CORRESPONDENCE 
BETWEEN 
THE CHAIRMAN 
OF THE COUNCIL 
OF MINISTERS 
OF THE USSR 
AND 
THE PRESIDENTS 
OF THE USA 
AND 
THE PRIME MINISTERS 
OF GREAT BRITAIN 
DURING 
THE GREAT 
PATRIOTIC WAR 
OF 1941-1945



From Marx to Mao 
ML 
© Digital Reprints 
2006

CORRESPONDENCE 
BETWEEN 
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL 
OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR 
AND 
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE USA 
AND 
THE PRIME MINISTERS 
OF GREAT BRITAIN 
DURING 
THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 
OF 1941-1945 
Volume 2 
Correspondence 
with Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and Harry S. Truman 
(August 1941-December 1945) 

 
P R O G R E S S P U B L I S H E R S 
M O S C OW

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
USSR Foreign Ministry Commission for the Publication of DipIomatic 
Documents: A. A. Gromyko, Dr. Sc. (Econ.) (Chairman), Prof. 
I. N. Zemskov (Deputy Chairman), G. K. Deyev (Executive Secretary), 
F. I. Dolgikh, Cand. Sc. (Phil.), Corr. Members of USSR Academy 
of Sciences P. A. Zhilin and L. M. Zamyatin, S. A. Kondrashov, 
Cand. Sc. (Hist.), V. S. Lavrov, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), Member of 
the USSR Academy of Sciences A. L. Narochnitsky, Sh. P. Sanakoyev, 
Dr. Sc. (Hist.), P. P. Sevostyanov, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), Corr. 
Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences S. L. Tikhvinsky, 
N. V. Tropkin, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), S. S. Khromov, Dr. Sc. (Hist.), 
Y. N. Chernyakov, Cand. Sc. (Techn.), I. I. Chkhikvishvili, Cand. Sc. 
(Phil.) . 
First printing 1957 
11101—106 
016(01)—77 
... .......yb. G

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CONTENTS 
Page 
Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271


D O C U M E N T S


7 
No. 1 
Sent on August 4, 1941 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
The U.S.S.R. attaches great importance to the matter of 
neutralising Finland and her dissociation from Germany. The 
severance of relations between Britain and Finland and the 
blockade of Finland, announced by Britain, have already borne 
fruit and engendered conflicts among the ruling circles of Finland. 
Voices are being raised in support of neutrality and reconciliation 
with the U.S.S.R. 
If the U.S. Government were to threaten Finland with a rupture 
of relations, the Finnish Government would be more 
resolute in the matter of breaking with Germany. In that case 
the Soviet Government could make certain territorial concessions 
to Finland with a view to assuaging her and conclude a 
new peace treaty1 with her. 
No. 2 
Received on August 15, 1941 
F. ROOSEVELT AND W. CHURCHILL 
TO J. V. STALIN*2 
We have taken the opportunity afforded by the consideration 
of the report of Mr Harry Hopkins on his return from Moscow3 
to consult together as to how best our two countries can help 
your country in the splendid defense that you are putting up 
against the Nazi attack. We are at the moment cooperating to

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8 
provide you with the very maximum of supplies that you most 
urgently need. Already many shiploads have left our shores and 
more will leave in the immediate future. 
We must now turn our minds to the consideration of a more 
long-term policy, since there is still a long and hard path to be 
traversed before there can be won that complete victory without 
which our efforts and sacrifices would be wasted. 
The war goes on upon many fronts and before it is over there 
may be yet further fighting fronts that will be developed. Our 
resources, though immense, are limited and it must become a 
question of where and when those resources can best be used 
to further to the greatest extent our common effort. This applies 
equally to manufactured war supplies and to raw materials. 
The needs and demands of your and our armed services can 
only be determined in the light of the full knowledge of the 
many facts which must be taken into consideration in the decisions 
that we take. In order that all of us may be in a position 
to arrive at speedy decisions as to the apportionment of our 
joint resources, we suggest that we prepare a meeting which 
should be held at Moscow, to which we would send high 
representatives who could discuss these matters directly 
with you. If this conference appeals to you, we want you 
to know that pending the decisions of that conference we 
shall continue to send supplies and material as rapidly as possible. 
We realize fully how vitally important to the defeat of 
Hitlerism is the brave and steadfast resistance of the Soviet 
Union and we feel therefore that we must not in any circumstances 
fail to act quickly and immediately in this matter of 
planning the program for the future allocation of our joint 
resources. 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
Winston S. CHURCHILL 
No. 3 
Received on September 30, 1941 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
My dear Mr Stalin, 
This note will be presented to you by my friend Averell Harriman, 
whom I have asked to be head of our delegation to 
Moscow.

9 
Mr Harriman is well aware of the strategic importance of 
your front and will, I know, do everything that he can to bring 
the negotiations in Moscow to a successful conclusion. 
Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his encouraging 
and satisfactory visits with you.3 I can’t tell you how thrilled 
all of us are because of the gallant defense of the Soviet armies. 
I am confident that ways will be found to provide the material 
and supplies necessary to fight Hitler on all fronts, including 
your own. 
I want particularly to take this occasion to express my great 
confidence that your armies will ultimately prevail over Hitler 
and to assure you of our great determination to be of every possible 
material assistance.
Yours very sincerely, 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
No. 4 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
My dear Mr Roosevelt, 
Your letter has reached me through Mr Harriman. 
I avail myself of this opportunity to express to you the Soviet 
Government’s deep gratitude for having entrusted the leadership 
of the U.S. delegation to such an authoritative person as 
Mr Harriman, whose participation in the Moscow Three-Power 
Conference4 was so fruitful. 
I have no doubt that you will do all that is necessary to 
ensure implementation of the Moscow Conference decisions as 
speedily and fully as possible, all the more because the Hitlerites 
will certainly try to use the pre-winter months for exerting 
maximum pressure upon the U.S.S.R. at the front. 
Like you, I am confident of final victory over Hitler for the 
countries now joining their efforts to accelerate the elimination 
of bloody Hitlerism, a goal for which the Soviet Union is 
now making such big and heavy sacrifices. 
Yours very sincerely,
J. STALIN 
October 3, 1941

10 
No. 5 
AIDE-MEMOIRE 
Handed to A. Y. Vyshinsky by the U.S. Ambassador, 
Mr Steinhardt, on November 2, 1941* 
In a personal message to Mr Stalin, President Roosevelt 
states: 
(1) That he has seen the Protocol of the Three-Power Conference 
in Moscow4 and has discussed with the members of the 
American Mission the data set forth therein. 
(2) That he has approved all the items of military equipment 
and munitions and has directed that the raw materials be provided 
so far as possible as rapidly as possible. 
(3) That he has given orders that the deliveries are to begin 
at once and are to be continued in the largest possible volume. 
(4) So as to obviate any financial difficulties he has directed 
that there be effected immediately arrangements under which 
shipments may be made under the Lease-Lend Act5 up to the 
value of $1,000,000,000. 
(5) He proposes, subject to the approval of the Soviet Government, 
that no interest be charged by the United States on such 
indebtedness as may be incurred by the Soviet Government 
arising out of these shipments and that on such indebtedness 
as the Soviet Government may incur, payments shall begin only 
five years after the end of the war, and that the payments be 
made over a period of ten years after the expiration of this 
five-year period. 
(6) The President hopes that the Soviet Government will 
make special efforts to sell such commodities and raw materials 
to the United States as may be available and of which the 
United States may be in need, the proceeds of sales to the 
United States to be credited on the account of the Government 
of the Soviet Union. 
(7) The President takes the opportunity to thank the Soviet 
Government for the speedy manner in which the Three-Power 
Conference in Moscow was conducted by Mr Stalin and his 
associates and assures him that the implications of that Conference 
will be carried out to the utmost. 
(8) The President expresses the hope that Mr Stalin will not 
hesitate to communicate with him directly should the occasion 
require. 
Kuibyshev, November 2, 1941

11 
No. 6 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
Mr President, 
I have not yet received the text of your message, but on 
November 2 Mr Steinhardt, the United States Ambassador, 
delivered to me through Mr Vyshinsky an Aide-Memoire giving 
its substance. 
I should like first of all to express complete agreement with 
your appraisal of the results of the Three-Power Conference in 
Moscow,4 which should be credited primarily to Mr Harriman 
and to Mr Beaverbrook who did their best to bring the Conference 
to an early and successful conclusion. The Soviet Government 
is most grateful for your statement that the implications 
of the Conference will be carried out to the utmost. 
Your decision, Mr President, to grant the Soviet Union an 
interest-free loan to the value of $1,000,000,000 to meet deliveries 
of munitions and raw materials to the Soviet Union is 
accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude as 
vital aid to the Soviet Union in its tremendous and onerous 
struggle gainst our common enemy—bloody Hitlerism. 
On instructions from the Government of the U.S.S.R. I 
express complete agreement with your terms for granting the 
loan, repayment of which shall begin five years after the end 
of the war and continue over 10 years after expiration of the 
five-year period. 
The Soviet Government is ready to do everything to supply 
the United States of America with such commodities and raw 
materials as are available and as the United States may 
need. 
As regards your wish, Mr President, that direct personal contact 
be established between you and me without delay if circumstances 
so require, I gladly join you in that wish and am 
ready, for my part, to do all in my power to bring it about. 
Yours very sincerely, 
J. STALIN 
November 4, 1941

12 
No. 7 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I am happy to inform you that medical supplies in the list 
prepared by the Medical Supplies Committee of the Three- 
Power Conference4 will be provided as rapidly as these supplies 
can be purchased and shipped, less such portion thereof as the 
British may provide. Conditions of American supply and production 
make impossible the immediate purchase of large 
amounts of certain items requested, but twenty-five per cent 
of the total list can be provided within thirty to sixty days and 
the balance in installments during the next eight months. 
The American Red Cross is prepared to provide approximately 
one-third of the total list at an approximate cost of $5,000,000 
as a gift of the American people. Acting on my instructions 
the American Red Cross will procure these supplies with funds 
placed at my disposal by the Congress and also funds contributed 
by the American people for relief in the Soviet Union. 
As the American Red Cross must account to the Congress and 
to its contributors for the use of these funds and supplies, 
Wardwell, the Chairman of their Delegation, outlined in a letter 
to Mr Kolesnikov, of the Soviet Alliance, the kind of cooperative 
arrangement between the Red Cross societies of our respective 
countries which is desired. The Red Cross is also 
transmitting a message to Mr Kolesnikov today pointing out 
the importance of reasonable observation by the American Red 
Cross representative of the distribution made of its supplies 
subject, of course, to all appropriate military considerations. 
I would deeply appreciate it if your Government can assure 
me that the desired arrangements are acceptable. I may point 
out that the procedures proposed by the American Red Cross 
are the same which are followed with regard to their assistance 
in Great Britain and other countries. 
On the basis indicated, the American Red Cross is prepared 
to consider further substantial assistance in the Soviet Union as 
needs develop and requests are made. 
November 6, 1941

13 
No. 8 
Sent on November 14, 1941 
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM J. STALIN 
TO Mr ROOSEVELT 
Your message about the favourable decision taken by the 
American Red Cross concerning delivery of medical supplies 
reached me on November 11. 
The Soviet Government has no objection to establishing the 
organisational forms of cooperation between the Red Cross 
societies of our two countries, it being understood that it will 
be organised in accordance with the exchange of letters the 
text of which was agreed early in November by Red Cross 
representatives of both countries in Kuibyshev. 
STALIN 
No. 9 
Received on December 16, 1941 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
(Retranslated) 
It is extremely important, in my view, to take immediate 
steps for the purpose of paving the way not only for joint 
operations in the coming weeks, but also for the final defeat 
of Hitlerism.6 I should like very much to see you and talk it 
over personally with you, but since at the moment this is impossible 
I am taking three preliminary steps which, I hope, 
will lead to more permanent joint planning. 
I am suggesting to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that he 
should immediately convene in Chungking a conference of 
Chinese, Soviet, British, Dutch and U.S. representatives. This 
group should get together not later than December 17 and 
report the results to their Governments absolutely confidentially 
by Saturday, December 20. That should give us a preliminary 
idea of the general problem from the Chungking 
angle. 
2. I am asking the British to call a naval conference at Singapore 
which could by Saturday, December 20, submit its

14 
report to be compiled chiefly in terms of operations in the 
southern zone. 
3. I would be very glad if you talked this over personally 
with the United States, British and Chinese Ambassadors in 
Moscow and let me know your proposals for the whole problem 
by Saturday, the 20th. 
4. In a week or so I will be discussing the same problems 
with the British Missions here and will inform you of the situation 
as it appears from here. I had a good talk with Litvinov 
and I fully understand your immediate tasks. I want to tell you 
once more about the genuine enthusiasm throughout the 
United States for the success of your armies in the defense 
of your great nation. I flatter myself with the hope that the preliminary 
conferences I have scheduled for the next week will 
lead to a more permanent organisation for the planning of 
our efforts. Hopkins and I send you our personal warm regards. 
ROOSEVELT 
No. 10 
Sent on December 17, 1941 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
I received your message on December 16. It did not indicate 
the aims of the conferences to be called in Chungking and Moscow 
and as they were to open overnight I saw fit when I met 
Mr Eden, who had just arrived in Moscow,7 to ask him what 
those aims were and whether the two conferences could be put 
off for a while. It appeared, however, that Mr Eden was 
not posted either. I should like, therefore, to have the appropriate 
elucidations from you in order to ensure the results 
expected from Soviet participation. 
Thank you for the sentiments expressed over the Soviet 
armies’ successes. 
I wish you success in the struggle against the aggression in 
the Pacific. 
Personal warm regards to you and Mr Hopkins.8 
STALIN

15 
No. 11 
Received on February 11, 1942 
SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO Mr STALIN 
For January and February our shipments have included and 
will include 449 light tanks, 408 medium tanks, 244 fighter 
planes, 24 B-25’s, and 233 A-20’s. 
I realize the importance of getting our supplies to you at the 
earliest possible date and every effort is being made to get shipments 
off. 
The reports here indicate that you are getting on well in 
pushing back the Nazis. 
Although we are having our immediate troubles in the Far 
East, I believe that we will have that area reinforced in the 
near future to such an extent that we can stop the Japs, but 
we are prepared for some further setbacks. 
No. 12 
Received on February 13, 1942 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I am much pleased that your Government has expressed its 
willingness to receive my old and trusted friend, Admiral Standley, 
as the Ambassador of the United States. He and I have 
been closely associated for many years, and I have complete 
confidence in him. I recommend him to you not only as a man 
of integrity and energy but also as one who is appreciative of 
and an admirer of the accomplishments of the Soviet Union, 
which, you will recall, he visited last year with Mr Harriman. 
Admiral Standley has since his return from Moscow already 
done much to further understanding in the United States of 
the situation in the Soviet Union and with his rich background 
and his knowledge of the problems which are facing our respective 
countries I am sure that with your cooperation his 
efforts to bring them still more close together will meet with 
success. 
My attention has just been called to the fact that the Soviet 
Government has placed requisitions with us for supplies and 
munitions of a value which will exceed the billion dollars 
which were placed at its disposal last autumn under the Lease

16 
Lend Act5 following an exchange of letters between us. Therefore, 
I propose that under this same Act a second billion dollars 
be placed at the disposal of your Government upon the same 
conditions as those upon which the first billion were allocated. 
Should you have any counter suggestions to offer with regard 
to the terms under which the second billion dollars should be 
made available you may be sure that careful and sympathetic 
consideration will be given them. It may, in any event, prove 
mutually desirable later to review such financial arrangements 
as we may enter into now to meet changing conditions.9 
No. 13 
Sent on February 18, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
I have received your message about U.S. arms deliveries in 
January and February. I stress that it is now, when the peoples 
of the Soviet Union and their Army are bending their energies 
to throw the Hitler troops back by a tenacious offensive, that 
U.S. deliveries, including tanks and aircraft, are essential for 
our common cause and our further success. 
No. 14 
Sent on February 18, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
This is to acknowledge receipt of yours of February 13. I 
should like first of all to point out that I share your conviction 
that the efforts of the new U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Admiral 
Standley, whom you hold in such high esteem, to bring 
our two countries still closer together, will be crowned with 
success. 
Your decision, Mr President, to grant the Government of the 
U.S.S.R. another $1,000,000,000 under the Lend-Lease Act5 on 
the same terms as the first $1,000,000,000, is accepted by the 
Soviet Government with sincere gratitude. With reference to 
the matter raised by you I would like to say that, in order not 
to delay decision, the Soviet Government will not at the moment 
raise the matter of revising the terms for the second 
$1,000,000,000 to be granted to the Soviet Union nor call for 
taking due account of the extreme strain placed on the U.S.S.R.

17 
by the war against our common foe. At the same time I fully 
agree with you and hope that later we shall jointly fix the 
moment when it will be mutually desirable to revise the financial 
agreements now being concluded, in order to take special 
account of the circumstances pointed out above.9 
I take this opportunity to draw your attention to the fact that 
in using the loan extended to the U.S.S.R. the appropriate 
Soviet agencies are encountering great difficulties as far as 
shipping the munitions and materials purchased in the U.S.A. 
is concerned. In these circumstances we think that the most 
useful system is the one effectively used in shipping munitions 
from Britain to Archangel, a system not introduced so far with 
regard to supplies from the U.S.A. In keeping with this system 
the British military authorities supplying the munitions and 
materials select the ships, supervise their loading in harbour 
and convoying to the ports of destination. The Soviet Government 
would be most grateful if the same system of delivering 
munitions and convoying the ships to Soviet harbours were 
adopted by the U.S. Government.
Yours very sincerely, 
J. STALIN 
No. 15 
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO Mr STALIN 
(Retranslated) 
This is to acknowledge receipt of your message of February 
20th.10 
I would like you to know that in due course we will be glad 
to revise with you our agreement on the funds advanced by us 
under the Lend-Lease Act.9 At the moment the prime task is 
delivery of supplies to you. 
I have given directions to study your proposal for centralizing 
here munitions deliveries to Russia. 
We are greatly encouraged by the latest news of the successes 
of your Army. 
I send you warm congratulations on the 24th anniversary of 
the Red Army. 
February 23, 1942

18 
No. 16 
Received on March 16, 194211 
HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH STALIN, 
PRESIDENT 
OF THE SOVIET OF PEOPLE’S COMMISSARS 
OF THE U.S.S.R. 
My dear Mr Stalin. 
Mr Harriman has handed me your kind note dated October 3, 
1941.12 I appreciate very much hearing from you. 
A cable has already gone to you advising you that we can 
include the Soviet Union under our Lend-Lease arrangements.5 
I want to take this opportunity to assure you again that we 
are going to bend every possible effort to move these supplies 
to your battle lines. 
The determination of your armies and people to defeat Hitlerism 
is an inspiration to the free people of all the world. 
Very sincerely yours, 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
No. 17 
Received on April 12, 1942 
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT 
TO Mr STALIN 
It is unfortunate that geographical distance makes it practically 
impossible for you and me to meet at this time. Such a 
meeting of minds in personal conversation would be useful to 
the conduct of the war against Hitlerism. Perhaps if things go 
as well as we hope, you and I could spend a few days together 
next summer near our common border off Alaska. But, in the 
meantime, I regard it as of the utmost military importance 
that we have the nearest possible approach to an exchange of 
views. 
I have in mind a very important military proposal involving 
the utilization of our armed forces in a manner to relieve your 
critical Western Front. This objective carries great weight 
with me. 
Therefore, I wish you would consider sending Mr Molotov 
and a General upon whom you rely to Washington in the immediate 
future. Time is of the essence if we are to help in an

19 
important way. We will furnish them with a good transport 
plane so that they should be able to make the round trip in 
two weeks. 
I do not want by such a trip to go over the head of my friend, 
Mr Litvinov, in any way, as he will understand, but we can gain 
time by the visit I propose. 
I suggest this procedure not only because of the secrecy, 
which is so essential, but because I need your advice before we 
determine with finality the strategic course of our common 
military action. 
I have sent Hopkins to London relative to this proposal. 
The American people are thrilled by the magnificent fighting 
of your armed forces and we want to help you in the destruction 
of Hitler’s armies and material more than we are doing 
now. 
I send you my sincere regards. 
ROOSEVELT 
No. 18 
Sent on April 20, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
Thank you for the message which I received in Moscow a few 
days ago. 
The Soviet Government agrees that it is essential to arrange 
a meeting between V. M. Molotov and you for an exchange of 
views on the organisation of a second front in Europe in the 
near future. Molotov can arrive in Washington not later than 
May 10-15, accompanied by an appropriate military representative. 
It goes without saying that Molotov will also go to London 
to exchange views with the British Government. 
I have no doubt that I shall be able to have a personal meeting 
with you, to which I attach great importance, especially in 
view of the big problems of organising the defeat of Hitlerism 
that confront our two countries. 
Please accept my sincere regards and wishes for success in 
the struggle against the enemies of the United States of 
America. 
J. STALIN

20 
No. 19 
FOR Mr STALIN 
We are having grave difficulties with the northern convoy 
route and have informed Litvinov of the complications. You 
may be sure, however, that no effort will be omitted to get as 
many ships off as possible. 
I have heard of Admiral Standley’s cordial reception by you 
and wish to express my appreciation. 
I am looking forward to seeing Molotov and the moment I 
hear of the route we shall make preparations to provide immediate 
transportation. I do hope Molotov can stay with me in the 
White House while he is in Washington but we can make a 
private home nearby available if that is desired. 
ROOSEVELT 
May 4, 1942 
No. 20 
Sent on May 15, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
Thank you for the message delivered by M. M. Litvinov. In 
connection with the present difficulties in sailing and escorting 
ships to the U.S.S.R. I have already approached Prime Minister 
Churchill for his help in overcoming them as quickly as possible. 
As the delivery of cargoes from the U.S.A. and Britain in 
May is a pressing matter, I address the same request to you, 
Mr President. 
V. M. Molotov will leave for the U.S.A. and Britain a few 
days later than planned—on account of weather vagaries. It 
appears that he can fly in a Soviet aircraft—both to Britain and 
the U.S.A. I should add that the Soviet Government thinks it 
necessary for Molotov to travel without any press publicity 
until he returns to Moscow, as was done in the case of 
Mr Eden’s visit to Moscow last December. 
As to Molotov’s place of residence in Washington, both he 
and I thank you for your offer. 
J. STALIN

21 
No. 21 
Received on June 8, 1942 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I am greatly appreciative of your having sent Mr Molotov to 
see me and I am anxiously awaiting word of his safe arrival 
back in the Soviet Union. Our visit was very satisfactory.13 
No. 22 
Sent on June 12, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
The Soviet Government considers as you do, Mr President, 
that the results of V. M. Molotov’s visit to the U.S.A. were 
quite satisfactory.13 
I take the occasion to express to you, Mr President, the Soviet 
Government’s sincere gratitude for the cordial welcome 
given to Molotov and his colleagues during their stay in the 
U.S.A. 
He returned safely to Moscow today. 
No. 23 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
The situation, which is developing in the the Northern Area of 
the Pacific Ocean and in the Alaskan Area, presents tangible 
evidence that the Japanese Government may be taking steps to 
carry out operations against the Soviet Maritime Provinces. 
Should such an attack materialize the United States is ready to 
assist the Soviet Union with American air power provided the 
Soviet Union makes available to it suitable landing fields in the 
Siberian Area. The efforts of the Soviet Union and of the 
United States would of course have to be carefully coordinated 
in order promptly to carry out such an operation. 
Ambassador Litvinov has informed me that you have signified 
your approval of the movement of American planes viâ 
Alaska and Northern Siberia to the Western Front and I am 
pleased to receive this news. I am of the opinion that in our 
common interests it is essential that detailed information be 
immediately initiated between our joint Army, Navy and Air

22 
representatives in order to meet this new danger in the Pacific 
I feel that the question is so urgent as to warrant granting to 
the representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United 
States full power to initiate action and to make definite plans. 
For this reason I propose that you and I appoint such representatives 
and that we direct them immediately to confer in Moscow 
and Washington. 
June 17, 1942 
No. 24 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
In connection with my message to you of June 17. I wish to 
emphasize that if the delivery of aircraft from the United 
States to the Soviet Union could be effected through Alaska 
and Siberia instead of across Africa, as is now the practice, a 
great deal of time would be saved. Furthermore, the establishment 
of a ferry service through Siberia would permit the delivery 
by air of short-range aircraft to the Soviet Union instead 
of by sea, as is now the case. 
If landing fields can be constructed in the Siberian area and 
meteorological and navigational facilities can be established to 
connect up with the appropriate American air services, I am 
prepared to instruct the American ferry crews to deliver aircraft 
to you at Lake Baikal. This air route could be easily connected 
up with the landing fields leading into the Vladivostok 
area. In the event of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Maritime 
Provinces, such a Siberian airway would permit the United 
States quickly to transfer American aircraft units to the latter 
area for the purpose of coming to the assistance of the Soviet 
Union. 
From the studies I have made of the problems involved in 
the establishment of a Siberian-Lake Baikal air service, it is 
clear that certain rivers which flow into the Arctic Ocean would 
have to be utilized for the shipping into Eastern Siberia of such 
bulky goods as fuel, as well as machinery, needed for the 
construction of the landing fields. The reason why I am communicating 
with you before receiving an answer to my message 
of June 17 is dictated by the necessity for immediate action, 
since this freight must be moved while the rivers in question 
are free of ice, that is, during the next few weeks. 
If you are in agreement with the urgency and importance of 
this air route, I request that in order to expedite its development 
you authorize an American airplane to make a survey

23 
and experimental flight from Alaska over the proposed route 
for the purpose of ascertaining what equipment and supplies 
would be needed to construct the necessary landing fields and 
to establish the essential navigational services. Civilian clothes 
would be worn by the personnel making this flight and they 
would in fact conduct the flight as personnel of a commercial 
agency. Furthermore, all necessary measures would be taken 
to make sure that the personnel in no way would be identified 
with the military services of the United States. One or two 
Soviet officers or officials could, of course, be taken on the 
American plane at Nome, Alaska. 
The flight would not be in lieu of the conversations of the 
joint Army, Navy and Air representatives of the United States 
and the Soviet Union as recommended in my message of June 
17. It would be conducted for the sole purpose of enabling these 
representatives to enter into their discussions with more accurate 
and detailed information of the problems involved than 
would otherwise be the case. 
June 23, 1942 
No. 25 
Sent on July 1, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
With reference to your latest messages I should like to tell 
you that I fully concur with you as to the advisability of using 
the Alaska-Siberia route for U.S. aircraft deliveries to the 
Western Front. The Soviet Government has, therefore, issued 
instructions for completing at the earliest possible date the 
preparations now under way in Siberia to receive aircraft, that 
is, for adapting the existing air fields and providing them with 
additional facilities. As to whose pilots should fly the aircraft 
from Alaska, I think the task can be entrusted, as the State 
Department once suggested, to Soviet pilots who could travel 
to Nome or some other suitable place at the appointed time. 
An appropriate group of those pilots could be instructed to carry 
out the survey flight proposed by you. To fully ensure reception 
of the aircraft we should like to know the number of 
planes which the U.S.A. is allocating for despatch to the 
Western Front by that route. 
As to your proposal for a meeting between U.S. and Soviet 
Army and Navy representatives to exchange information if 
necessary, the Soviet Government is in agreement and would 
prefer to have the meeting in Moscow.

24 
No. 26 
Received on July 6, 1942 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
The Egyptian crisis which is threatening the supply route to 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has caused Prime Minister 
Churchill to direct to me an urgent inquiry whether forty 
A-20 bombers which are now in Iraq en route to the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics can be transferred to the Egyptian 
front. Because of limited information here, it is impossible for 
me to express judgment on this matter. For this reason I have 
thought it better to request you to make a decision, taking into 
consideration the interests of the war effort of the United Nations14 
as a whole. 
No. 27 
Sent on July 7, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
In view of the situation in which the Allied forces find themselves 
in Egypt I have no objection to forty of the A-20 bombers 
now in Iraq en route to the U.S.S.R. being transferred to the 
Egyptian front. 
No. 28 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
As the American representatives at the conferences to be 
held in Moscow which were suggested in my cable to you of 
June 17, I am designating Major-General Follet Bradley, our 
Naval Attaché, Captain Duncan, and our Military Attaché, 
Colonel Michela. General Bradley is the only representative 
who will be sent to Moscow from the United States. He will 
come fully prepared and authorized to discuss all plans in relation 
to the conference. 
We are prepared to have at Nome within the next few days 
an American four-engine plane to make the survey trip, three 
or four Soviet officers to accompany it. On the other hand we 
would be very glad to have American officers accompany a 
Soviet plane. 
July 7, 1942

25 
No. 29 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I am deeply appreciative of your telegram authorizing the 
transfer of forty bombers to Egypt. I have arranged for one 
hundred and fifteen medium tanks with ammunition and spare 
parts to be shipped to you at once in addition to all tanks being 
shipped in accordance with the terms of the July protocol.15 
July 9, 1942 
No. 30 
Sent on July 18, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
Your message on the designation of Major-General F. Bradley, 
Captain Duncan and Colonel Michela as the U.S. representatives 
at the Moscow conference has reached me. The U.S. 
delegates will be given every assistance in carrying out their 
assignment. 
On the Soviet side the conference will be attended by Major- 
General Sterligov, Colonel Kabanov and Colonel Levandovich. 
As regards the survey flight, we could in the next few days 
send a plane from Krasnoyarsk to Nome—I mean an American 
twin-engine aircraft—which could take on the U.S. officers on 
its way back from Nome. 
I take this opportunity to thank you for the news about the 
despatch of an additional hundred and fifteen tanks to the 
U.S.S.R. 
I consider it my duty to warn you that, according to our 
experts at the front, U.S. tanks catch fire very easily when hit 
from behind or from the side by anti-tank rifle bullets. The 
reason is that the high-grade gasoline used forms inside the tank 
a thick layer of highly inflammable fumes. German tanks also 
use gasoline, but of low grade which yields smaller quantities 
of fumes, hence, they are more fireproof. Our experts think that 
the diesel makes the best tank motor.

26 
No. 31 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I have received your message regarding the proposed survey 
flight from Alaska and the Moscow conference. Members of the 
survey flight will be in Alaska and ready to depart by August 
first. In this connection a four-engine bomber will be at Nome 
in the event that it is required. 
I greatly appreciate your report on the difficulties experienced 
at the front with American tanks. It will be most helpful 
to our tank experts in eradicating the trouble with this model 
to have this information. The fire hazard in future models will 
be reduced, however, as they will operate on a lower octane 
fuel. 
July 23, 1942 
No. 32 
Sent on August 2, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
I have received your latest message about the survey flight 
from Alaska. Our B-25 aircraft will arrive at Nome probably 
between August 8 and 10 and before taking off for the planned 
survey flight will pick up the three American members of the 
flight. 
No. 33 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I have asked Mr Harriman to go to Moscow to be at your call 
and that of your visitor16 to render any help which he may 
possibly give. 
August 5, 1942

27 
No. 34 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
Knowledge has come to me which I feel is definitely authentic 
that the Government of Japan has decided not to undertake 
military operations against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
at this time. This, I believe, means postponement of any 
attack on Siberia until the spring of next year. Will you be 
kind enough to give this information to your visitor.16 
August 5, 1942 
No. 35 
Sent on August 7, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
I have received your messages dated August 5. Thank you 
for advising me of Mr Harriman’s forthcoming arrival in Moscow. 
I read with interest your information on Japan, and shall 
not fail to pass it on to my visitor.16 
No. 36 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
Your frank opinion on the following plan, which I think may 
be useful, would be very much appreciated: 
For the primary purpose of explaining to the Governments 
of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt the 
danger they run in a German victory and that their greatest 
hope for the future lies in the defeat of Nazi domination of the 
places of the Near East and the Middle East, I am sending Mr 
Wendell Willkie to visit the Governments of these countries. 
For a wholly different purpose Mr Willkie would very much 
like to visit the Soviet Union. In addition to seeing for himself 
the undying unity of thought in repelling the invader and the 
great sacrifices which you are all making, he wants to know 
more about the wonderful progress made by the Russian people. 
As you know Mr Willkie was my opponent in the 1940 
elections and he is today the head of the minority party. He is 
heart and soul with my administration in our foreign policy of 
opposition to Nazism and real friendship with your Govern

28 
ment, and he is greatly helping in war work. For the sake of 
the present and the future I personally think that a visit to the 
Soviet Union by Mr Willkie would be a good thing. He would 
proceed to the Soviet Union by air during the first two weeks 
of September. 
I should be grateful if you would confidentially and frankly 
inform me whether you would welcome a very short visit by 
him. 
August 9, 1942 
No. 37 
Sent on August 12, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
Your message of August 9 to hand. The Soviet Government 
takes a favourable view of Mr Wendell Willkie’s visit to the 
U.S.S.R. and I can assure you that he will be most cordially 
entertained. 
No. 38 
Received on August 19, 1942 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I regret indeed that I was unable to have been with you and 
Mr Churchill in the conferences which have recently taken 
place in Moscow. The urgent needs of the military situation, 
especially insofar as the Soviet-German front is concerned, are 
well known to me. 
I am of the opinion that it will be difficult for the Japanese 
to dislodge us from the vantage point which we have gained in 
the area of the South-west Pacific.17 Although the naval losses 
of our forces were considerable in that area, the advantages 
which we have gained will justify them and I can assure you 
we are going to press them in a vigorous manner. I well realize 
on the other hand that the real enemy of both our countries 
is Germany and that at the earliest possible moment it will be 
necessary for both our countries to bring our power and forces 
to bear against Hitler. Just as soon as it is humanly possible to 
assemble the transportation you may be sure that this will be 
done.

29 
In the interim there will leave the United States for the 
Soviet Union during the month of August over 1,000 tanks, and 
at the same time other strategic materials are going forward, 
including aircraft. 
The fact that the Soviet Union is bearing the brunt of the 
fighting and losses during the year 1942 is well understood by 
the United States and I may state that we greatly admire the 
magnificent resistance which your country has exhibited. We 
are coming as quickly and as strongly to your assistance as 
we possibly can and I hope that you will believe me when I 
tell you this. 
No. 39 
Sent on August 22, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
Your message of August 19 received. I, too, regret that you 
were unable to take part in the talks which Mr Churchill and 
I recently had. 
With reference to what you say about the despatch of tanks 
and other strategic materials from the United States in August 
I should like to emphasise our special interest in receiving U.S. 
aircraft and other weapons, as well as trucks in the greatest 
numbers possible. It is my hope that every step will be taken 
to ensure early delivery of the cargoes to the Soviet Union, 
particularly over the northern sea route. 
No. 40 
HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH STALIN, 
PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET OF PEOPLE’S 
COMMISSARS OF THE U.S.S.R. 
Moscow 
My dear Mr Stalin, 
I am giving this letter of presentation to you to General 
Patrick J. Hurley, former Secretary of War and at present 
United States Minister to New Zealand. 
General Hurley is returning to his post in New Zealand and 
I have felt it to be of the highest importance that, prior to his 
return, he should be afforded the opportunity of visiting Moscow 
and of learning, so far as may be possible, through his own

30 
eyes the most significant aspects of our present world strategy. 
I wish him in this way, as a result of his personal experiences, 
to be able to assure the Government of New Zealand and likewise 
the Government of Australia that the most effective manner 
in which the United Nations14 can join in defeating Hitler 
is through the rendering of all possible assistance to the gallant 
Russian armies, who have so brilliantly withstood the attacks 
of Hitler’s armies. 
I have requested General Hurley likewise to visit Egypt, as 
well as Iran and Iraq, in order that he might thus personally 
familiarize himself with that portion of the Middle East and see 
for himself the campaign which is being carried on in that area. 
As you know, the Governments of Australia and of New 
Zealand have been inclined to believe that it was imperative 
that an immediate and all-out attack should be made by the 
United Nations against Japan. What I wish General Hurley to 
be able to say to those two Governments after his visit to the 
Soviet Union is that the best strategy for the United Nations 
to pursue is for them first to join in making possible the defeat 
of Hitler and that this is the best and surest way of insuring 
the defeat of Japan. 
I send you my heartiest congratulations on the magnificent 
achievements of the Soviet armies and my best wishes for your 
continued welfare. 
Believe me. 
Yours very sincerely, 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
October 5, 194218 
No. 41 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT 
In taking this opportunity to send you a personal message 
through the courtesy of Mr Standley, who is leaving for 
Washington, I should like to say a few words about U.S. 
military deliveries to the U.S.S.R. 
The difficulties of delivery are reported to be due primarily 
to shortage of shipping. To remedy the shipping situation the 
Soviet Government would be prepared to agree to a certain 
curtailment of U.S. arms deliveries to the Soviet Union. We 
should be prepared temporarily fully to renounce deliveries of 
tanks, guns, ammunition, pistols, etc. At the same time, however, 
we are badly in need of increased deliveries of modern 
fighter aircraft—such as Aircobras—and certain other sup

31 
plies. It should be borne in mind that the Kittyhawk is no 
match for the modern German fighter. 
It would be very good if the U.S.A. could ensure the monthly 
delivery of at least the following items: 500 fighters, 8,000 to 
10,000 trucks, 5,000 tons of aluminium, and 4,000 to 5,000 tons 
of explosives. Besides, we need, within 12 months, two million 
tons of grain (wheat) and as much as we can have of fats, 
concentrated foods and canned meat. We could bring in a considerable 
part of the food supplies in Soviet ships viâ Vladivostok 
if the U.S.A. consented to turn over to the U.S.S.R. 20 to 
30 ships at the least to replenish our fleet. I have talked this 
over with Mr Willkie, feeling certain that he will convey it 
to you. 
As regards the situation at the front, you are undoubtedly 
aware that in recent months our position in the South, particularly 
in the Stalingrad area, has deteriorated due to shortage 
of aircraft, mostly fighters. The Germans have bigger stocks of 
aircraft than we anticipated. In the South they have at least a 
twofold superiority in the air, which makes it impossible for 
us to protect our troops. War experience has shown that the 
bravest troops are helpless unless protected against air attack. 
October 7, 1942 
No. 42 
Received on October 9, 1942 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I have received a copy of the Prime Minister’s message to 
you. We are going to move as rapidly as possible to place an 
air force under your strategic command in the Caucasus. I am 
now trying to find additional planes for you immediately and 
will advise you soon. I am also trying to arrange to have some 
of our merchant ships transferred to your flag to increase your 
flow of materials in the Pacific. I have just ordered an automobile 
tire plant to be made available to you. We are sending very 
substantial reinforcements to the Persian Gulf to increase the 
flow of supplies over that route and are confident that this can 
be done. We are sending a large number of engines and other 
equipment as well as personnel. I am confident that our contemplated 
operation will be successfull. 
The gallant defense of Stalingrad has thrilled everyone in 
America and we are confident of its success.

