reflect. We did this and met again, and again the same arguments. Michael's mother, in her cunning way, tried to impose some concessions on us to postpone this unexpected thing for a while. We did not agree, but neither did they agree and after asking our permission, the king went outside. We racked our brains about why he went out, and we had reasons for this, because he had telephoned the guard, ordering them to arrest us as we left, and his forces, which were surrounding the palace and in the city, were to stage a putsch. However, we had foreseen this,>> said Dej <<and had established an encirclement of the encirclement.
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<<When the king returned to the chamber, I signalled to Groza to present him the document for his signature. Then, I began to speak,>> said Dej, <<and in a stern tone I told him that he had to sign the document, for otherwise we would overthrow him by force.
<<'You must have no illusions, must issue no orders,' I stressed to the king,>> said Dej. <<'Anything you may attempt will be in vain, since we have taken all measures around the palace and the troops loyal to you.'
<<He turned and twisted, but in the end he sat down and signed the abdication. Thus, the monarchy came to an end. The king, like a wounded bull, went out again, no doubt, to cancel the order he had given, and when we were leaving the palace on the stairs we saw those same officers, only no longer haughty, but in despair. Some were sitting on the steps, some had unbuttoned their uniforms and some were holding their heads in their hands. We passed through them,>> said Dej, <<with our heads high and the document in the briefcase.>>
<<A brilliant victory over a bankrupt king,>> I said to myself when Dej proudly uttered these words. But he still hadn't finished with the history of the king and reaction.
<<We reached agreement with him about the day of his departure from Rumania,>> continued Dej, <<and we permitted him to take what he wanted of his personal property and some people who served him, including two or three of his mistresses. Before he left, he asked to go to the Sinaia Palace to get some personal property. We permitted this. There he had collected a number of gold watches from which he took the gold cases and the rubies. We sent him by train outside our borders, accompanied by our guards. He and his suite did not speak while on Rumanian territory, but when the train passed into foreign territory, in the presence of our guards, he began to abuse us, our regime, the guards, etc. But there,>> said Dej, <<there was nothing we could do to him.>>
<<You should have done it when he was inside,>> I told him, <<but you let the 'bird' escape from your hands.>>
<<But we left nothing undone against him and react on>>
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said Dej boastfully, <<we forced him to abdicate and depart defeated and disgraced (!). We have dealt roundly with reaction, too; reaction was arrogant, but we behaved arrogantly with it. Even when they were still powerful we challenged them. I myself with one guard,>> boasted Dej, <<went into all the cafes where they gathered and sat down with a pistol in my belt in order to let them know: 'We, the communists, are masters of the country and not you'.>>
While listening to Dej, I made a comparison between us and them. Oh, how far we were removed from them! There the class struggle had still not begun. The story of King Michael, which Dej related to us at such length, showed the situation clearly. But we were to see this for ourselves even better and more concretely when we walked through some streets of Bucharest.
I said good night to Dej, and Chuvakin and I went up to the rooms allocated to us, because the next day Vyshinsky was to come and the meeting would commence.
My bed-room communicated with another room through a door. I opened it to make sure what was on the other side. It was a big room, completely empty, except for a table in one corner, on which lay a big luxurious book. I went to the table and turned over the pages of this book with a cover that looked like gold. It was a royal album! The whole dynasty of Rumanian kings, queens and princes was in it. I put the album under my arm and knocked on Chuvakin's door.
<<I've brought you a book,>> I told him, <<because you may not have anything to read to put you to sleep. Dej's king took the watches but he forgot this. Look through it and give it to Dej tomorrow to send by post to Michael, because he needs it, while it wouldn't serve us even for toilet paper, since it's not suitable.>> Chuvakin and I had a good laugh. The history of the king of Rumania was closed together with the album. One day later the history of the ascension of another new king, King Tito of Yugoslavia, would begin.
The following day Vyshinsky was to come from Moscow. The name and personality of Vyshinsky was great and well
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known to all of us on account of the important role he had played as state prosecutor in the Moscow trials against Trotskyites, Bukharinites, rightists and other traitors of the Soviet Union. During the war I had got hold of a French translation of the account of the Moscow trials and had had the opportunity to study the evil activity and treachery of these sworn enemies of communism. Their guilt and secret collaboration with the foreign enemies of the Soviet Union was brought out clearly and completely exposed there. Everything was convincing. And the claims of foreign enemies that the admissions had been allegedly extorted from the criminals by torture were slanders. Our struggle against local enemies, the trials which were held in our country after the war against enemies of the people, the struggle which our Party had waged against Trotskyite elements further reinforced our belief in the justness of the merciless fight which the state in the Soviet Union had undertaken against these criminals.
When they held power, the foreign and internal enemies of our peoples employed the most inhuman forms and methods. But naturally the foreign enemies will defend their friends within our countries, while our duty has been and still is to suppress the enemies of the people and to give them no possibility to operate against the constructive work of the people.