32 
No. 43 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I am examining every possibility of increasing the number 
of fighter planes to be sent to the Soviet Union. The fact of the 
matter is that all Aircobra production is now going to fighting 
fronts immediately. While these urgent combat requirements 
make it impossible to increase the number of Aircobras for you 
at the moment, nevertheless I am hoping to increase our production 
of this type at the expense of other types in order to 
give you more planes. Also if our forthcoming operations which 
you know about turn out as successfully as they promise, we 
would then be in a position to release fighters. 
Our heavy bombardment group has been ordered mobilized 
immediately for the purpose of operating on your southern 
flank. This movement will not be contingent on any other 
operation or commitment and these planes and sufficient transports 
will go to the Caucasus at an early date. 
I shall telegraph you in a day or so in reference to explosives, 
aluminium and trucks. 
Twenty merchant ships for use in the Pacific are being made 
available to you. 
In October we will ship to you 276 combat planes and everything 
possible is being done to expedite these deliveries. 
October 12, 1942 
No. 44 
Sent on October 15, 1942 
REPLY FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Your message of October 12 to hand. I am grateful for the 
information. 
J. STALIN

33 
No. 45 
Received on October 16, 1942 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I am glad to inform you, in response to your request, that 
the items involved can be made available for shipment as follows: 
Wheat; two million short tons during the remainder of the 
protocol year15 at approximately equal monthly rates. 
Trucks; 8,000 to 10,000 per month. 
Explosives; 4,000 short tons in November and 5,000 tons per 
month thereafter. 
Meat; 15,000 tons per month. 
Canned Meat; 10,000 tons per month. 
Lard; 12,000 tons per month. 
Soap Stock; 5,000 tons per month. 
Vegetable Oil; 10,000 tons per month. 
I will advise you at an early date of the aluminum shipments 
which I am still exploring. 
I have given orders that no effort be spared to keep our routes 
fully supplied with ships and cargo in conformity with your 
desires as to priorities on our commitments to you. 
No. 46 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO U.S. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I have received your message of October 16. I am behind in 
answering because front affairs held my attention. The thing 
now is to have the promised cargoes delivered to the U.S.S.R. 
as scheduled by you. 
October 19, 1942 
No. 47 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I have just received from Admiral Standley your personal 
note, a copy of which you had previously sent me.19 The Ambassador 
has also given me a very full report of his views on 
the situation in the Soviet Union. He confirms reports we have

34 
already received of the fighting qualities and strength of the 
Soviet Army and the urgent need of the supplies which you 
have indicated. These needs I fully recognize. 
October 24, 1942 
No. 48 
Sent on October 28, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
Your message of October 24 received. Thank you for the 
information. 
No. 49 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
My dear Mr President, 
Thank you very much for your letter, which reached me 
through General Hurley18 today. I have had a long talk with 
him on strategic matters. I think that he understood me and is 
now convinced of the soundness of the Allies’ present strategy. 
He asked for an opportunity to visit one of our fronts, in particular 
the Caucasus. This opportunity will be provided. 
No serious changes have occurred on the Soviet-German 
front in the past week. We plan to launch our winter campaign 
in the near future and are preparing for it. I shall keep you 
informed about it. 
All of us here rejoice at the brilliant success of U.S. and 
British arms in North Africa. Congratulations on the victory. 
With all my heart I wish you further success. 
Yours very sincerely, 
STALIN 
November 14, 1942

35 
No. 50 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I am glad you have been so kind to General Hurley. As you 
can well recognize, I have had a problem in persuading the 
people of Australia and New Zealand that the menace of Japan 
can be most effectively met by destroying the Nazis first. General 
Hurley will be able to tell them at first hand how you and 
Churchill and I are in complete agreement on this. 
Our recent battles in the South-west Pacific make the position 
there more secure even though we have not yet eliminated 
attempts by the Japanese to extend their southward drive. 
The American and British staffs are now studying further 
moves in the event that we secure the whole south shore of 
the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Syria. Before any further 
step is taken, both Churchill and I want to consult with you 
and your staff, because whatever we do next in the Mediterranean 
will have a definite bearing on your magnificent campaign 
and your proposed moves this coming winter. 
I do not have to tell you to keep up the good work. You 
are doing that, and I honestly feel that things everywhere look 
brighter. 
With my warm regards, 
ROOSEVELT 
November 19, 1942 
No. 51 
Sent on November 20, 1942 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT 
We have begun the offensive operations in the Stalingrad area 
—in its southern and north-western sectors. The objective of 
the first stage is to seize the Stalingrad-Likhaya railway and 
disrupt the communications of the Stalingrad group of the 
German troops. In the north-western sector the German front 
has been pierced along a 22-kilometre line and along a 12-kilometre 
line in the southern sector. The operation is proceeding 
satisfactorily.

36 
No. 52 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I want you to know that we have hit the Japs very hard in 
the Solomons. There is a probability that we have broken the 
backbone of the strength of their fleet, although they still have 
too many aircraft carriers to suit me, but we may well get some 
more of them soon. 
We are in the South-west Pacific with very heavy forces 
by air, land and sea and we do not intend to play a waiting 
game. We are going to press our advantages. 
I am sure we are sinking far more Jap ships and destroying 
more airplanes than they can build. 
I am hopeful that we are going to drive the Germans out of 
Africa soon and then we will give the Italians a taste of some 
real bombing, and I am quite sure they will never stand up 
under that kind of pressure. 
The news from the Stalingrad area is most encouraging and 
I send you my warmest congratulations. 
November 26, 1942 
No. 53 
Sent on November 27, 1942 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Thank you for your message, received on November 21. I 
fully appreciate your desire to explain the military set-up to 
people in Australia and New Zealand, and your preoccupation 
with operations in the South-west Pacific. As to the Mediterranean 
operations, which are making such favourable progress 
and are important in terms of changing the whole military 
situation in Europe, I share your view that the time is ripe for 
appropriate consultations between the General Staffs of the 
U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. 
Heartfelt regards and best wishes for further success in your 
offensive.

37 
No. 54 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Thank you for your message which reached me on November 
27. I am glad to hear of your successes in the Solomons 
area and of the strong build-up of your forces in the Southwest 
Pacific. 
Feeling certain of the speedy expulsion of Germans from 
North Africa, I trust that this will help in launching Allied offensive 
operations in Europe. The intensive air raids planned 
for Italy will no doubt be very- useful. 
We have achieved some success in the Stalingrad operation, 
largely facilitated by snowfall and fog which prevented the 
Germans from making full use of their aircraft. 
We have decided to launch operations on the Central Front, 
too, to keep the enemy from moving his forces south. 
I send you warm regards and best wishes to the U.S. Armed 
Forces. 
November 28, 1942 
No. 55 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
The more I consider our mutual military situation and the 
necessity for reaching early strategic decisions, the more persuaded 
I am that you, Churchill and I should have an early 
meeting. 
It seems to me that a conference of our military leaders 
alone will not be sufficient, first, because they could come to 
no ultimate decisions without our approval and, secondly, 
because I think we should come to some tentative understanding 
about the procedures which should be adopted in event of 
a German collapse. 
My most compelling reason is that I am very anxious to have 
a talk with you. My suggestion would be that we meet secretly 
in some secure place in Africa that is convenient to all three 
of us. The time, about January 15th to 20th. 
We would each of us bring a very small staff of our top army, 
air and naval commanders. 
I hope that you will consider this proposal favourably because 
I can see no other way of reaching the vital strategic

38 
decisions which should be made soon by all of us together. 
If the right decision is reached, we may, and I believe will, 
knock Germany out of the war much sooner than we anticipated. 
I can readily fly, but I consider Iceland or Alaska out of the 
question at this time of the year. Some place can, I think, be 
found in Southern Algeria or at or near Khartoum where all 
visitors and press can be kept out. As a mere suggestion as to 
date would you think of sometime around January 15. 
December 2, 1942 
No. 56 
Sent on December 6, 1942 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Your message reached me on December 5. 
I welcome the idea of a meeting between the three heads of 
the Governments to establish a common strategy. To my great 
regret, however, I shall be unable to leave the Soviet Union 
This is so crucial a moment that I cannot absent myself even 
for a single day. Just now major military operations—part of 
our winter campaign—are under way, nor will they be relaxed 
in January. It is more than likely that it will be the other way 
round. 
Fighting is developing both at Stalingrad and on the Central 
Front. At Stalingrad we have encircled a large group of German 
troops and hope to complete their destruction. 
No. 57 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I am deeply disappointed you feel you cannot get away for 
a conference in January. There are many matters of vital importance 
to be discussed between us. These relate not only to 
vital strategic decision, but also to things we should talk over 
in a tentative way in regard to emergency policies which we 
should be ready with, if, and when, conditions in Germany 
permit.

39 
These would also include other matters relating to future 
policies about North Africa and the Far East which cannot be 
discussed by our military people alone. 
I fully realize your strenuous situation now and in the immediate 
future and the necessity of your presence close to the 
fighting front. Therefore I want to suggest that we set a tentative 
date for meeting in North Africa about March 1. 
December 8, 1942 
No. 58 
Sent on December 14, 1942 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
I, too, express deep regret at not being able to leave the 
Soviet Union in the immediate future, or even in early March. 
Front affairs simply will not let me do so. Indeed, they necessitate 
my continuous presence. 
I do not know as yet what were the specific matters that you, 
Mr President, and Mr Churchill wanted discussed at our joint 
conference. Could we not discuss them by correspondence until 
we have an opportunity to meet? I think we shall not differ. 
I feel confident that no time is being wasted, that the promise 
to open a second front in Europe, which you, Mr President, and 
Mr Churchill gave for 1942 or the spring of 1943 at the latest, 
will be kept and that a second front in Europe will really be 
opened jointly by Great Britain and the U.S.A. next spring. 
With reference to the rumours about the Soviet attitude to 
the use of Darlan and people like him, I should like to tell you 
that as I and my colleagues see it, Eisenhower’s policy towards 
Darlan, Boisson, Giraud and the others is absolutely sound. I 
consider it an important achievement that you have succeeded 
in winning Darlan and others to the Allied side against Hitler. 
Earlier I wrote the same to Mr Churchill. 
No. 59 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I am not clear as to just what has happened in regard to our 
offer of American air assistance in the Caucasus. I am fully 
willing to send units with American pilots and crews. I think 
they should operate by units under their American comman

40 
ders, but each group would, of course, be under overall Russian 
command as to tactical objectives. 
Please let me know your desires as soon as possible, as I 
truly want to help all I can. 
Pursuit plane program would not be affected. What I refer 
to is essentially the bombing plane type which can be flown to 
the Caucasus. 
December 16, 1942 
No. 60 
Sent on December 18, 1942 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO THE U.S. PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT 
Thank you very much for the willingness to help us. The 
Anglo-American squadrons with crews are no longer needed 
in Transcaucasia. The main battles are being fought, and will 
be fought, on the Central Front and in the Voronezh area. I 
should be most grateful if you would expedite the despatch of 
aircraft, especially fighters, but without crews, whom you now 
need badly for use in the areas mentioned. 
A feature of the Soviet Air Force is that we have more than 
enough pilots but suffer from a shortage of machines. 
No. 61 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I am very sorry arrangements for conference could not be 
made but I can well understand your position. This will 
acknowledge your note about the Anglo-American squadrons. 
We will expedite delivery of planes to the utmost. I have arranged 
to get you ten transport planes in January. 
I am writing you in regard to certain post-war activities. 
December 21, 1942

41 
No. 62 
Received on December 28, 1942 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
Struggling side by side against powerful foes, thousands 
upon thousands of soldiers of those nations, large and small, 
which are united in defense of freedom and justice and human 
rights face the holiday season far from home, across oceans 
or continents, in fields-of desert sand or winter snow, in jungles, 
forests, on warships or merchant vessels, on island ramparts 
from Iceland to the Solomons, in the old and new worlds. 
They strive to the limit of their strength, without regard 
for the clock or the calendar, to hold the enemy in check and 
to push him back. They strike mighty blows and receive blows 
in return. They fight the good fight in order that they may win 
victory which will bring to the world peace, freedom, and the 
advancement of human welfare. 
With a deep and abiding sense of gratitude the Congress of 
the United States has by a joint resolution asked me to transmit 
on behalf of the people of the United States to the armed 
forces and auxiliary services of our Allies on land, on sea, and 
in the air, the best wishes and greetings of the season to them 
and to their families and a fervent hope and prayer for a 
speedy and complete victory and a lasting peace. 
Accordingly, I shall be grateful to you if you will convey to 
your armed forces and auxiliary services, in the name of the 
Congress of the United States, in my own name, and in the 
name of the people of the United States, the cordial wishes and 
greetings and the hope and prayer expressed in the joint resolution.

42 
No. 63 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I note in a radio news report from Tokyo that a Japanese 
submarine sank an Allied nation submarine in the Pacific on 
October 12. 
This report appears to refer to your submarine, Love-16, 
sunk by enemy action on October 11 while en route to the 
United States from Alaska,20 and I am sending to you this 
expression of regret for the loss of your ship with its gallant 
crew, and of my appreciation of the part your gallant Navy is 
also contributing to the Allied cause in addition to the heroic 
accomplishments of your Army. 
December 30, 1942 
No. 64 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
In the event that Japan should attack Russia in the Far 
East, I am prepared to assist you in that theater with an American 
air force of approximately one hundred four-engine bombardment 
airplanes as early as practicable, provided that certain 
items of supply and equipment are furnished by Soviet 
authorities and that suitable operation facilities are prepared 
in advance. 
Supply of our units must be entirely by air transport, hence 
it will be necessary for the Soviet Government to furnish such 
items as bombs, fuel, lubricants, transportation, shelter, heat 
and other minor items to be determined. 
Although we have no positive information that Japan will 
attack Russia, it does appear to be an eventual probability. 
Therefore, in order that we may be prepared for this contingency, 
I propose that the survey of air force facilities in the 
Far East, authorized by you to General Bradley on October 6 
be made now, and that the discussions initiated on November 
11 on your authority between General Bradley and General 
Korolenko be continued. 
It is my intention to appoint General Bradley, who has my 
full confidence, to continue these discussions for the United 
States if you so agree. He will be empowered to explore for the 
United States every phase of combined Russo-American operations 
in the Far East theater and based upon his survey to 
recommend the composition and strength of our air forces,

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
43 
which will be allocated to assist you should the necessity arise. 
He will also determine the extent of advance preparations 
practicable and necessary to insure effective participation of 
our units promptly on initiation of hostilities. His party will 
not exceed twenty persons to fly into Russia in two American 
Douglas DC-3 type airplanes. 
If this meets with your approval, I would suggest that they 
proceed from Alaska along the ferry route into Siberia, thence, 
under Russian direction, to the headquarters of the Soviet 
armies in the Far East, and thence to such other places in Russia 
as may be necessary to make their quiet survey and discuss 
operating plans. 
It would be very helpful if an English-speaking Russian officer 
such as Captain Vladimir Ovnovin, Washington, or Captain 
Smolyarov in Moscow be detailed to accompany General Bradley 
as adjutant and liaison officer. 
I seize this opportunity of expressing my admiration for the 
courage, stamina and military prowess of your great Russian 
armies as reported to me by General Bradley and as demonstrated 
by your great victories of the past month. 
December 30, 1942 
No. 65 
Sent on January 1, 1943 
TO Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
I would ask you, Mr President, to convey to the United States 
Congress and accept my gratitude for the cordial greetings and 
good wishes sent to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in 
the name of the American people. 
J. STALIN 
No. 66 
Sent on January 5, 1943 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Your message concerning the Far East received. I thank you 
for the readiness to send 100 bombers to the Far East for the 
Soviet Union. I must say, however, that what we need at pres

44 
ent is aircraft, not in the Far East, where the U.S.S.R. is not 
fighting, but on a front where a most cruel war is being waged 
against the Germans, that is, on the Soviet-German front. The 
arrival of those aircraft without pilots—because we have a sufficient 
number of pilots—on the South-Western or Central 
Front would play a notable part in the most important sectors 
of our struggle against Hitler. 
As regards the course of the war on our fronts, so far our 
offensive is, on the whole, making satisfactory progress. 
No. 67 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
After reading your reply to my radio concerning the Far 
East, I am afraid I did not make myself clear. As I previously 
explained reference South Caucasus, it is not practicable 
to send heavy bombers to Russia at this time other than in 
existing organized units. Our proposal regarding the one 
hundred planes referred to a situation which would occur if 
hostilities were actually to break out between Japan and 
Russia. 
Under such conditions, we calculated that by regrouping our 
air units in the Pacific theater, one hundred planes in organized 
units could be concentrated in Eastern Siberia because their 
action as well as your battle there would enable us to reduce 
our air strength elsewhere in the Pacific theater. 
My radio was intended to be in the nature of anticipatory 
protective planning against a possibility only. 
The immediate action recommended was in reference to the 
survey and discussions by General Bradley with Soviet officials. 
Only by such preliminary survey and advance planning will 
it be possible to render reasonably prompt assistance in the 
event of an outbreak of hostilities in Siberia. I should like to 
send General Marshall to Moscow for a visit in the very near 
future, and if this can be arranged, I hope that you will be able 
to discuss this matter with him at that time. 
He will be able to tell you about the current situation in 
Africa and also about planned operations for balance of this 
year in all war theaters. I think this will be very helpful and 
he will have the latest news. 
Meanwhile I would appreciate an early reply to my proposal 
of December 30 that General Bradley and his party proceed 
without delay to the Far East for survey and staff discussions.

45 
My deep appreciation for the continuing advances of your 
armies. The principle of attrition of the enemy forces on all 
fronts is beginning to work. 
January 8, 1943 
No. 68 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I have arranged that two hundred C-47 transport planes be 
assigned to you in 1943 beginning in January. 
Your mission here is being advised of the dates of delivery 
by months. 
I am going to do everything I can to give you another one 
hundred but you can definitely count on the two hundred 
planes referred to above. 
January 9, 1943 
No. 69 
Sent on January 13, 1943 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Thank you for the decision to send 200 transport planes to 
the Soviet Union. 
As to sending bomber units to the Far East, I have already 
pointed out in my previous messages that what we need is not 
air force units, but planes without pilots, because we have 
more than enough pilots of our own. Secondly, we need your 
help in the way of aircraft not in the Far East where the 
U.S.S.R. is not in a state of war, but on the Soviet-German 
front, where the need for aircraft aid is particularly great. 
I was rather surprised at your proposal that General Bradley 
should inspect Russian military objectives in the Far East and 
elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. It should be perfectly obvious that 
only Russians can inspect Russian military objectives, just as 
U.S. military objectives can be inspected by none but Americans. 
There should be no unclarity in this matter. 
Concerning General Marshall’s visit to the U.S.S.R. I must 
say I am not quite clear about his mission. Kindly advise me 
of the purpose of the visit so that I can consider the matter 
with full understanding and reply accordingly.

46 
My colleagues are upset by the fact that the operations in 
North Africa have come to a standstill and, I gather, for a long 
time, too. Would you care to comment on the matter? 
No. 70 
Received on January 27, 1943 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL 
TO PREMIER STALIN 
We have been in conference with our military advisers and 
have decided on the operations which are to be undertaken by 
the American and British forces in the first nine months of 
1943.21 We wish to inform you of our intentions at once. We 
believe that these operations, together with your powerful 
offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943. Every 
effort must be made to accomplish this purpose. 
2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate 
on the defeat of Germany with a view to achieving an 
early and decisive victory in the European theater. At the same 
time we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain 
the initiative in the Pacific and the Far East and sustain China 
and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to 
other theaters such as your Maritime Provinces. 
3. Our main desire has been to divert strong German land 
and air forces from the Russian front and to send Russia the 
maximum flow of supplies. We shall spare no exertion to send 
you material assistance in any case by every available route. 
4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North 
Africa and set up naval and air installations to open: 
(1) an effective passage through the Mediterranean for military 
traffic, and 
(2) an intensive bombardment of important Axis targets in 
Southern Europe. 
5. We have made the decision to launch large-scale amphibious 
operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible 
moment. The preparation for these operations is now under way 
and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, including 
landing craft and shipping, in Egypt and the North Africa 
ports. In addition we shall concentrate within the United Kingdom 
a strong American land and air force. These, combined with 
the British forces in the United Kingdom, will prepare themselves 
to re-enter the continent of Europe as soon as practicable. 
These concentrations will certainly be known to our enemies

47 
but they will not know where or when or on what scale we 
propose striking. They will, therefore, be compelled to divert 
both land and air forces to all the shores of France, the Low 
Countries, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and the Levant, and Italy, 
Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese. 
6. In Europe we shall increase the Allied bomber offensive 
from the United Kingdom against Germany at a rapid rate and 
by midsummer it should be double its present strength. Our 
experiences to date have shown that day bombing attacks result 
in the destruction of, and damage to, large numbers of German 
fighter aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo and weight 
of daylight and night attacks will lead to greatly increased 
material and moral damage in Germany and rapidly deplete 
German fighter strength. As you are aware, we are already 
containing more than half the German Air Force in Western 
Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our 
intensified and diversified bombing offensive, together with the 
other operations which we are undertaking, will compel further 
withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian 
front. 
7. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from 
Rabaul22 within the next few months and thereafter to exploit 
the success in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to 
increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen 
this channel of supply to China. We intend to increase our 
Air Forces in China at once. We shall not, however, allow our 
offensives against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take 
advantage of every opportunity that may present itself for the 
decisive defeat of Germany in 1943. 
8. Our ruling purpose is to bring to bear upon Germany and 
Italy the maximum forces by land, sea and air which can be 
physically applied. 
No. 71 
Sent on January 30, 1943 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT, 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr CHURCHILL 
Your friendly joint message reached me on January 27. Thank 
you for informing me of the Casablanca decisions about the 
operations to be undertaken by the U.S. and British armed

48 
forces in the first nine months of 1943. Assuming that your 
decisions on Germany are designed to defeat her by opening a 
second front in Europe in 1943, I should be grateful if you 
would inform me of the concrete operations planned and of 
their timing. 
As to the Soviet Union, I can assure you that the Soviet armed 
forces will do all in their power to continue the offensive 
against Germany and her allies on the Soviet-German front. 
We expect to finish our winter campaign, circumstances permitting, 
in the first half of February. Our troops are tired, they 
are in need of rest and they will hardly be able to carry on the 
offensive beyond that period.
No. 72 
Received on February 5, 1943 
HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH V. STALIN, 
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES 
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
Moscow 
As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United 
States of America I congratulate you on the brilliant victory at 
Stalingrad of the armies under your Supreme Command. The 
one hundred and sixty-two days of epic battle for the city 
which has for ever honoured your name and the decisive result 
which all Americans are celebrating today will remain one of 
the proudest chapters in this war of the peoples united against 
Nazism and its emulators. The commanders and fighters of your 
armies at the front and the men and women, who have supported 
them in factory and field, have combined not only to 
cover with glory their country’s arms, but to inspire by their 
example fresh determination among all the United Nations14 
to bend every energy to bring about the final defeat and unconditional 
surrender of the common enemy. 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

49 
No. 73 
Sent on February 6, 1943 
TO Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The White House, Washington 
Thank you for your congratulations on the victory of the 
Soviet troops at Stalingrad. 
I am convinced that the joint combat operations of the armed 
forces of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union 
will soon lead to victory over our common foe. 
J. STALIN 
No. 74 
Received on February 12, 1943 
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, 
Mr WINSTON CHURCHILL, 
TO M. STALIN23 
Your message of January 30th. I have now consulted the 
President and the matter has been referred to the Staffs on 
both sides of the Ocean. I am authorized to reply for us both 
as follows: 
(a) There are a quarter of a million Germans and Italians in 
Eastern Tunisia. We hope to destroy or expel these during 
April, if not earlier. 
(b) When this is accomplished, we intend in July, or earlier 
if possible, to seize Sicily with the object of clearing the Mediterranean, 
promoting an Italian collapse with the consequent 
effect on Greece and Yugoslavia and wearing down of the German 
Air Force; this is to be closely followed by an operation in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, probably against the Dodecanese. 
(c) This operation will involve all the shipping and landing 
craft we can get together in the Mediterranean and all the 
troops we can have trained in assault-landing in time, and will 
be of the order of three or four hundred thousand men. We

50 
shall press any advantage to the utmost once ports of entry and 
landing bases have been established. 
(d) We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our 
resources for a cross-Channel operation in August, in which 
British and United States units would participate. Here again 
shipping and assault-landing craft will be the limiting factors. 
If the operation is delayed by the weather or other reasons, it 
will be prepared with stronger forces for September. The timing 
of this attack must, of course, be dependent upon the condition 
of German defensive possibilities across the Channel at that 
time. 
(e) Both operations will be supported by very large United 
States and British air forces, and that across the Channel by 
the whole metropolitan Air Force of Great Britain. Together 
these operations will strain to the very utmost the shipping 
resources of Great Britain and the United States. 
(f) The President and I have enjoined upon our Combined 
Chiefs of Staff 24 the need for the utmost speed and for reinforcing 
the attacks to the extreme limit that is humanly and physically 
possible. 
February 9th, 1943 
No. 75 
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT 
On February 12 I received from Mr Churchill a message 
giving additional information on the decisions taken by the 
two of you at Casablanca. Since, according to Mr Churchill, his 
message is a common reply giving your opinion as well, I 
should like to make some comments, which I have conveyed to 
Mr Churchill. 
It appears from the message that the date—February—fixed 
earlier for completing the operations in Tunisia is now set back 
to April. There is no need to demonstrate at length the undesirability 
of this delay in operations against the Germans and 
Italians. It is now, when the Soviet troops are still keeping up 
their broad offensive, that action by the Anglo-American troops 
in North Africa is imperative. Simultaneous pressure on Hitler 
from our front and from yours in Tunisia would be of great 
positive significance for our common cause and would create 
most serious difficulties for Hitler and Mussolini. It would also 
expedite the operations you are planning in Sicily and the 
Eastern Mediterranean.

51 
As to the opening of a second front in Europe, in particular 
in France, it is planned, judging by your communication, for 
August or September. As I see it, however, the situation calls 
for shortening these time limits to the utmost and for the 
opening of a second front in the West at a date much earlier 
than the one mentioned. So that the enemy should not be given 
a chance to recover, it is very important, to my mind, that the 
blow from the West, instead of being put off till the second 
half of the year, be delivered in spring or early summer. 
According to reliable information at our disposal, since the 
end of December, when for some reason the Anglo-American 
operations in Tunisia were suspended, the Germans have moved 
27 divisions, including five armoured divisions, to the Soviet- 
German front from France, the Low Countries and Germany. 
In other words, instead of the Soviet Union being aided by 
diverting German forces from the Soviet-German front, what 
we get is relief for Hitler, who, because of the let-up in Anglo- 
American operations in Tunisia, was able to move additional 
troops against the Russians. 
The foregoing indicates that the sooner we make joint use of 
the Hitler camp’s difficulties at the front, the more grounds we 
shall have for anticipating early defeat for Hitler. Unless we 
take account of this and profit by the present moment to further 
our common interests, it may well be that, having gained a respite 
and rallied their forces, the Germans might recover. It is 
clear to you and us that such an undesirable miscalculation 
should not be made. 
February 16, 1943 
No. 76 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
In reply to your message of February 16 in which you set 
forth certain considerations that you had transmitted to 
Mr Churchill in reply to his message of February 12 to you, I 
desire to state that I share your regret that the Allied effort in 
North Africa did not proceed in accordance with the schedule. 
It was interrupted by unexpected heavy rains that made the 
roads extremely difficult for both supplies and troops proceeding 
to the front lines from our landing ports. These rains made 
the fields and mountains impassable. 
I am fully aware of the adverse effect on the common Allied 
effort of this delay and I am taking every possible step to begin

52 
successful aggressive action against the forces of the Axis in 
Africa at the earliest possible moment with the purpose of 
accomplishing their destruction. 
The wide dispersion of America’s transportation facilities at 
the present time is well known by you and I can assure you 
that a maximum effort to increase our transportation is being 
made. 
I understand the importance of a military effort on the continent 
of Europe at the earliest date practicable in order to 
reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army. You may be sure 
that the American war effort will be projected on to the European 
Continent at as early a date subsequent to success in 
North Africa as transportation facilities can be provided by our 
maximum effort. 
We wish for the continuance of the success of your heroic 
army which is an inspiration to all of us. 
February 22, 1943 
No. 77 
Received on February 23, 1943 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
On behalf of the people of the United States I want to express 
to the Red Army on its twenty-fifth anniversary our profound 
admiration for its magnificent achievements unsurpassed in all 
history. For many months in spite of many tremendous losses 
in supplies, transportation and territory the Red Army denied 
victory to a most powerful enemy. It checked him at Leningrad, 
at Moscow, at Voronezh, in the Caucasus and finally at 
the immortal battle of Stalingrad the Red Army not only 
defeated the enemy but launched the great offensive which is 
still moving forward along the whole front from the Baltic to 
the Black Sea. The enforced retreat of the enemy is costing 
him heavily in men, supplies, territory and especially in morale. 
Such achievements can only be accomplished by an army that 
has skillful leadership, sound organization, adequate training 
and above all determination to defeat the enemy no matter 
what the cost in self-sacrifice. At the same time I also wish to 
pay tribute to the Russian people from whom the Red Army 
springs and upon whom it is dependent for its men, women 
and supplies. They, too, are giving their full efforts to the war 
and are making the supreme sacrifice. The Red Army and the 
Russian people have surely started the Hitler forces on the

53 
road to ultimate defeat and have earned the lasting admiration 
of the people of the United States. 
No. 78 
Sent on February 23, 1943 
TO THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
Washington 
Please accept my heartfelt thanks for your friendly message 
on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Red Army and 
your high praise of its combat achievements. 
I share your confidence that these achievements clear the 
way for the final defeat of our common enemy, who must and 
shall be crushed by the combined might of our countries and 
of all the freedom-loving nations. 
J. STALIN 
No. 79 
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Now that I have Mr Churchill’s reply to my message of February 
16, I consider it my duty to answer yours of February 
22, which likewise was a reply to mine of February 16. 
I learned from Mr Churchill’s message that Anglo-American 
operations in North Africa, far from being accelerated, are being 
postponed till the end of April; indeed, even this date is 
given in rather vague terms. In other words, at the height of 
the fighting against the Hitler troops—in February and March— 
the Anglo-American offensive in North Africa, far from having 
been stepped up, has been called off altogether, and the time 
fixed for it has been set back. Meanwhile Germany has succeeded 
in moving from the West 36 divisions, including six 
armoured, to be used against the Soviet troops. The difficulties 
that this has created for the Soviet Army and the extent to 
which it has eased the German position on the Soviet-German 
front will be readily appreciated.