This the Soviet state did through the Moscow trials. In these trials Andrey Vyshinsky, outstanding jurist and Marxist-Leninist, played an important role. He displayed skill, acumen, wisdom, courage and determination in this important task. Through his acumen and strong logic, on the basis of a profound dialectical Marxist-Leninist analysis, he uncovered all the obscure angles of problems, the intrigues and plans of the enemies who stood in the dock, as well as of the external enemies who pulled the strings of this terrible and dangerous agency. And it was precisely this unerring method of unravelling matters which astonished the external enemies and their espionage agencies about how their secret plans were discovered and compelled them to slander and
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propagate that everything, every statement, every admission by the accused had been extorted by means of torture, drugs,>> etc.
We had gathered in one of the rooms of the palace, where we were staying, waiting for Vyshinsky. At last he came. I was excited because I was meeting him for the first time. (When I went to Moscow in July 1947, Vyshinsky was not in the Soviet Union.) He was just as I had heard, a vigorous man, not very tall, with horn-rimmed glasses and bright black eyes that took in everything. He was wearing a blue suit. Vyshinsky shook hands with all of us in turn and when he came to me, apparently as I was the only one he had not met before, he guessed who I was, because he gave me his hand and asked me in Russian:
<<How is your health, Comrade Enver Hoxha?>>
<<Harasho! [*]>> I replied.
Meanwhile Chuvakin intervened and said:
<<Comrade Enver speaks French well.>> Then Vyshinsky started to speak to me in French and I could speak more freely.
We began the meeting which Dej opened with a short speech. He welcomed us to Bucharest and gave the floor to Vyshinsky.
He greeted us warmly and also transmitted the greetings of Stalin and other comrades of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU (b).
<<The object of this meeting,>> said Vyshinsky in general outline, <<is to exchange our experience and reveal our joint knowledge about the betrayal of the Yugoslav Titoites, about their undermining activity against our countries, parties and socialism, and to define the method of combatting and unmasking their deviation which is dangerous for communism in general and for the Yugoslav Communist Party and socialism in Yugoslavia in particular.>>
In the course of the analysis he made of the secret and
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open activity of Tito's renegade group, Vyshinsky explained to us in detail the theoretical and political content of the letters of the Bolshevik Party to the CPY and the Resolution of the meeting of the Information Bureau on this important question. Our parties were acquainted with these documents which we had studied in detail and on which we had taken decisions, fully endorsing them.
With his penetrating style, with arguments and the amazing clarity characteristic of him, Vyshinsky, as the true bolshevik prosecutor that he was, made their content even clearer to us. This time we did not have the accused before us in the dock, but the fact is that their trial was being held and it was a fair trial, based on sound arguments, an historic trial the justice of which was to be completely confirmed by the passage of time.
Vyshinsky demonstrated to us with convincing historical facts that the political activity of Tito's renegade group was not something fortuitous and spontaneous. Despite their false appearance the views of Tito and his main associates were not those of formed Marxists. They posed as Marxists, as if they were in solidarity with the Soviet Union and Stalin, and in this way deceived the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav communists. However, during the war, on many occasions they showed obvious signs of a pronounced megalomania, bourgeois nationalist tendencies and an incorrect concept of the war of the Soviet Union and the aid which this war gave all the peoples, especially the peoples of Yugoslavia.
<<The Bolshevik Party,>> continued Vyshinsky in essence, <<had sufficient experience to detect such tendencies, but did not consider them incurable. At that period the main issue was the war against the German nazis. And we understood that in the face of countless difficulties during the war, actions which were ill-considered and sometimes unclear would occur, but we thought that experience, the war and the passage of time would clear them up. Of course, with the victory,>> he stressed, <<our relations with the Yugoslavs would be closer and everything would be cleared up in a comradely way, even
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though the Yugoslav leadership had created doubts in our relations. And this is what occurred. After the victory over Hitlerite Germany, the closest fraternal relations were established between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and important decisions were taken to give economic, military and political aid in the international arena to Yugoslavia, which we considered one of our most faithful political and ideological allies. There were no clouds apparent in the sky of our relations. The clouds were gathered one after the other by the Tito group when the political, economic, ideological and military construction of the PFR of Yugoslavia began. At that time the bourgeois nationalist and anti-Soviet tendencies of the renegade group of Tito became clearer.>>
Vyshinsky went on to demonstrate to us how the Yugoslav renegade leaders attacked and distorted the basic, universal principles of Marxism-Leninism and disguised these deviations on the grounds that they were allegedly applying the Marxist-Leninist principles <<in the concrete post-war conditions>> of Yugoslavia.
<<The question was not that everything should have been copied as it is in the Soviet Union,>> Vyshinsky told us, <<but they took this as a basis to attack the principles, to deviate from them. This, of course, was bound to lead to discussions, as it did, and in the end to differences between us.