54 
Mr Churchill has also informed me that the Anglo-American 
operation against Sicily is planned for June. For all its importance 
that operation can by no means replace a second front 
in France. But I fully welcome, of course, your intention to 
expedite the carrying out of the operation. 
At the same time I consider it my duty to state that the early 
opening of a second front in France is the most important 
thing. You will recall that you and Mr Churchill thought it possible 
to open a second front as early as 1942 or this spring at 
the latest. The grounds for doing so were weighty enough. 
Hence it should be obvious why I stressed in my message of 
February 16 the need for striking in the West not later than 
this spring or early summer. 
The Soviet troops have fought strenuously all winter and are 
continuing to do so, while Hitler is taking important measures 
to rehabilitate and reinforce his Army for the spring and summer 
operations against the U.S.S.R.; it is therefore particularly 
essential for us that the blow from the West be no longer 
delayed, that it be delivered this spring or in early summer. 
I appreciate the considerable difficulties caused by a shortage 
of transport facilities, of which you advised me in your message. 
Nevertheless, I think I must give a most emphatic warning, 
in the interest of our common cause, of the grave danger 
with which further delay in opening a second front in France 
is fraught. That is why the vagueness of both your reply and 
Mr Churchill’s as to the opening of a second front in France 
causes me concern, which I cannot help expressing. 
March 16, 1943 
No. 80 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
The behaviour of the Polish Government towards the U.S.S.R. 
of late is, in the view of the Soviet Government, completely 
abnormal and contrary to all the rules and standards governing 
relations between two allied states. 
The anti-Soviet slander campaign launched by the German 
fascists in connection with the Polish officers whom they themselves 
murdered in the Smolensk area, in German-occupied 
territory, was immediately seized upon by the Sikorski Government 
and is being fanned in every way by the Polish official 
press. Far from countering the infamous fascist slander against

55 
the U.S.S.R., the Sikorski Government has not found it necessary 
even to address questions to the Soviet Government or to 
request information on the matter. 
The Hitler authorities, having perpetrated a monstrous crime 
against the Polish officers, are now staging a farcical investigation, 
using for the purpose certain pro-fascist Polish elements 
picked by themselves in occupied Poland, where everything is 
under Hitler’s heel and where no honest Pole can open his 
mouth. 
Both the Sikorski and Hitler Governments have enlisted for 
the “investigation” the aid of the International Red Cross, 
which, under a terror régime of gallows and wholesale extermination 
of the civil population, is forced to take part in the 
investigation farce directed by Hitler. It is obvious that this 
“investigation,” which, moreover, is being carried out behind 
the Soviet Government’s back, cannot enjoy the confidence of 
anyone with a semblance of honesty. 
The fact that the anti-Soviet campaign has been started 
simultaneously in the German and Polish press and follows 
identical lines is indubitable evidence of contact and collusion 
between Hitler—the Allies’ enemy—and the Sikorski Government 
in this hostile campaign. 
At a time when the peoples of the Soviet Union are shedding 
their blood in a grim struggle against Hitler Germany and 
bending their energies to defeat the common foe of the freedomloving 
democratic countries, the Sikorski Government is striking 
a treacherous blow at the Soviet Union to help Hitler 
tyranny. 
These circumstances compel the Soviet Government to consider 
that the present Polish Government, having descended to 
collusion with the Hitler Government, has, in practice, severed 
its relations of alliance with the U.S.S.R. and adopted a hostile 
attitude to the Soviet Union. 
For those reasons the Soviet Government has decided to 
interrupt relations with that Government. 
I think it necessary to inform you of the foregoing, and I 
trust that the U.S. Government will appreciate the motives that 
necessitated this forced step on the part of the Soviet Government. 
April 21, 1943

56 
No. 81 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT 
TO Mr STALIN 
I received your telegram during an inspection trip which I 
was making in the western part of the United States. I fully 
understand your problem but at the same time I hope that you 
can find a way in this present situation to define your action 
as a suspension of conversations with the Polish Government 
in exile in London rather than to label it as a complete severance 
of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and 
Poland. 
I cannot believe that Sikorski has in any way whatsoever 
collaborated with the Hitler gangsters. In my opinion, however, 
he has erred in taking up this particular question with the 
International Red Cross. Furthermore, I am inclined to think 
that Prime Minister Churchill will find a way of prevailing 
upon the Polish Government in London in the future to act 
with more common sense. 
I would appreciate it if you would let me know if I can help 
in any way in respect to this question and particularly in connection 
with looking after any Poles which you may desire to 
send out of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
Incidentally, I have several million Poles in the United States, 
a great many of whom are in the Army and Navy. I can assure 
you that all of them are bitter against the Hitlerites. However, 
the overall situation would not be helped by the knowledge 
of a complete diplomatic break between the Soviet and 
Polish Governments. 
April 26, 1943 
No. 82 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
I am sorry to say your reply did not reach me until April 27, 
whereas on April 25 the Soviet Government was compelled to 
interrupt relations with the Polish Government. 
As the Polish Government for nearly two weeks, far from 
ceasing a campaign hostile to the Soviet Union and beneficial 
to none but Hitler, intensified it in its press and on the radio 
Soviet public opinion was deeply outraged by such conduct,

57 
and hence the Soviet Government could no longer defer action. 
It may well be that Mr Sikorski himself has no intention of 
collaborating with the Hitler gangsters. I should be happy to see 
this surmise borne out by facts. But my impression is that certain 
pro-Hitler elements—either inside the Polish Government 
or in its environment—have induced Mr Sikorski to follow 
them, with the result that the Polish Government has come to 
be, possibly against its own will, a tool in Hitler’s hands in the 
anti-Soviet campaign of which you are aware. 
I, too, believe that Prime Minister Churchill will find ways to 
bring the Polish Government to reason and help it proceed 
henceforward in a spirit of common sense. I may be wrong, but 
I believe that one of our duties as Allies is to prevent this or 
that Ally from taking hostile action against any other Ally 
to the joy and benefit of the common enemy. 
As regards Polish subjects in the U.S.S.R. and their future, 
I can assure you that Soviet Government agencies have always 
treated and will continue to treat them as comrades, as people 
near and dear to us. It should be obvious that there never has 
been, nor could have been, any question of their being deported 
from the U.S.S.R. If, however, they themselves wish to leave 
the U.S.S.R., Soviet Government agencies will not hinder them, 
just as they have never done, and will, in fact, try to help 
them. 
April 29, 1943 
No. 83 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
My dear Mr Stalin, 
I am sending this personal note to you by the hands of my old 
friend, Joseph E. Davies. It relates solely to one subject which 
I think it is easier for us to talk over through a mutual friend. 
Mr Litvinov is the only other person with whom I have talked 
about it. 
I want to get away from the difficulties of large Staff conferences 
or the red tape of diplomatic conversations. Therefore, 
the simplest and most practical method that I can think of 
would be an informal and completely simple visit for a few 
days between you and me. 
I fully appreciate the desirability for you to stay in daily 
touch with your military operations; I also find it inadvisable 
to be away from Washington more than a short time. There are

58 
two sides to the problem. The first relates to timing. There is 
always the possibility that the historic Russian defense, followed 
by taking the offensive, may cause a crack-up in Germany next 
winter. In such a case we must be prepared for the many next 
steps. We are none of us prepared today. Therefore, it is my 
belief that you and I ought to meet this summer. 
The second problem is where to meet. Africa is almost out of 
the question in summer and Khartoum is British territory. 
Iceland I do not like because for both you and me it involves 
rather difficult flights and, in addition, would make it, quite 
frankly, difficult not to invite Prime Minister Churchill at the 
same time. 
Therefore, I suggest that we could meet either on your side or 
my side of Bering Straits. Such a point would be about three 
days from Washington and I think about two days from Moscow 
if the weather is good. That means that you could always get 
back to Moscow in two days in an emergency. 
It is my thought that neither of us would want to bring any 
Staff. I would be accompanied by Harry Hopkins, an interpreter 
and a stenographer—and that you and I would talk very informally 
and get what we call “a meeting of the minds.” I do not 
believe that any official agreements or declarations are in the 
least bit necessary. 
You and I would, of course, talk over the military and naval 
situation, but I think we can both do that without Staffs being 
present. 
Mr Davies has no knowledge of our military affairs nor of 
the post-war plans of this Government, and I am sending him 
to you for the sole purpose of talking over our meeting. 
I greatly hope that our forces will be in complete control of 
Tunisia by the end of May, and Churchill and I next week will 
be working on the second phase of the offensive. 
Our estimates of the situation are that Germany will deliver 
an all-out attack on you this summer, and my Staff people think 
it will be directed against the middle of your line. 
You are doing a grand job. Good luck! 
Always sincerely, 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
May 6, 1943

59 
No. 84 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
I wish to inform you that Prime Minister Churchill is proceeding 
next week to Washington for the purpose of discussing 
our immediate next steps. General Belyaev will, of course, be 
kept currently informed of our conversations. 
May 6, 1943 
No. 85 
Sent on May 8, 1943 
FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Washington 
I congratulate you and the gallant U.S. and British troops on 
the brilliant victory which has resulted in the liberation of Bizerta 
and Tunis from Hitler tyranny. I wish you further success. 
J. STALIN 
No. 86 
Received on May 14, 1943 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
I wish to express my appreciation for your kind message of 
congratulation on the performance of our armies in bringing 
about the liberation of Tunisia. Now that we have gained the 
initiative further successes on the Eastern and Western Fronts, 
as well as further supplies, including aircraft, may reasonably 
be expected.

60 
No. 87 
Received on May 20, 1943 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
I know that the following American estimates of Axis losses 
in North Africa during the period December 8, 1940, to May 12, 
1943, will be of interest to you. These figures agree substantially 
with the estimates which have been made by the British 
with the exception of personnel losses. The British estimates of 
these losses are somewhat lower than ours. 
1. Total personnel losses: 625,000. 
2. Total plane losses (in North Africa and in the Mediterranean): 
7,596 destroyed, 1,748 probably destroyed, 4,499 damaged. 
3. Total tank losses: Not less than 2,100. 
4. Total losses of merchant ships: 625 ships sunk (approximately 
2,200,000 tons) and 371 ships damaged (approximately 
1,600,000 tons). 
5. Italian losses in East Africa: 150,000 (exclusive of natives). 
No. 88 
J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT* 
My dear Mr Roosevelt, 
Mr Davies has delivered your message to me. 
I agree that this summer—possibly as early as June—we 
should expect the Hitlerites to launch a new major offensive on 
the Soviet-German front. Hitler has already concentrated about 
200 German divisions and up to 30 divisions of his allies for use 
against us. We are getting ready to repel the new German offensive 
and to launch counter-attacks, but we are short of aircraft 
and aircraft fuel. Of course, it is at the moment impossible to 
foresee all the military and other steps that we may have to 
take. That will depend on the course of events on our front. 
A good deal will also depend on the speed and vigour with 
which Anglo-American military operations are launched in 
Europe. 
I have mentioned these important circumstances to explain 
why my reply to your suggestion for a meeting between us 
cannot be quite specific as yet. 
I agree that the time is ripe for such a meeting and that it 
should not be delayed. But I beg you to assess properly the im

61 
portance of the circumstances I have referred to, because the 
summer months will be exceedingly trying for the Soviet 
armies. As I do not know how events will develop on the 
Soviet-German front in June, I shall not be able to leave Moscow 
during that month. I therefore suggest holding the meeting in 
July or August. If you agree, I shall let you know two weeks 
before the date of the meeting just when it could be held in 
July or August. If, after being notified by me, you agree to the 
date suggested, I could arrive in time. 
Mr Davies will personally inform you of the meeting place. 
I agree with you about cutting down the number of your advisers 
and mine. 
Thank you for sending Mr Davies to Moscow, a man familiar 
with the Soviet Union and who can pass impartial judgment 
on things. 
Yours very sincerely, 
J. STALIN 
May 26, 1943 
No. 89 
Received on June 4, 1943 
FOR Mr STALIN FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
The Combined Chiefs of Staff 24 have recently approved certain 
decisions which have the approval as well of Mr Churchill and 
myself. 
As these decisions are of the very highest secrecy, I am asking 
Ambassador Standley to deliver them to you personally. 
ROOSEVELT 
No. 90 
Received on June 4, 1943 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO Mr STALIN 
(PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET) 
Basic strategy in the recent decisions approved by the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff 24 is divided into the below listed groupings:

62 
A. The control of the threat developed by enemy submarines 
receives primary consideration, along with the security of Allied 
maritime communication lines and with every practicable means 
of support for the Soviet Union. 
B. The laying of preparatory groundwork for the participation 
of Turkey in the war, either as an active or as a passive ally. 
C. The reduction of Japanese military power by keeping up 
an unremitting pressure against her. 
D. The carrying out of those measures found practicable by 
which China may be kept in the war as an effective power and 
maintained as a base from which operations may be carried out 
against Japan. 
E. The rendering of such aid and assistance to the French 
forces in Africa that they may be prepared for an active part in 
the attacks to be made on enemy-held territory in Europe. 
Referring to (A) above, we have been greatly encouraged by 
results recently obtained against enemy submarines by the use 
of long-range airplanes carrying new devices and equipment 
and also of groups of special attack vessels. Since the first of 
May, we have destroyed an average of more than one submarine 
per day. Destruction at this rate over a period of time 
will have a tremendous effect on the morale of the crews of the 
German undersea fleet. It will eventually reduce our ship losses 
and will thereby increase our shipping pool. 
In respect support of the U.S.S.R., the following decisions 
were made: the air offensive now being mounted against enemyheld 
Europe will be intensified, for the threefold purpose of 
destruction of enemy industry, of whittling down of German 
fighter plane strength, and for the breaking of German civil 
morale. That this intensification is already in progress is 
demonstrated by the events of the last three weeks, during 
which France, Italy, Germany, Sicily and Sardinia have been 
heavily attacked. British strength in Bomber Command is growing 
steadily. The United States heavy bomber force operating in 
England has increased at a constant rate and will continue to 
do so. In March, there were about 350 United States heavy 
bombers in England. At the present time there are about 700. 
Plans call for 900 at the end of June, 1,150 at the end of 
September and 2,500 by the first of April. 
It has been decided to put Italy out of the war at the earliest 
possible moment. The plan for the attack on Sicily is designated 
as “Husky.” General Eisenhower has been ordered that when 
“Husky” has been successfully concluded, he is to be prepared 
to immediately launch offensives directed toward the collapse of 
Italy. Forces available to Eisenhower for these operations will 
be the total now in the Mediterranean theater less four American 
and three British divisions which are to be sent to England

63 
as part of a concentration of forces in that country shortly to be 
referred to below. 
The collapse of Italy will greatly facilitate the carrying out 
of the air offensive against South and East Germany, will continue 
the attrition of their fighter strength and will jeopardize 
the Axis position in the Balkan area. 
With Africa firmly in our hands, it was decided that it was 
now feasible to resume the concentration of ground forces in 
England. A joint Anglo-American staff has been and is constantly 
occupied with keeping up to the last minute the necessary 
plans for instantly taking advantage of any enemy weakness 
in France or Norway. Under the present plans, there should be 
a sufficiently large concentration of men and materiel in the 
British Isles in the spring of 1944 to permit a full-scale invasion 
of the continent at that time. The great air offensive will then 
be at its peak. A certain number of large landing craft have 
necessarily been sent to the South-west Pacific, the Aleutians, 
and to the Mediterranean. The necessity of so doing has of 
course reduced by that extent the number of such boats sent 
to England. This has been the most important limiting factor as 
far as operations out of England have been concerned. 
The decisions enumerated and explained above are believed 
to be such that the enemy will be forced to disperse his ground 
forces to an excessive degree, both to oppose actual attacks and 
to guard against the possibility of attack. He will in addition be 
subject to heavy and continuous activity in the air. When 
signs of Axis weakness become apparent in any quarter, actual 
attacks and threats of attack will easily and quickly be translated 
into successful operations. We believe that these decisions 
as stated herein will require the full resources which we will 
be able to bring to bear. 
ROOSEVELT 
No. 91 
Received on June 5, 1943 
SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
Permit me to express to you my sincere thanks for the courtesies 
which you have extended to me and to the Government of 
the United States in your cordial reception of Mr Davies. He 
has returned safely to Washington bringing with him your

64 
message25 to me. I am pleased to note that you and I fully 
agree in principle on all matters set forth in your letter. In accordance 
with your letter and your understanding with 
Mr Davies I will await your further communication. 
Please give my kind remembrances and warm personal regards 
to Mr Brown.26 
No. 92 
Sent on June 11, 1943 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
Your message informing me of certain decisions on strategic 
matters adopted by you and Mr Churchill reached me on 
June 4. Thank you for the information. 
It appears from your communication that the decisions run 
counter to those reached by you and Mr Churchill earlier this 
year concerning the date for a second front in Western Europe. 
You will doubtless recall that the joint message of January 
26,27 sent by you and Mr Churchill, announced the decision 
adopted at that time to divert considerable German ground and 
air forces from the Russian front and bring Germany to her 
knees in 1943. 
Then on February 12 Mr Churchill communicated on his own 
behalf and yours the specified time of the Anglo-American 
operation in Tunisia and the Mediterranean, as well as on the 
west coast of Europe. The communication said that Great 
Britain and the United States were vigorously preparing to 
cross the Channel in August 1943 and that if the operation were 
hindered by weather or other causes, then it would be prepared 
with an eye to being carried out in greater force in September 
1943. 
Now, in May 1943, you and Mr Churchill have decided to 
postpone the Anglo-American invasion of Western Europe until 
the spring of 1944. In other words, the opening of the second 
front in Western Europe, previously postponed from 1942 till 
1943, is now being put off again, this time till the spring of 1944. 
Your decision creates exceptional difficulties for the Soviet 
Union, which, straining all its resources, for the past two years, 
has been engaged against the main forces of Germany and her 
satellites, and leaves the Soviet Army, which is fighting not 
only for its country, but also for its Allies, to do the job alone,

65 
almost single-handed, against an enemy that is still very strong 
and formidable. 
Need I speak of the disheartening negative impression that 
this fresh postponement of the second front and the withholding 
from our Army, which has sacrificed so much, of the anticipated 
substantial support by the Anglo-American armies, will produce 
in the Soviet Union—both among the people and in the 
Army? 
As for the Soviet Government, it cannot align itself with this 
decision, which, moreover, was adopted without its participation 
and without any attempt at a joint discussion of this highly 
important matter and which may gravely affect the subsequent 
course of the war. 
No. 93 
SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
TO PREMIER STALIN 
I wish to reply herewith to your special request in connection 
with the supply of aluminum. 
In July, August and September the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics will receive from Canada and the United States the 
following shipments: (Long tons) Primary aluminum, 5,000 tons 
per month; Secondary aluminum, 1,000 tons per month. 
The secondary aluminum is of a high quality and we use it 
in the construction of airplanes. 
The monthly shipments of primary aluminum which is 1,000 
tons over the agreement for 4,000 tons as contained in the Protocol15 
may possibly make it necessary that succeeding shipments 
after September will have to be cut down in compensation. I 
hope that this will not be necessary. I regret that due to a 
shortage of primary aluminum we find it impossible to increase 
the Protocol Agreement amount. The secondary aluminum is, 
however, an additional offering. We will inform you again within 
the next two months regarding the schedule of shipments 
for October, November and December. We will also try to give 
you information on shipments for the rest of the protocol year15 
at the same time. 
June 16, 1943

66 
No. 94 
SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
TO PREMIER STALIN 
I have given instructions that you are to receive during the 
remainder of 1943 the following additional planes over the new 
Protocol Agreement28: 
78 B-25 bombers, 
600 P-40-N fighters. 
We have no fighters that are more maneuverable than the 
P-40-N type which was used with excellent results in the 
recent fighting in Tunisia. This plane proved to be our best 
protection against dive bombers. It also proved to be highly 
useful in covering low-level strafing attacks of the P-39’s. 
We will be in a position to furnish you in November with 
a shipping schedule covering the last half of the protocol year 
as we will by that time have again reviewed the aircraft 
situation. 
June 16, 1943 
No. 95 
Received on June 20, 1943 
SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
What the Prime Minister cabled you has my full accord. 
Please be assured that everything possible at this time is being 
done. I hope you will understand and appreciate that the situation 
as to shipping is still tight. We are, however, encouraged 
by the way our anti-submarine campaign has been going during 
the last two months. It has resulted in a good net gain in 
available shipping. 
This answer is a few days late as I was away when your telegram 
was received.

67 
No. 96 
Received on June 22, 1943 
MARSHAL JOSEPH V. STALIN, 
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES 
OF THE U.S.S.R. 
The Kremlin, Moscow 
Two years ago tomorrow by an act of treachery in keeping 
with the long record of Nazi duplicity the Nazi leaders launched 
their brutal attack upon the Soviet Union. They thus added to 
their growing list of enemies the mighty forces of the Soviet 
Union. These Nazi leaders had underestimated the extent to 
which the Soviet Government and people had developed and 
strengthened their military power to defend their country and 
had utterly failed to realize the determination and valor of the 
Soviet people during the past two years. The freedom-loving 
peoples of the world have watched with increasing admiration 
the history-making exploits of the armed forces of the Soviet 
Union and the almost incredible sacrifices which the Russian 
people are so heroically making. The growing might of the combined 
forces of all the United Nations14 which is being brought 
increasingly to bear upon our common enemy testifies to the 
spirit of unity and sacrifice necessary for our ultimate victory. 
This same spirit will, I am sure, animate us in approaching the 
challenging tasks of peace, which victory will present to the 
world. 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
No. 97 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT 
I am sending you the text of my reply to a message from 
Mr Churchill, with which you are in full accord, as stated in 
the message delivered to me by Mr Standley on June 20.29 
June 24, 1943

68 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL 
Your message of June 19 received. 
I fully realise the difficulty of organising an Anglo-American 
invasion of Western Europe, in particular, of transferring troops 
across the Channel. The difficulty could also be discerned in 
your communications. 
From your messages of last year and this I gained the 
conviction that you and the President were fully aware of 
the difficulties of organising such an operation and were preparing 
the invasion accordingly, with due regard to the difficulties 
and the necessary exertion of forces and means. Even 
last year you told me that a large-scale invasion of Europe by 
Anglo-American troops would be effected in 1943. In the 
Aide-Memoire handed to V. M. Molotov on June 10, 1942, you 
wrote: 
“Finally, and most important of all, we are concentrating 
our maximum effort on the organisation and preparation of 
a large-scale invasion of the Continent of Europe by British 
and American forces in 1943. We are setting no limit to the 
scope and objectives of this campaign, which will be carried 
out in the first instance by over a million men, British and 
American, with air forces of appropriate strength.” 
Early this year you twice informed me, on your own behalf 
and on behalf of the President, of decisions concerning an Anglo-
American invasion of Western Europe intended to “divert 
strong German land and air forces from the Russian front.” You 
had set yourself the task of bringing Germany to her knees as 
early as 1943, and named September as the latest date for the 
invasion. 
In your message of January 2627 you wrote: 
“We have been in conference with our military advisers 
and have decided on the operations which are to be undertaken 
by the American and British forces in the first nine 
months of 1943. We wish to inform you of our intentions at 
once. We believe that these operations together with your 
powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees 
in 1943.” 
In your next message, which I received on February 12, you 
wrote, specifying the date of the invasion of Western Europe, 
decided on by you and the President:

69 
“We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our 
resources for a cross-Channel operation in August, in which 
British and United States units would participate. Here 
again, shipping and assault-landing craft will be the limiting 
factors. If the operation is delayed by the weather or 
other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for 
September.” 
Last February, when you wrote to me about those plans and 
the date for invading Western Europe, the difficulties of that 
operation were greater than they are now. Since then the Germans 
have suffered more than one defeat: they were pushed 
back by our troops in the South, where they suffered appreciable 
loss; they were beaten in North Africa and expelled by 
the Anglo-American troops; in submarine warfare, too, the Germans 
found themselves in a bigger predicament than ever, while 
Anglo-American superiority increased substantially; it is also 
known that the Americans and British have won air superiority 
in Europe and that their navies and mercantile marines have 
grown in power. 
It follows that the conditions for opening a second front in 
Western Europe during 1943, far from deteriorating, have, indeed, 
greatly improved. 
That being so, the Soviet Government could not have 
imagined that the British and U.S. Governments would revise 
the decision to invade Western Europe, which they had adopted 
early this year. In fact, the Soviet Government was fully entitled 
to expect that the Anglo-American decision would be carried 
out, that appropriate preparations were under way and that 
the second front in Western Europe would at last be opened 
in 1943. 
That is why, when you now write that “it would be no help 
to Russia if we threw away a hundred thousand men in a disastrous 
cross-Channel attack,” all I can do is remind you of 
the following: 
First, your own Aide-Mémoire of June 1942 in which you 
declared that preparations were under way for an invasion, not 
by a hundred thousand, but by an Anglo-American force exceeding 
one million men at the very start of the operation. 
Second, your February message, which mentioned extensive 
measures preparatory to the invasion of Western Europe in 
August or September 1943, which, apparently, envisaged an 
operation, not by a hundred thousand men, but by an adequate 
force. 
So when you now declare: “I cannot see how a great British 
defeat and slaughter would aid the Soviet armies,” is it not 
clear that a statement of this kind in relation to the Soviet

70 
Union is utterly groundless and directly contradicts your previous 
and responsible decisions, listed above, about extensive 
and vigorous measures by the British and Americans to organise 
the invasion this year, measures on which the complete 
success of the operation should hinge. 
I shall not enlarge on the fact that this responsible decision, 
revoking your previous decisions on the invasion of Western 
Europe, was reached by you and the President without Soviet 
participation and without inviting its representatives to the 
Washington conference, although you cannot but be aware that 
the Soviet Union’s role in the war against Germany and its 
interest in the problems of the second front are great enough. 
You say that you “quite understand” my disappointment. I 
must tell you that the point here is not just the disappointment 
of the Soviet Government, but the preservation of its confidence 
in its Allies, a confidence which is being subjected to severe 
stress. One should not forget that it is a question of saving millions 
of lives in the occupied areas of Western Europe and Russia 
and of reducing the enormous sacrifices of the Soviet armies, 
compared with which the sacrifices of the Anglo-American 
armies are insignificant. 
June 24, 1943 
No. 98 
Sent on June 26, 1943 
TO Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Washington 
Thank you for your high commendation of the resolve and 
bravery of the Soviet people and Armed Forces in fighting the 
Hitler invaders. 
As a result of the two years of the Soviet Union’s struggle 
against Hitler Germany and her vassals and of the telling blows 
delivered by the Allies to the Italo-German armies in North 
Africa, conditions have been created for the final defeat of our 
common enemy. 
I have no doubt that the sooner we strike from east and west 
our joint, combined blows at the enemy, the sooner victory will 
come. 
J. STALIN

71 
No. 99 
Received on July 16, 1943 
SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO MARSHAL STALIN 
Following the unfortunate sinking of one of your ships in the 
North Pacific, for which I am deeply sorry, I have directed that 
every possible precaution be taken in the future.30 
Although I have no detailed news, I think I can safely congratulate 
you on the splendid showing your armies are making 
against the German offensive at Kursk. 
I hope to hear from you soon about the other matter which I 
still feel to be of great importance to you and me. 
No. 100 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
Your forces have, during a month of tremendous fighting, by 
their skill, their courage, their sacrifices and their ceaseless effort, 
not only stopped the long planned German attack, but 
have launched a successful counter-offensive of far-reaching 
import. 
Sincere congratulations to the Red Army, the people of the 
Soviet Union and to yourself upon the great victory of Orel. 
The Soviet Union can be justly proud of its heroic achievements. 
August 6, 1943 
No. 101 
SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
I can answer your latest message—that of July 16—now that 
I am back from the front. I have no doubt that you are aware 
of our military position and will appreciate the delay. 
Contrary to our expectations, the Germans launched their offensive 
in July, not in June, and now fighting is in full swing 
on the Soviet-German front. The Soviet armies have, as you

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
72 
know, repulsed the July offensive of the Hitlerites, switched to 
the offensive, taking Orel and Belgorod, and are still pressing 
the enemy. 
It will be readily seen that in the present crucial situation on 
the Soviet-German front the Soviet Command has to exert great 
efforts and display the utmost vigilance towards the enemy’s 
activities. For this reason I, too, am compelled to put aside 
other problems and my other duties, to a certain degree, except 
my chief duty, that of directing the front. I have to go to the 
various front sectors more frequently and to subordinate all 
else to the interests of the front. 
I hope you will appreciate that in these circumstances I cannot 
start on a distant journey and shall unfortunately be unable 
during the summer and autumn to make good the promise I 
gave you through Mr Davies. 
I am very sorry about this, but circumstances, as you know, 
are stronger than people, and so we must bow to them. 
I consider it highly advisable for responsible representatives 
of our two countries to meet. In the present military situation 
the meeting could be held either in Astrakhan or in Archangel 
If that does not suit you personally, then you might send a fully 
authorised man of confidence to one of these two towns. If you 
accept, we should specify beforehand the range of problems to 
be discussed at the conference and draft appropriate proposals. 
I have already told Mr Davies that I have no objection to 
Mr Churchill attending the conference and to the bipartite conference 
being turned into a tripartite one. I still hold this view 
provided you have no objections. 
2. I take this opportunity to congratulate you and the Anglo- 
American forces on their outstanding success in Sicily, which 
has led to the fall of Mussolini and his gang. 
3. Thank you for congratulating the Red Army and the 
Soviet people on their success at Orel. 
August 8, 1943 
No. 102 
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, 
Mr WINSTON CHURCHILL, 
TO MARSHAL J. V. STALIN 
On August 15th the British Ambassador at Madrid reported 
that General Castellano31 had arrived from Badoglio with a letter 
of introduction from the British Minister to the Vatican. The

73 
General declared that he was authorized by Badoglio to say that 
Italy was willing to surrender unconditionally provided that she 
could join the Allies. The British representative to the Vatican 
has since been furnished by Marshal Badoglio with a written 
statement that he has duly authorized General Castellano. Thistherefore 
seems a firm offer. 
We are not prepared to enter into any bargain with Badoglio’s 
Government to induce Italy to change sides; on the other hand 
there are many advantages and a great speeding up of the campaign 
which might follow therefrom. We shall begin our invasion 
of the mainland of Italy probably before the end of this 
month and about a week later we shall make our full-scale 
thrust at “Avalanche.”32 It is very likely that Badoglio’s Government 
will not last so long. The Germans have one or more armoured 
division outside Rome and once they think that the 
Badoglio Government is playing them false, they are quite 
capable of overthrowing it and setting up a Quisling Government 
of Fascist elements under, for instance, Farinacci. Alternatively, 
Badoglio may collapse and the whole of Italy pass 
into disorder. 
Such being the situation, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 24 have 
prepared, and the President and the Prime Minister approved, 
as a measure of military diplomacy, the following instructions 
which have been sent to General Eisenhower for 
action: 
“The President and the Prime Minister having approved, 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct you to send at once to 
Lisbon two Staff Officers; one United States’, and one British. 
They should report upon arrival to the British Ambassador. 
They should take with them agreed armistice terms 
which have already been sent to you. Acting on instructions 
the British Ambassador at Lisbon will have arranged a 
meeting with General Castellano. Your Staff Officers will be 
present at this meeting. 
At this meeting a communication to General Castellano 
will be made on the following lines: 
(a) The unconditional surrender of Italy is accepted on 
the terms stated in the document to be handed to him. (He 
should then be given the armistice terms for Italy already 
agreed and previously sent to you. He should be told that 
these do not include the political, economic or financial 
terms which will be communicated later by other means.)33 
(b) These terms do not visualize active assistance of Italy 
in fighting the Germans. The extent to which the terms will 
be modified in favour of Italy will depend on how far the 
Italian Government and people do in fact aid the United 
Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war.

74 
The United Nations, however, state without reservation, that 
wherever Italian troops or Italians fight the Germans, or 
destroy German property, or hamper German movements, 
they will be given all possible support by troops of the 
United Nations. Meanwhile, provided that information about 
the enemy is immediately and regularly supplied, Allied 
bombing will so far as possible be directed on targets 
which affect the movements and operations of German 
troops. 
(c) Cessation of hostilities between the United Nations 
and Italy will take effect from a date and hour to be notified 
by General Eisenhower. 
(N o t e: General Eisenhower should make this notification 
a few hours before Allied troops land in Italy in strength.) 
(d) Italian Government must undertake to proclaim the 
Armistice immediately it is announced by General Eisenhower, 
and to order their troops and people from that hour 
to collaborate with the Allies and to resist the Germans. 
(N o t e: As will be seen from 2(c) above,34 the Italian 
Government will be given a few hours’ notice.) 
(e) Italian Government must, at the hour of Armistice, order 
that all United Nations prisoners in danger of capture 
by the Germans shall be immediately released. 
(f) Italian Government must at the hour of the Armistice 
order the Italian fleet and as much of their merchant shipping 
as possible to put to sea for Allied ports. As many 
military aircraft as possible shall fly to Allied bases. 
Any ships or aircraft in danger of capture must be destroyed. 
2. General Castellano should be told that meanwhile there 
is a good deal that Badoglio can do without the Germans 
becoming aware of what is afoot. The precise character and 
extent of his action must be left to his judgment but the following 
are the general lines which should be suggested to 
him: 
(a) General passive resistance throughout the country if 
this order can be conveyed to local authorities without the 
Germans’ knowing. 
(b) Minor sabotage throughout the country, particularly 
of communications and of air fields used by the Germans. 
(c) Safeguard of Allied prisoners of war. If German pressure 
to hand them over becomes too great they should be 
released. 
(d) No Italian warships to be allowed to fall into German 
hands. Arrangements to be made to ensure that all of these 
ships can sail to ports designated by General Eisenhower 
immediately he gives the order. Italian submarines should

75 
not be withdrawn from patrol as this would reveal our common 
purpose to the enemy. 
(e) No merchant shipping to be allowed to fall into German 
hands. Merchant shipping in northern ports should, if 
possible, be sailed to ports south of a line Venice-Leghorn. 
In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must 
be ready to sail for ports designated by General Eisenhower. 
(f) Germans must not be allowed to take over Italian 
coast defences. 
(g) Instructions to be put into force at the proper time 
for Italian formations in the Balkans to march to the coast 
with a view to their being taken off to Italy by the United 
Nations. 
3. A safe channel of communication between General 
Eisenhower and the Italian headquarters is to be arranged 
with General Castellano by General Eisenhower’s representatives.” 
(End of General Eisenhower’s message.) 
To turn to another subject, following on decisions taken at 
“Trident,”35 His Majesty’s Government entered upon negotiations 
with Portugal in order to obtain naval and air facilities in 
a “life-belt.”36 Accordingly His Majesty’s Ambassador at Lisbon 
invoked the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance which has lasted 600 
years unbroken and invited Portugal to grant the said facilities. 
Dr. Salazar was of course oppressed by the fear of German 
bombing out of revenge and of possible hostile moves by the 
Spaniards. We have accordingly furnished him with supplies of 
antiaircraft artillery and fighter aircraft which are now in 
transit, and we have also informed Dr. Salazar that should Spain 
attack Portugal we shall immediately declare war on Spain and 
render such help as is in our power. We have not however 
made any precise military convention earmarking particular 
troops as we do not think either of these contingencies probable. 
Dr. Salazar has now consented to the use of a “life-belt” by the 
British with Portuguese collaboration in the early part of October. 
As soon as we are established there and he is relieved from 
his anxieties we shall press for extensions of these facilities to 
United States ships and aircraft. 
The possession of the “life-belt” is of great importance to the 
sea war. The U-boats have quitted the North Atlantic where 
convoys have been running without loss since the middle of 
May and have concentrated on the southern route. The use of 
the “life-belt” will be of the utmost help in attacks on them 
from the air. Besides this there is the ferrying of United States

76 
heavy bombers to Europe and Africa which is also most desirable. 
All the above is of most especially secret operational 
character. 
August 19th, 1943 
No. 103 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL 
Mr Churchill and I are here,37 accompanied by our staffs, and 
will confer for a period of perhaps ten days. We are very desirous 
of emphasizing to you again the importance of our all 
three meeting. We at the same time entirely understand the 
strong reasons which cause you to be near the fronts of battle, 
fronts where your personal presence has been so fruitful of 
victory. 
Neither Astrakhan nor Archangel are suitable, in our opinion. 
We are quite prepared, however, to go with appropriate officers 
to Fairbanks, Alaska. There, we may survey the entire 
picture, in common with you. 
We are now at a crucial point in the war, a time presenting 
a unique chance for a rendezvous. Both Mr Churchill and I 
earnestly hope you will give this opportunity your consideration 
once more. 
If we are unable to agree on this very essential meeting between 
our three governmental heads, Churchill and I agree with 
you that we should in the near future arrange a meeting of 
foreign office level representatives. Final decisions must, of 
course, be left to our respective Governments, so such a meeting 
would be of an exploratory character. 
In 38 days General Eisenhower and General Alexander have 
accomplished the conquest of Sicily. 
The Axis defenders amounted to a total of 405,000 men: 
315,000 Italians and 90,000 Germans. We attacked with 13 American 
and British divisions, suffering approximately 18,000 casualties 
(killed and wounded). The Axis forces lost 30,000 dead 
and wounded: 23,000 Germans and 7,000 Italians, collected and 
counted. There were 130,000 prisoners. 
Italian forces on Sicily have been wiped out, with the exception 
of some few who took to the countryside in plain clothes. 
There is a tremendous amount of booty, guns and planes and 
munitions of all sorts lying about everywhere, including more 
than 1,000 airplanes captured on the various air fields.

77 
As you have been informed previously, we will soon make a 
powerful attack on the mainland of Italy. 
ROOSEVELT 
CHURCHILL 
August 19, 1943 
No. 104 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. D. ROOSEVELT, 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL 
I have received your message on the negotiations with the 
Italians and on the new armistice terms for Italy. Thank you 
for the information. 
Mr Eden advised Sobolev that Moscow had been kept fully 
informed of the negotiations with Italy. I must say, however, 
that Mr Eden’s statement is at variance with the facts, for I 
received your message with large omissions and without the 
closing paragraphs.38 It should be said, therefore, that the Soviet 
Government has not been kept informed of the Anglo- 
American negotiations with the Italians. Mr Kerr assures me 
that he will shortly receive the full text of your message, but 
three days have passed and Ambassador Kerr has yet to give 
it to me. I cannot understand how this delay could have come 
about in transmitting information on so important a matter. 
2. I think the time is ripe for us to set up a military-political 
commission of representatives of the three countries—the 
U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.—for consideration of 
problems related to negotiations with various Governments 
falling away from Germany. To date it has been like this: the 
U.S.A. and Britain reach agreement between themselves while 
the U.S.S.R. is informed of the agreement between the two 
Powers as a third party looking passively on. I must say that this 
situation cannot be tolerated any longer. I propose setting up 
the commission and making Sicily its seat for the time 
being. 
3. I am looking forward to receiving the full text of your 
message on the negotiations with Italy. 
August 22, 1943

78 
No. 105 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL, 
AND THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. D. ROOSEVELT 
Your joint message of August 19 has reached me. 
I fully share your opinion and that of Mr Roosevelt concerning 
the importance of a meeting between the three of us. At 
the same time I earnestly request you to appreciate my position 
at a moment when our armies are exerting themselves to the 
utmost against the main forces of Hitler and when Hitler, far 
from having withdrawn a single division from our front, has 
already moved, and keeps moving, fresh divisions to the Soviet- 
German front. At a moment like this I cannot, in the opinion 
of all my colleagues, leave the front without injury to our military 
operations to go to so distant a point as Fairbanks, even 
though, had the situation on our front been different, Fairbanks 
would doubtless have been a perfectly suitable place for our 
meeting, as I indeed thought before. 
As to a meeting between representatives of our states, and 
perhaps representatives in charge of foreign affairs, I share 
your view of the advisability of such a meeting in the near 
future. However, the meeting should not be restricted to the 
narrow bounds of investigation, but should concern itself with 
practical preparations so that after the conference our Governments 
might take specific decisions and thus avoid delay in 
reaching decisions on urgent matters. 
Hence I think I must revert to my proposal for fixing beforehand 
the range of problems to be discussed by the representatives 
of the three states and drafting the proposals they will 
have to discuss and submit to our Governments for final decision. 
2. Yesterday we received from Mr Kerr the addenda and corrections 
to the joint message in which you and Mr Roosevelt informed 
me of the instructions sent to General Eisenhower in 
connection with the surrender terms worked out for Italy during 
the discussions with General Castellano.31 I and my colleagues 
believe that the instructions given to General Eisenhower 
follow entirely from the thesis on Italy’s unconditional 
surrender and hence cannot give rise to any objections. 
Still, I consider the information received so far insufficient 
for judging the steps that the Allies should take in the negotiations 
with Italy. This circumstance confirms the necessity of 
Soviet participation in reaching a decision in the course of the

79 
negotiations. I consider it timely, therefore, to set up the military-
political commission representing the three countries, of 
which I wrote to you on August 22. 
August 24, 1943 
No. 106 
Received on August 26, 1943 
F. ROOSEVELT AND W. CHURCHILL 
TO J. V. STALIN* 
The following is the decision as to the military operations to 
be carried out during 1943 and 1944 which we have arrived at 
in our conference at Quebec just concluded. We shall continue 
the bomber offensive against Germany from bases in the United 
Kingdom and Italy on a rapidly increasing scale. The objectives 
of this air attack will be to destroy the air combat strength of 
Germany, to dislocate her military, economic and industrial 
system and to prepare the way for an invasion across the Channel. 
A large-scale building-up of American forces in the United 
Kingdom is now under way. It will provide an assemblage force 
of American and British divisions for operations across the 
Channel. Once a bridgehead on the Continent has been secured 
it will be reinforced steadily by additional American troops at 
the rate of from three to five divisions a month. This operation 
will be the primary American and British air and ground effort 
against the Axis. The war in the Mediterranean is to be pressed 
vigorously. In that area our objectives will be the elimination 
of Italy from the Axis alliance and the occupation of Italy, as 
well as of Corsica and Sardinia, as bases for operations against 
Germany. In the Balkans operations will be limited to the supply 
by air and sea transport of the Balkan guerrillas, minor commando 
raids and the bombarding of strategic objectives. In the 
Pacific and in South-east Asia we shall accelerate our operations 
against Japan. Our purposes are to exhaust the air, naval and 
shipping resources of Japan, to cut her communications and to 
secure bases from which Japan proper may be bombed.