<<We defended the principles,>> continued Vyshinsky, <<they violated them more and more openly and grasped at the smallest things with which they tried to prove that our country was allegedly interfering in their internal affairs, that the Soviet Union was allegedly not assisting them economically as much as it should, and that we were allegedly not properly backing their political and territorial demands in the international arena. Of course, there was no foundation for any of these charges and we rejected them with facts and great patience. However, neither the principles nor the facts made any impression on them. The Yugoslav renegades proceeded towards an ideological and political line contrary to ours, they had set out on the rails of anti-Marxism. This compelled the
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CPSU (b) to write the first letter and the subsequent ones to the CC of the CPY which we sent them some time ago. Our aim was that the Yugoslav Communist Party must be saved from catastrophe, should abandon the wrong course on which Tito was setting it and Yugoslavia should build socialism, avoiding the re-establishment of capitalism, towards which it was heading. The course which the Bolshevik Party adopted was the most comradely, Marxist-Leninist course in accordance with the rules, but the renegades rejected it.
<<The question of Yugoslavia is an internal question of the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav communists,>> continued Vyshinsky, <<and we have not meddled and will not meddle in their internal affairs. We have no right to interfere, but it is our duty to ensure the political and ideological exposure of the activity of this clique which is fighting against Marxism-Leninism and serves world capitalism. Already,>> continued Vyshinsky, <<in the international arena and the internal plane the Titoites present themselves as open enemies of the Soviet Union and their activities in this direction will increase, not only against us, but also against all the countries of people's democracy and the socialist camp. Their activity is identical with the activities of the Trotskyites, Bukharinites and agents of world capital whom we have unmasked in our trials.
<<The unmasking of the enemy has very great importance,>> stressed Vyshinsky. <<The Soviet peoples had to be convinced of the treacherous activity of the Trotskyites, the Bukharinites and the rightists, therefore we placed importance on this and managed to achieve that our enemies themselves brought out the smallest details which are frequently important because they explain major questions. The truth which proved their treachery emerged naked before our courts and our peoples. This had decisive importance. This is the important thing to achieve,>> said Vyshinsky. <<After this the number of years to which the enemy is sentenced has secondary importance. The people must approve this sentence, must be convinced. This is what we must do with Tito's
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renegade group, too. This group is in power and will defend itself. It will also commit all sorts of provocations against our socialist states, but we must be prudent, vigilant and must not fall for their provocations!>> he concluded.
In his speech Dej, amongst other things, pointed out the great danger of this agency of criminals and murderers; made an interpretation of the joint decisions which they had taken in the Information Bureau, told of the arrogance of the Yugoslav <<comrades>> at this meeting against the French and Italian communist parties, etc. Amongst other things, he mentioned some episodes from his first official visit to Yugoslavia, and his first meeting with Tito.
<<Tito behaved with us in a disdainful way and this he showed from the first meetings,>> said Dej, <<He wanted to underrate our National Liberation War, received us with great pomp in order to overawe us with his uniforms, his decorations, the rings on his fingers and his palaces. Seeing such a situation,>> said Dej, <<I 'took my courage in both hands' and said to Tito in conversation: 'Both you and I are workers and communists. Let us speak simply and directly about the problems which worry us,' etc. And he pretended to agree,>> continued Dej, <<but the luxurious life of a megalomaniacal anti-Marxist and bourgeois that he lived had become a living reality and he could not break away from that way of life. Matters had gone so far,>> said Dej, <<that Tito took me and the foreign minister of Rumania (who was a bourgeois and was removed and condemned later) to visit his stable. Tito, dressed in a black uniform with high boots and his chest covered with decorations, led the way. When we approached the horse-boxes,>> pointed out Dej, <<he shouted to one of his officers secer-secer and the officer brought a great dish of sugar into which Tito thrust his fist and gave it to the horses to eat from his hand.
<<When we parted from Tito and left that place,>> continued Dej, <<in the car my foreign minister said to me in confidence: 'Comrade Dej, Dimitrov is a communist and a fine man, but with Tito one could go to the end in com-
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munism.' That is the price the bourgeois put on Tito,>> concluded Dej.
I, too, took the floor. I had a lot to say about the Titoites. In our relations with the traitor group of Belgrade there were loads of facts and data which proved their betrayal of Marxism-Leninism and the openly state capitalist and colonialist tendencies in the relations which they tried to establish in our country.
I pointed out to the comrades, amongst other things, that our contacts and relations with the Yugoslavs, which began during the National Liberation War, at first through political and party channels, later, especially from the end of the War onwards, were developed in all directions, taking into account the circumstances which were created by our common war against the same enemy and the formation of our states of people's democracy. I presented the participation of our National Liberation Partisan Army in the war for the liberation of Yugoslavia correctly and objectively, as an honourable, correct and undeniable act, which had a truly liberation character, but always remained an aid, alongside the Yugoslav National Liberation Army which for its party fought heroically. This must not be denied or underrated, irrespective of the fact that the Tito group betrayed the blood shed by this heroic army which bore the brunt in the liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia.
After telling them about the true role of Miladin Popovic and Dusan Mugosa with theoretical and practical arguments, I refuted the absurd anti-Marxist claim that allegedly the Yugoslavs had created our Party, that allegedly they had <<kindled the fire of our national liberation war>>.
Of course these anti-Marxist, nationalist views of <<domination>> had cropped up amongst them during the war. But they assumed provocative proportions especially on the eve of Liberation and after Liberation.
<<I must point out,>> I told the comrades, <<that our contacts with the Yugoslavs during the war were rare, and moreover, when we managed to meet (and I told them about
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the meetings with Vukmanovic-Tempo and Blazo Jovanovic), we had differences over principles with them on many issues, since even at that time the Yugoslav tendencies to consider and use our Party as an appendage of their party, and Albania as a province of Yugoslavia were already apparent. Of course the smoke from these anti-Marxist views emerged a little later.
<<We, for our part, have always considered our war in unity with that of the peoples of Yugoslavia. This was a major duty of ours as Marxist-Leninists, not only because we were fighting for liberation against the same enemy, but also because through the militant friendship between our two peoples we sought whole-heartedly to wipe out forever those feelings which the circumstances of past periods, such as the partitioning of Albania, the leaving of Kosova to Serbia, the ceaseless terror and countless intrigues of the Serbs against our country had created.
<<We, for our part, did everything we could, while the Yugoslavs at every stage of the development of this false friendship on their part hatched up plots and back-stage conspiracies for the domination of Albania immediately after the war.>>
With arguments I outlined to Vyshinsky and the other comrades the preparation of the putsch at the Berat Plenum, which failed, the countless efforts at the beginning of Liberation to discredit the leadership of our Party and our line on the war, by creating their agency within our leadership with Koçi Xoxe, whom they supported with all their might and set the task of seizing power and operating and applying the <<line>> of the Yugoslav Titoites in our country. I explained to the comrades the essence of this Yugoslav line, which squarely proved that the Yugoslav leadership was anti-Marxist, bourgeois, nationalist, chauvinist, anti-Soviet and anti-Albanian. I went on to inform them about the Yugoslavs' hostile activity in our country in every field, one by one, demonstrating this with many arguments backed by concrete facts which were indisputable and not in the least equivocal.
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<<On ideological matters and on the organization of our Party,>> I told the comrades, <<during the war, but especially after the war, the Titoites tried with all their means to impose the organizational forms of their party on us and to divert us from the Marxist-Leninist line on the structure of the party and its correct thought and action. They did everything in their power to keep us isolated from the experience of the Bolshevik Party, with which we acquainted ourselves through the documents of that party which came into our hands and from the opinions we exchanged with the Soviet diplomats, because,>> I told Vyshinsky, <<we still had not established direct relations with the CC of the CPSU in order to exchange party experience. This came about not through any fault or lack of desire on our part, but, in general, this was the reality. Despite this lack, our Party did not budge from this orientation. The Yugoslavs, who considered this very harmful and dangerous for their diabolical plan, and finding it impossible at that time to conduct an open propaganda against the Marxist-Leninist principles which guided our Party, against close principled ideological and organizational links with the Bolshevik Party, undertook their assault against the correct general line of our Party. Koçi Xoxe, as the leader of the anti-party group, became a complete supporter of the Yugoslav Titoites. He was inflated by them with ultra-leftist and Trotskyite terms, was called 'the proletarian conscience' of our Party, hence 'the most trusted, loyal and proletarian leader of the Party'. With these activities the Yugoslav Titoites and the Titoite group of Koçi Xoxe wanted to create the belief that now our Party was on 'the true Marxist-Leninist rails', not only because it was led by 'proletarian elements', but also because it was inspired by the CPY. Through this group and Koçi Xoxe, who at Berat, on the insistence of the Yugoslavs, assumed the function of the organizational secretary of the Party, as well as that of the minister of internal affairs a grave situation was created in our Party and in our state.>>
I went on to tell the comrades: <<As well as all the other
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parts, we read carefully also those parts of the letters of the Bolshevik Party in which the Yugoslav anti-Marxist practices of the organizational secretary of the party also being minister of internal affairs, the keeping of the Party in a semi-illegal situation, etc. were criticized. These alien practices and forms were imposed on us, too, by the Yugoslav leadership, and in the analyses that we are making, new grave facts are emerging about the dangerous consequences which these practices have brought in our Party and state. Very soon this situation will come to an end, just as every shred of the influence which Tito and his supporters in our ranks have managed to impose on us is coming to an end. We have fought ceaselessly against all these deviations by the Yugoslav Titoites and their secret agency in our Party,>> I continued, <<but understandably, to the extent we were able, because we had to rely solely on our own reasoned judgments and our conviction that we were on the right course. What we knew of Marxism-Leninism, we defended fanatically, and we have never abandoned the experience of the CP of the Soviet Union.>>
In a round-about way I let Vyshinsky know that we had not been given direct aid from the CPSU and also alluded to other problems, that the Soviet comrades with whom we had direct contact, whom we informed about everything, listened to us, assisted us in those fields in which they were specialists, but never expressed any opinion in reference to our contradictions with the Yugoslavs. In our presence they posed as neutral on these questions and we did not know what they reported to Moscow.