80 
No. 107 
Received on August 29, 1943 
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
(Retranslated) 
We are just examining your proposals and are almost certain 
that plans satisfactory to all of us can be made both for a meeting 
of representatives of the Foreign Ministries and for setting 
up a tripartite commission. The Prime Minister and I meet again 
early next week and shall communicate with you again by 
cable. 
No. 108 
Received on September 4, 1943 
SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
General Charlie31 has stated that the Italians accept and he is 
coming to sign, but we do not know for certain whether this 
statement refers to the short military terms, which have been 
seen by you, or to the more complete and comprehensive terms 
which your readiness to sign has been specifically indicated.39 
The military situation there is both critical and hopeful. The 
mainland invasion begins almost immediately while the heavy 
blow called “Avalanche”32 will be delivered in the next week 
or so. The difficulties of the Italian Government and people in 
escaping from the clutches of Hitler may make a still more 
daring move necessary, and for this General Eisenhower will 
require as much Italian help as he can get. The acceptance of 
the terms by the Italians is largely supported by the fact that 
we shall send an air-borne division to Rome to help them hold 
off the Germans who have gathered Panzer strength near there 
and who may replace the Badoglio Government with a Quisling 
administration probably headed by Farinacci. We think, since 
matters are moving so fast there, that General Eisenhower 
should have discretion not to delay settlement with the Italians 
because of differences between the long and the short terms. 
The short terms, it is clear, are included in the long terms, that

81 
they are based on unconditional surrender, and that clause ten 
of the short terms40 places the interpretation in the hands of the 
Allied Commander-in-Chief. 
We are assuming, therefore, that you expect General Eisenhower 
to sign the short terms in your behalf, if that be necessary, 
to avoid the further journeying of General Charlie to 
Rome and the consequent delay and uncertainty affecting military 
operations. 
We are, of course, anxious that the Italian unconditional surrender 
be to the Soviet Union as well as to the United States 
and Britain. The date of the surrender announcement must, of 
course, be fitted in with the military coup. 
CHURCHILL 
ROOSEVELT 
No. 109 
Received on September 6, 1943 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE FROM 
THE PRESIDENT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
Both the Prime Minister and myself are pleased with the 
idea of a political and military meeting on the State Department 
level. 
It should be held, I think, as soon as possible. Perhaps 
September 25 would be a good date. What do you think of 
this? 
The Prime Minister has suggested London or some other 
place in England, and I should agree to have my representative 
go to either of these if you also think it best. I am inclined, 
however, to the thought of a more remote spot where the meeting 
would be less surrounded by reporters. Perhaps Casablanca 
or Tunis, and I do not object to Sicily, except that the communications 
from and to there are more troublesome. 
The political representatives would, of course, report to their 
respective Governments as I do not think we could give plenary 
powers to them. They could be advised on military developments 
by attaching one or two military advisers to them, 
although I do not want to have the meeting develop at this 
stage into a full-scale combined chiefs’ conference. 
If Mr Molotov and Mr Eden attend I should wish to send 
Mr Hull but I do not want Mr Hull to undertake such a long journey, 
so I would, therefore, send Mr Welles, the Under Secretary

82 
of State. Mr Harriman would also attend as he has an excellent 
knowledge of shipping and commercial matters. I shall endeavor 
to send someone from my staff as American military adviser. 
He would be in complete touch with the work of the Combined 
Staffs.24 
May I congratulate you again on the tenacity and drive of 
your armies. It is magnificent. 
While this coming conference is a very good thing, I still have 
the hope that you and Mr Churchill and myself can meet as 
soon as possible. I, personally, could arrange to meet in a place 
as far as North Africa between November 15 and December 15. 
You will understand, I know, that I cannot be away for more 
than 20 days from Washington as, under our constitution, no 
one can sign for me while I am absent. 
Why not send an officer to General Eisenhower’s headquarters 
in connection with the commission to sit in Sicily on further 
settlements with the Italians? He would join the British 
and Americans who are now working on this very subject. 
There is no objection as far as I am concerned to adding a 
French member to this commission, as we are now in the midst 
of equipping ten or eleven of their divisions in North Africa. It 
would, however, be very unwise to let the French take part in 
the discussions relating to the military occupation of Italy. If 
the Italians go through with the terms of surrender, which they 
have already signed, I hope they will wholeheartedly support 
the occupation troops. On the whole, the Italians dislike the 
French greatly, and if we bring the French into occupation discussions, 
the civil and military elements in Italy will resent it 
extremely. 
The problem of consulting the Greeks and Yugoslavs can be 
discussed later on. 
ROOSEVELT 
No. 110 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, 
Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, 
Mr WINSTON CHURCHILL 
I have received your message of September 4. The question 
which you ask me, namely, whether the Soviet Government 
would agree to General Eisenhower signing on its behalf the

83 
short armistice terms for Italy, should be considered as having 
been answered in the letter which V. M. Molotov, People’s 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Mr Kerr, the British 
Ambassador, on September 2. The letter said that the powers 
which the Soviet Government entrusted to General Eisenhower 
also extended to his signing the short armistice terms. 
September 7, 1943 
No. 111 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. D. ROOSEVELT 
I received on September 6 your message dealing with a number 
of important subjects. 
I still think that the most pressing problem is to set up a 
three-Power military-political commission, with headquarters in 
Sicily, or in Algiers to begin with. The despatch of a Soviet 
officer to Gen. Eisenhower’s headquarters can in no way replace 
the military-political commission, which is required to direct 
on the spot negotiations with Italy and with the Governments of 
other countries falling away from Germany. Much time has 
passed without things making the slightest headway. 
As to French participation in the commission, I have already 
stated my opinion.41 However, if you have any doubts we can 
naturally discuss the matter after the three-Power commission 
is set up. 
2. The time suggested by the Prime Minister for the meeting 
of our three representatives—early October—would be suitable; 
as to the place, I suggest Moscow. By that time the three Governments 
could agree on the range of subjects to be discussed, 
as well as on proposals relating to those problems, otherwise the 
conference will not yield the results which our Governments 
want. 
3. As regards a personal meeting between us with Mr Churchill 
participating, I, too, desire this as early as possible. The 
date suggested by you is acceptable to me. It would be advisable 
to select a country where all the three countries are represented, 
such as Iran. I should add, however, that we shall yet have to 
specify the date of meeting with due regard to the situation on 
the Soviet-German front, where more than 500 divisions are 
engaged on both sides and where supervision by the Supreme 
Command of the U.S.S.R. is required almost daily.

84 
4. Thank you for your congratulations on the successes of the 
Soviet armies. I take the occasion to congratulate you and the 
Anglo-American forces on their latest brilliant successes in 
Italy. 
September 8, 1943 
No. 112 
Received on September 10, 1943 
F. ROOSEVELT AND W. CHURCHILL 
TO J. V. STALIN* 
We are pleased to tell you that General Eisenhower has accepted 
the unconditional surrender of Italy, terms of which were 
approved by the United States, the Soviet Republics and the 
United Kingdom. 
Allied troops have landed near Naples and are now in contact 
with German forces. Allied troops are also making good 
progress in the southern end of the Italian peninsula. 
No. 113 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT, 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr CHURCHILL 
I have received your message of September 10. I congratulate 
you on your latest success, particularly the landing in the 
Naples area. There can be no doubt that the landing in the 
Naples area and Italy’s break with Germany will be yet another 
blow to Hitler Germany and considerably facilitate the Soviet 
armies’ operations on the Soviet-German front. 
So far the offensive of the Soviet troops is making good progress. 
I think we shall have further success in the next two or 
three weeks. It may be that we shall take Novorossiisk in a day 
or two. 
September 10, 1943

85 
No. 114 
Received on September 11, 1943 
PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I thank you for your message received today. 
I agree on the immediate setting up of the military-political 
commission, but think that Algiers would be better than Sicily 
if only because of communications and, therefore, suggest they 
meet in Algiers on Tuesday, 21 September. Full information 
will be given, of course, in regard to the progress of current and 
future negotiations, but they should not have plenary powers. 
Such authority would, of course, have to be referred to their 
governments before final action. 
I am entirely willing to have a French representative on 
this commission. It is important to all of us that the secrecy of 
all their deliberations be fully maintained. 
Regarding the meeting of our three representatives, I will 
cheerfully agree that the place of meeting be Moscow and the 
date the beginning of October—say Monday, the fourth. I will 
send you in two or three days a suggested informal list of subjects 
to be discussed, but I think the three members should feel 
free, after becoming acquainted with each other, to discuss any 
other matters which may come up. 
I am delighted with your willingness to go along with the 
third suggestion, and the time about the end of November is 
all right. I fully understand that military events might alter 
the situation for you or for Mr Churchill or myself. Meanwhile, 
we can go ahead on that basis. Personally, my only hesitation 
is the place, but only because it is a bit further away from 
Washington than I had counted on. My Congress will be in 
session at that time and, under our constitution, I must act on 
legislation within ten days. In other words, I must receive documents 
and return them to the Congress within ten days, and 
Tehran makes this rather a grave risk if the flying weather is 
bad. If the Azores route is not available, it means coming by 
way of Brazil and across the South Atlantic Ocean. For these 
reasons I hope that you will consider some part of Egypt, which 
is also a neutral state, and where every arrangement can be 
made for our convenience. 
I really feel that the three of us are making real headway.

86 
No. 115 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. D. ROOSEVELT, 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL 
I have received your messages of September 10.42 
Basically, the point about the military-political commission 
can be regarded as settled. We have appointed as the Soviet 
Ambassador A. Y. Vyshinsky, Deputy Chairman of the Council 
of People’s Commissars and Deputy People’s Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs, whom you know. A. Y. Bogomolov, the Soviet 
Ambassador to the Allied Governments in London, has been 
appointed his deputy. In addition, we are sending a group of 
responsible military and political experts and a small technical 
staff. 
I think that the date September 25-30 should be fixed for the 
military-political commission getting down to work. I have 
nothing against the commission functioning in Algiers for a 
start and later deciding whether it should move to Sicily or 
elsewhere in Italy. 
The Prime Ministers’ considerations regarding the functions 
of the commission are correct in my view, but I think that 
later, taking into account the initial experience of the commission, 
we shall be able to specify its functions in respect of both 
Italy and other countries. 
2. Concerning the meeting of our three representatives I 
suggest that we consider it agreed that Moscow be the place, 
and the date, October 4, as suggested by the President. 
As stated in previous messages, I still believe that for the 
conference to be a success it is essential to know in advance 
the proposals that the British and U.S. Governments intend to 
submit to it. I do not, however, suggest any restrictions as far 
as the agenda is concerned. 
3. As regards the meeting of the three heads of the Governments, 
I have no objection to Tehran, which, I think, is a more 
suitable place than Egypt where the Soviet Union is not yet 
represented. 
September 12, 1943

87 
No. 116 
PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I regret that I feel it necessary to reopen the question of the 
meeting of the foreign ministers, but on further consideration 
I am most anxious that Secretary Hull attend in person in the 
meeting with Mr Molotov and Mr Eden. 
Mr Hull would find the long flight to Moscow extremely difficult 
for physical reasons. Would it be possible, therefore, for 
the conference to be held in England. It would, I believe, be a 
great advantage to all of us if Mr Hull could personally attend 
the conference. 
I feel sure the British would be willing to make the change. 
Could the date be made October 15 for the opening session. 
September 27, 1943 
No. 117 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
Your message of September 27 reached me today. 
I agree on the desirability of the Secretary of State, Mr Hull, 
being present at the forthcoming conference of the representatives 
of the three Governments. 
At the same time I must call your attention to the great difficulties 
we should encounter if the agreed decision to hold the 
conference in Moscow were revised. If the conference were 
convened, not in Moscow, but in Britain, as you now suggest, 
V. M. Molotov, who I think should attend the three-Power conference 
as the representative of the Soviet Government, would 
be unable to get there in time. Molotov will not be able to leave 
the U.S.S.R.—at least in the immediate future—because 
A. Y. Vyshinsky, who is his first deputy in the People’s Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs, is expected, as you know, to leave 
for Algiers shortly. 
Moreover, as you are aware, the U.S. and British press has 
been announcing for a long time that the forthcoming meeting 
will be held in Moscow, and a change of place might give rise 
to undesirable comments.

88 
I have no objection to October 15 as the date of meeting. Presumably 
by that time the three Governments will have reached 
final agreement on the conference agenda. 
September 28, 1943 
No. 118 
PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
The Prime Minister of Great Britain and I have agreed with 
a recommendation of General Eisenhower that the long-term 
surrender document, after it is signed by the Italian Government, 
should be retained in a confidential status and not 
published at the present time. 
September 28, 1943 
No. 119 
PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
The Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean area, 
Eisenhower, has recommended the following changes in the “Instrument 
of Surrender of Italy.”43 
Change the title to “Additional Conditions of the Armistice 
with Italy. 
Change the last sentence of the preamble to read “and have 
been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head 
of the Italian Government.” 
Omit the statement of unconditional surrender in Paragraph 
One. 
General Eisenhower and all of his senior commanders concur 
in this recommendation as highly advantageous to our progress 
in defeating the German forces in Italy in that it will help to 
align the Italian army, navy and civil population on our side. 
Eisenhower urgently requests that pending a decision on 
these recommendations, secrecy in regard to the terms of the 
surrender document is “absolutely vital to our success in Italy.” 
I hope that these recommendations of General Eisenhower 
will be approved by the Allied Powers because they are highly 
advantageous to our war effort and can be of no disadvantage 
to us.

89 
Your concurrence is requested by telegraph at the earliest 
practicable date. 
October 1, 1943 
No. 120 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT 
I have no objection to you and the British Prime Minister 
having approved General Eisenhower’s suggestion that the 
long-term surrender document be kept secret after the Italian 
Government has signed it and not published for the time being. 
October 2, 1943 
No. 121 
PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Your wire has reached me and our delegation will be in Moscow 
on October 15th. While I do not consider this conference 
as one to plan or recommend military strategy, I have no objection 
to and would welcome the widest exchange of views of 
your proposal relating to an expedition directed against France.44 
General Deane, who is to be a member of our mission, will be 
informed fully of our plans and intentions. 
That this is a three-Power conference and that any discussion 
on our proposal should be limited to the future intentions 
and plans of these three Powers exclusively is agreeable to me. 
This would, of course, in no way preclude a wider participation 
at some later date and under circumstances which would be 
mutually acceptable to our three Governments. 
I am sure that we are going to find a meeting of minds for 
the important decisions which must finally be made by us. And 
so this preliminary conference will explore the ground, and if 
difficulties develop at the meeting of our Foreign Ministers, I 
would still have every hope that they can be reconciled when 
you and Mr Churchill and I meet. 
It appears that the American and British armies should enter 
Rome in another few weeks. 
October 4, 1943

90 
No. 122 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
I received your message of October 1 only today, October 5. 
I have no objection to the changes you suggest making in the 
“Instrument of Surrender of Italy.” 
October 5, 1943 
No. 123 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
Your message of October 4 received. 
Regarding military matters, that is, Anglo-American measures 
to shorten the war, you already know the Soviet Government’s 
point of view from my previous message.44 It is still my 
hope that in this respect a preliminary three-Power conference 
will be useful and clear the ground for further important decisions. 
If I have understood you aright, the Moscow conference will 
confine itself to discussing matters bearing on our three countries 
only, hence we can take it as agreed that a four-Power 
declaration is not to be on the agenda. 
Our representatives should do their best to overcome the 
difficulties that may arise in their responsible work. As to 
decisions, they can, of course, only be taken by our Governments—
I hope when you, Mr Churchill and myself meet in 
person. 
I wish the U.S. and British armies successful fulfilment of 
their mission and entry into Rome, which will be another blow 
to Mussolini and Hitler. 
October 14, 1943

91 
No. 124 
Received on October 13, 1943 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
War will be declared on Germany on October 13 by Badoglio. 
Allied forces have secured air and naval facilities in the 
Azores. This move is based on old treaty relationships. 
October 12, 1943 
No. 125 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
Your message of October 13 received. Thank you for the 
news. All success to the armed forces of the United States of 
America and Great Britain. 
October 14, 1943 
No. 126 
PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
The Secretary of State and his staff are well on their way to 
Moscow but it seems doubtful if they can get there before the 
17th. I will let you know of their progress. 
I am very much disturbed in regard to the location of the 
other meeting, but I will send you this problem in another 
message. 
October 14, 1943

92 
No. 127 
PERSONAL AND SECRET TO MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
The problem of my going to the place you suggested is becoming 
so acute that I feel that I should tell you frankly that, 
for constitutional reasons, I cannot take the risk. The Congress 
will be in session. New laws and resolutions must be acted on 
by me after their receipt and must be returned to the Congress 
physically before ten days have elapsed. None of this can be 
done by radio or cable. The place you mentioned is too far to 
be sure that the requirements are fulfilled. The possibility of 
delay in getting over the mountain—first east-bound and then 
west-bound—is insurmountable. We know from experience 
that planes in either direction are often held up for three or 
four days. 
I do not think that any one of us will need legation facilities 
as each of us can have adequate personal and technical staffs 
I venture, therefore, to make some other suggestions and I hope 
you will consider them or suggest any other place where I can 
be assured of meeting my constitutional obligations. 
In many ways Cairo is attractive, and I understand there is a 
hotel and some villas out near the pyramids which could be 
completely segregated. Asmara, the former Italian capital of 
Eritrea, is said to have excellent buildings and a landing field— 
good at all times. 
Then there is the possibility of meeting at some port in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, each one of us to have a ship. If this 
idea attracts you, we could easily place a fine ship entirely at 
your disposal for you and your party so that you would be 
completely independent and, at the same time, be in constant 
contact with your own war front. 
Another suggestion is in the neighborhood of Bagdad where 
we could have three comfortable camps with adequate Russian, 
British and American guards. This last idea seems worth considering. 
In any event I think the press should be entirely banished, 
and the whole place surrounded by a cordon so that we would 
not be disturbed in any way. What would you think of November 
20th or November 25th as the date of the meeting. 
I am placing a very great importance on the personal and 
intimate conversations which you and Churchill and I will have 
for on them depend the hopes of the future world 
Your continuous initiative along your whole front heartens 
all of us. 
October 14, 1943

93 
No. 128 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT 
I have received your two messages of October 14. 
Thank you for the news about the Secretary of State and his 
staff who are on their way. I hope they will soon arrive safely 
in Moscow. 
As regards the subject raised in your second message, I shall 
send you a reply after I have conferred with my Government 
colleagues. 
October 17, 1943 
No. 129 
SECRET AND PERSONAL TO MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
In view of Mr Molotov’s note to the United States Chargé 
d’Affaires of October 14,45 and in order that there may be no 
misunderstanding with regard to representation on the Political-
Military Commission, I think I should make clear that, as 
indicated in my telegram to you of September 5, I feel that 
French representation should be restricted to matters other than 
the military occupation of Italy in which the three Governments 
establishing the Commission decide ~hat France has a direct 
interest. 
I feel that in this regard French representation should correspond 
to that which I suggested in my message of October 1346 
should be accorded to the Governments of China, Brazil, Greece 
and Yugoslavia, or to any other Governments which may by 
mutual agreement be invited to participate. 
It was never my intention that the French Committee of National 
Liberation should function on the same plane as the 
Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United 
States or enter into its deliberations on all subjects. 
October 17, 1943

94 
No. 130 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
With regard to the place for the meeting of the three heads 
of the Governments I should like to inform you of the following. 
I am afraid I cannot accept as suitable any one of the places 
suggested by you as against Tehran. It is not a matter of security, 
for that does not worry me. 
In the course of the Soviet troops’ operations in the summer 
and autumn of this year it became evident that our forces would 
be able to continue their offensive operations against the German 
Army and that the summer campaign would thus continue 
into winter. My colleagues hold that the operations necessitate 
day-to-day guidance by the Supreme Command and my personal 
contact with the Command. In Tehran, unlike the other 
places, these requirements can be met by communicating directly 
with Moscow by telegraph or telephone. For this reason my 
colleagues insist on Tehran. 
I agree that the press should be barred. I also accept your 
proposal for fixing November 20 or 25 as possible dates for the 
meeting. 
Mr Hull has arrived safely in Moscow, and I hope his attendance 
at the Moscow three-Power conference47 will be very 
useful. 
October 19, 1943 
No. 131 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Your message of October 17 received. I have nothing against 
your suggestion for the powers to be accorded the French representatives 
on the Allied military-political commission. 
October 21, 1943

95 
No. 132 
Received on October 25, 194348 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
Your message in regard to our meeting was received today 
(October 21). I am deeply disappointed. 
Your reason for needing daily guidance from and your personal 
contact with the Supreme Command, which is causing 
such outstanding results, is fully appreciated by me. Please accept 
my assurance on that. 
All this is of high importance, and I wish you would realize 
that there are other vital matters which, in our constitutional 
American Government, are my fixed obligations. These I cannot 
change. Under our constitution legislation must be acted on by 
the President within ten days after such legislation has been 
passed. In other words, the President must receive and return to 
Congress physical documents, with his written approval or veto, 
within this period. As I have told you previously, I cannot do 
this by cable or radio. 
The difficulty with Tehran is this simple fact. The over-themountain 
approach to that city often makes flying impossible 
for some days at a time. This risk of delay is double, both for 
the plane delivering documents from Washington and for the 
one returning these documents to Congress. I regret to say that, 
as the head of the nation, it is impossible for me to go to a place 
where it is impossible to fulfill my obligations under our constitution. 
The flying risks for documents up to and including the low 
country as far as the Gulf of Persia can be assumed by me 
through a relay system of planes. I cannot assume, however, the 
delays suffered by flights over the mountains in both directions 
into the saucer where Tehran lies. With much regret, therefore, 
I must tell you that I cannot go to Tehran. My cabinet 
members and legislative leaders are in complete agreement on 
this. 
One last practical suggestion, however, can be made. Let all 
three of us go to Basra where we shall be perfectly protected in 
three camps, established and guarded by our respective troops. 
You can have easily, as you know, a special telephone, controlled 
by you, laid from Basra to Tehran where it would connect with 
your own line into Russia. All your needs should be met by 
such a wire service, and by plane you will only be a little 
further off from Russia than at Tehran itself.

96 
I do not consider in any way the fact that from United States 
territory I would have to travel to within six hundred miles 
from Russian territory. 
I must carry on a constitutional government more than one 
hundred and fifty years old. Were it not for this fact I would 
gladly go ten times the distance to meet you. 
Your obligation to your people to carry on the defeat of our 
common enemy is great, but I am begging you not to forget my 
great obligation to the American Government and toward maintenance 
of the all-out United States war effort. 
I look upon our three meeting as of the greatest possible importance; 
this not only as regards our people of today, but also 
in the light of a peaceful world for generations to come. This I 
have told you before. 
Future generations would look upon it as a tragedy if a 
few hundred miles caused yourself, Mr Churchill and me to 
fail. 
I say again that I would go to Tehran gladly if limitations 
over which I have no control did not prevent me. 
Because of your communications problem, may I suggest 
Basra. 
If this does not appeal to you, may I hope deeply you will 
think again of Bagdad or Asmara, or even Ankara. I think the 
latter place is worth considering. It is in neutral territory. The 
Turks might think well of the idea of being hosts. Of course, 
this has not been mentioned by me to them or to anyone else. 
Please do not fail me in this crisis. 
ROOSEVELT 
No. 133 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
Mr Hull delivered your latest message to me on October 25, 
and I discussed it with him. I did not reply at once, being certain 
that Mr Hull had informed you of our talk and of my considerations 
as to the meeting with you and Mr Churchill. 
I cannot but take into account the circumstances which you 
say prevent you from going to Tehran. It is for you alone, of 
course, to decide whether you can go there. 
As far as I am concerned, there is no city more suitable than 
the one mentioned.

97 
I have been entrusted with the Supreme Command of the Soviet 
forces, which obliges me to direct military operations day 
in and day out. This is particularly essential now, when the continuous 
four-month summer campaign is developing into a winter 
campaign and when military operations are getting under 
way practically along the entire 2,600-kilometre front. In this 
situation I, as Supreme Commander, cannot possibly go any farther 
than Tehran. My Government colleagues tend to the view 
that at present I cannot leave the U.S.S.R. at all in view of the 
exceedingly complicated situation at the front. 
That accounts for the idea which has occurred to me and 
which I have already mentioned to Mr Hull. I could be fully 
replaced at that meeting by my First Deputy in the Government, 
V. M. Molotov, who during the discussions will enjoy, in 
keeping with our Constitution, the rights of head of the Soviet 
Government. In that case the difficulties of choosing a place 
would disappear. I hope this suggestion will at the moment be 
found suitable. 
November 5, 1943 
No. 134 
SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
Your Ambassador, Mr Gromyko, was good enough to deliver 
to me your message of November 5th and I thank you for it. 
I hope in a few days to leave here and to arrive in Cairo by 
November 22nd. 
You will be glad to know that I have worked out a method 
whereby, if I receive word that there has been passed by the 
Congress and forwarded to me a bill requiring my veto, I will 
fly to Tunis to meet it and then return to the Conference. 
I have therefore decided to go to Tehran and this makes me 
especially happy. 
As I have told you, I regard it as of vital importance that 
you and Mr Churchill and I should meet. Even if our meeting 
lasted only two days, the psychology of the present feeling really 
demands it. It is my thought, therefore, that the staffs begin their 
work on November 22nd in Cairo, and I hope Mr Molotov and 
your military representative will come to Cairo at that time. 
We can then all go to Tehran on November 26th and meet with 
you there on the 27th, 28th, or 30th, for as long as you feel you 
can be away. Churchill and I and the top staff people can then 
return to Cairo to complete the details.

98 
The whole world is watching for this meeting of the three of 
us and the fact that you and Churchill and I have got to know 
each other personally will have far-reaching effect on the good 
opinion within our three nations and will assist in the further 
disturbance of Nazi morale even if we make no announcements 
as vital as those announced at the recent highly successful meeting 
in Moscow. 
I am looking forward with keen anticipation to a good talk 
with you. 
ROOSEVELT 
November 8, 1943 
No. 135 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
I am in receipt of yours of November 8. Thank you for your 
reply. 
I agree with your plan for our meeting in Iran and hope Mr 
Churchill will do likewise. 
V. M. Molotov and our military representative will arrive in 
Cairo on November 22, and there work out with you everything 
about our meeting in Iran. 
November 10, 1943 
No. 136 
PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
It now turns out that reasons of a serious nature will prevent 
V. M. Molotov from reaching Cairo on November 22. He will 
accompany me to Iran towards the end of the month. I am simultaneously 
advising Mr Churchill of this, as you will be informed. 
P.S. Despatch of this message was, unfortunately, held up 
through the fault of some members of the staff, but I hope 
it will arrive in time just the same. 
November 12, 1943

99 
No. 137 
Sent on November 13, 1943 
PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
I feel that I must inform you that today I sent a message to 
Mr Churchill which reads as follows: 
“Today I received two messages from you. 
“Although I had written to the President that V. M. Molotov 
would arrive in Cairo on November 22, I must say that, owing to 
reasons of a serious nature, Molotov will not, unfortunately, be 
able to go to Cairo. He will travel with me to Tehran towards 
the end of November. A number of military officers will also accompany 
me. 
“It goes without saying that the Tehran meeting should involve 
only the three heads of the Governments as agreed. Participation 
of representatives of any other Powers should be absolutely 
ruled out. 
“I wish you success in your conference with the Chinese on 
Far Eastern affairs. 
“November 12, 1943.” 
No. 138 
Received on November 13, 1943 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
Your telegram of November 10th and the definite prospect of 
our meeting makes me, of course, very happy. I shall be very 
glad to see Mr Molotov in Cairo on November 22nd. 
I am just departing for North Africa. 
Warm regards.

100 
No. 139 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I am sincerely happy about the fine continuance of your gains. 
I have just landed. I am sorry about Mr Molotov and hope 
he is all well again. I will be glad to see him with you in Tehran. 
Let me know when you expect to get there. I will be in 
Cairo from tomorrow on and Mr Churchill will be nearby. 
November 20, 1943 
No. 140 
Received on November 24, 1943 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
This morning I arrived in Cairo and have begun discussions 
with the Prime Minister. By the end of the week, conference 
will follow with the Generalissimo49 after which he will return 
to China. Then the Prime Minister and myself accompanied by 
our senior staffs can proceed to Tehran to meet you, Mr Molotov 
and your staff officers. I could arrive the afternoon of November 
29 if it meets with your convenience. I am prepared to 
remain for two to four days depending upon how long you can 
stay away from your compelling responsibilities. If you would 
telegraph me what day you wish to set for the meeting and how 
long you could stay I would be very grateful. I would appreciate 
your keeping me informed of your plans as I realize bad weather 
often causes delays in travel from Moscow to Tehran at this 
time of the year. 
I understand that your Embassy and the British Embassy 
in Tehran are placed close together whereas my Legation is 
some distance away. I am informed that all three of us would 
be incurring unnecessary risks while driving to and from our 
meetings if we were staying too far apart. 
Where do you think we should live? 
It is with keen anticipation that I look forward to our conversations.

101 
No. 141 
PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
Your Cairo message has reached me. I shall be at your service 
in Tehran on November 28 in the evening. 
November 25, 1943 
No. 142 
Received on November 27, 1943 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I thank you very much for your message of November 23 
telling me of your intention to arrive at Tehran on the 28th or 
29th of November.50 
As for myself, I hope to get there on the 27th. It will be good 
to see you. 
No. 143 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
PROPOSALS PRESENTED 
BY UNITED STATES DELEGATION 
AT MOSCOW CONFERENCE47 
During the recent Moscow Conference the United States Delegation 
proposed that air bases be made available in the 
U.S.S.R. on which United States aircraft could be refueled, 
emergency repaired and rearmed in connection with shuttle 
bombing from the United Kingdom. It was also proposed that a 
more effective mutual interchange of weather information be 
implemented and that both signal and air communication between 
our two countries be improved. 
It was my understanding that the U.S.S.R. agreed to these 
proposals in principle and that appropriate Soviet authorities 
would be given instructions to meet with my Military Mission

102 
for the purpose of considering concrete measures which would 
be necessary to carry out the proposals. 
I hope that it will be possible to work out these arrangements 
promptly. 
No. 144 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
ADVANCE PLANNING FOR AIR OPERATIONS 
IN NORTH-WESTERN PACIFIC 
With a view of shortening the war, it is our opinion that the 
bombing of Japan from your Maritime Provinces, immediately 
following the beginning of hostilities between the U.S.S.R. and 
Japan, will be of the utmost importance, as it will enable us to 
destroy Japanese military and industrial centers. 
If agreeable, would you arrange for my Military Mission in 
Moscow to be given the necessary information covering airports 
housing, supplies, communications, and weather in the Maritime 
Provinces and the route thereto from Alaska. Our objective 
is to base the maximum bomber force possible, anywhere from 
100 to 1,000 four-engine bombers, with their maintenance and 
operating crews in that area, the number to depend upon facilities 
available. 
It is of the utmost importance that planning to this end 
should be started at once. I realize that the physical surveys by 
our people should be limited at this time to a very few individuals 
and accomplished with the utmost secrecy. We would of 
course meet any conditions you might prescribe in this regard. 
If the above arrangements are worked out now, I am convinced 
that the time of employment of our bombers against 
Japan will be materially advanced. 
November 29, 194351

103 
No. 145 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
ADVANCE PLANNING FOR NAVAL OPERATIONS 
IN NORTH-WESTERN PACIFIC 
I would like to arrange with you at this time for the exchange 
of information and for such preliminary planning as 
may be appropriate under the present conditions for eventual 
operations against Japan when Germany has been eliminated 
from the war. The more of this preliminary planning that can 
be done, without undue jeopardy to the situation, the sooner 
the war as a whole can be brought to a conclusion. 
Specifically, I have in mind the following items: 
a. We would be glad to receive combat intelligence information 
concerning Japan. 
b. Considering that the ports for your Far Eastern submarine 
and destroyer force might be threatened seriously by land or 
air attack, do you feel it desirable that the United States should 
expand base facilities sufficiently to provide for these forces in 
U.S. bases? 
c. What direct or indirect assistance would you be able to 
give in the event of a U.S. attack against the Northern Kuriles? 
d. Could you indicate what ports, if any, our forces could use, 
and could you furnish data on these ports in regard to their 
naval use as well as port capacities for despatch of cargo? 
These questions can be discussed as you may find appropriate 
with our Military Mission in Moscow, similar to the procedure 
suggested for plans regarding air operations. 
November 29, 194351 
No. 146 
TO MARSHAL JOSEPH V. STALIN, 
PREMIER OF THE U.S.S.R. 
Moscow, Russia 
Dear Marshal Stalin, 
The weather conditions were ideal for crossing the mountains 
the day of our departure from Tehran so that we had an 
easy and comfortable flight to Cairo. I hasten to send you my 
personal thanks for your thoughtfulness and hospitality in pro

104 
viding living quarters for me in your Embassy at Tehran. I was 
not only extremely comfortable there but I am very conscious of 
how much more we were able to accomplish in a brief period 
of time because we were such close neighbors throughout our 
stay. 
I view those momentous days of our meeting with the greatest 
satisfaction as being an important milestone in the progress 
of human affairs. I thank you and the members of your staff 
and household for the many kindnesses to me and to the members 
of my staff. 
I am just starting home and will visit my troops in Italy on 
the way. 
Cordially yours, 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
December 3, 1943 
No. 147 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
The destination of our party has been reached in safety and 
all of us earnestly hope that by this time you also have arrived 
safely. I consider the conference to have been a great success, 
and it was an historic event, I feel sure, in the assurance not 
only of our ability to wage war together but also to work for 
the peace to come in utmost harmony. Our personal talks together 
were enjoyed very much by me, and particularly the opportunity 
of meeting with you face to face. I look forward to 
seeing you again sometime, and, until that time, I wish the 
greatest success to you and your armies. 
December 4, 1943 
No. 148 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
Thank you for your telegram. 
I agree that the Tehran Conference was a great success and 
that our personal meetings were of great importance in many

105 
respects. I hope the common enemy of our peoples—Hitler Germany—
will soon feel this. Now there is certainty that our peoples 
will cooperate harmoniously, both at present and after the 
war
I wish you and your armed forces the best of success in the 
coming momentous operations. 
I also hope that our meeting in Tehran will not be the last 
and that we shall meet again. 
December 6, 1943 
No. 149 
Received on December 7, 1943 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
It has been decided to appoint General Eisenhower immediately 
to the command of cross-Channel operations. 
No. 150 
Received on December 7, 1943 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
In the Conference just concluded in Cairo we have reached 
the following decisions regarding the conduct of the war against 
Germany in 1944 in addition to the agreements arrived at by 
the three of us at Tehran. 
With the purpose of dislocating the German military, economic 
and industrial system, destroying the German air combat 
strength, and paving the way for an operation across the Channel 
the highest strategic priority will be given to the bomber 
offensive against Germany. 
The operation scheduled for March in the Bay of Bengal has 
been reduced in scale in order to permit the reinforcement of 
amphibious craft for the operation against Southern France. 
We have directed the greatest effort be made to increase the 
production of landing craft in the United States and Great Brit

106 
ain to provide reinforcement of cross-Channel operations. The 
diversion from the Pacific of certain landing craft has been ordered 
for the same purpose. 
No. 151 
SECRET AND PERSONAL TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
Thank you for your joint message informing me of the 
additional decisions on waging the war against Germany in 
1944. Best regards. 
December 10, 1943 
No. 152 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
I have received your message about the appointment of General 
Eisenhower. I welcome it. I wish him success in preparing 
and carrying out the forthcoming decisive operations. 
December 10, 1943 
No. 153 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
FROM PREMIER STALIN 
Thank you for your letter, which reached me through your 
Ambassador on December 18.52 
I am glad that chance enabled me to render you a service in 
Tehran. I, too, attach great importance to our meeting and to 
the talks we had on the vital problem of accelerating our common 
victory and establishing lasting peace among the nations. 
December 20, 1943

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
107 
No. 154 
MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT 
I am glad to learn from the press that your health is improving. 
I send you best regards and, more important, wish you 
speedy and complete recovery. 
January 4, 1944 
No. 155 
Received on January 23, 1944 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL 
AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
With regard to the handing over to Soviet Russia of the 
Italian shipping asked for by the Soviet Government at the 
Moscow Conference47 and agreed to with you by us both at 
Tehran, we have received a memorandum by the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff 24 contained in our immediately following telegram. 
For the reasons set out in this memorandum, we think it 
would be dangerous to our triple interests actually to carry out 
any transfer or to say anything about it to the Italians until 
their cooperation is no longer of operational importance. 
Nevertheless if after full consideration you desire us to proceed, 
we will make a secret approach to Marshal Badoglio with 
a view to concluding the necessary arrangements without their 
becoming generally known to the Italian naval forces. If in 
this way agreement could be reached, such arrangements with 
the Italian naval authorities as were necessary could be left to 
him. These arrangements would have to be on the lines that the 
Italian ships selected should be sailed to suitable Allied ports 
where they would be collected by Russian crews, who would 
sail into Russian northern ports which are the only ones open 
where any refitting necessary would be undertaken. 
We are, however, very conscious of the dangers of the above 
course for the reasons we have laid before you and we have

108 
therefore decided to propose the following alternative, which 
from the military point of view has many advantages. 
The British battleship Royal Sovereign has recently completed 
refitting in the United States. She is fitted with radar for all 
types of armament. The United States will make one light cruiser 
available at approximately the same time. 
His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government 
are willing for their part that these vessels should be 
taken over at British ports by Soviet crews and sailed to North 
Russian ports. You could then make such alterations as you find 
necessary for Arctic conditions. 
These vessels would be temporarily transferred on loan to 
Soviet Russia and would fly the Soviet flag until, without prejudice 
to military operations, the Italian vessels can be made 
available. 
His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government 
will each arrange to provide 20,000 tons of merchant shipping to 
be available as soon as practicable and until the Italian merchant 
ships can be obtained without prejudice to the projected essential 
operations “Overlord”53 and “Anvil.”54 
This alternative has the advantage that the Soviet Government 
would obtain the use of the vessels at a very much earlier 
date than if they all had to be refitted and rendered suitable for 
northern waters. Thus, if our efforts should take a favourable 
turn with the Turks, and the Straits become open, these vessels 
would be ready to operate in the Black Sea. We hope you will 
very carefully consider this alternative, which we think is in 
every way superior to the first proposal. 
CHURCHILL 
ROOSEVELT 
No. 156 
Received on January 23, 1944
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL 
MESSAGE FROM 
Mr CHURCHILL AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
Our immediately preceding telegram. 
Our Combined Chiefs of Staff 24 have made the following positive 
recommendation with supporting data: 
(a) The present time is inopportune for effecting the transfer

109 
of captured Italian ships because of pending Allied operations. 
(b) To impose the transfer at this time would remove needed 
Italian resources now employed in current operations and would 
interfere with their assistance now being given by Italian repair 
facilities. It might cause scuttling of Italian warships and result 
in the loss of Italian cooperation, thus jeopardizing “Overlord”53 
and “Anvil.”54 
(c) At the earliest moment permitted by operations the implementation 
of the delivery of the Italian vessels may proceed. 
CHURCHILL 
ROOSEVELT 
No. 157 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, 
Mr WINSTON CHURCHILL 
The joint messages signed by you, Mr President, and you, 
Mr Prime Minister, concerning the transfer of Italian vessels to 
the Soviet Union, arrived on January 23. 
I must say that after getting your joint favourable reply to 
my question in Tehran about transferring Italian ships to the 
Soviet Union before the end of January 1944, I had considered 
the matter settled; it never occurred to me that that decision 
reached and agreed to by the three of us could be revised in any 
way. All the more so because we agreed at the time that the 
matter would be fully settled with the Italians during December 
and January. Now I see that this is not the case and that nothing 
has been said to the Italians on this score. 
However, in order not to delay settlement of this matter, 
which is so vitally important to our common fight against Germany, 
the Soviet Union is willing to accept your proposal for 
the battleship Royal Sovereign and one cruiser being transferred 
from British ports to the U.S.S.R. and for the Soviet Naval 
Command using the two ships temporarily, until corresponding 
Italian ships can be made available to the Soviet Union. In the 
same way we are ready to accept from the U.S.A. and Britain 
20,000 tons of merchant shipping apiece, which we shall likewise 
use until we are provided with the same amount of Italian 
shipping. The important thing is that there should no longer 
be any delay in the matter and that the ships mentioned above 
be handed over to us before the end of February.