<<Another matter which confused us to some extent,>> I pointed out, <<was that for a long time our suspicions about the hostile actions of the Yugoslavs did not extend to the top, to Tito, and the whole of their leadership. In this direction it must be admitted that we were not given any information about whether the sister parties had ever drawn the attention of the Yugoslav leadership to its incorrect stands. Indeed, this situation continued right to recent weeks or
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months, when the letters of the Bolshevik Party, which criticized the Yugoslav leadership, reached us. Before these letters the only signal that things were not going well,>> I told them, <<was given us when we informed Comrade Stalin about the question of the Yugoslav division which Tito wanted to deploy on our territory. We had opposed Tito's demand and when the Soviet reply reached us, we were convinced that we had acted correctly.>>
<<Stalin personally criticized Tito for this impermissible act which he wanted to commit against you,>> said Vyshinsky.
<<This rejoices us immensely,>> I told Vyshinsky, <<but through the Soviet embassy I was told only that Stalin agreed with our opinions and not with those of Tito and that was all. However, I think that I and the comrades of our leadership could and should have been told something more, should have been told why Tito did these things.
<<A similar thing occurred,>> I pointed out to the comrades, <<over another question, that of the so-called 'Balkan Federation' or 'Confederation', allegedly proposed and settled between Tito and Dimitrov, about which we were never given any information.
<<To this very day,>> I continued, <<we cannot say precisely what this thing was, how it came about, and approval from us was neither sought nor received. Only at the beginning of this year we learned at one moment that the Moscow news paper 'Pravda' criticized this 'idea' of Dimitrov's and he replied to Stalin and 'Pravda' that they were right, that in the existing conditions the idea of a 'Balkan Federation' was impossible and incorrect.>>
While pointing out that behind the efforts for a <<Balkan Federation>> lurked the chauvinist aims of the Tito clique to dominate the Balkans, I outlined to the comrades the anti-Marxist chauvinist policy pursued by the Belgrade leadership towards Kosova and the other Albanian regions in Yugoslavia, both during and after the war.
After speaking about our correct principled stand towards this painful problem of our nation, I went on to tell the
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comrades about the pressure exerted on us by the Yugoslavs and Koçi Xoxe to accept the union of Albania with Yugoslavia and about our categorical opposition to this proposal.
<<However,>> I emphasized again, <<on these capital problems of such importance for the fate of our Homeland and people we acted on our own initiative. With our unshakeable conviction we heroically defended the freedom and independence of our Homeland,>> and I let Vyshinsky know that at these important moments we were not assisted as much as we should have been, that is, we found ourselves alone.
I remember that at this point Vyshinsky interrupted me and said:
<<People are tempered in struggle!>>
I went on to tell them about our army, how we created it, and what <<aid>> the Yugoslavs gave us for this, and dwelt at somewhat greater length on the Yugoslavs' <<economic aid>>.
<<The culmination of this chauvinist, colonialist and annexationist policy of the Yugoslav revisionists against our country,>> I told them, <<was the treaties on 'the planned joint economy', 'the joint companies', 'the parity of the currencies', etc., etc.>>
I told the comrades at the meeting about all these diabolical mechanisms and aims of the Yugoslav anti-Marxists, about our resistance and struggle against them, and finally about our triumph and the defeat of the conspiratorial work of Tito and company.
My speech at the meeting, which was fairly lengthy, and all those facts which I presented to them very clearly confirmed the treachery of the Titoites and the correctness of the views of Stalin expressed in the letters sent to the CPY. On the other hand, those facts testified to the correct struggle of our Party for the defence of the interests of our Homeland, of internationalism, of friendship with the Soviet Union and to our loyalty to Stalin. In the meeting I made it quite clear to the comrades present that during this struggle our Party had very frequently found itself alone, and therefore, needed
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to be and should have been helped to a greater extent, more openly and with greater trust.
As soon as I had finished, we took a break, after which Vyshinsky gave the conclusions of the meeting. He described that meeting as very positive, necessary and valuable.
<<We learned many things which will help us,>> he said in essence, <<in the continuation of the struggle for the exposure of this clique of renegades.>>
Vyshinsky went on to say among other things:
<<The clear presentation of matters, supported by facts on the part of Comrade Enver Hoxha made very clear to us a series of base actions of the Yugoslav anti-Marxists and the facts and events which were brought forward at this meeting, prove that the things the Yugoslavs have done towards the Communist Party of Albania and the People's Republic of Albania are conscious actions against socialism and our common ideology.
<<We are not mistaken in the estimation we have made of the activity of these renegades and draw conclusions that this is a protracted political and ideological struggle. The Bolshevik Party,>> said Vyshinsky, <<approves the correct actions and persistent struggle in defence of Marxism-Leninism by the Communist Party of Albania, its Central Committee and Comrade Enver Hoxha. We must bear in mind,>> he continued, <<that this clique will go even further in its hostile actions against our socialist camp. The Titoites will commit many provocations of all kinds, in order to justify themselves and put the blame on us. They will commit these provocations to deceive opinion inside and outside Yugoslavia and to justify their policy of betrayal and links with the capitalist states.
<<This requires that we must always be vigilant, must safeguard and strengthen our Marxist-Leninist unity, love for and loyalty to Stalin,>> stressed Vyshinsky. <<We are not afraid of these dregs of our society who are doomed to disappear into the rubbish bin of history. We must make the relations between our parties and socialist states even
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stronger and must help one another more. I stress,>> said Vyshinsky finally, <<that it is our duty as friends, as comrades, and as internationalists to help the PR of Albania more, so that it makes up for the time lost, improves its economic situation, and we must not forget, either, that now it is completely encircled by enemy states. The sister Republic of Albania is a worthy member of our powerful socialist camp, therefore, it never should feel itself isolated, and will never be isolated either politically, economically, ideologically or militarily. This is the instruction of Comrade Stalin.
<<In regard to our future stand towards the leadership in Belgrade,>> concluded Vyshinsky, <<we must display great care and through mature and principled stands bring about that any attempt or provocation of Tito's fails, and avoid giving him the possibility on any occasion to accuse us of stands and actions alien to our socialist ideology and policy. In the direction of Albania, in particular, Tito's provocations may be greater and more severe, because, as Comrade Enver said, apart from other things, between the two countries there is still the unsolved problem of Kosova and other Albanian regions in Yugoslavia. From there Tito can hatch up all sorts of traps, therefore, through vigilance and maturity we must ensure that he is thwarted in such manoeuvres, as he has been up till now.>>
Later, during my second and third visit to the Soviet Union[1], the great Stalin personally was to express his concern for vigilance and care in regard to any provocation of the Titoites especially in connection with Kosova.
In one of the unforgettable conversations with him, after I told him about our protracted battle with the leadership of Belgrade, and about many problems, including that of Kosova, amongst other things I said:
<<Without ever interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, we, for our part, will never cease supporting the rights of our brothers of the same blood in Yugoslavia, will
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raise our voice against the terror and the policy of extermination which the Tito-Rankovic clique[1] pursues towards them.>>
Stalin listened to me attentively and, when I had finished, said:
<<In the future, too, as Marxist-Leninists, we must attack the anti-Marxist actions and views of Tito and the Yugoslav leadership, but I stress that we must not in any way interfere in their internal affairs. This would not be Marxist. The Yugoslav communists and the peoples of Yugoslavia must see to this matter, it is up to them to solve the problems of their present and future. This is the context in which I see the problem of Kosova and the other Albanian population living on their own lands in Yugoslavia. We must not leave the Titoite enemy any way to make the accusation that we are allegedly waging our struggle to break up the Yugoslav Federation. This is a delicate matter and must be treated with very great care. . .>>[2]
But let us return to the meeting with Vyshinsky and Dej in Bucharest, which, as I said, began and ended with success.
I was very satisfied, first, because matters were made clear to us, but also because of the good assessment which Vyshinsky made of the work of our Party.
After dinner at which toasts were drunk, Vyshinsky, who was very intelligent and with great humour, cracked many jokes. When we embraced on parting, he said to me:
<<Au revoir in Moscow!>> (In fact, I met Vyshinsky later in Moscow on two or three occasions, when I went officially or for holidays to the Soviet Union.)