110 
However, there is no mention in your reply of the transfer to 
the Soviet Union at the end of January of the eight Italian destroyers 
and four submarines to which you, Mr President, and 
you, Mr Prime Minister, consented in Tehran. Yet this question 
of destroyers and submarines is of paramount importance to the 
Soviet Union, for without them the transfer of one battleship 
and one cruiser would be pointless. You will agree that cruisers 
and battleships are powerless unless accompanied by destroyers. 
As the whole of the Italian Navy is at your disposal, it should 
not be difficult for you to carry out the Tehran decision for the 
transfer of eight destroyers and four submarines from that 
Navy to the Soviet Union. I also agree to accept, instead of 
Italian destroyers and submarines, as many U.S. or British 
destroyers and submarines for the Soviet Union. The transfer 
of the destroyers and submarines should not be delayed 
it should be effected simultaneously with the transfer of 
the battleship and cruiser, as agreed by the three of us 
in Tehran. 
January 29, 1944 
No. 158 
Received on February 24, 1944 
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL 
JOINT PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND Mr CHURCHILL 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
The receipt is acknowledged of your message in regard to the 
handing over of the Italian shipping to Soviet Russia. 
It is our intention to carry out the transfer agreed to at Tehran 
at the earliest date practicable without hazarding the success 
of “Anvil”54 and “Overlord,”53 which operations we all agree 
should be given the first priority in our common effort to defeat 
Germany at the earliest possible date. 
There is no thought of not carrying through the transfers 
agreed at Tehran. The British battleship and American cruiser 
can be made available without any delay and an effort will be 
made at once to make available from the British Navy the eight 
destroyers. Four submarines will also be provided temporarily 
by Great Britain. We are convinced that disaffecting Italian

111 
Navy at this time would be what you have so aptly termed an 
unnecessary diversion and that it would adversely affect the 
prospects of our success in France. 
February 7th, 1944 
No. 159 
Received on February 11, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I have been following the recent developments in your relations 
with Poland with the closest attention. I feel that I am 
fully aware of your views on the subject and am therefore taking 
this opportunity of communicating with you on the basis 
of our conversations at Tehran. First of all, let me make it plain 
that I neither desire nor intend to attempt to suggest much less 
to advise you in any way as to where the interests of Russia 
lie in this matter since I realize to the full that the future security 
of your country is rightly your primary concern. The 
observations which I am about to make are prompted solely 
by the larger issues which affect the common goal towards 
which we are both working. 
As you know, the overwhelming majority of our people and 
Congress welcomed with enthusiasm the broad principles subscribed 
to at the Moscow47 and Tehran conferences, and I know 
that you agree with me that it is of the utmost importance that 
faith in these understandings should not be left in any doubt. I 
am sure that a solution can be found which would fully protect 
the interests of Russia and satisfy your desire to see a friendly, 
independent Poland, and at the same time not adversely 
affect the cooperation so splendidly established at Moscow and 
Tehran. 
I have given careful consideration to the views of your Government 
as outlined by Mr Molotov to Mr Harriman on January 
18 regarding the impossibility from the Soviet point of 
view of having any dealings with the Polish Government in 
Exile in its present form and Mr Molotov’s suggestion that the 
Polish Government should be reconstituted by the inclusion of 
Polish elements at present in the United States, Great Britain, 
and the Soviet Union. I fully appreciate your desire to deal only 
with a Polish Government in which you can repose confidence 
and which can be counted upon to establish permanent friendly 
relations with the Soviet Union, but it is my earnest hope that

112 
while this problem remains unsolved nothing should be done 
to transform this special question into one adversely affecting 
the larger issues of future international collaboration. While 
public opinion is forming in support of the principle of international 
collaboration, it is especially incumbent upon us to 
avoid any action which might appear to counteract the achievement 
of our long-range objective. 
I am told by Prime Minister Churchill that he is endeavoring 
to persuade the Polish Prime Minister to make a clean-cut acceptance 
as a basis for negotiation of the territorial changes 
which have been proposed by your Government. Is it not possible 
on that basis to arrive at some answer to the question of 
the composition of the Polish Government which would leave 
it to the Polish Prime Minister himself to make such changes in 
his government as may be necessary without any evidence of 
pressure or dictation from a foreign country? 
It seems to me, as a matter of timing, that the first consideration 
at this time should be that Polish guerrillas should work 
with and not against your advancing troops. That is of current 
importance and as a first step some assurance on the part of all 
Poles would be of great advantage. 
No. 160 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Your message on the Polish question to hand. It goes without 
saying that a correct solution of this problem is of great importance 
both to the U.S.S.R. and to our common cause. 
There are two major points to be considered: first, the Soviet- 
Polish frontier and, second, the composition of the Polish Government. 
The Soviet Government’s point of view is familiar to 
you from its recently published statements55 and from V. M. Molotov’s 
letter56 in reply to Mr Hull’s Note, received in Moscow 
through the Soviet Ambassador, Gromyko, on January 22. 
First of all, about the Soviet-Polish frontier. As you know, 
the Soviet Government has officially declared that it does not 
consider the 1939 boundary final, and has agreed to the Curzon 
Line.57 In stating this we have made quite important concessions 
to the Poles on the frontier question. We had grounds for anticipating 
an appropriate declaration on the part of the Polish 
Government. It should have officially declared that the frontier 
established by the Riga Treaty58 would be revised and that it 
accepts the Curzon Line as the new frontier line between the

113 
U.S.S.R. and Poland. It should have made an official declaration 
on recognition of the Curzon Line just as the Soviet Government 
has done. But the Polish Government in London refused 
to budge, and continued to insist in official statements that the 
frontier imposed upon us under the Riga Treaty at a difficult 
moment should be left unchanged. Hence, there is no basis for 
agreement, for the standpoint of the present Polish Government, 
as we see, precludes agreement. 
In view of this circumstance the question of the composition 
of the Polish Government has likewise become more acute. It is 
clear that the Polish Government, in which the main role is 
played by pro-fascist, imperialist elements hostile to the Soviet 
Union, such as Sosnkowski, and in which there are hardly any 
democratic elements, can have no basis in Poland, nor, as experience 
has shown, can it establish friendly relations with democratic 
neighbouring countries. Clearly, such a Polish Government 
is incapable of establishing friendly relations with the 
Soviet Union and it cannot be anticipated that it will not sow 
discord among the democratic countries which, on the contrary, 
would like to strengthen their unity. It follows that a radical 
improvement in the composition of the Polish Government is 
an urgent matter. 
I had to delay reply, being busy at the front. 
February 16, 1944 
No. 161 
Received on February 18, 1944 
SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I am glad to inform you, in response to your message of the 
29th of January, that the United States vessels listed below are 
available to the Naval Command of the U.S.S.R. for temporary 
use until adequate Italian tonnage can be placed at the disposal 
of the Soviet Union to replace them: 
The cruiser Milwaukee scheduled to arrive on March 8 in the 
United Kingdom at some port not yet designated. 
The 10,000-ton merchant ships John Gorrie and Harry Percy 
now at Liverpool and Glasgow respectively.

114 
No. 162 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT 
I am in receipt of your message of February 18. Thank you 
for the news. 
It does not, however, exhaust the matter as it says nothing 
about Anglo-American destroyers and submarines in lieu of the 
Italian ones—eight destroyers and four submarines—as decided 
at Tehran. I look forward to an early reply on these points. 
mentioned in my message of January 29. 
February 21, 1944 
No. 163 
Received on February 21, 1944 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
The recent successes of your armies in the North-west and in 
the Ukraine have been followed by us with keen interest and 
deep satisfaction. I send you my best wishes and congratulations. 
No. 164 
PERSONAL FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I have received your message with congratulations on the 
latest successes of the Soviet forces. Please accept my thanks 
for your friendly wishes. 
February 23, 1944

115 
No. 165 
Received on February 23, 1944 
HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH V. STALIN, 
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES 
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
(Retranslated) 
Moscow 
On the occasion of the 26th anniversary of the Red Army I 
would like to convey to you as Supreme Commander my sincere 
congratulations on the great and momentous victories won by 
the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union over the past year. The 
splendid victories which the Red Army has achieved under your 
leadership were an inspiration to all. The heroic defence of 
Leningrad was crowned and rewarded with the recent crushing 
defeat of the enemy at the gates of that city. As a result of the 
victorious offensive of the Red Army millions of Soviet citizens 
have been freed from slavery and oppression. These achievements, 
along with the cooperation on which agreement was 
reached at Moscow47 and Tehran, ensure our eventual victory 
over the Nazi aggressors. 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
No. 166 
Received on February 24, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Your message of the twenty-first of February about the loan 
of British and American ships to the Soviet Navy has been 
received. 
According to my understanding, Great Britain would provide 
the battleship, the four submarines and the eight destroyers. I 
have cabled to the Prime Minister about this. When I hear from 
him, I will let you know.

116 
No. 167 
Received on February 25, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
With reference to my message of February 23, 1944, I have 
received a reply from Prime Minister Churchill and our understanding 
as expressed to you is now confirmed. 
No. 168 
Received on February 25, 1944 
SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
A number of important steps have been taken in recent 
months by the Governments of the United Nations14 toward 
laying the foundations for post-war cooperative action in the 
various fields of international economic relations. You will recall 
that the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture 
held in May 1943, gave rise to an interim commission which is 
now drafting recommendations to lay before the various Governments 
for a permanent organization in this field. More recently, 
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration59 
has been established and is now in operation. 
There have been for nearly a year informal technical discussions 
at the expert level among many of the United Nations on 
mechanisms for international monetary stabilization; these discussions 
are preparatory to a possible convocation of a United 
Nations monetary conference. Similar discussions have been 
taking place, though on a more restricted scale, with regard to 
the possibility of establishing mechanisms for facilitating international 
development investment. Also, to some extent, informal 
discussions have taken place among some of the United 
Nations with regard to such questions as commercial policy, 
commodity policy, and cartels. Discussions are in contemplation 
on such questions as commercial aviation, oil, and others. A 
conference of the International Labor Organization will take 
place in April, in part for the purpose of considering its future 
activities. 
The need for both informal discussions and formal conferences 
on various economic problems was emphasized in a document 
presented by the Secretary of State at the Moscow meet

117 
ing of Foreign Ministers47 entitled “Bases of Our Program for 
International Economic Cooperation.” It was suggested that 
“the time has come for the establishment of a commission comprising 
representatives of the principal United Nations and possibly 
certain others of the United Nations for the joint planning 
of the procedures to be followed in these matters.” It is clear 
to me that there is a manifest need for United Nations machinery 
for joint planning of the procedures by which consideration 
should be given to the various fields of international economic 
cooperation, the subjects which should be discussed, the 
order of discussion, and the means by which existing and prospective 
arrangements and activities are to be coordinated. 
It is not my purpose at this time and in this connection to 
raise the broader issues of international organization for the 
maintenance of peace and security. Preliminary discussions on 
this subject are currently in contemplation between our three 
Governments under the terms of the Moscow Protocol.60 What 
I am raising here is the question of further steps toward the 
establishment of United Nations machinery for post-war economic 
collaboration, which was raised at the Moscow meeting by 
the Secretary of State and was discussed at Tehran by you, 
Prime Minister Churchill and myself. 
I should very much appreciate it if you would give me your 
views on the suggestion made by the Secretary of State at Moscow, 
together with any other thoughts as to the best procedure 
to be followed in this extremely important matter. 
No. 169 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT, 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL 
Your two messages concerning the Italian vessels reached me, 
through Mr Harriman, on February 24 and 25. I have also received 
from you and the Prime Minister the message of February 
7,61 transmitted by British Ambassador Kerr on February 
24. 
My thanks to you and the Prime Minister for the news about 
the temporary transfer to the Soviet Union of eight destroyers 
and four submarines, as well as a battleship and 20,000 tons 
of merchant shipping by Great Britain and a cruiser and 
20,000 tons of merchant shipping by the United States.

118 
Mr Kerr has expressly warned us that all the destroyers are old 
ones so that I have misgivings about their combat qualities 
It seems to me that the British and U.S. Navies should find no 
difficulty in assigning, out of the eight destroyers, at least four 
modern, not old, ones. I still hope that you and the Prime Minister 
will find it possible to transfer at least four modern destroyers. 
As a result of military operations by Germany and Italy 
we have lost a substantial part of our destroyers. It is, therefore, 
very important for us to have that loss repaired at least 
in part. 
February 26, 1944 
No. 170 
Sent on February 28, 1944 
TO Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 
The White House, Washington 
Please accept my heartfelt gratitude for your friendly congratulations 
on the 26th anniversary of the Red Army and the successes 
achieved by the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the 
struggle against the Hitler invaders. 
I am firmly convinced that the day is not far off when the successful 
struggle of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union jointly 
with the Armies of the United States and Great Britain will, on 
the basis of the agreements reached at Moscow47 and Tehran, 
result in the final defeat of our common foe, Hitler Germany. 
J. STALIN 
No. 171 
Received on February 28, 1944 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
The text of the Prime Minister’s message of February 20 to 
you on the subject of a tentative settlement of the Polish postwar 
boundary by an agreement between the Soviet and Polish 
Governments is known to me.

119 
If accepted, the Prime Minister’s suggestion goes far toward 
furthering our prospects of an early defeat of Germany and I am 
pleased to recommend that you give favorable and sympathetic 
consideration to it. 
I think, as I intimated before, that the most realistic problem 
is to be assured that when you get into Poland your armies will 
be assisted by the Poles. 
No. 172 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Much as I should like to react favourably to Mr Churchill’s 
message about the Poles—a message you are familiar with—I 
feel obliged to say that the Polish émigré Government does not 
want normal relations with the U.S.S.R. Suffice it to say that the 
Polish émigrés in London not only reject the Curzon Line,57 they 
also claim Lvov, and Vilna, the Lithuanian capital. 
All I can say is that the time is not yet ripe for a solution of 
the problem of Polish-Soviet relations. For your information I 
enclose my reply to Mr Churchill on this matter. 
March 3, 1944 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL 
Both messages of February 20 on the Polish question reached 
me through Mr Kerr on February 27. 
Now that I have read the detailed record of your conversations 
with the leaders of the Polish émigré Government, I am more 
convinced than ever that men of their type are incapable of 
establishing normal relations with the U.S.S.R. Suffice it to 
point out that they, far from being ready to recognise the Curzon 
Line, claim both Lvov and Vilna. As regards the desire to 
place certain Soviet territories under foreign control, we cannot 
agree to discuss such encroachments, for, as we see it, the mere 
posing of the question is an affront to the Soviet Union. 
I have already written to the President that the time is not

120 
yet ripe for a solution of the problem of Soviet-Polish relations 
I am compelled to reaffirm the soundness of this conclusion. 
March 3, 1944 
No. 173 
Received on March 4, 1944 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I stated today at a press conference in response to insistent 
questioning that Italian warships and merchant ships are now 
being used in our war effort by the Allied Mediterranean Command 
and that in order to assist the Soviet Navy in their requirements 
for the war effort Italian ships or substitutions therefore 
from the American and British tonnage will be allocated 
to the Soviet Navy. 
No. 174 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, 
Mr F. D. ROOSEVELT 
I am in receipt of your communication on the statement made 
at the press conference in Washington concerning the transfer 
of a number of Italian vessels or their equivalent of U.S. and 
British shipping to the Soviet Union. Thank you. 
March 6, 1944

121 
No. 175 
Received on March 9, 1944 
PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET 
MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL 
AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
Although the Prime Minister instructed Ambassador Clark 
Kerr to tell you that the destroyers we are lending you were 
old, this was only for the sake of absolute frankness. In fact 
they are good, serviceable ships, quite efficient for escort duty. 
There are only seven fleet destroyers in the whole Italian Navy, 
the rest being older destroyers and torpedo-boats. Moreover, 
these Italian destroyers when we do get them, are absolutely unfitted 
for work in the North without very lengthy refit. Therefore 
we thought the eight which the British Government had 
found would be an earlier and more convenient form of help to 
you. The Prime Minister regrets that he cannot spare any new 
destroyers at the present time. He lost two the week before 
last, one in the Russian convoy, and for landing at “Overlord”53 
alone he has to deploy, for close in-shore work against batteries 
no fewer than forty-two destroyers, a large proportion of which 
may be sunk. Every single vessel that he has of this class is 
being used to the utmost pressure in the common cause. The 
movement of the Japanese Fleet to Singapore creates a new 
situation for us both in the Indian Ocean. The fighting in Anzio 
bridgehead and generally throughout the Mediterranean is at 
its height. The vast troop convoys are crossing the Atlantic with 
the United States Army of Liberation. The Russian convoys are 
being run up to the last minute before “Overlord” with very 
heavy destroyer escorts. Finally there is “Overlord” itself. The 
President’s position is similarly strained but in this case mainly 
because of the great scale and activity of the operations in the 
Pacific. Our joint intentions to deliver to you the Italian ships 
agreed on at Moscow47 and Tehran remain unaltered, and we 
shall put the position formally to the Italian Government at the 
time the latter is broadened and the new Ministers take over 
their responsibilities. There is no question of our right to dispose 
of the Italian Navy, but only of exercising that right with 
the least harm to our common interests. Meanwhile all our 
specified ships are being prepared for delivery to you on loan 
as already agreed. 
ROOSEVELT 
CHURCHILL

122 
No. 176 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT 
Your message on post-war economic cooperation to hand. The 
problems of international economic cooperation, raised in 
Mr Hull’s Memorandum,62 are undoubtedly of great importance 
and merit attention. I think it quite timely to set up a United 
Nations14 staff to study them and to specify ways and means of 
examining the various aspects of international economic cooperation 
in keeping with the decisions of the Moscow47 and Tehran 
conferences. 
March 10, 1944 
No. 177 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT, 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL 
I have received your message on the transfer of eight destroyers 
to the Soviet Union by the British Government. I am read 
to agree that the said destroyers are quite fit for escort service 
but surely you realise that the Soviet Union also needs destroyers 
fit for other combat operations. The Allies’ right to dispose 
of the Italian Navy is absolutely beyond question, of course 
and this should be made clear to the Italian Government 
especially as regards the Italian ships which are to be transferred 
to the Soviet Union. 
March 17, 1944 
No. 178 
Received on March 18, 1944 
F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* 
I have today despatched by air a personal letter to President 
Inonu on the subject of chrome, as I am impressed by the importance 
of Turkish chrome to Germany. I have sent the letter

123 
to Ambassador Steinhardt in Ankara for delivery. I feel sure 
that you will concur, but please let me know if this action 
should run counter to any steps you are now taking or contemplating 
so that I can halt delivery of the letter. The text of my 
letter to President Inonu reads in paraphrase as follows: 
Almost every day in the week there are many matters about 
which I would like to talk to you and I greatly wish that you 
and I were not thousands of miles apart. 
“At this time I want to write to you about the subject of 
chrome. 
“As you are aware, the Russians by the capture of Nikopol 
have succeeded in denying an important source of manganese 
to the Germans. For many purposes Turkish chrome ore can be 
substituted for manganese, and the denial to the Germans of 
manganese from Nikopol consequently multiplies the importance 
of chrome from Turkey to the German war production. 
“It is obvious that it has now become a matter of grave concern 
to the United Nations14 that large supplies of chrome ore 
continue to move to Germany from Turkey. You can best 
decide how the Germans can be denied further access to Turkish 
chrome ore. Knowing of your inventive genius I hope you 
will find some method to bring this about. I firmly believe that 
you will recognize this opportunity for a unique contribution 
to be made by Turkey to what really is the welfare of the 
world. 
“It is needless to tell you how very happy I was in our talks 
in Cairo and I feel that now you and I can talk to each other 
as old friends. 
“I send you all my good wishes and count on our meeting 
again in the near future.” 
I am sending Mr Churchill a similar telegram. 
No. 179 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I have received your message setting forth the draft of your 
letter to the President of Turkey about Turkish deliveries of 
chrome to Germany. 
The representation you suggest making to the Turks is, I 
think, most timely, although I must say that I have little hope 
of positive results. 
March 20, 1944

124 
No. 180 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Since Mr Churchill has sent you, as he tells me, a copy of his 
March 21 message to me on the Polish question, I think it 
proper to send, for your information, a copy of my reply to his 
message. 
Copy enclosed. 
March 23, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, 
Mr W. CHURCHILL 
I have lately received two messages from you on the Polish 
question and have read the statement made by Mr Kerr on the 
question to V. M. Molotov on instructions from you.63 I have not 
been able to reply earlier as front affairs often keep me away 
from non-military matters. 
I shall now answer point by point. 
I was struck by the fact that both your message and particularly 
Kerr’s statement bristle with threats against the Soviet 
Union. I should like to call your attention to this circumstance 
because threats as a method are not only out of place in relations 
between Allies, but also harmful, for they may lead to opposite 
results. 
The Soviet Union’s efforts to uphold and implement the Curzon 
Line57 are referred to in one of your messages as a policy 
of force. This implies that you are now trying to describe the 
Curzon Line as unlawful and the struggle for it as unjust. I 
totally disagree with you. I must point out that at Tehran you 
the President and myself were agreed that the Curzon Line 
was lawful. 
At that time you considered the Soviet Government’s stand 
on the issue quite correct, and said it would be crazy for representatives 
of the Polish émigré Government to reject the Curzon 
Line. But now you maintain something to the contrary. 
Does this mean that you no longer recognise what we agreed 
on in Tehran and are ready to violate the Tehran agreement? I

125 
have no doubt that had you persevered in your Tehran stand 
the conflict with the Polish émigré Government could have been 
settled. As for me and the Soviet Government, we still adhere 
to the Tehran standpoint, and we have no intention of going 
back on it, for we believe implementation of the Curzon Line 
to be evidence, not of a policy of force, but of a policy of reestablishing 
the Soviet Union’s legitimate right to those territories, 
which even Curzon and the Supreme Council of the 
Allied Powers recognised as non-Polish in 1919. 
You say in your message of March 7 that the problem of the 
Soviet-Polish frontier will have to be put off till the armistice 
conference is convened. I think there is a misunderstanding 
here. The Soviet Union is not waging nor does it intend to 
wage war against Poland. It has no conflict with the Polish 
people and considers itself an ally of Poland and the Polish 
people. That is why it is shedding its blood to free Poland 
from German oppression. It would be strange, therefore, to 
speak of an armistice between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. But 
the Soviet Union is in conflict with the Polish émigré Government, 
which does not represent the interests of the Polish people 
or express their aspirations. It would be stranger still to 
identify Poland with the Polish émigré Government in London, 
a government isolated from Poland. I even find it hard to tell 
the difference between Poland’s émigré Government and the 
Yugoslav émigré Government, which is akin to it, or between 
certain generals of the Polish émigré Government and the Serb 
General Mihajlovic. 
In your message of March 21 you tell me of your intention to 
make a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that 
all territorial questions must await the armistice or peace 
conferences of the victorious Powers and that in the meantime 
you cannot recognise any forcible transferences of territory. As 
I see it you make the Soviet Union appear as being hostile to 
Poland, and virtually deny the liberation nature of the war 
waged by the Soviet Union against German aggression. That is 
tantamount to attributing to the Soviet Union something which 
is non-existent, and, thereby, discrediting it. I have no doubt 
that the peoples of the Soviet Union and world public opinion 
will evaluate your statement as a gratuitous insult to the Soviet 
Union. 
To be sure you are free to make any statement you like in 
the House of Commons—that is your business. But should you 
make a statement of this nature I shall consider that you have 
committed an unjust and unfriendly act in relation to the Soviet 
Union. 
In your message you express the hope that the break-down 
over the Polish question will not affect our cooperation in other

126 
spheres. As far as I am concerned, I have been, and still am, 
for cooperation. But I fear that the method of intimidation 
and defamation, if continued, will not benefit our cooperation. 
March 23, 1944 
No. 181 
Received on March 23, 1944 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Ambassador Harriman has just informed me that the Soviet 
Union is not planning to participate in the conference of the 
International Labor Organization starting April 2 in Philadelphia. 
I have given considerable thought to the role that the International 
Labor Organization should play in constantly improving 
the labor and social standards throughout the world. I am anxious 
that you should know about this matter. 
The International Labor Organization should be, in my 
opinion, the instrument for the formulation of international 
policy on matters directly affecting the welfare of labor and 
for international collaboration in this field. I should like to see 
it become a body which will serve as an important organ of the 
United Nations14 for discussing economic and social matters 
relating to labor and an important agency for consideration of 
international economic policies which look directly toward improvement 
in standards of living. It would be unfortunate if 
both our Governments did not take advantage of the conference 
in Philadelphia to help develop our common objectives. We 
could thereby adapt the existing International Labor Organization 
to the tasks facing the world without loss of time. 
The United States Government delegates to the Philadelphia 
Conference are being instructed by me to propose measures to 
broaden the activities and functions of the International Labor 
Organization and raise the question of its future relationship to 
other international organizations. In view of your interest in 
these matters and since there is a great range of social and 
economic problems that are of common interest to both our 
Governments, I greatly hope that your Government will participate 
in this conference.

127 
No. 182 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I share your desire for cooperation between our two Governments 
in studying economic and social problems linked with 
improving the welfare of labour on an international scale. The 
Soviet Union cannot, however, send representatives to the International 
Labour Organisation conference in Philadelphia for 
the reasons set forth in the letter to Mr Harriman,64 because 
the Soviet trade unions are opposed to participation in it, and 
the Soviet Government cannot but take account of the opinion 
of the trade unions. 
It goes without saying that if the International Labour Organisation 
were to become an agency of the United Nations,14 not 
of the League of Nations with which the Soviet Union cannot 
associate itself, Soviet participation would be possible. I hope 
that this will become feasible and the appropriate steps taken 
in the near future. 
March 25, 1944 
No. 183 
Received on March 25, 1944 
SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
Dr. Lange and Father Orlemanski will, in accordance with 
your suggestion, be given passports in order to accept your invitation 
to proceed to the Soviet Union.65 Our transportation 
facilities, however, are greatly overcrowded at the present time 
due to military movements, and accordingly transportation 
from the United States to the Soviet Union will have to be 
furnished by Soviet facilities. You will realize, I know, that 
Dr. Lange and Father Orlemanski are proceeding as private 
citizens in their individual capacity and the Government of the 
United States can assume no responsibility whatsoever for 
their views or activities. It might be necessary for the United 
States Government to make this point clear should the trip 
become the subject of public comment.

128 
No. 184 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I am in receipt of your message advising me that passports 
have been issued to Dr. Lange and Father Orlemanski.65 
Although Soviet transport facilities are greatly overtaxed, we 
shall make transport available for Lange and Orlemanski. The 
Soviet Government regards the Lange and Orlemanski visit to 
the Soviet Union as a visit by two private persons. 
March 28, 1944 
No. 185 
Received on April 4, 1944 
SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Many thanks for your message of March 25. It is my hope 
that the International Labor Organization at the coming meeting 
will make it clear that it no longer is an organ of the 
League of Nations and that it will affiliate itself with the United 
Nations.14 I trust, therefore, that the Soviet Union will have 
representatives at the next conference. 
I will keep you informed of what takes place at the meeting 
in Philadelphia. 
No. 186 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Your message about the International Labour Organisation 
reached me on April 4. Thank you for reply. I believe that 
implementation of measures for reconstructing the International 
Labour Organisation will pave the way for future Soviet participation 
in its work. 
April 6, 1944

129 
No. 187 
PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET 
MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL 
AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
Pursuant to our talks at Tehran, the general crossing of the 
sea will take place around “R” date, which Generals Deane and 
Burrows have recently been directed to give to the Soviet General 
Staff.66 We shall be acting at our fullest strength. 
2. We are launching an offensive on the Italian mainland at 
maximum strength about mid-May. 
3. Since Tehran your armies have been gaining a magnificent 
series of victories for the common cause. Even in the month 
when you thought they would not be active they have gained 
these great victories. We send you our very best wishes and 
trust that your armies and ours, operating in unison in accordance 
with our Tehran agreement, will crush the Hitlerites. 
ROOSEVELT 
CHURCHILL 
April 18th, 1944 
No. 188 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT, 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL 
Your message of April 18 received. 
The Soviet Government is gratified to learn that in accordance 
with the Tehran agreement the sea crossing will take place 
at the appointed time, which Generals Deane and Burrows 
have already imparted to our General Staff,66 and that you will 
be acting at full strength. I am confident that the planned 
operation will be a success. 
I hope that the operations you are undertaking in Italy will 
likewise be successful. 
As agreed in Tehran, the Red Army will launch a new offensive 
at the same time so as to give maximum support to the 
Anglo-American operations.