I retain very good memories and have a special admiration for his great intelligence and acumen, for his Bolshevik determination and loyalty to the great Stalin. He loved Albania, interested himself in our situation, and always asked me about it whenever we met. At one dinner which he gave
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for our official delegation, he created a very intimate and happy atmosphere. Many comrades of the Political Bureau of the CPSU, headed by Molotov, were present, and amidst the rejoicing, the comrades of our embassy brought me a telegram with the happy news about the birth of my first child and that mother and son were very well. Of course, we drank a bit that night and one could do nothing else with the Soviet comrades who liked to drink. They told Vyshinsky about the birth of my son and he immediately approached me, shook my hand and congratulated me saying: <<My heartfelt congratulations on the son that is born. May he have a long life!>> On the following day they told Stalin, too, at an unforgettable reception which he organized for us, about the birth of my son.[1]
Another time when I had a meeting with Vyshinsky to talk about the international situation and the stands which our delegations would take in the UNO on various problems, during the talk he offered me a drink saying:
<<I know that you do drink a little because I noticed it at the reception.>>
I replied that I did not like to drink at all, that I only smoked, but I had drunk a bit at that reception, because I had had so much to rejoice over. I noticed that he did not insist, as the other Soviet comrades did, that I should drink, but he himself did not drink, either.
<<It's not the habit of the Russians to clink glasses with <<borzhom *,>> said Vyshinsky. <<I am a Russian, but I have diabetes, and liquor is banned for me.>>
<<You stick to the rules as you do in everything,>> I said, <<but I wish you good health and a very long life.>>
Later, when I heard of Vyshinsky's death, I was very grieved. I shall never forget this great Stalinist statesman who, not only as a prosecutor, not only as a jurist, but also as a diplomat proved himself to be of a very high calibre.
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His speeches at the UNO as Foreign Minister and representative of the Soviet Union are landmarks in the history of international relations. His speeches are masterpieces of defence of the Stalinist line and merciless political and ideological exposure of the imperialist policy with exemplary and powerful Marxist-Leninist logic. Vyshinsky was a brilliant debator. The enemies trembled at his words, because he was right, because he brought up countless facts, and facts are stubborn. He knew how to use his facts and documents with rare mastery, because he was a Bolshevik, a loyal pupil of Lenin and Stalin. But let us return to the meeting in Bucharest and say <<farewell>> to Dej.
The day after the meeting, Chuvakin and I asked Dej for permission to go to visit the city of Bucharest by car and on foot. Dej agreed to our proposal with pleasure. Apparently, the <<illegality>> of my visit had been lifted. After breakfast we climbed into cars and set out on the excursion. We drove all round Bucharest, stopped on the edge of some very beautiful lakes, of which there were many in Bucharest, surrounded with trees and flowers. Around one of them stood beautiful villas, residences, and another royal palace. The Rumanian bourgeoisie oppressed the people and enjoyed a prosperous life, amusing itself at the expense of the blood of this people. Rumania was a wealthy country, exported grain, while the people did not have bread to eat. Rumania had resources of oil and was noted for the famous Ploest oilfield, but this wealth belonged to the Rumanian bourgeoisie and foreign oil companies.
In the past Rumania had highly developed trade with the various capitalist countries, and the many-sided relations with these countries, the influence of capitalism and the capitalist way of life had introduced political and moral degeneration to this country. Corruption, bribery, cabarets, transactions, prevailed here. Even merchants of Albanian origin, especially from Korça, had established themselves in Rumania. Some of them had become relatively wealthy. Families from Korça had emigrated to find work or because of
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the persecution by the Greeks. This small colony of Albanians, which was very active, with patriotic and militant sentiments for the cause of the liberation of Albania, became one of the most fiery centres for the national cause, from which emerged many outstanding men like Viktor Eftimiu and others, who were progressive and with rare talents.
The Rumanians called Bucharest <<the little Paris>>. I had read Paul Morand's[1] book about Bucharest. As I said above, when you looked at the city, you formed the impression that it had never seen the war, as if it had not been hit by the smallest bomb during the Second World War. There was no damage, no ruins to be seen. But what of our poverty-stricken cities! They had been bombed and devastated by the Italians, the Germans, and even by the British <<allies>>. It seemed that here in Bucharest the Germans had done no fighting at all, but had just raised their hands in the air.
When we came to the most beautiful and busiest street of Bucharest, where business was brisk, we got off the cars and walked. A member of the Central Committee and five or six security men accompanied us.
What there was to see! The shops were full of strikingly luxurious goods; every shop contained such goods of a particular speciality such as marten and fox, and all kinds of other luxurious furs; there were shops full of luxurious shoes, marvellous porcelain ware, fabrics, ready-made clothes, book shops. All the showcases were aglow with luxury and sensational advertisments. It seemed as if you were not in a city which had just emerged from the war, but in Champs Elysées of pre-war Paris. And all the shops were still the property of the Rumanian bourgeoisie, were in its hands, it made the law in commerce. Chuvakin and I looked at the shopwindows with curiosity and astonishment. As always I thought of the empty shops in Tirana, while Chuvakin thought of those in Moscow which certainly were not full of goods like these. We asked the Rumanian comrade who accompanied us:
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<<Do these shops belong to the state?>>
<<No, they have not been nationalized yet,>> he replied. <<But, please, let us go into one of the shops and have a look inside.>>
He begged us to go inside whenever we stopped to look in a window, but we did not fulfil his desire. Later we understood what the Rumanian comrade had on his mind. He had received an order from Dej that we were to choose what we wanted in the shops we entered and he was not to allow us to pay. These things were to be gifts for us from the CC of the WP of Rumania. In the end we went into one shop which the comrade told us was partly owned by the state. It was a big luxurious shop. We went in, of course, to have a look, to please the Rumanian comrade, who was wearing himself out begging us, and not to buy. We noticed that he took the manager of the shop aside and certainly gave him the order to serve us. Then, he and the salesman did their best to press many things on us, but we did not accept all they offered us. I chose a paper knife, a pair of office scissors to open books and a leather compendium for my desk. Chuvakin, too, chose much the same things. We fulfilled the Rumanian comrade's desire!
When we came out of the shop we went into a big cafe and sat down to rest. There were many people there, strikingly well-dressed. They looked us over curiously from the corner of their eyes; they did not know us, but certainly recognized the security men who accompanied us. This was one of those cafes which Dej told us were frequented by the bourgeoisie, where he <<with his revolver in his belt and surrounded by security men went to provoke them within their own lairs>>.
He went and <<provoked>> them in cafes, indeed! But what harm did such a thing do them when they had the economy, the market, their wealth in their hands? This scandalized me and I wondered: What sort of communists are they? What sort of socialism is this?
Only a few years later they were to show completely what their worth was -- Dej, this <<stern fighter>> against Tito,
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was the first to become the defender and the supporter of Tito as soon as Khrushchev turned over the page.
When we returned to the Palace for the farewell dinner with the Rumanian comrades (because the next day we were to return to the Homeland), in the course of conversation I spoke about the very good impressions we had of Rumania, of the people, the individuals, but I also spoke about our experience and I expressed my astonishment in the form of a question:
<<Why do you not expropriate the bourgeoisie, but allow them to exploit the people?>> Dej explained to me that <<everything will be done in its own time, because the situation here is different from that in your country,>> and other such theories.
The following day we parted from Dej and Anna Pauker and the other Rumanian comrades who saw us off at the airport.
OUR FINAL BREACH WITH TITO AND
THE TITOITES
The public denunciation of Titoism * On the relations of the CPA with the CPSU and the parties of the other countries until 1948 * An incognito journey to Rumania in connection with Tito's betrayal. A meeting with Andrey Vyshinsky. The meeting with Vyshinsky and Dej. Irrefutable arguments of the CPA on Tito's traitorous activity. Vyshinsky: <<The Bolshevik Party approves the correct activity and struggle of the CPA in defence of Marxism-Leninism.>> A visit to Bucharest. Back home * Desperate manoeuvres of Koçi Xoxe and company to escape exposure and rendering account * Profound analyses in our Political Bureau. Kristo Themelko and Pandi Kristo testify * The 10th and 11th Plenums of the CC of the CPA. <<The line of the CPA has been correct. It has been attacked but has not wavered, has been threatened but has not been damaged>> * The historic 1st Congress of the CPA. Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo in the dock * The end of our relations with Tito and the Titoites.
The sudden and ignominious departure from Albania of Tito's envoys and their suite in the spring of 1948 brought about a rapid improvement in our affairs. This was reflected both in the subsequent development of relations between our Party and the Yugoslav Party and in the relations within the
The public denunciation of Titoism
The pressure which Tito and company exerted in April and May 1948 about <<re-examining our position>>, the demand that we send a top-level delegation to Belgrade to <<iron out the disagreements>>, etc. were like the final desperate writhings of drowning men of all times. The Titoite leaders were now more than convinced that the game was up for them in Albania.
* Bureaucratic state functionaries of czarist Russia.
An incognito journey
to Rumania in connection with Tito's betrayal
A meeting with Vyshinsky and Dej
[1]
On November 10, 1940.
[1]
Commander of an Albanian volunteer unit in the 60's of the 19th century. Fighting for the defence of the Albanian territories, he was encircled by Montenegrin bands in a house near the Shkodra Lake and rather than fall in their hands, blew up the house with himself and his 23 men together with many of his Montenegrin enemies.
[1]
Codreanu Cornelieu-Zelea -- Rumanian fascist politician.
*
Leader (Rum. in the original).
[2]
General, fascist dictator of Rumania (1940-1944).
[1]
German linguists, collectors and editors of fairy tales' publications.
* Well (Russ. in the original).
[1]
In March-April and in November 1949.
[1]
See Enver Hoxha, <<With Stalin>> (Memoirs), Tirana 1982, p. 141, 2nd Eng. ed.
[2]
Ibidem.
[1]
See Enver Hoxha, <<With Stalin>> (Memoirs), Tirana 1982, p. 123, 2nd Eng. ed.
* Mineral water (Rus. in the original).
[1]
French writer.