130 
Please accept my thanks for the good wishes you have expressed 
on the occasion of the Red Army’s success. I subscribe 
to your statement that your armies and our own, supporting 
each other, will defeat the Hitlerites and thus fulfil their historic 
mission. 
April 22, 1944 
No. 189 
TO Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 
The White House, Washington 
Please accept the sincere condolences of the Soviet Government 
on the occasion of the grievous loss suffered by the United 
States through the death of Franklin Knox, U.S. Secretary of 
the Navy. 
J. STALIN 
April 29, 1944 
No. 190 
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
Accept, please, my real appreciation and that of the Government 
and people of the United States for your kind message 
on the tragic death of Mr Frank Knox, the Secretary of the 
Navy. 
May 5, 1944

131 
No. 191 
Sent on May 6, 1944 
TO FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 
Dear friend, 
Thank you very much for helping Father Stanislaw Orlemanski65 
to obtain permission to come to Moscow. 
I wish you good health and success. 
Sincerely yours, 
STALIN 
No. 192 
Received on May 14, 1944 
JOINT MESSAGE 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
In order to give the maximum strength to the attack across 
the sea against Northern France, we have transferred part of 
our landing craft from the Mediterranean to England. This, 
together with the need for using our Mediterranean land forces 
in the present Italian battle makes it impracticable to attack 
the Mediterranean coast of France simultaneously with the 
“Overlord”53 assault. We are planning to make such an attack 
later, for which purpose additional landing craft are being sent 
to the Mediterranean from the United States. In order to keep 
the greatest number of German forces away from Northern 
France and the Eastern Front, we are attacking the Germans in 
Italy at once on a maximum scale and, at the same time, are 
maintaining a threat against the Mediterranean coast of France. 
ROOSEVELT 
CHURCHILL

132 
No. 193 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT, 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, 
Mr W. CHURCHILL 
Your joint message received. You can best decide how and 
in what way to allocate your forces. The important thing, of 
course, is to ensure complete success for “Overlord.”53 I express 
confidence also in the success of the offensive launched in Italy. 
May 15, 1944 
No. 194 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
I would appreciate receiving your views on my making a 
statement to be issued after “D” day67 along the following lines 
in place of a tripartite statement to be issued by the Soviet, 
United States, and British Governments: 
“A suggestion has been made that the Allied Governments 
issue a joint statement to the people of Germany and their 
sympathizers in which emphasis would be placed on the recent 
landings made on the European continent. I have not agreed 
with this as it might overemphasize the importance of these 
landings. What I desire to impress upon the German people 
and their sympathizers is that their defeat is inevitable. I also 
wish to emphasize to them that it is unintelligent on their part 
to continue in the war from now on. They must realize in their 
hearts that, with their present objectives and their present leaders, 
it is inevitable that they will be totally defeated. 
“From now on, every German life that is lost is an unnecessary 
loss. It is true, from a cold-blooded point of view, that the 
Allies will also suffer losses. However, the Allies outnumber so 
greatly Germany in population and in resources that the Germans 
on a relative basis will be much harder hit—down to the 
last family—than the Allies, and mere stubbornness will never 
help Germany in the long run. It has been made abundantly 
clear by the Allies that they do not seek the total destruction 
of the people of Germany. What they seek is the total destruc

133 
tion of the philosophy of those Germans who have stated that 
they could subjugate the world. 
“The Allies desire to attain the long-range goal of human 
freedom—greater real liberty—political, intellectual, and religious, 
and a greater justice, economic and social. 
“We are being taught by our times that no group of men can 
ever be sufficiently strong to dominate the entire world. The 
United States Government and the people of the United States 
—with almost twice the population of Germany—send word 
to the German people that this is the time for them to abandon 
the teachings of evil. 
“By far the greater part of the population of the world of 
nearly two billion people feel the same way. It is only Germany 
and Japan who stand out against all the rest of humanity. 
“In his heart every German knows that this is true. Germany 
and Japan have made a disastrous and terrible mistake. Germany 
and Japan must atone reasonably for the wanton destruction 
of lives and property which they have committed. They 
must renounce the philosophy which has been imposed upon 
them—the falsity of this philosophy must be very clear to them 
now. 
“The more quickly the fighting and the slaughter shall terminate, 
the more rapidly shall arrive a more decent civilization in 
the entire world. 
“The attacks which the American, the British, and the Soviet 
armies and their associates are now making in the European 
theater will, we hope, continue with success. However, the people 
of Germany must realize that these attacks are only a part 
of many which will increase in volume and number until victory, 
which is inevitable, is attained.” 
Prime Minister Churchill has agreed to follow me with a 
message along the above lines. 
May 23, 1944 
No. 195 
HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH V. STALIN, 
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES, 
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
Moscow 
My dear Marshal Stalin, 
I am sending to you two scrolls for Stalingrad68 and Leningrad69 
which cities have won the wholehearted admiration of

134 
the American people. The heroism of the citizens of these two 
cities and the soldier who so ably defended them has not only 
been an inspiration to the people of the United States, but has 
served to bind even more closely the friendship of our two 
nations. Stalingrad and Leningrad have become synonyms for 
the fortitude and endurance which has enabled us to resist and 
will finally enable us to overcome the aggression of our enemies. 
I hope that in presenting these scrolls to the two cities you 
will see fit to convey to their citizens my own personal expressions 
of friendship and admiration and my hope that our people 
will continue to develop that close understanding which has 
marked our common effort. 
Very sincerely yours, 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
May 25, 194470 
No. 196 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Your communication on a statement to the people of Germany 
has reached me. 
In view of the experience of the war against the Germans 
and the German character I do not think that your suggested 
statement would have a positive effect, seeing that it is to be 
synchronised with the beginning of the landing and not with the 
moment when the Anglo-American landing and the forthcoming 
offensive of the Soviet armies will have registered notable 
success. 
As to the nature of the statement, we can return to this when 
circumstances favour publication. 
May 26, 1944

135 
No. 197 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
With reference to my message of May 23 proposing for consideration 
a message to be issued by me with the purpose of 
influencing the German people, I am informed that the suggestion 
is not approved by the Prime Minister of Great Britain and 
his Cabinet. 
Because the proposed statement is not of essential impor ance 
and in view of a definite and positive objection by the British 
Government, I propose to do nothing in the way of a statement 
of that nature at the present time. 
May 27, 1944 
No. 198 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Your message informing me that you have decided not to do 
anything in the way of a statement to the German people at 
the present time has reached me. 
Thank you for the communication. 
May 30, 1944 
No. 199 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
I have your message of May 26 regarding my proposal to 
make a statement designed to influence the German people. 
The message I sent to you on May 27, which evidently crossed 
your message in transit, is in agreement with your opinion 
that at the present time such a statement should not be made. 
May 30, 1944

136 
No. 200 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A., 
Mr ROOSEVELT 
I congratulate you on the taking of Rome—a grand victory 
for the Allied Anglo-American troops. 
The news has caused deep satisfaction in the Soviet Union. 
June 5, 1944 
No. 201 
Sent on June 7, 1944 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT, 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
I feel it necessary to let you know that on June 6, in reply to 
a message from Mr Churchill I sent the following personal message 
about the plan for a Soviet summer offensive. 
“Your communication on the successful launching of ‘Overlord 
has reached me. It is a source of joy to us all and of 
hope for further successes. 
“The summer offensive of the Soviet troops, to be launched 
in keeping with the agreement reached at the Tehran Conference, 
will begin in mid-June in one of the vital sectors of the 
front. The general offensive will develop by stages, through 
consecutive engagement of the armies in offensive operations. 
Between late June and the end of July operations will turn into 
a general offensive of the Soviet troops. 
“I shall not fail to keep you posted about the course of the 
operations. 
“June 6, 1944.”

137 
No. 202 
Received on June 8, 1944 
SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I have received your message of congratulation on the fall of 
Rome and thank you very much for it, also for sending me the 
copy of your message to Mr Churchill. All of this makes me 
very happy. 
From Northern France the news is that everything is progressing 
as scheduled. 
I send my warm regards to you. 
No. 203 
Received on June 19, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Mr Mikolajczyk, the Polish Prime Minister, has, as you know, 
just completed a brief visit to Washington and for reasons 
which Ambassador Harriman has already explained to you I 
considered his visit to be desirable and necessary at this time. 
Therefore you are aware that his visit was not connected with 
any attempt on my part to inject myself into the merits of the 
differences which exist between the Polish Government in Exile 
and the Soviet Government. Although we had a frank and 
beneficial exchange of views on a wide variety of subjects affecting 
Poland, I can assure you that no specific plan or proposal 
in any way affecting Polish-Soviet relations was drawn up. I 
believe, however, that you would be interested in my personal 
impression of Mr Mikolajczyk and of his attitude toward the 
problems with which his country is confronted. 
Mr Mikolajczyk impressed me as a very sincere and reasonable 
man whose sole desire is to do what is best for his country. 
He is fully cognizant that the whole future of Poland depends 
upon the establishment of genuinely good relations with the 
Soviet Union and to achieve that end will, in my opinion, make 
every effort. 
The vital necessity for the establishment of the fullest kind 
of collaboration between the Red Army and the forces of the 
Polish underground in the common struggle against our enemy

138 
is his primary immediate concern. He believes that coordination 
between your armies and the organized Polish underground 
is a military factor of the highest importance not only 
to your armies in the East but also to the main task of finishing 
off the Nazi beast in his lair by our combined efforts. 
It is my impression that the Prime Minister is thinking only 
of Poland and the Polish people and will not allow any petty 
considerations to stand in the way of his efforts to reach a 
solution with you. In fact it is my belief that he would not 
hesitate to go to Moscow, if he felt that you would welcome 
such a step on his part, in order to discuss with you personally 
and frankly the problems affecting your two countries, 
particularly the urgency of immediate military collaboration. 
I know you will understand that in making this observation 
I am in no way attempting to press upon you my personal 
views in a matter which is of special concern to you and your 
country. I felt, however, that you were entitled to have a frank 
account of the impressions I received in talking with Premier 
Mikolajczyk. 
No. 204 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT, 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
I am in a position to inform you that not later than a week 
from now the Soviet armies will start the second round of their 
offensive. It will involve 130 divisions, including armoured 
ones. I and my colleagues anticipate important success. I hope 
that it will be a substantial help to the Allied operations in 
France and Italy. 
June 21, 1944

139 
No. 205 
Received on June 23, 1944 
SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Thanks for your message of June 21. Your good action together 
with our efforts on the Western Front should quickly 
put the Nazis in a very difficult position. 
No. 206 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT, 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
Thank you for informing me of your meeting with Mr Mikolajczyk. 
If we have in view military cooperation between the Red 
Army and the Polish underground forces fighting the Hitler 
invaders, that, undoubtedly, is vital to the final defeat of our 
common enemy. Certainly, the proper solution of the problem 
of Soviet-Polish relations is of great importance in this respect. 
You are aware of the Soviet Government’s point of view and 
of its desire to see Poland strong, independent and democratic, 
and Soviet-Polish relations good-neighbourly and based on 
lasting friendship. A vital condition for this, in the view of the 
Soviet Government, is a reconstruction of the Polish émigré 
Government that would ensure participation of Polish leaders 
in Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., and more particularly 
of Polish democratic leaders inside Poland, plus recognition 
by the Polish Government of the Curzon Line57 as the new 
frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. 
I must say, however, that Mr Mikolajczyk’s Washington statement 
makes it appear that he has not made a step forward on 
this point. Hence at the moment I find it hard to express an 
opinion about a visit to Moscow by Mr Mikolajczyk. 
We all greatly appreciate your attention to Soviet-Polish 
relations and your efforts in this field. 
Moscow, June 24, 1944

140 
No. 207 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT, 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
Your message about the two scrolls for Stalingrad and 
Leningrad has reached me. They were handed to me by 
Ambassador Harriman and will be forwarded to their destinations. 
Upon receiving the scrolls I made the following statement: 
“I accept President Roosevelt’s scrolls as a symbol of 
the fruitful cooperation between our two countries in the 
name of the freedom of our nations and of human progress 
“The scrolls will be handed to the representatives of 
Leningrad and Stalingrad.” 
2. Please accept my heartfelt gratitude for your high commendation 
of the efforts exerted by Stalingrad and Leningrad 
in the struggle against the German invaders. 
June 27, 1944 
No. 208 
PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT, 
Mr F. D. ROOSEVELT 
Please accept my warm congratulations on the liberation of 
Cherbourg from the German invaders. I salute the valiant U.S. 
and British troops on the occasion of their splendid success. 
J. STALIN 
June 27, 1944 
No. 209 
Received on June 28, 1944 
CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
The news of your major victory at Vitebsk has made me 
very happy. I send herewith my congratulations to you personally 
and to your gallant Army.

141 
No. 210 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT, 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
I thank you on my own behalf and on behalf of the Red 
Army for your congratulations on the liberation of Vitebsk by 
Soviet troops. 
June 30, 1944 
No. 211 
Received on July 19, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I feel that, as things are moving so fast and so successfully, 
there should be a meeting in the reasonably near future between 
you, the Prime Minister and me. Mr Churchill is in 
hearty accord with this thought. 
It would be best for me to have a meeting between the 10th 
and 15th of September. I am now on a trip in the Far West 
and must be in Washington for several weeks on my return. 
The North of Scotland would be the most central point for 
me and you. You could come either by ship or by plane and 
I could go by ship. 
I hope you can let me have your thoughts. Security and 
secrecy can be maintained either on shore or on shipboard. 
No. 212 
TO MARSHAL JOSEPH V. STALIN 
Moscow 
My dear Marshal, 
Just as I was leaving on this trip to the Pacific, I received 
the very delightful framed photograph of you which I consider 
excellent. I am particularly happy to have it and very 
grateful to you.

142 
The speed of the advance of your armies is amazing and I 
wish much that I could visit you to see how you are able to 
maintain your communications and supplies to the advancing 
troops. 
We have taken the key island of Saipan after rather heavy 
losses and are at this moment engaged in the occupation of 
Guam. At the same time, we have just received news of the 
difficulties in Germany and especially at Hitler’s headquarters. 
It is all to the good. 
With my very warm regards, I am
Very sincerely yours, 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
July 21, 1944 
No. 213 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I share your opinion about the desirability of a meeting between 
you, Mr Churchill and myself. 
I must say, however, that now, with the Soviet armies deeply 
involved in fighting along so vast a front, it is impossible for 
me to leave the country and withdraw myself for any length 
of time from direction of front affairs. My colleagues consider 
it absolutely impossible. 
July 22, 1944 
No. 214 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I am sending you for your information the text of my message 
to the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill, on the Polish question. 
July 3, 1944

143 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, 
Mr W. CHURCHILL 
Your message of July 20 received. I am now writing to you 
on the Polish question only. 
Events on our front are going forward at a very rapid pace. 
Lublin, one of Poland’s major towns, was taken today by our 
troops, who continue their advance. 
In this situation we find ourselves confronted with the practical 
problem of administration on Polish territory. We do not 
want to, nor shall we, set up our own administration on Polish 
soil, for we do not wish to interfere in Poland’s internal affairs. 
That is for the Poles themselves to do. We have, therefore, 
seen fit to get in touch with the Polish Committee of National 
Liberation, recently set up by the National Council of Poland, 
which was formed in Warsaw at the end of last year, and consisting 
of representatives of democratic parties and groups, as 
you must have been informed by your Ambassador in Moscow. 
The Polish Committee of National Liberation intends to set up 
an administration on Polish territory, and I hope this will be 
done. We have not found in Poland other forces capable of 
establishing a Polish administration. The so-called underground 
organisations, led by the Polish Government in London, have 
turned out to be ephemeral and lacking influence. As to the 
Polish Committee, I cannot consider it a Polish Government, 
but it may be that later on it will constitute the core of a Provisional 
Polish Government made up of democratic forces. 
As for Mikolajczyk, I shall certainly not refuse to see him. 
It would be better, however, if he were to approach the Polish 
National Committee, who are favourably disposed towards him. 
July 23, 1944

144 
No. 215 
Received on July 28, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Your telegram about the Polish situation has reached me and 
the Prime Minister71 tells me that Mikolajczyk is leaving for 
Moscow to call on you. 
Needless to say I greatly hope you can work out with him 
this whole matter to the best advantage of our common 
effort. 
No. 216 
Received on July 28, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
In view of the rapid military progress now being made, I 
can fully understand the difficulty of your coming to a conference 
with the Prime Minister71 and me, but I hope you can 
keep very much in mind such a conference and that we can 
meet as early as possible. We are approaching the time for further 
strategical decisions and such a meeting would help me 
domestically. 
No. 217 
SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM PREMIER STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I have received your messages of July 28. 
I share your opinion concerning the importance of a meeting, 
but circumstances connected with the operations on our front, 
of which I apprised you last time, prevent me, unfortunately, 
from reckoning on the possibility of a meeting in the immediate 
future. 
As regards the Polish question, the matter hinges primarily 
on the Poles themselves and on the ability of members of the 
Polish émigré Government to cooperate with the Committee 
of National Liberation which is already functioning in Poland

145 
and to which the democratic forces of Poland are rallying more 
and more. For my part I am ready to render all Poles whatever 
assistance I can. 
August 2, 1944 
No. 218 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I should like to inform you of my meeting with Mikolajczyk, 
Grabski and Romer. My talk with Mikolajczyk convinced me 
that he has inadequate information about the situation in 
Poland. At the same time I had the impression that Mikolajczyk 
is not against ways being found to unite the Poles. 
As I do not think it proper to impose any decision on the 
Poles, I suggested to Mikolajczyk that he and his colleagues 
should meet and discuss their problems with representatives of 
the Polish Committee of National Liberation, first and foremost 
the matter of early unification of all democratic forces on 
liberated Polish soil. Meetings have already taken place. I have 
been informed of them by both parties. The National Committee 
delegation suggested the 1921 Constitution as a basis for 
the Polish Government and expressed readiness if the Mikolajczyk 
group acceded to the proposal, to give it four portfolios, 
including that of Prime Minister for Mikolajczyk. Mikolajczyk, 
however, could not see his way to accept. I regret to say the 
meetings have not yet yielded the desired results. Still, they 
were useful because they provided Mikolajczyk and Morawski 
as well as Bierut, who had just arrived from Warsaw, with the 
opportunity for an exchange of views and particularly for 
informing each other that both the Polish National Committee 
and Mikolajczyk are anxious to cooperate and to seek practical 
opportunities in that direction. That can be considered as the 
first stage in the relations between the Polish Committee and 
Mikolajczyk and his colleagues. Let us hope that things will 
improve. 
I understand the Polish Committee of National Liberation in 
Lublin has decided to invite Professor Lange to join it and take 
charge of foreign affairs. If Lange, a well-known Polish democratic 
leader, were enabled to go to Poland72 in order to 
assume that office it would undoubtedly promote Polish unity 
and the struggle against our common enemy. I hope you

146 
share this view and will for your part not withhold your 
support in this matter, which is so very important to the 
Allied cause. 
August 9, 1944 
No. 219 
Received on August 12, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I have received your telegram of August 9 and am most 
grateful for the resume you have been good enough to give me 
of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk’s conversations with you and 
the Polish Committee in Moscow. 
It is as you know my earnest hope that there will emerge 
from these conversations some solution satisfactory to all concerned 
and which will permit an interim legal and truly representative 
Polish Government to be formed. 
I am sure you recognize the difficulty of this Government 
taking official action at this stage in regard to Lange. He as 
a private citizen has of course every right under law to do what 
he sees fit, including the renunciation of his American citizenship. 
I am sure you will understand why, under the circumstances 
and particularly pending the outcome of the conversations 
between Premier Mikolajczyk, whose government 
we still officially recognize, and the Polish Committee, the 
Government of the United States does not want to become 
involved in the request of the Polish Committee that Professor 
Lange join it as head of the section on Foreign Affairs, nor to 
express any opinion concerning this request.

147 
No. 220 
URGENT AND MOST SECRET MESSAGE FROM 
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND Mr CHURCHILL 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
We are thinking of world opinion if anti-Nazis in Warsaw 
are in effect abandoned. We believe that all three of us should 
do the utmost to save as many of the patriots there as possible. 
We hope that you will drop immediate supplies and munitions 
to the patriot Poles of Warsaw, or will you agree to help 
our planes in doing it very quickly? We hope you will approve. 
The time element is of extreme importance. 
ROOSEVELT 
CHURCHILL 
August 20, 1944 
No. 221 
Received on August 20, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I have just seen our Commanders in the Pacific theater. 
Though I am highly pleased with the progress that is being 
made, I am greatly impressed with the magnitude of the task. 
Your agreement to inaugurate promptly planning for future 
joint cooperation between our respective forces has been reported 
to me by Harriman. I have been told by General Deane 
of the proposals which he submitted to the Red Army General 
Staff concerning Soviet-American collaboration. I hope that 
you will instruct your Staff to pursue expeditiously with the 
United States Military Mission in Moscow the joint preparation 
of plans. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have 
authorized the Military Mission to represent them in this planning 
in preparation for the time when you are ready to act. 
I feel that there is nothing we could do at the present time in 
preparing to bring the Pacific war to a speedy conclusion 
that would be of more assistance.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
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148 
No. 222 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I have received your message on Pacific affairs and I appreciate 
the importance you attach to them. We, too, attach considerable 
importance to your success there. At the same time I 
feel sure that you are well aware of the effort exerted by our 
forces in order to ensure success of the struggle that has now 
been joined in Europe. This gives us reason to hope that the 
day is not far off when we shall succeed in fulfilling our urgent 
task and be able to turn to other matters. It is my wish that 
General Deane will even now cooperate fruitfully with our 
Staff. 
August 22, 1944 
No. 223 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT, 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL 
The message from you and Mr Churchill about Warsaw has 
reached me. I should like to state my views. 
Sooner or later the truth about the handful of power-seeking 
criminals who launched the Warsaw adventure will out. Those 
elements, playing on the credulity of the inhabitants of Warsaw, 
exposed practically unarmed people to German guns, 
armour and aircraft. The result is a situation in which every 
day is used, not by the Poles for freeing Warsaw, but by the 
Hitlerites, who are cruelly exterminating the civilian population. 
From the military point of view the situation, which keeps 
German attention riveted to Warsaw, is highly unfavourable 
both to the Red Army and to the Poles. Nevertheless, the Soviet 
troops, who of late have had to face renewed German counterattacks, 
are doing all they can to repulse the Hitlerite sallies 
and go over to a new large-scale offensive near Warsaw. I can 
assure you that the Red Army will stint no effort to crush 
the Germans at Warsaw and liberate it for the Poles. That will 
be the best, really effective, help to the anti-Nazi Poles. 
August 22, 1944

149 
No. 224 
Received on September 1, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
The reference made by your Delegation at Dumbarton Oaks73 
that the Soviet Government might desire to have the sixteen 
Constituent Republics considered for individual membership 
in the new International Organization gives me much concern. 
Even though your Delegation made it clear that this subject 
would not be raised again during this present stage of the con 
versations, I feel I must tell you that the whole project, certainly 
as far as the United States is concerned and undoubtedly 
other important countries as well, would very definitely be 
imperiled if this question is raised at any stage before the final 
establishment and entry into its functions of the International 
Organization. I hope you will find it possible to reassure me 
with regard to this. 
Deferring this question now would not prejudice later discussion 
once the Assembly has come into being. The Assembly 
would have full authority to act at that time. 
No. 225 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I have received your message about participation of the Soviet 
Union Republics in the International Security Organisation. 
I attach the utmost importance to the statement made by 
the Soviet Delegation on the subject. Since the constitutional 
changes in our country early this year the Governments of the 
Union Republics have been taking very careful note of the 
friendly countries’ reaction to the extension of their rights in 
international relations, set down in the Soviet Constitution. You 
know, of course, that the Ukraine and Byelorussia, for instance, 
which are members of the Soviet Union, surpass some countries 
in population and political importance, countries which we all 
agree should be among the founders of the International Organisation. 
I hope, therefore, to have an opportunity of explaining

150 
to you the political importance of the question raised by the 
Soviet Delegation at Dumbarton Oaks.73 
September 7, 1944 
No. 226 
Received on September 9, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I have had an interesting and pleasant talk with your Ambassador 
on the progress of the talks at Dumbarton Oaks.73 One issue 
of importance only apparently remains on which we have 
not yet reached agreement. This is the question of voting in the 
Council. We and the British both feel strongly that in the 
decisions of the Council parties to a dispute should not vote 
even if one of the parties is a permanent member of the Council, 
whereas I gather from your Ambassador that your Government 
holds a contrary view. 
Traditionally since the founding of the United States parties 
to a dispute have never voted on their own case. I know that 
public opinion in the United States would never understand or 
support a plan of international organization which violated this 
principle. I know, furthermore, that many nations of the world 
hold this same view and I am fully convinced that the smaller 
nations would find it difficult to accept an international organization 
in which the Great Powers insisted upon the right to 
vote in the Council in disputes involving themselves. The 
would most certainly see in this an attempt on the part of the 
Great Powers to set themselves up above the law. I would have 
real trouble with the Senate. 
I hope for these reasons that you will find it possible to 
instruct your Delegation to agree to our suggestion on voting. 
The talks at Dumbarton Oaks can be speedily concluded with 
complete and outstanding success if this can be done.

151 
No. 227 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I am in receipt of your message on the Dumbarton Oaks discussions.
73 
It is my wish, too, that those important discussions be brought 
to a successful close. This may play a prominent part in furthering 
cooperation between our countries and promoting future 
peace and security as a whole. 
The voting procedure in the Council will, I feel, be of appreciable 
importance to the success of the International Security Organisation 
because it is essential that the Council should base 
its work on the principle of agreement and unanimity between 
the four leading Powers on all matters, including those that 
directly concern one of these Powers. The original American 
proposal for establishing a special voting procedure in the event 
of a dispute directly involving one or several members of the 
Council who have the status of permanent members is, I think, 
sound. Otherwise the agreement we reached at the Tehran 
Conference, where we were guided by the desire to ensure 
above all the four-Power unity of action so vital to preventing 
future aggression, will be reduced to nought. 
This unity implies, naturally, that there must be no suspicions 
among the Powers. As to the Soviet Union, it cannot very well 
ignore the existence of certain absurd prejudices which often 
hamper a genuinely objective attitude to the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, 
other countries should likewise weigh the likely consequences 
of lack of unity among the leading Powers. 
I hope you will appreciate the importance of these considerations 
and that we shall arrive at an agreed decision on this 
matter. 
September 14, 1944

152 
No. 228 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
TO MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
AND HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT 
We have arrived at the following decisions as to military operations 
in our conference at Quebec just concluded: 
North-west Europe—Our intention is to press on with all 
speed to destroy the German armed forces and penetrate into 
the heart of Germany. The best opportunity to defeat the enemy 
in the West lies in striking at the Ruhr and the Saar since the 
enemy will concentrate there the remainder of his available 
forces in the defense of these essential areas. The northern line 
of approach clearly has advantages over the southern and it is 
essential that before bad weather sets in we should open up the 
northern ports, particularly Rotterdam and Antwerp. It is on 
the left, therefore, that our main effort will be exerted. 
2. Italy—Our present operations in Italy will result in either: 
(A) The forces of Kesselring will be routed, in which event it 
should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit 
toward the Ljubljana Gap; or (B) Kesselring will succeed 
in effecting an orderly retreat, in which event we may 
have to be content this year with the clearing of the plains of 
Lombardy. 
The progress of the battle will determine our future action 
Plans are being prepared for an amphibious operation to be 
carried out if the situation so demands on the Istrian 
Peninsula. 
3. The Balkans—We will continue operations of our air forces 
and commando type operations. 
4. Japan—With the ultimate objective of invading the Japanese 
homeland we have agreed on further operations to intensify 
in all theaters the offensive against the Japanese. 
5. Plans were agreed upon for the prompt transfer of power 
after the collapse of Germany to the Pacific theater. 
ROOSEVELT 
CHURCHILL 
September 19, 1944

153 
No. 229 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I have received the message from you and Mr Churchill about 
the Quebec Conference, informing me of your future military 
plans. Your communication shows the important tasks ahead of 
the U.S. and British armed forces. Allow me to wish you and 
your armies every success. 
At present Soviet troops are mopping up the Baltic group of 
German forces which threatens our right flank. Without wiping 
out this group we shall not be able to thrust deep into Eastern 
Germany. Besides, our forces have two immediate aims—to 
knock Hungary out of the war and to probe the German defences 
on the Eastern Front and, if the situation proves favourable, 
pierce them. 
September 29, 1944 
No. 230 
Received on October 5, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Although it had been my hope that the next meeting could 
have been between you, Churchill, and myself, I appreciate that 
the Prime Minister wished to have a conference with you at an 
early date. 
I am sure you understand that in this global war there is literally 
no question, military or political, in which the United 
States is not interested. I am firmly convinced that the three of 
us, and only the three of us, can find the solution of the questions 
still unresolved. In this sense, while appreciating Mr Churchill’s 
desire for the meeting, I prefer to regard your forthcoming 
talks with the Prime Minister as preliminary to a meeting of 
the three of us which can take place any time after the elections 
here as far as I am concerned. 
I am suggesting, under the circumstances, if you and the 
Prime Minister approve, that my Ambassador in Moscow be present 
at your coming conference as an observer for me. Mr Harriman 
naturally would not be in position to commit this Govern

154 
ment in respect to the important matters which very naturally 
will be discussed by you and Mr Churchill. 
By this time you will have received from General Deane the 
statement of the position of our Combined Chiefs of Shaff24 regarding 
the war against Japan, and I want to reiterate to you 
how completely I accept the assurances on this point that you 
have given us. Our three countries are waging a successful war 
against Germany and surely we can join together with no less 
success in crushing a nation which is, I am sure, as great an 
enemy of Russia as of us. 
No. 231 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I was somewhat puzzled by your message of October 5. I had 
imagined that Mr Churchill was coming to Moscow in keeping 
with an agreement reached with you at Quebec. It appears, however, 
that my supposition is at variance with reality. 
I do not know what points Mr Churchill and Mr Eden want 
to discuss in Moscow. Neither of them has said anything to me 
so far. In a message, Mr Churchill expressed the wish to come 
to Moscow if it was all right with me. I agreed, of course. That 
is how matters stand with the Churchill visit to Moscow. 
I shall keep you informed, according as I clear up things with 
Mr Churchill. 
October 8, 1944 
No. 232 
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
FROM MARSHAL STALIN 
AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL 
In an informal discussion we have taken a preliminary view 
of the situation as it affects us and have planned out the course 
of our meetings, social and others. We have invited Messrs Mikolajczyk, 
Romer and Grabski to come at once for further conversations 
with us and with the Polish National Committee. We 
have agreed not to refer in our discussions to the Dumbarton 
Oaks issues,73 and that these shall be taken up when we three 
can meet together. We have to consider the best way of reach

155 
ing an agreed policy about the Balkan countries, including 
Hungary and Turkey. We have arranged for Mr Harriman to 
sit in as an observer at all the meetings, where business of 
importance is to be transacted, and for General Deane to be 
present whenever military topics are raised. We have arranged 
for technical contacts between our high officers and General 
Deane on military aspects, and for any meetings which may be 
necessary later in our presence and that of the two Foreign 
Secretaries together with Mr Harriman. We shall keep you fully 
informed ourselves about the progress we make. 
2. We take this occasion to send you our heartiest good wishes 
and to offer our congratulations on the prowess of the United 
States forces and upon the conduct of the war in the West by 
General Eisenhower. 
CHURCHILL 
STALIN 
October 10, 1944 
No. 233 
Received on October 12, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
AND THE PRIME MINISTER 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
Thanks for your joint message of October 10 Number 794.74 
I am most pleased to know that you are reaching a meeting 
of your two minds as to international policies in which, because 
of our present and future common efforts to prevent international 
wars, we are all interested. 
ROOSEVELT 
No. 234 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
During the stay of Mr Churchill and Mr Eden in Moscow we 
exchanged views on a number of issues of common interest. Am

156 
important talks. I also know that the Prime Minister intended 
sending you his appraisal of the talks. For my part I can say 
that they were very useful in acquainting us with each other’s 
views on such matters as the future of Germany, the Polish 
question, policy on the Balkans and major problems of future 
military policies. The talks made it plain that we can without 
undue difficulty coordinate our policies on all important issues 
and that even if we cannot ensure immediate solution of this 
or that problem, such as the Polish question, we have, nevertheless, 
more favourable prospects in this respect as well. I hope 
that the Moscow talks will be useful also in other respects, that 
when we three meet we shall be able to take specific decisions 
on all the pressing matters of common interest to us. 
2. Ambassador Gromyko has informed me of his recent talk 
with Mr Hopkins, who told him that you could arrive at the 
Black Sea late in November and meet with me on the Soviet 
Black Sea coast. I should very much welcome your doing so. My 
talk with the Prime Minister convinced me that he shares the 
idea. In other words, the three of us could meet late in November 
to examine the questions that have piled up since Tehran. 
I shall be glad to hear from you about this. 
October 19, 1944 
No. 235 
Received on October 21, 1944 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
We have been giving active consideration to the diplomatic 
recognition of the existing French authorities as the Provisional 
Government of France. These authorities have been made more 
representative of the French people by the recent enlargement 
of the consultative assembly. It is expected that the French, 
with the agreement of General Eisenhower, will set up in the 
very near future a real zone of the interior which will be under 
French administration and that when this is done it would be 
an appropriate time to recognize French authorities as the Provisional 
Government of France. I am informing you of our 
intentions in this regard in advance in the event that you may 
wish, when the zone of the interior is set up under French 
administration, to take some similar action.

157 
No. 236 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I have received your message of October 21 concerning your 
intention to recognise the existing French authorities as the Provisional 
Government of France and to establish a zone of the 
interior under French administration. The British Government, 
too, has notified the Soviet Government of its desire to recognise 
the Provisional Government of France. As regards the 
Soviet Union, it welcomes the decision to recognise the French 
Provisional Government and has already given proper instructions 
to its representative in Paris. 
October 22, 1944 
No. 237 
Received on October 25, 1944 
TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I am delighted to learn from reports made by Ambassador 
Harriman and from your message of October 19 of the success 
attained by you and the Prime Minister in approaching agreement 
on a number of questions of high interest to all of us in 
our common desire to secure and maintain a durable and satisfactory 
peace. I am sure that the progress made during your 
conversations in Moscow will facilitate and expedite our work 
in the next meeting when we three should come to a full agreement 
on our future activities, policies, and mutual interests. 
All of us must investigate the practicability of various places 
where our November meeting can be held, i.e., from the standpoint 
of living accommodations, security, accessibility, and so 
forth. I would appreciate receiving your suggestions. 
I have been considering the practicability of Cyprus, Athens, 
or Malta in the event that my entering the Black Sea on a ship 
should be too difficult or impracticable. I prefer travelling and 
living on a ship. We know that security and living conditions in 
Cyprus and Malta are satisfactory. 
I am looking forward to seeing you again with much pleasure. 
I would be pleased to have your advice and suggestions.

158 
No. 238 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, 
Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Your message of October 25 to hand. 
If a meeting on the Soviet Black Sea coast, as suggested by 
you earlier, is all right with you, I should think it highly desirable 
to carry out that plan. Conditions are quite favourable for 
a meeting there. I hope the safe entry of your ship into the 
Black Sea will also be possible by that time. My doctors advise 
for the time being against long journeys so I must take their 
view into account. 
I shall be glad to see you if you find it possible to make the 
voyage. 
October 29, 1944 
No. 239 
Sent on November 9, 1944 
FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Washington 
I congratulate you on your re-election. I am confident that under 
your tried and tested leadership the American people will, 
jointly with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and 
the other democratic countries, round off the struggle against 
the common foe and ensure victory in the name of liberating 
mankind from Nazi tyranny. 
J. STALIN

159 
No. 240 
Received on November 11, 1944 
PERSONAL 
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
I am very pleased to have your message of congratulations 
and happy that you and I can continue together with our Allies 
to destroy the Nazi tyrants and establish a long period of peace 
in which all of our peoples freed from the burdens of war may 
reach a higher order of development and culture each in accordance 
with its own desires. 
No. 241 
Received on November 19, 1944 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
We are all three of us of one mind that we should meet very 
soon, but problems chiefly geographic do not make this easy 
at this moment. Under difficulties, I can arrange to go somewhere 
now in order to get back here by Christmas, but frankly 
it would be far more convenient if I could postpone it until after 
my inauguration on the 20th of January. 
My naval authorities strongly recommend against the Black 
Sea. They do not want to risk a capital ship through the Dardanelles 
or the Aegean as this would involve a very large escort 
which is much needed elsewhere. Churchill has suggested Alexandria 
or Jerusalem and there is a possibility of Athens, though 
this is not yet sure. 
In addition to this, I have at the present time a great hesitation 
in leaving here while my old Congress is in its final days, 
with the probability of its not final adjourning until the 15th 
of December. Furthermore I am required by the Constitution 
to be here in order to send the annual message to the new Congress 
which meets here early in January. 
My suggestion is that we should all meet about the 28th or 
30th of January and I should hope that by that time it will be 
possible for you to travel by rail to some Adriatic port and that 
we should meet you there or that you could come across in a 
few hours on one of our ships to Bari and then motor to Rome, 
or that you should take the same ship a little further in and 
that we should all meet at some place like Taormina, in Eastern

160 
Sicily, which at that time should provide a fairly good climate. 
Almost any spot in the Mediterranean is accessible to me so 
that I can be within easy distance of Washington by air in order 
that I may carry out action on legislation—a subject you are 
familiar with. It must be possible for me to get bills or resolutions 
sent from here and returned within ten days. I hope that 
your January military operations will not prevent you from 
coming at that time and I do not think that we should put off 
the meeting longer that to the end of January or early February. 
If, of course, in the meantime the Nazi army or people should 
disintegrate quickly, we should have to meet earlier, although 
I should much prefer that the meeting take place at the end of 
January. 
Another suggestion is that the place of meeting should be 
one on the Riviera but this would be dependent on withdrawal 
of the German troops from the north-western part of Italy. I 
wish you would let me know your thoughts on this. 
There are many things I hope to talk over with you. You 
and I understand each other ’s problems and, as you know, I 
like to keep these discussions informal, and I have no reason 
for formal agenda. 
General Hurley, my Ambassador in China, is doing his best 
to iron out problems between the forces in Northern China and 
the Generalissimo.49 He is making some progress but so far 
nothing has been signed. 
I send you my warmest regards. 
No. 242 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT F. ROOSEVELT 
It is too bad that your naval authorities question the advisability 
of your original idea that the three of us should meet on 
the Soviet Black Sea coast. There is no objection, as far as I 
am concerned, to the time of meeting suggested by you—late 
January or early February; I expect, however, that we shall be 
able to select one of the Soviet sea ports. I still have to pay heed 
to my doctors’ warning of the risk involved in long journeys. 
Even so I hope that we shall be able to reach final agreement— 
a little later if not now—on a place acceptable to all of us. 
Best wishes. 
November 23, 1944

161 
No. 243 
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT F. ROOSEVELT 
The indications are that de Gaulle and his friends, who have 
arrived in the Soviet Union, will raise two questions. 
1. Concluding a Franco-Soviet pact of mutual aid similar to 
the Anglo-Soviet pact. 
We shall find it hard to object. But I should like to know what 
you think. What do you advise. 
2. De Gaulle will probably suggest revising the eastern frontier 
of France and shifting it to the left bank of the Rhine. There 
is talk, too, about a plan for forming a Rhine-Westphalian region 
under international control.75 Possibly French participation in 
the control is likewise envisaged. In other words, the French proposal 
for shifting the frontier line to the Rhine will compete 
with the plan for a Rhineland region under international control. 
I would like your advice on this matter as well. 
I have sent a similar message to Mr Churchill. 
December 2, 1944 
No. 244 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, 
Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
The meeting with General de Gaulle provided the opportunity 
for a friendly exchange of views on Franco-Soviet relations. 
In the course of the talks General de Gaulle, as I had anticipated, 
brought up two major issues—the French frontier on the 
Rhine and a Franco-Soviet mutual aid pact patterned on the 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty. 
As to the French frontier on the Rhine, I said, in effect, that 
the matter could not be settled without the knowledge and consent 
of our chief Allies, whose forces are waging a liberation 
struggle against the Germans on French soil. I stressed the difficulty 
of the problem. 
Concerning the proposal for a Franco-Soviet mutual aid pact 
I pointed to the need for a thorough study of the matter and for 
clearing up the legal aspects, in particular the question of who

162 
in France in the present circumstances is to ratify such a pact. 
This means the French will have to offer a number of elucidations, 
which I have yet to receive from them. 
I shall be obliged for a reply to this message and for your 
comments on these points. 
I have sent a similar message to Mr Churchill. 
Best wishes. 
December 3, 1944 
No. 245 
Received on December 7, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Many thanks for your two informative messages of December 
2nd and 3rd. 
With reference to a proposed Franco-Soviet pact along the 
lines of the Anglo-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, this 
Government would have no objection in principle if you and 
General de Gaulle considered such a pact in the interests of 
both your countries and European security generally. 
With your replies to General de Gaulle regarding the postwar 
frontier of France I am in complete agreement. At the 
present time it appears to me that no advantage to our common 
war effort would result from an attempt to settle this 
question now, and that it is preferable that it be settled subsequent 
to the collapse of Germany. 
No. 246 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Thank you for your communication on the subject of France. 
General de Gaulle and I have arrived at the conclusion that the 
Franco-Soviet mutual aid pact will benefit both Franco-Soviet 
relations and European security in general. The pact was 
signed today. 
As to the past-war frontier of France, examination of this 
question has, as I informed you, been deferred. 
December 10, 1944

163 
No. 247 
Received on December 14, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO MARSHAL STALIN 
Since the prospects are still unsettled for an early meeting 
between us and because of my conviction, in which I am confident 
you concur, that we must move forward as rapidly as 
possible in the convening of a general conference of the United 
Nations14 on the subject of an International Organization, I 
am requesting Ambassador Harriman to deliver this message 
and to discuss with you on my behalf the important subject of 
the voting procedure in the Security Council. Before the 
general conference will be possible, we will of course have to 
agree upon this and other questions. I am taking this matter 
up with Prime Minister Churchill as well. 
I now feel, after giving this whole subject further consideration, 
that the substance of the following draft provision should 
be eminently satisfactory to everyone concerned. 
Proposal for Section C of the Chapter on the Security 
Council: 
S e c t i o n C 
Voting 
1. One vote should be allotted to each member of the 
Security Council. 
2. On matters of procedure decisions of the Security Council 
should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members. 
3. On all other matters decisions of the Security Council 
should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including 
the concurring votes of the permanent members; 
provided that a party to a dispute should abstain from voting 
in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under Paragraph 
One of Chapter VIII, Section C.76 
This calls, you will note, for the unanimity of the permanent 
members in all Council decisions relating to a determination 
of a threat to peace, as well as to action for the removal 
of such a threat or for the suppression of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace. As a practical matter, I can see that this 
is necessary if action of this kind is to be feasible. I am consequently 
prepared to accept in this respect the view expressed 
by your Government in its memorandum presented at the 
Dumbarton Oaks meetings73 on an International Security 
Organization. This naturally means that each permanent member 
would always have a vote in decisions of this character. 
The Dumbarton Oaks proposals at the same time provide

164 
in Chapter VIII Section A for judicial or other procedures of 
a recommendatory character which may be employed by the 
Security Council in promoting voluntary peaceful settlement 
of disputes. In this respect, also, I am satisfied that if recommendations 
of the Security Council are concurred in by the 
permanent members they will carry far greater weight. However, 
I am also convinced that such procedures will be effective 
only if the Great Powers exercise moral leadership by demonstrating 
their fidelity to the principles of justice. I firmly 
believe, therefore, that by accepting a provision under which 
all parties to a dispute would abstain from voting with regard 
to such procedures and thus indicating their willingness not 
to claim for themselves a special position in this respect, the 
permanent members would greatly enhance their moral prestige 
and would strengthen their own position as the principal 
guardians of the future peace, without jeopardizing in any way 
their vital interests or impairing the essential principle that 
the Great Powers must act unanimously in all decisions of the 
Council which affect such interests. To do this would make 
much more acceptable to all nations the overall plan, which 
must necessarily assign a special role to the Great Powers in 
the enforcement of peace. 
Specific provisions for voting procedure on questions of this 
nature were not contained in either the Soviet or the American 
memoranda presented at Dumbarton Oaks. Our representatives 
there were not in a position, of course, to reach a definite 
agreement on this question. You and I must now find a way 
of completing the work which they have carried forward on 
our behalf so well. 
Would you, if you are disposed to give favorable consideration 
to some such approach as I now suggest to the problem of 
voting in the Council, be willing that there be held as soon as 
possible a meeting of representatives designated by you, by me, 
and by Prime Minister Churchill to work out a complete provision 
on this question and to discuss the arrangements necessary 
for a prompt convening of a general conference of the 
United Nations?

165 
No. 248 
Received on December 20, 1944 77 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I believe that, in view of the interest aroused in this country 
by Prime Minister Churchill’s statement in the House of Commons 
yesterday and the strong pressure we are under to make 
known our position in regard to Poland it may be necessary 
for this Government to issue some statement on the subject 
in the next few days. If issued, this statement will outline our 
attitude along the following lines: 
(There followed the substance of the statement issued on 
December 18 by Mr Stettinius, the full text of which is 
attached.) 
As you will note, the proposed statement will, I am sure, 
contain nothing that is not known to you as the general attitude 
of this Government and, in so far as it goes, is I believe in 
general accord with the results of your discussion with Prime 
Minister Churchill in Moscow in the autumn and I am sure 
you will welcome it for this reason. 
It is my feeling that it is of the highest importance that, 
until we three can get together and discuss this troublesome 
question thoroughly there be no action on any side which 
would render our discussions more difficult. 
I have seen indications that the Lublin Committee78 may be 
intending to give itself the status of a Provisional Government 
of Poland. I appreciate fully the desirability from your point 
of view of having a clarification of Polish authority before 
your armies move further into Poland. However, because of 
the great political implications which such a step would entail, 
I very much hope that you would find it possible to refrain 
from recognizing the Lublin Committee as a Government of 
Poland before we meet, which I hope will be immediately after 
my inauguration on January 20. Could you not continue to 
deal with the Committee in its present form until that date? 
I know that my views on this point are shared by Prime 
Minister Churchill.

166 
STATEMENT BY Mr STETTINIUS 
Issued on December 18, 1944 
The United States Government stands unequivocally for a 
strong, free and independent Polish state with the untrammelled 
right of the Polish people to order their internal existence 
as they see fit. 
It has been the consistently held policy of the United States 
Government that questions relating to boundaries should be 
left in abeyance until the termination of hostilities. As Mr Hull 
stated in his address of April 9, 1944, “this does not mean that 
certain questions may not and should not in the meantime be 
settled by friendly conferences and agreement.” In the case 
of the future frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement is 
reached by the United Nations14 directly concerned, this 
Government would have no objection to such an agreement 
which could make an essential contribution to the prosecution 
of the war against the common enemy. If as a result of such 
agreement the Government and people of Poland decide that 
;t would be in the interests of the Polish state to transfer 
national groups, the United States Government, in cooperation 
with other governments, will assist Poland, in so far as practicable, 
in such transfers. The United States Government continues 
to adhere to its traditional policy of declining to give 
guarantees for any specific frontiers. The United States Government 
is working for the establishment of a world security 
organization through which the United States together with 
other member states would assume responsibility for the preservation 
of general security. 
It is the announced aim of the United States Government, 
subject to legislative authority, to assist the countries liberated 
from the enemy in repairing the devastation of war and thus 
to bring to their peoples the opportunity to join as full partners 
in the task of building a more prosperous and secure life for 
all men and women. This applies to Poland as well as the other 
United Nations. 
The policy of the United States Government regarding 
Poland outlined above has as its objective the attainment of 
the announced basic principles of the United States foreign 
policy.

167 
No. 249 
Received on December 22, 1944 
HIS EXCELLENCY J. V. STALIN, 
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION 
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
Moscow 
It gives me great pleasure on this anniversary of your Excellency’s 
birth to extend to you my sincere congratulations and 
best wishes. 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
No. 250 
Received on December 24, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
In order that all of us may have information essential to our 
coordination of effort, I wish to direct General Eisenhower to 
send a fully qualified officer of his staff to Moscow to discuss 
with you Eisenhower’s situation on the Western Front and its 
relation to the Eastern Front. We will maintain complete 
secrecy. 
It is my hope that you will see this officer from General 
Eisenhower’s staff and arrange to exchange with him information 
that will be of mutual benefit. The situation in Belgium 
is not bad but we have arrived at the time to talk of the 
next phase. 
An early reply to this proposal is requested in view of the 
emergency.

168 
No. 251 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I have received your message about the sending of a competent 
officer from Gen. Eisenhower’s staff to Moscow. 
It goes without saying that I agree to your proposal, and, 
by the same token, I am ready to meet the officer from Gen. 
Eisenhower’s staff and to exchange information with him. 
December 25, 1944 
No. 252 
Sent on December 26, 1944 
TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The White House, Washington 
Please accept my thanks for your congratulations and good 
wishes on the occasion of my birthday. 
J. STALIN 
No. 253 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Your message reached me through Mr Harriman on December 
14. 
I fully share your opinion that before the general conference 
of the United Nations14 meets to discuss the founding of an 
International Organisation it would be advisable for us to 
reach agreement on the more important problems that found 
no solution at Dumbarton Oaks,73 primarily on the voting 
procedure in the Security Council. I feel it necessary to recall 
that the original American draft stressed the necessity of 
drawing up special rules with regard to voting procedure in

169 
the event of a dispute directly affecting one of several permanent 
members of the Council. The British draft, too, pointed 
out that the general procedure of settling disputes between 
the Great Powers, should disputes arise, might prove unworkable. 
In this connection paragraphs 1 and 2 of your proposal do 
not give rise to any objections and can be accepted, it being 
understood that paragraph 2 is concerned with questions of 
procedure mentioned in Chapter VI, Section D.79 
As to paragraph 3 of your proposal, I regret to say that I 
cannot accept it as worded by you. As acknowledged by you, 
the principle of unanimity of the permanent members is indispensable 
in all Council decisions determining a threat to 
peace, as well as in those calling for action to remove the 
threat or to crush aggression or other breaches of peace. In 
adopting decisions on these questions there should without 
doubt be complete agreement among the Powers who are 
permanent members of the Council and who bear the chief 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. It 
goes without saying that any attempt to bar at any stage one 
or several permanent members of the Council from voting on 
the questions mentioned above, and this, theoretically speaking, 
is possible, and it may even be that the majority of the permanent 
members find themselves excluded from participation 
in settling an issue—could have dire consequences for the 
preservation of international security. This runs counter to the 
principle of agreement and unanimity in the decisions of the 
four leading Powers and may result in some of the Great 
Powers being played against others—a development which 
would be likely to undermine universal security. The small 
countries are interested in preventing that just as much as the 
Great Powers, for a split among the Great Powers who have 
united to safeguard peace and the security of all freedomloving 
nations is fraught with the most dangerous consequences 
to all those states. 
That is why I must insist on our former stand as to the 
voting in the Security Council. As I see it this attitude will 
ensure four-Power unity for the new International Organisation 
and help to prevent attempts at playing some of the Great 
Powers against others, which is vital to their joint struggle 
against future aggression. Such a situation would, naturally, 
safeguard the interests of the small nations in maintaining 
their security and would be in keeping with the interests of 
universal peace. 
I hope that you will fully appreciate the importance of the 
considerations set forth above in support of the principle of 
unanimity of the four leading Powers and that we shall arrive

170 
at agreed decisions on this point, as well as on certain other 
points still outstanding. On the basis of an agreed decision our 
representatives could work out a final draft and discuss the 
measures necessary for the early convening of a general United 
Nations conference. 
December 26, 1944 
No. 254 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Your message on Polish affairs reached me on December 20. 
As to Mr Stettinius’ statement of December 18, I should 
prefer to comment on it when we meet. At any rate events in 
Poland have already gone far beyond that which is reflected in 
the said statement. 
A number of things that have taken place since Mr Mikolajczyk’s 
last visit to Moscow, in particular the wireless correspondence 
with the Mikolajczyk Government, which we found 
on terrorists arrested in Poland—underground agents of the 
émigré Government—demonstrate beyond all doubt that 
Mr Mikolajczyk’s talks with the Polish National Committee 
served to cover up those elements who, behind Mr Mikolajczyk’s 
back, had been engaged in terror against Soviet officers 
and soldiers in Poland. We cannot tolerate a situation in which 
terrorists, instigated by Polish émigrés, assassinate Red Army 
soldiers and officers in Poland, wage a criminal struggle against 
the Soviet forces engaged in liberating Poland and directly aid 
our enemies, with whom they are virtually in league. The 
substitution of Arciszewski for Mikolajczyk and the ministerial 
changes in the émigré Government in general have aggravated 
the situation and have resulted in a deep rift between Poland 
and the émigré Government. 
Meanwhile the National Committee has made notable progress 
in consolidating the Polish state and the machinery of 
state power on Polish soil, in expanding and strengthening the 
Polish Army, in implementing a number of important government 
measures, primarily the land reform in favour of the 
peasants. These developments have resulted in the consolidation 
of the democratic forces in Poland and in an appreciable 
increase in the prestige of the National Committee among the 
Polish people and large sections of the Poles abroad. 
As I see it, we must now be interested in supporting the 
National Committee and all who are willing to cooperate and

171 
who are capable of cooperating with it, which is of special 
moment for the Allies and for fulfilment of our common task— 
accelerating the defeat of Hitler Germany. For the Soviet Union, 
which is bearing the whole burden of the struggle for freeing 
Poland from the German invaders, the problem of relations 
with Poland is, in present circumstances, a matter of everyday, 
close and friendly relations with an authority brought 
into being by the Polish people on their own soil, an authority 
which has already grown strong and has armed forces of its 
own, which, together with the Red Army, are fighting the 
Germans. 
I must say frankly that in the event of the Polish Committee 
of National Liberation becoming a Provisional Polish Government, 
the Soviet Government will, in view of the- foregoing, 
have no serious reasons for postponing its recognition. It should 
be borne in mind that the Soviet Union, more than any other 
Power, has a stake in strengthening a pro-Ally and democratic 
Poland, not only because it is bearing the brunt of the struggle 
for Poland’s liberation, but also because Poland borders on the 
Soviet Union and because the Polish problem is inseparable 
from that of the security of the Soviet Union. To this I should 
add that the Red Army’s success in fighting the Germans in 
Poland largely depends on a tranquil and reliable rear in 
Poland, and the Polish National Committee is fully cognizant 
of this circumstance, whereas the émigré Government and its 
underground agents by their acts of terror threaten civil war 
in the rear of the Red Army and counter its successes. 
On the other hand, in the conditions now prevailing in 
Poland there are no grounds for continuing to support the 
émigré Government, which has completely forfeited the trust 
of the population inside the country and which, moreover, 
threatens civil war in the rear of the Red Army, thereby injuring 
our common interest in the success of the struggle we 
are waging against the Germans. I think it would be only 
natural, fair and beneficial to our common cause if the Governments 
of the Allied Powers agreed as a first step to 
exchange representatives at this juncture with the National 
Committee with a view to its later recognition as the lawful 
government of Poland, after it has proclaimed itself the Provisional 
Government of Poland. Unless this is done I fear that 
the Polish people’s trust in the Allied Power may diminish. 
I think we should not countenance a situation in which Poles 
can say that we are sacrificing the interests of Poland to those 
of a handful of émigrés in London. 
December 27, 1944

172 
No. 255 
Received on December 31, 1944 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I must tell you that I am disturbed and deeply disappointed 
by your message of December 27 regarding Poland in which 
you tell me that you cannot see your way clear to hold the 
question of recognition of the Lublin Committee78 as the Provisional 
Government in abeyance until we have had an opportunity 
to discuss thoroughly the whole question at our meeting. 
I would have thought that no serious inconvenience would have 
been caused your Government or your Armies if you were to 
delay the purely juridical act of recognition for the short 
period of a month remaining until our meeting. 
In my request there was no suggestion that you curtail your 
practical relations with the Lublin Committee nor any thought 
that you should deal with or accept the London Government 
in its present composition. I had urged this delay upon you 
because of my feeling that you would realize how extremely 
unfortunate and even serious it would be in its effect on world 
opinion and enemy morale at this time in the war if your 
Government should formally recognize one Government of 
Poland while the majority of the other United Nations14 
including Great Britain and the United States continue to 
recognize the Polish Government in London and maintain 
diplomatic relations with it. 
With frankness equal to your own I must tell you that I see 
no prospect of this Government’s following suit and transferring 
its recognition from the London Government to the Lublin 
Committee in its present form. In no sense is this due to any 
special ties or feelings for the Government in London. The fact 
is that as yet neither the Government nor the people of the 
United States have seen any evidence arising either from the 
manner of its creation or from subsequent developments to 
justify the conclusion that the Lublin Committee as at present 
constituted represents the people of Poland. I cannot ignore 
the fact that only a small fraction of Poland proper west of 
the Curzon Line57 has yet been liberated from German tyranny, 
and it is therefore an unquestioned truth that no opportunity 
to express themselves in regard to the Lublin Committee 
has been afforded the people of Poland. 
If there is established at some future date following the 
liberation of Poland a Provisional Government of Poland with

173 
popular support, the attitude of this Government would of 
course be governed by the Polish people’s decision. 
I share fully your opinion that the situation has been worsened 
by the departure of Mr Mikolajczyk from the Government 
in London. I have always felt that Mr Mikolajczyk, who 
I am convinced is sincerely desirous of settling all points at 
issue between the Soviet Union and Poland, is the only Polish 
leader in sight who seems to offer the possibility of a genuine 
solution of the difficult and dangerous Polish question. From 
my personal knowledge of Mr Mikolajczyk and my conversations 
with him when he was here in Washington and his subsequent 
efforts and policies during his visit at Moscow I find 
it most difficult to believe that he had knowledge of any 
instructions for acts of terrorism. 
This message is sent to you so that you will know this 
Government’s position regarding the recognition at the present 
time of the Lublin Committee as the Provisional Government 
of Poland. I am more than ever convinced that when the three 
of us meet we can reach a solution of the Polish problem, and 
I therefore still hope that you can hold the formal recognition 
of the Lublin Committee as a Government of Poland in abeyance 
until then. I cannot see any great objection to a month’s 
delay from a military angle. 
No. 256 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Your message of December 31 received. 
I am very sorry that I have not succeeded in convincing you 
of the correctness of the Soviet Government’s stand on the 
Polish question. Nevertheless, I hope events will convince you 
that the National Committee has always given important help 
to the Allies, and continues to do so, particularly to the Red 
Army, in the struggle against Hitler Germany, while the émigré 
Government in London is disorganising that struggle, 
thereby helping the Germans. 
Of course I quite understand your proposal for postponing 
recognition of the Provisional Government of Poland by the 
Soviet Union for a month. But one circumstance makes me 
powerless to comply with your wish. The point is that on 
December 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
U.S.S.R., replying to a corresponding question by the Poles, 
declared that it would recognise the Provisional Government

174 
of Poland the moment it was set up. This circumstance makes 
me powerless to comply with your wish. 
Allow me to congratulate you on the New Year and to wish 
you good health and success. 
January 1, 1945 
No. 257 
PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Today, January 15, I had a talk with Marshal Tedder and 
the generals accompanying him. In my view the information 
we exchanged was complete enough. Both parties gave exhaustive 
answers to the questions. I must say that I was most 
impressed by Marshal Tedder. 
After four days of offensive operations on the Soviet-German 
front I am now in a position to inform you that our offensive 
is making satisfactory progress despite unfavourable weather. 
The entire Central Front—from the Carpathians to the Baltic 
Sea—is moving westwards. The Germans, though resisting 
desperately, are retreating. I feel sure that they will have to 
disperse their reserves between the two fronts and, as a result, 
relinquish the offensive on the Western Front. I am glad that 
this circumstance will ease the position of the Allied troops 
in the West and expedite preparations for the offensive 
planned by General Eisenhower. 
As regards the Soviet troops, you may rest assured that, 
despite the difficulties, they will do all in their power to make 
the blow as effective as possible. 
January 15, 1945 
No. 258 
Received on January 18, 1845 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Many thanks for your encouraging message of January 15 
regarding your conference with Air Marshal Tedder and the 
offensive of your armies on the Soviet-German front.

175 
Your heroic soldiers’ past performance and the efficiency 
they have already demonstrated in this offensive give high 
promise of an early success to our armies on both fronts. The 
time required to force surrender upon our barbarian enemies 
will be radically reduced by skillful coordination of our combined 
efforts. 
America, as you know, is putting forth a great effort in the 
Pacific at a distance of seven thousand miles and my hope is 
that an early collapse Germany will permit the movement to 
the Pacific area of sufficient forces to destroy quickly the 
menace of Japan to all of our Allies. 
No. 259 
Received on January 23, 1845 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
I have decided to permit only a small group of uniformed 
service photographers from the American Navy to take the 
pictures that we will want at “Argonaut”80 and not to have 
any press representatives. Prime Minister Churchill agrees 
with this. 
ROOSEVELT 
No. 260 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
I have received your cable about the attendance of press 
representatives and photographers at “Argonaut.”80 I h av e 
nothing against your suggestions. 
I have sent a similar reply to the Prime Minister ’s71 query. 
January 23, 1945

176 
No. 261 
Received on January 26, 1945
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
Allow me to express my deep personal regret at the death of 
the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico. 
Mr Oumansky made many friends in Washington, and we 
knew him well during the period of his services as Ambassador 
here. 
ROOSEVELT 
No. 262 
PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Thank you for the condolences on the occasion of the tragic 
death of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, K. A. Oumansky, 
whose work was highly valued by the Soviet Government. 
January 29, 1945 
No. 263 
Sent on January 30, 1945 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Please accept, Mr President, my heartfelt congratulations 
and best wishes on the occasion of your birthday.

177 
No. 264 
Received on February 2, 1945 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Allow me to express my appreciation for the kind message 
of congratulations which you were good enough to send me 
on the anniversary of my birthday. 
No. 265 
MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
The following are two basic military questions to which the 
United States Chiefs of Staff would appreciate an early answer 
at this conference81: 
(a) Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it 
essential to you that a supply line be kept open across the 
Pacific to Eastern Siberia? 
(b) Will you assure us that United States air forces will be 
permitted to base in the Komsomolsk-Nikolayevsk or some 
more suitable area providing developments show that these 
air forces can be operated and supplied without jeopardizing 
Russian operations?82 
F.D.R. 
February 5, 1945 
No. 266 
MARSHAL J. V. STALIN 
Koreiz, the Crimea 
My dear Marshal Stalin, 
I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting 
this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what 
is on my mind. 
In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am 
greatly disturbed that the three Great Powers do not have a 
meeting of minds about the political set up in Poland. It seems 
to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world 
to have you recognizing one government while we and the

178 
British are recognizing another in London. I am sure the state 
of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only 
lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which 
is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach 
between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way 
to reconcile our differences. 
I was very much impressed with some of the things you 
said today, particularly your determination that your rear must 
be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, 
and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which 
will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want 
you to know that I am fully mindful of this. 
You must believe me when I tell you that our people at 
home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement 
between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in 
effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when 
our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can 
we get an understanding on even more vital things in the 
future. 
I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize 
the Lublin Government83 as now composed, and the world 
would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if 
we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us 
on this issue. 
You said today that you would be prepared to support any 
suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a 
fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility 
of bringing some members of the Lublin Government here. 
Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this 
matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little 
and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Bierut 
and Mr Osubka Morawski from the Lublin Government and 
also two or three from the following list of Poles, which according 
to our information would be desirable as representatives 
of the other elements of the Polish people in the development 
of a new temporary government which all three of us could 
recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente 
Witos, Mr Zurlowski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba. 
If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, 
we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government 
in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish leaders 
from abroad such as Mr Mikolajczyk, Mr Grabski and Mr Romer, 
the United States Government, and I feel sure the British 
Government as well, would then be prepared to examine with 
you conditions in which they would dissociate themselves from 
the London government and transfer their recognition to the 
new provisional government.

179 
I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States 
will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government 
in Poland that would be inimical to your interests. 
It goes without saying that any interim government which 
could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles 
here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in 
Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely 
consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic 
Poland emerge from the welter of this war. 
Most sincerely yours, 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
February 6, 1945 
No. 267 
TOP SECRET 
MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
The full potential of the United States air forces now based 
in South-eastern Italy is not being realized due to excessive 
distances from the only available bases to targets in enemy 
territory and bad weather that is frequently encountered over 
the Alps and the Northern Adriatic. The staging or basing of 
fighters in the Budapest area would be of particular importance 
in providing the heavy fighter escort which is now required 
on deep penetrations and which may be increasingly 
necessary with the recent revival of German fighter strength 
employing jet-propelled aircraft. Also, the staging of heavy 
bombers in the Budapest area would considerably increase the 
radius of action and bomb tonnage delivered against targets 
north of the Alps by United States air forces. 
Therefore your agreement is requested to the provision of 
two airdromes in the Budapest area for use by United States 
air units. If you agree, our military staffs can begin work on 
this project at once.84 
February 7, 1945

180 
No. 268 
MARSHAL J. V. STALIN 
Koreiz, the Crimea 
My dear Marshal Stalin, 
In connection with the tragic death in an airplane accident 
of your Ambassador to Mexico, Mr Oumansky, his wife and 
three secretaries of the Soviet Embassy, it has occurred to me 
that you might wish to have their remains sent back by United 
States Army plane either to Fairbanks, Alaska, for transfer to 
a Soviet plane, or, if you prefer, the United States Army plane 
could proceed with these remains direct to Moscow. 
If you will let me know which of these alternatives you 
consider most desirable, I will be glad to have your wishes carried 
out. 
I make the above suggestion on behalf of the American 
Government and people, who have been deeply shocked by 
this tragic occurrence. 
Most sincerely yours,
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
February 7, 1945 
No. 269 
Received on February 8, 1945 
MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
An urgent need exists for the earliest possible survey of 
targets bombed by the U.S. Strategic Air Forces, similar to the 
survey made of Ploesti. To be effective, investigation must be 
instituted before tangible evidence is destroyed and personnel 
present during the bombing are removed from the area. 
Details of the survey requirements are being passed to Marshal 
Khudyakov. 
I request your agreement to the conduct of these surveys.84 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

181 
No. 270 
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
“Livadia,” the Crimea 
My dear Mr Roosevelt, 
Please accept my thanks for the sentiments expressed on 
behalf of the American people and the U.S. Government on 
the occasion of the tragic death of the Soviet Ambassador in 
Mexico, K. A. Oumansky, his wife and the three members of 
the Embassy staff. 
The Soviet Government gratefully accepts your offer to have 
their remains sent to Moscow by a U.S. Army plane. 
Yours very sincerely,
J. STALIN 
Koreiz, February 9, 1945 
No. 271 
MARSHAL J. V. STALIN 
Koreiz, the Crimea 
My dear Marshal Stalin, 
I have been thinking, as I must, of possible political difficulties 
which I might encounter in the United States in connection 
with the number of votes which the Big Powers will 
enjoy in the Assembly of the World Organization. We have 
agreed, and I shall certainly carry out that agreement, to support 
at the forthcoming United Nations14 Conference the 
admission of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as 
members of the Assembly of the World Organization. I am 
somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United 
States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be 
necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure wholehearted 
acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States 
of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for 
additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the 
United States. 
I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you 
would perceive no objection and would support a proposal 
along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forth

182 
coming conference. I would greatly appreciate your letting me 
have your views in reply to this letter. 
Most sincerely yours,
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
February 10, 1945 
No. 272 
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
“Livadia,” the Crimea 
My dear Mr Roosevelt, 
Your letter of February 10 received. I fully agree with you 
that because the Soviet Union’s votes will increase to three 
owing to the admission of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet 
Byelorussia to Assembly membership, the number of U.S. votes 
should likewise be increased. 
I think that the U.S. votes should be raised to three as in 
the case of the Soviet Union and its two main Republics. If 
necessary, I am prepared to give official endorsement to this 
proposal. 
Most sincerely yours,
J. STALIN 
Koreiz, February 11, 1945 
No. 273 
Received on February 13, 1945 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I wish again, upon leaving the hospitable shores of the 
Soviet Union, to tell you how deeply grateful I am for the 
many kindnesses which you showed me while I was your guest 
in the Crimea. I leave greatly heartened as a result of the 
meeting between you, the Prime Minister71 and myself. The 
peoples of the world, I am sure, will regard the achievements 
of this meeting not only with approval but as a genuine assurance 
that our three great nations can work in peace as well as 
they have in war.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
183 
No. 274 
Received on February 23, 1945 
HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH V. STALIN, 
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES 
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
Moscow 
In anticipation of our common victory against the Nazi oppressors 
I wish to take this opportunity to extend my heartiest 
congratulations to you as Supreme Commander on this, the 
twenty-seventh anniversary of the founding of the Red Army. 
The far-reaching decisions we took at Yalta will hasten victory 
and the establishment of a firm foundation for a lasting peace. 
The continued outstanding achievements of the Red Army 
together with the all-out effort of the United Nations14 forces 
in the South and the West assure the speedy attainment of our 
common goal—a peaceful world based upon mutual understanding 
and cooperation. 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
No. 275 
Sent on February 27, 1945 
TO Mr FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The White House, Washington 
Please accept, Mr President, my gratitude for your friendly 
greetings on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of the Red 
Army. 
I am confident that the further strengthening of cooperation 
between our two countries, which found expression in the 
decisions of the Crimea Conference, will shortly lead to the 
complete defeat of our common enemy and to a lasting peace 
based on the principle of cooperation among all freedom-loving 
nations. 
J. STALIN

184 
No. 276 
Received on March 4, 1945 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I have reliable information regarding the difficulties which 
are being encountered in collecting, supplying, and evacuating 
American ex-prisoners of war and American aircraft crews 
who are stranded east of the Russian lines. It is urgently 
requested that instructions be issued authorizing ten American 
aircraft with American crews to operate between Poltava85 
and places in Poland where American ex-prisoners of 
war and stranded airmen may be located. This authority is 
requested for the purpose of providing supplementary clothing, 
medical and food supplies for all American soldiers, to 
evacuate stranded aircraft crews and liberated prisoners of 
war, and especially to transfer the injured and sick to the 
American hospital at Poltava. I regard this request to be of 
the greatest importance not only for humanitarian reasons but 
also by reason of the intense interest of the American public 
in the welfare of our ex-prisoners of war and stranded aircraft 
crews. 
Secondly, on the general matter of prisoners of war still in 
German hands, I feel that we ought to do something quickly. 
The number of these prisoners of war, Russian, British and 
United States, is very large. In view of your disapproval of 
the plan we submitted, what do you suggest instead? 
No. 277 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
Your message of March 4 about prisoners of war received. 
I have again conferred with our local representatives in charge 
of this matter and can tell you the following: 
The difficulties which arose during the early stages of the 
speedy evacuation of American prisoners of war from the 
zones of direct military operations have decreased substantially. 
At present the special agency set up by the Soviet Government 
to take care of foreign prisoners of war has adequate 
personnel, transport facilities and food supplies, and whenever 
new groups of American prisoners of war are discovered steps

185 
are taken at once to help them and to evacuate them to assembly 
points for subsequent repatriation. According to the information 
available to the Soviet Government, there is now 
no accumulation of U.S. prisoners of war on Polish territory 
or in other areas liberated by the Red Army, because all of 
them, with the exception of individual sick men who are in 
hospital, have been sent to the assembly point in Odessa, 
where 1,200 U.S. prisoners of war have arrived so far and 
the arrival of the remainder is expected shortly. Hence there 
is no need at the moment for U.S. planes to fly from Poltava85 
to Polish territory in connection with U.S. prisoners of war. 
You may rest assured that appropriate measures will immediately 
be taken also with regard to American aircraft crews 
making a forced landing. This, however, does not rule out 
cases in which the help of U.S. aircraft may be required. In 
this event the Soviet military authorities will request the 
U.S. military representatives in Moscow to send U.S. aircraft 
from Poltava. 
As at the moment I have no proposals to make concerning 
the status of the Allied prisoners of war in German hands, 
I should like to assure you that we shall do all we can to provide 
them with facilities as soon as they find themselves on 
territory captured by Soviet troops. 
March 5, 1945 
No. 278 
Received on March 4, 1945 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
In the matter of evacuation of American ex-prisoners of 
war from Poland I have been informed that the approval for 
General Deane to survey the United States prisoners of war 
situation in Poland has been withdrawn. You stated in your 
last message to me that there was no need to accede to my 
request that American aircraft be allowed to carry supplies 
to Poland and to evacuate the sick. I have information that I 
consider positive and reliable that there are still a considerable 
number of sick and injured Americans in hospitals in Poland 
and also that there have been, certainly up to the last days 
and possibly still are, large numbers of other liberated American 
prisoners either at Soviet assembly points awaiting en

186 
trainment to Odessa or wandering about in small groups not 
in contact with Soviet authorities looking for American contact 
officers. 
I cannot, in all frankness, understand your reluctance to 
permit American contact officers, with the necessary means, 
to assist their own people in this matter. This Government has 
done everything to meet each of your requests. I now request 
you to meet mine in this particular matter. Please call Ambassador 
Harriman to explain to you in detail my desires. 
No. 279 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I am in receipt of your message about the evacuation of 
former U.S. prisoners of war from Poland. 
With regard to your information about allegedly large numbers 
of sick and injured Americans in Poland or awaiting 
evacuation to Odessa, or who have not contacted the Soviet 
authorities, I must say that the information is inaccurate. 
Actually, apart from a certain number who are on their way 
to Odessa, there were only 17 sick U.S. servicemen on Polish 
soil as of March 16. I have today received a report which says 
that the 17 men will be flown to Odessa in a few days. 
With reference to the request contained in your message 
I must say that if it concerned me personally I would be ready 
to give way even to the detriment of my own interests. But 
in the given instance the matter concerns the interests of 
Soviet armies at the front and of Soviet commanders who do 
not want to have around odd officers who, while having no 
relation to the military operations, need looking after, want 
all kinds of meetings and contacts, protection against possible 
acts of sabotage by German agents not yet ferreted out, and 
other things that divert the attention of the commanders and 
their subordinates from their direct duties. Our commanders 
bear full responsibility for the state of affairs at the front and 
in the immediate rear, and I do not see how I can restrict their 
rights to any extent. 
I must also say that U.S. ex-prisoners of war liberated by 
the Red Army have been treated to good conditions in Soviet 
camps—better conditions than those afforded Soviet ex-prisoners 
of war in U.S. camps, where some of them were lodged 
with German war prisoners and were subjected to unfair

187 
treatment and unlawful persecutions, including beating, as has 
been communicated to the U.S. Government on more than one 
occasion. 
March 22, 1945 
No. 280 
Received on March 25, 1945 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
The State Department has just been informed by Ambassador 
Gromyko concerning the composition of the Soviet Delegation 
to the San Francisco Conference.86 We have the highest 
regard for Ambassador Gromyko’s character and capabilities 
and know that he would ably represent the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless I cannot help but be deeply disappointed that 
Mr Molotov apparently does not plan to attend. Recalling the 
friendly and fruitful cooperation at Yalta between Mr Molotov, 
Mr Eden and Mr Stettinius, I know that the Secretary of State 
has been looking forward to continuing at San Francisco in 
the same spirit the joint work for the eventual realization of 
our common goal—the establishment of an effective international 
organization to insure for the world a secure and peaceful 
future. 
The Conference, without Mr Molotov’s presence, will be 
deprived of a very great asset. If his pressing and heavy responsibilities 
in the Soviet Union make it impossible for him 
to stay for the entire Conference, I hope very much that you 
will find it possible to let him come at least for the vital 
opening sessions. All sponsoring Powers and the majority of 
the other countries attending will be represented by their 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In these circumstances I am afraid 
that Mr Molotov’s absence will be construed all over the world 
as a lack of comparable interest in the great objectives of this 
Conference on the part of the Soviet Government.

188 
No. 281 
Received on March 25, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Ambassador Harriman has communicated to me a letter 
which he has received from Mr Molotov regarding an investigation 
being made by Field Marshal Alexander into a reported 
possibility of obtaining the surrender of part or all of the 
German army87 in Italy. In this letter Mr Molotov demands 
that, because of the non-participation therein of Soviet officers, 
this investigation to be undertaken in Switzerland should be 
stopped forthwith. 
The facts of this matter I am sure have, through a misunderstanding, 
not been correctly presented to you. The following 
are the facts: 
Unconfirmed information was received some days ago in 
Switzerland that some German officers were considering the 
possibility of arranging for the surrender of German troops 
that are opposed to Field Marshal Alexander’s British-American 
Armies in Italy. 
Upon the receipt of this information in Washington, Field 
Marshal Alexander was authorized to send to Switzerland an 
officer or officers of his staff to ascertain the accuracy of the 
report and if it appeared to be of sufficient promise to arrange 
with any competent German officers for a conference to discuss 
details of the surrender with Field Marshal Alexander at 
his headquarters in Italy. If such a meeting could be arranged 
Soviet representatives would, of course, be welcome. 
Information concerning this investigation to be made in 
Switzerland was immediately communicated to the Soviet 
Government. Your Government was later informed that it will 
be agreeable for Soviet officers to be present at Field Marshal 
Alexander’s meetings with German officers if and when arrangements 
are finally made in Berne for such a meeting at 
Caserta to discuss details of a surrender. 
Up to the present time the attempts by our representatives 
to arrange a meeting with German officers have met with no 
success, but it still appears that such a meeting is a possibility. 
My Government, as you will of course understand, must 
give every assistance to all officers in the field in command 
of Allied forces who believe there is a possibility of forcing 
the surrender of enemy troops in their area. For me to take 
any other attitude or to permit any delay which must cause 
additional and avoidable loss of life in the American forces

189 
would be completely unreasonable. As a military man you 
will understand the necessity for prompt action to avoid losing 
an opportunity. The sending of a flag of truce to your 
General at Königsberg or Danzig would be in the same category. 
There can be in such a surrender of enemy forces in the field 
no violation of our agreed principle of unconditional surrender 
and no political implications whatever. 
I will be pleased to have at any discussion of the details of 
surrender by our commander of American forces in the field 
the benefit of the experience and advice of any of your officers 
who can be present, but I cannot agree to suspend investigation 
of the possibility because of objection by Mr Molotov for 
some reason completely beyond my comprehension. 
Not much is expected from the reported possibility, but for 
the purpose of preventing misunderstanding between our 
officers, I hope you will point out to the Soviet officials concerned 
the desirability and necessity of our taking prompt and 
effective action without any delay to effect the surrender of 
any enemy military forces that are opposed to American forces 
in the field. 
I feel certain that you will have the same attitude and will 
take the same action when a similar opportunity comes on the 
Soviet front. 
No. 282 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
We highly value and attach great importance to the San 
Francisco86 Conference to lay the foundations of an international 
organisation for peace and security of the nations, but 
present circumstances preclude V. M. Molotov’s attendance. 
I and Molotov are very sorry about this, but the convening, 
at the instance of Deputies to the Supreme Soviet, of a session 
of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in April, at which Molotov’s 
attendance is imperative, makes it impossible for him 
to attend even the opening session of the Conference. 
You are aware that Ambassador Gromyko successfully coped 
with his task at Dumbarton Oaks,88 and we are certain that he 
will ably head the Soviet Delegation at San Francisco. 
As to the different interpretations, you will appreciate that 
they cannot determine the decisions to be taken. 
March 27, 1945

190 
No. 283 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I have analysed the matter raised in your letter of March 25, 
and find that the Soviet Government could not have given any 
other reply after its representatives were barred from the Berne 
negotiations with the Germans for a German surrender and 
opening the front to the Anglo-American troops in Northern 
Italy. 
Far from being against, I am all for profiting from cases of 
disintegration in the German armies to hasten their surrender 
on one or another sector and encourage them to open the front 
to Allied forces. 
But I agree to such talks with the enemy only in cases where 
they do not lead to an easing of the enemy’s position, if the 
opportunity for the Germans to manoeuvre and to use the talks 
for switching troops to other sectors, above all to the Soviet 
front, is precluded. 
And it was solely with an eye to providing this guarantee 
that the Soviet Government found it necessary to have representatives 
of its Military Command take part in such negotiations 
with the enemy wherever they might take place—whether 
in Berne or in Caserta. I cannot understand why the representatives 
of the Soviet Command have been excluded from the 
talks and in what way they could have handicapped the representatives 
of the Allied Command. 
I must tell you for your information that the Germans have 
already taken advantage of the talks with the Allied Command 
to move three divisions from Northern Italy to the Soviet 
front. 
The task of coordinated operations involving a blow at the 
Germans from the West, South and East, proclaimed at the 
Crimea Conference, is to hold the enemy on the spot and prevent 
him from manoeuvring, from moving his forces to the 
points where he needs them most. The Soviet Command is 
doing this. But Field Marshal Alexander is not. This circumstance 
irritates the Soviet Command and engenders distrust. 
“As a military man,” you write to me, “you will understand 
the necessity for prompt action to avoid losing an opportunity. 
The sending of a flag of truce to your General at Königsberg 
or Danzig would be in the same category.” I am afraid the 
analogy does not fit the case. The German troops at Danzig 
and at Königsberg are encircled. If they surrender they will 
do so to escape extermination, but they cannot open the front

191 
to Soviet troops because the front has shifted as far west as 
the Oder. The German troops in Northern Italy are in an entirely 
different position. They are not encircled and are not 
faced with extermination. If, nevertheless, the Germans in 
Northern Italy seek negotiations in order to surrender and to 
open the front to the Allied troops, then they must have some 
other, more far-reaching aims affecting the destiny of Germany. 
I must tell you that if a similar situation had obtained on 
the Eastern Front, somewhere on the Oder, providing an opportunity 
for a German surrender and for the opening of the 
front to the Soviet troops, I should have immediately notified 
the Anglo-American Military Command and asked it to send 
its representatives to take part in the talks, for in a situation 
of this kind Allies should have nothing to conceal from each 
other. 
March 29, 1945 
No. 284 
Received on April 1, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I cannot conceal from you the concern with which I view 
the developments of events of mutual interest since our fruitful 
meeting at Yalta. The decisions we reached there were good 
ones and have for the most part been welcomed with enthusiasm 
by the peoples of the world who saw in our ability to 
find a common basis of understanding the best pledge for a 
secure and peaceful world after this war. Precisely because 
of the hopes and expectations that these decisions raised, their 
fulfillment is being followed with the closest attention. We 
have no right to let them be disappointed. So far there has been 
a discouraging lack of progress made in the carrying out, which 
the world expects, of the political decisions which we reached 
at the conference particularly those relating to the Polish 
question I am frankly puzzled as to why this should be and 
must tell you that I do not fully understand in many respects 
the apparent indifferent attitude of your Government. Having 
understood each other so well at Yalta I am convinced that the 
three of us can and will clear away any obstacles which have 
developed since then. I intend, therefore, in this message to 
lay before you with complete frankness the problem as I see it. 
Although I have in mind primarily the difficulties which the

192 
Polish negotiations have encountered, I must make a brief 
mention of our agreement embodied in the Declaration on 
Liberated Europe.89 I frankly cannot understand why the 
recent developments in Roumania90 should be regarded as not 
falling within the terms of that Agreement. I hope you will 
find time personally to examine the correspondence between 
our Governments on this subject. 
However, the part of our agreements at Yalta which has 
aroused the greatest popular interest and is the most urgent 
relates to the Polish question. You are aware of course that 
the Commission91 which we set up has made no progress. I feel 
this is due to the interpretation which your Government is 
placing upon the Crimea decisions. In order that there shall 
be no misunderstanding I set forth below my interpretations 
of the points of the Agreement which are pertinent to the difficulties 
encountered by the Commission in Moscow. 
In the discussions that have taken place so far your Government 
appears to take the position that the new Polish Provisional 
Government of National Unity which we agreed should 
be formed should be little more than a continuation of the 
present Warsaw Government. I cannot reconcile this either 
with our agreement or our discussions. While it is true that the 
Lublin Government83 is to be reorganized and its members 
play a prominent role, it is to be done in such a fashion as to 
bring into being a new government. This point is clearly 
brought out in several places in the text of the Agreement. I 
must make it quite plain to you that any such solution which 
would result in a thinly disguised continuance of the present 
Warsaw régime would be unacceptable and would cause the 
people of the United States to regard the Yalta agreement as 
having failed. 
It is equally apparent that for the same reason the Warsaw 
Government cannot under the Agreement claim the right to 
select or reject what Poles are to be brought to Moscow by 
the Commission for consultation. Can we not agree that it is 
up to the Commission to select the Polish leaders to come to 
Moscow to consult in the first instance and invitations be sent 
out accordingly. If this could be done I see no great objection 
to having the Lublin group come first in order that they may 
be fully acquainted with the agreed interpretation of the Yalta 
decisions on this point. It is of course understood that if the 
Lublin group come first no arrangements would be made independently 
with them before the arrival of the other Polish 
leaders called for consultation. In order to facilitate the agreement 
the Commission might first of all select a small but 
representative group of Polish leaders who could suggest other 
names for the consideration of the Commission. We have not

The leaders of the 
three powers at 
the 
Tehran Conference

The Crimea Conference 
Plenary session

193 
and would not bar or veto any candidate for consultation which 
Mr Molotov might propose, being confident that he would not 
suggest any Poles who would be inimical to the intent of the 
Crimea decision. I feel that it is not too much to ask that my 
Ambassador be accorded the same confidence and that any 
candidate for consultation presented by any one of the Commission 
be accepted by the others in good faith. It is obvious 
to me that if the right of the Commission to select these Poles 
is limited or shared with the Warsaw Government the very 
foundation on which our agreement rests would be destroyed. 
While the foregoing are the immediate obstacles which in 
my opinion have prevented our Commission from making any 
progress in this vital matter, there are two other suggestions 
which were not in the agreement but nevertheless have a very 
important bearing on the result we all seek. Neither of these 
suggestions has been as yet accepted by your Government. 
I refer to: 
(1) That there should be the maximum of political tranquility 
in Poland and that dissident groups should cease any 
measures and counter-measures against each other. That we 
should respectively use our influence to that end seems to me 
eminently reasonable. 
(2) It would also seem entirely natural in view of the 
responsibilities placed upon them by the Agreement that 
representatives of the American and British members of the 
Commission should be permitted to visit Poland. As you will 
recall Mr Molotov himself suggested this at an early meeting 
of the Commission and only subsequently withdrew it. 
I wish I could convey to you how important it is for the 
successful development of our program of international collaboration 
that this Polish question be settled fairly and speedily. 
If this is not done all of the difficulties and dangers to Allied 
unity which we had so much in mind in reaching our decisions 
at the Crimea will face us in an even more acute form. You 
are, I am sure, aware that the genuine popular support in the 
United States is required to carry out any government policy, 
foreign or domestic. The American people make up their own 
mind and no government action can change it. I mention this 
fact because the last sentence of your message about Mr. Molotov’s 
attendance at San Francisco86 made me wonder whether 
you give full weight to this factor.

194 
No. 285 
Received on April 1, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
In the exchange of messages we have had on possible future 
negotiations with the Germans for surrender of their forces 
in Italy, it seems to me that, although both of us are in agreement 
on all the basic principles, the matter now stands in an 
atmosphere of regrettable apprehension and mistrust. 
No negotiations-for surrender have been entered into, and 
if there should be any negotiations they will be conducted at 
Caserta with your representatives present throughout. Although 
the attempt at Berne to arrange for the conduct of these 
negotiations has been fruitless, Marshal Alexander has been 
directed to keep you informed of his progress in this matter. 
I must repeat that the meeting in Berne was for the single 
purpose of arranging contact with competent German military 
officers and not for negotiations of any kind. 
There is no question of negotiating with the Germans in any 
way which would permit them to transfer elsewhere forces 
from the Italian front. Negotiations, if any are conducted, will 
be on the basis of unconditional surrender. With regard to the 
lack of Allied offensive operations in Italy, this condition has 
in no way resulted from any expectation of an agreement with 
the Germans. As a matter of fact, recent interruption of offensive 
operations in Italy has been due primarily to the recent 
transfer of Allied forces, British and Canadian divisions, from 
that front to France. Preparations are now made for an offensive 
on the Italian front about April 10, but while we hope 
for success, the operation will be of limited power due to the 
lack of forces now available to Alexander. He has seventeen 
dependable divisions and is opposed by twenty-four German 
divisions. We intend to do everything within the capacity of 
our available resources to prevent any withdrawal of the 
German forces now in Italy. 
I feel that your information about the time of the movements 
of German troops from Italy is in error. Our best information 
is that three German divisions have left Italy since the first 
of the year, two of which have gone to the Eastern Front. The 
last division of the three started moving about February 25, 
more than two weeks before anybody heard of any possibility 
of a surrender. It is therefore clearly evident that the approach 
made of German agents in Berne occurred after the last move

195 
ment of troops began and could not possibly have had any 
effect on the movement. 
This entire episode has arisen through the initiative of a 
German officer reputed to be close to Himmler and there is, 
of course, a strong possibility that his sole purpose is to create 
suspicion and distrust between the Allies. There is no reason 
why we should permit him to succeed in that aim. I trust that 
the above categorical statement of the present situation and of 
my intentions will allay the apprehension which you express 
in your message of March 29.
No. 286
PERSONAL, MOST SECRET 
FROM MARSHAL J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr ROOSEVELT 
I am in receipt of your message on the Berne talks. 
You are quite right in saying, with reference to the talks 
between the Anglo-American and German Commands in Berne 
or elsewhere, that “the matter now stands in an atmosphere 
of regrettable apprehension and mistrust.” 
You affirm that so far no negotiations have been entered 
into Apparently you are not fully informed. As regards my 
military colleagues, they, on the basis of information in their 
possession, are sure that negotiations did take place and that 
they ended in an agreement with the Germans, whereby the 
German Commander on the Western Front, Marshal Kesselring, 
is to open the front to the Anglo-American troops and let them 
move east, while the British and Americans have promised, in 
exchange, to ease the armistice terms for the Germans. 
I think that my colleagues are not very far from the truth. 
If the contrary were the case the exclusion of representatives 
of the Soviet Command from the Berne talks would be inexplicable. 
Nor can I account for the reticence of the British, who have 
left it to you to carry on a correspondence with me on this 
unpleasant matter, while they themselves maintain silence, 
although it is known that the initiative in the matter of the 
Berne negotiations belongs to the British. 
I realise that there are certain advantages resulting to the 
Anglo-American troops from these separate negotiations in 
Berne or in some other place, seeing that the Anglo-American 
troops are enabled to advance into the heart of Germany almost 
without resistance; but why conceal this from the Russians,

196 
and why were the Russians, their Allies, not forewarned? 
And so what we have at the moment is that the Germans 
on the Western Front have in fact ceased the war against 
Britain and America. At the same time they continue the war 
against Russia, the Ally of Britain and the U.S.A. 
Clearly this situation cannot help preserve and promote 
trust between our countries. 
I have already written in a previous message, and I think I 
must repeat, that I and my colleagues would never in any 
circumstances have taken such a hazardous step, for we realise 
that a momentary advantage, no matter how great, is overshadowed 
by the fundamental advantage of preserving and 
promoting trust between Allies. 
April 3, 1945 
No. 287 
Received on April 5, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
I have received with astonishment your message of April 3 
containing an allegation that arrangements which were made 
between Field Marshals Alexander and Kesselring at Berne 
“permitted the Anglo-American troops to advance to the East 
and the Anglo-Americans promised in return to ease for the 
Germans the peace terms.” 
In my previous messages to you in regard to the attempts 
made in Berne to arrange a conference to discuss a surrender 
of the German army in Italy I have told you that: (1) No 
negotiations were held in Berne, (2) The meeting had no 
political implications whatever, (3) In any surrender of the 
enemy army in Italy there would be no violation of our agreed 
principle of unconditional surrender, (4) Soviet officers would 
be welcomed at any meeting that might be arranged to discuss 
surrender. 
For the advantage of our common war effort against Germany, 
which today gives excellent promise of an early success 
in a disintegration of the German armies, I must continue to 
assume that you have the same high confidence in my truthfulness 
and reliability that I have always had in yours. 
I have also a full appreciation of the effect your gallant 
army has had in making possible a crossing of the Rhine by 
the forces under General Eisenhower and the effect that your

197 
forces will have hereafter on the eventual collapse of the 
German resistance to our combined attacks. 
I have complete confidence in General Eisenhower and know 
that he certainly would inform me before entering into any 
agreement with the Germans. He is instructed to demand and 
will demand unconditional surrender of enemy troops that may 
be defeated on his front. Our advances on the Western Front 
are due to military action. Their speed has been attributable 
mainly to the terrific impact of our air power resulting in 
destruction of German communications, and to the fact that 
Eisenhower was able to cripple the bulk of the German forces 
on the Western Front while they were still west of the Rhine. 
I am certain that there were no negotiations in Berne at 
any time and I feel that your information to that effect must 
have come from German sources which have made persistent 
efforts to create dissension between us in order to escape in 
some measure responsibility for their war crimes. If that was 
Wolff ’s purpose in Berne, your message proves that he has had 
some success. 
With a confidence in your belief in my personal reliability 
and in my determination to bring about, together with you, 
an unconditional surrender of the Nazis, it is astonishing that 
a belief seems to have reached the Soviet Government that 
I have entered into an agreement with the enemy without first 
obtaining your full agreement. 
Finally I would say this, it would be one of the great tragedies 
of history if at the very moment of the victory, now within 
our grasp, such distrust, such lack of faith should prejudice 
the entire undertaking after the colossal losses of life, material 
and treasure involved. 
Frankly I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment toward 
your informers, whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations 
of my actions or those of my trusted subordinates. 
No. 288 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
I have received your message of April 5. 
In my message of April 3 the point was not about integrity 
or trustworthiness. I have never doubted your integrity or 
trustworthiness, just as I have never questioned the integrity 
or trustworthiness of Mr Churchill. My point is that in the 
course of our correspondence a difference of views has arisen

198 
over what an Ally may permit himself with regard to another 
and what he may not. We Russians believe that, in view of 
the present situation on the fronts, a situation in which the 
enemy is faced with inevitable surrender, whenever the representatives 
of one of the Allies meet the Germans to discuss 
surrender terms, the representatives of the other Ally should 
be enabled to take part in the meeting. That is absolutely 
necessary, at least when the other Ally seeks participation in 
the meeting. The Americans and British, however, have a different 
opinion—they hold that the Russian point of view is 
wrong. For that reason they have denied the Russians the right 
to be present at the meeting with the Germans in Switzerland. 
I have already written to you, and I see no harm in repeating 
that, given a similar situation, the Russians would never have 
denied the Americans and British the right to attend such a 
meeting. I still consider the Russian point of view to be the 
only correct one, because it precludes mutual suspicions and 
gives the enemy no chance to sow distrust between us. 
2. It is hard to agree that the absence of German resistance 
on the Western Front is due solely to the fact that they have 
been beaten. The Germans have 147 divisions on the Eastern 
Front. They could safely withdraw from 15 to 20 divisions 
from the Eastern Front to aid their forces on the Western 
Front. Yet they have not done so, nor are they doing so. They 
are fighting desperately against the Russians for Zemlenice, an 
obscure station in Czechoslovakia, which they need just as 
much as a dead man needs a poultice, but they surrender 
without any resistance such important towns in the heart of 
Germany as Osnabrück, Mannheim and Kassel. You will admit 
that this behaviour on the part of the Germans is more than 
strange and unaccountable. 
3. As regards those who supply my information, I can assure 
you that they are honest and unassuming people who carry 
out their duties conscientiously and who have no intention of 
affronting anybody. They have been tested in action on numerous 
occasions. Judge for yourself. In February General Marshall 
made available to the General Staff of the Soviet troops 
a number of important reports in which he, citing data in his 
possession, warned the Russians that in March the Germans 
were planning two serious counter-blows on the Eastern Front. 
one from Pomerania towards Thorn, the other from the Moravská 
Ostrava area towards Lódz. It turned out, however, that 
the main German blow had been prepared, and delivered, not 
in the areas mentioned above, but in an entirely different area, 
namely, in the Lake Balaton area, southwest of Budapest. The 
Germans, as we now know, had concentrated 35 divisions in 
the area, 11 of them armoured. This, with its great concentra

199 
tion of armour, was one of the heaviest blows of the war. 
Marshal Tolbukhin succeeded first in warding off disaster and 
then in smashing the Germans, and was able to do so also 
because my informants had disclosed—true, with some delay 
—the plan for the main German blow and immediately apprised 
Marshal Tolbukhin. Thus I had yet another opportunity to 
satisfy myself as to the reliability and soundness of my sources 
of information. 
For your guidance in this matter I enclose a letter sent by 
Army General Antonov, Chief of Staff of the Red Army, to 
Major-General Deane. 
April 7, 1945 
Copy. 
S E C R E T 
TO MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE, 
HEAD OF THE MILITARY MISSION OF THE U.S.A. 
IN THE U.S.S.R. 
Dear General Deane, 
Please convey to General Marshall the following: 
On February 20 I received a message from General Marshall 
through General Deane, saying that the Germans were forming 
two groups for a counter-offensive on the Eastern Front: one 
in Pomerania to strike in the direction of Thorn and the other 
in the Vienna-Moravská Ostrava area to advance in the direction 
of Lódz. The southern group was to include the 6th S.S. 
Panzer Army. On February 12 I received similar information 
from Colonel Brinkman, head of the Army Section of the 
British Military Mission. 
I am very much obliged and grateful to General Marshall 
for the information, designed to further our common aims, 
which he so kindly made available to us. 
At the same time it is my duty to inform General Marshall 
that the military operations on the Eastern Front in March 
did not bear out the information furnished by him. For the 
battles showed that the main group of German troops, which 
included the 6th S.S. Panzer Army, had been concentrated, 
not in Pomerania or in the Moravská Ostrava area, but in the 
Lake Balaton area, whence the Germans launched their offensive 
in an attempt to break through to the Danube and force 
it south of Budapest.

200 
Thus, the information supplied by General Marshall was at 
variance with the actual course of events on the Eastern Front 
in March. 
It may well be that certain sources of this information 
wanted to bluff both Anglo-American and Soviet Headquarters 
and divert the attention of the Soviet High Command from 
the area where the Germans were mounting their main offensive 
operation on the Eastern Front. 
Despite the foregoing, I would ask General Marshall, if possible, 
to keep me posted with information about the enemy. 
I consider it my duty to convey this information to General 
Marshall solely for the purpose of enabling him to draw the 
proper conclusions in relation to the source of the information. 
Please convey to General Marshall my respect and gratitude. 
Truly yours, 
Army General ANTONOV 
Chief of staff of the Red Army 
March 30, 1945 
No. 289 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT 
With reference to your message of April 1st I think I must 
make the following comments on the Polish question. 
The Polish question has indeed reached an impasse. 
What is the reason? 
The reason is that the U.S. and British Ambassadors in 
Moscow—members of the Moscow Commission91—have departed 
from the instructions of the Crimea Conference, introducing 
new elements not provided for by the Crimea 
Conference. 
Namely: 
(a) At the Crimea Conference the three of us regarded the 
Polish Provisional Government as the government now functioning 
in Poland and subject to reconstruction, as the government 
that should be the core of a new Government of National 
Unity. The U.S. and British Ambassadors in Moscow, however, 
have departed from that thesis; they ignore the Polish Provisional 
Government, pay no heed to it and at best place individuals 
in Poland and London on a par with the Provisional

201 
Government. Furthermore, they hold that reconstruction of the 
Provisional Government should be understood in terms of its 
abolition and the establishment of an entirely new government. 
Things have gone so far that Mr Harriman declared in 
the Moscow Commission that it might be that not a single 
member of the Provisional Government would be included in 
the Polish Government of National Unity. 
Obviously this thesis of the U.S. and British Ambassadors 
cannot but be strongly resented by the Polish Provisional 
Government. As regards the Soviet Union, it certainly cannot 
accept a thesis that is tantamount to direct violation of the 
Crimea Conference decisions. 
(b) At the Crimea Conference the three of us held that five 
people should be invited for consultation from Poland and 
three from London, not more. But the U.S. and British Ambassadors 
have abandoned that position and insist that each 
member of the Moscow Commission be entitled to invite an 
unlimited number from Poland and from London. 
Clearly the Soviet Government could not agree to that, 
because, according to the Crimea decision, invitations should 
be sent not by individual members of the Commission, but by 
the Commission as a whole, as a body. The demand for no limit 
to the number invited for consultation runs counter to what 
was envisaged at the Crimea Conference. 
(c) The Soviet Government proceeds from the assumption 
that, by virtue of the Crimea decisions, those invited for consultation 
should be in the first instance Polish leaders who 
recognise the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including the 
one on the Curzon Line,57 and, secondly, who actually want 
friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Government insists on this because the blood of Soviet 
soldiers, so freely shed in liberating Poland, and the fact that 
in the past 30 years the territory of Poland has twice been 
used by an enemy for invading Russia, oblige the Soviet Government 
to ensure friendly relations between the Soviet Union 
and Poland. 
The U.S. and British Ambassadors in Moscow, however, 
ignore this and want to invite Polish leaders for consultation 
regardless of their attitude to the Crimea decisions and to the 
Soviet Union. 
Such, to my mind, are the factors hindering a settlement of 
the Polish problem through mutual agreement. 
In order to break the deadlock and reach an agreed decision, 
the following steps should, I think, be taken: 
(1) Affirm that reconstruction of the Polish Provisional 
Government implies, not its abolition, but its reconstruction 
by enlarging it, it being understood that the Provisional Gov

202 
ernment shall form the core of the future Polish Government 
of National Unity. 
(2) Return to the provisions of the Crimea Conference and 
restrict the number of Polish leaders to be invited to eight 
persons, of whom five should be from Poland and three from 
London. 
(3) Affirm that the representatives of the Polish Provisional 
Government shall be consulted in all circumstances, that they 
be consulted in the first place, since the Provisional Government 
is much stronger in Poland compared with the individuals 
to be invited from London and Poland whose influence among 
the population in no way compares with the tremendous prestige 
of the Provisional Government. 
I draw your attention to this because, to my mind, any other 
decision on the point might be regarded in Poland as an affront 
to the people and as an attempt to impose a government without 
regard to Polish public opinion. 
(4) Only those leaders should be summoned for consultation 
from Poland and from London who recognise the decisions of 
the Crimea Conference on Poland and who in practice want 
friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. 
(5) Reconstruction of the Provisional Government to be 
effected by replacing a number of Ministers of the Provisional 
Government by nominees among the Polish leaders who are 
not members of the Provisional Government. 
As to the ratio of old and new Ministers in the Government 
of National Unity, it might be established more or less on the 
same lines as was done in the case of the Yugoslav Government. 
I think if these comments are taken into consideration the 
Polish question can be settled in a short time. 
April 7, 1945 
No. 290 
Received on April 13, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
Thank you for your frank explanation of the Soviet point 
of view on the Berne incident which it now appears has faded 
into the past without having accomplished any useful purpose. 
In any event, there must not be mutual distrust, and minor 
misunderstandings of this character should not arise in the

203 
future. I feel sure that when our armies make contact in 
Germany and join in a fully coordinated offensive the Nazi 
armies will disintegrate. 
No. 291 
Sent on April 13, 1945 
FOR PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
Washington 
On behalf of the Soviet Government and on my own behalf 
I express to the Government of the United States of America 
deep regret at the untimely death of President Roosevelt. The 
American people and the United Nations14 have lost in the person 
of Franklin Roosevelt a great statesman of world stature 
and champion of post-war peace and security. 
The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its heartfelt 
sympathy with the American people in their grievous loss and 
its confidence that the policy of cooperation between the Great 
Powers who have borne the brunt of the war against the common 
foe will be promoted in the future as well. 
J. STALIN 
No. 292 
Received on April 18, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
I appreciate your kind and true statement of the contribution 
which the late President Franklin Roosevelt made to the 
cause of civilization and your assurances with respect to the 
efforts which we will make in common in this same cause.

204 
No. 293 
Received on April 18, 1945 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER 
We are sending this joint reply to your messages of April 7 
in regard to the Polish negotiations for the sake of greater 
clarity and in order that there will be no misunderstanding 
as to our position on this matter. The British and the United 
States Governments have tried most earnestly to be constructive 
and fair in their approach and will continue to do so. 
Before putting before you the concrete and constructive suggestion 
which is the purpose of this message we feel it necessary, 
however, to correct the completely erroneous impression 
which you have apparently received in regard to the position 
of the, British and United States Governments as set forth by 
our Ambassadors under direct instructions during the negotiations. 
It is most surprising to have you state that the present government 
functioning in Warsaw has been in any way ignored 
during these negotiations. Such has never been our intention 
nor our position. You must be cognizant of the fact that our 
Ambassadors in Moscow have agreed without question that the 
three leaders of the Warsaw Government should be included in 
the list of Poles to be invited to come to Moscow for consultation 
with the Polish Commission.91 We have never denied 
that among the three elements from which the new Provisional 
Government of National Unity is to be formed the representatives 
of the present Warsaw Government will play unquestionably 
a prominent part. Nor can it be said with any 
justification that our Ambassadors are demanding the right to 
invite an unlimited number of Poles. The right to put forward 
and have accepted by the Commission individual representative 
Poles from abroad and from within Poland to be invited 
to Moscow for consultation cannot be interpreted in that sense. 
Indeed in his message of April 1 President Roosevelt specifically 
said: “In order to facilitate the agreement the Commission 
might first of all select a small but representative group of 
Polish leaders who could suggest other names for consideration 
by the Commission.” The real issue between us is whether 
or not the Warsaw Government has the right to veto individual 
candidates for consultation. No such interpretation in our 
considered opinion can be found in the Crimea decision. It 
appears to us that you are reverting to the original position 
taken by the Soviet delegation at the Crimea which was sub

205 
sequently modified in the agreement. Let us keep clearly in 
mind that we are now speaking only of the group of Poles who 
are to be invited to Moscow for consultation. 
You mention the desirability of inviting eight Poles—five 
from within Poland and three from London—to take part in 
these first consultations and in your message to the Prime 
Minister you indicate that Mikolajczyk would be acceptable if 
he issued a statement in support of the Crimea decision. We, 
therefore, submit the following proposals for your consideration 
in order to prevent a breakdown, with all its incalculable 
consequences, of our endeavors to settle the Polish question. 
We hope that you will give them your most careful and earnest 
consideration. 
1. That we instruct our representatives on the Commission 
to extend invitations immediately to the following Polish 
leaders to come to Moscow for consultation: Bierut, Osubka 
Morawski, Rola-Zymierski, Bishop Sapieha; one representative 
Polish political party leader not connected with the present 
Warsaw Government (if any of the following were agreeable 
to you he would be agreeable to us: Witos, Zulawski, Chacinski, 
Jasiukowicz), and from London Mikolajczyk, Grabski and 
Stanczyk. 
2. That once the invitations to come for consultation have 
been issued by the Commission the representatives of the Warsaw 
Government could arrive first if desired. 
3. That it be agreed that these Polish leaders called for consultation 
could suggest to the Commission the names of a certain 
number of other Polish leaders from within Poland or 
abroad who might be brought in for consultation in order that 
all the major Polish groups be represented in the discussions. 
4. We do not feel that we could commit ourselves to any 
formula for determining the composition of the new Government 
of National Unity in advance of consultation with the 
Polish leaders and we do not in any case consider the Yugoslav 
precedent92 to be applicable to Poland. 
We ask you to read again carefully the American and British 
messages of April 1 since they set forth the larger considerations 
which we still have very much in mind and to which 
we must adhere. 
TRUMAN

206 
No. 294 
Received on April 20, 1945 
HIS EXCELLENCY J. V. STALIN, 
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION 
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
Moscow 
My countrymen join with me in sincerely thanking you for 
your message of sympathy which is a source of great comfort 
in our loss. It is my conviction that President Roosevelt’s sacrifice 
for the cause of freedom will serve to strengthen the 
determination of all peoples that the goal, for which he so 
faithfully strove, shall not have been in vain. 
Harry S. TRUMAN 
No. 295 
Received on April 21, 1945 
TO MARSHAL STALIN FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
With respect to the arrangements for the announcement of 
the meeting of our armies in Germany, I will see that instructions 
are given to General Eisenhower to inform the Soviet, 
British and United States Governments as soon as possible of 
the day on which the linking up of the Soviet-Anglo-American 
armies in Germany may be announced by the three Chiefs of 
Government. 
In order that the announcement may be made simultaneously 
in all three capitals, I wish to propose that the hour of the day 
recommended by Eisenhower be twelve o’clock noon Washington 
Time, and would be glad to have your agreement to this 
proposal. 
An identic message is being sent to Churchill. 
TRUMAN

207 
No. 296 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
Your message about announcing the link-up of our armies 
in Germany reached me on April 21. 
I have nothing against your proposal for accepting the hour 
for the announcement suggested by Gen. Eisenhower, that is, 
twelve o’clock noon Washington Time. 
I am sending a similar message to Mr Churchill. 
April 23, 1945 
No. 297 
FOR INFORMATION OF MARSHAL STALIN 
There was an agreement at Yalta in which President Roosevelt 
participated for the United States Government to reorganize 
the Provisional Government now functioning in Warsaw 
in order to establish a new Government of National Unity in 
Poland by means of previous consultation between representatives 
of the Provisional Polish Government of Warsaw and 
other Polish democratic leaders from Poland and from abroad. 
In the opinion of the United States Government the Crimean 
decision on Poland can only be carried out if a group of genuinely 
representative democratic Polish leaders are invited 
to Moscow for consultation. The United States Government 
cannot be party to any method of consultation with Polish 
leaders which would not result in the establishment of a new 
Provisional Government of National Unity genuinely representative 
of the democratic elements of the Polish people. The 
United States and British Governments have gone as far as 
they can to meet the situation and carry out the intent of the 
Crimean decisions in their joint message delivered to Marshal 
Stalin on April 18th. 
The United States Government earnestly requests that the 
Soviet Government accept the proposals set forth in the joint 
message of the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. 
And that Mr Molotov continue the conversations with the 
Secretary of State and Mr Eden in San Francisco on that basis. 
The Soviet Government must realize that the failure to go 
forward at this time with the implementation of the Crimean 
decision on Poland would seriously shake confidence in the

208 
unity of the three Governments and their determination to 
continue the collaboration in the future as they have in the 
past. 
Harry S. TRUMAN 
April 23, 194593 
No. 298 
J. V. STALIN TO H. TRUMAN* 
I have received from you and Prime Minister Churchill the 
joint message of April 18 and the message transmitted to me 
through V. M. Molotov on April 24. 
The messages indicate that you still regard the Polish Provisional 
Government, not as the core of a future Polish Government 
of National Unity, but merely as a group on a par with 
any other group of Poles. It would be hard to reconcile this 
concept of the position of the Provisional Government and this 
attitude towards it with the Crimea decision on Poland. At 
the Crimea Conference the three of us, including President 
Roosevelt, based ourselves on the assumption that the Polish 
Provisional Government, as the Government now functioning 
in Poland and enjoying the trust and support of the majority 
of the Polish people, should be the core, that is, the main part 
of a new, reconstructed Polish Government of National Unity. 
You apparently disagree with this understanding of the issue. 
By turning down the Yugoslav example92 as a model for 
Poland, you confirm that the Polish Provisional Government 
cannot be regarded as a basis for, and the core of, a future 
Government of National Unity. 
2. Another circumstance that should be borne in mind is 
that Poland borders on the Soviet Union, which cannot be said 
about Great Britain or the U.S.A. 
Poland is to the security of the Soviet Union what Belgium 
and Greece are to the security of Great Britain. 
You evidently do not agree that the Soviet Union is entitled 
to seek in Poland a Government that would be friendly to it, 
that the Soviet Government cannot agree to the existence in 
Poland of a Government hostile to it. This is rendered imperative, 
among other things, by the Soviet people’s blood freely 
shed on the fields of Poland for the liberation of that country. 
I do not know whether a genuinely representative Government 
has been established in Greece, or whether the Belgian Government 
is a genuinely democratic one. The Soviet Union was

The Potsdam Conference in session

The house where the Potsdam Conference was held

209 
not consulted when those Governments were being formed, 
nor did it claim the right to interfere in those matters, because 
it realises how important Belgium and Greece are to the security 
of Great Britain. 
I cannot understand why in discussing Poland no attempt is 
made to consider the interests of the Soviet Union in terms 
of security as well. 
3. One cannot but recognise as unusual a situation in which 
two Governments—those of the United States and Great 
Britain—reach agreement beforehand on Poland, a country in 
which the U.S.S.R. is interested first of all and most of all, 
and place its representatives in an intolerable position, trying 
to dictate to it. 
I say that this situation cannot contribute to agreed settlement 
of the Polish problem. 
4. I am ready to accede to your request and to do all in my 
power to reach an agreed settlement. But you are asking too 
much. To put it plainly, you want me to renounce the interests 
of the security of the Soviet Union; but I cannot proceed 
against the interests of my country. 
I think there is only one way out of the present situation 
and that is to accept the Yugoslav precedent as a model for 
Poland. That, I believe, might enable us to arrive at agreed 
settlement. 
April 24, 1945 
No. 299 
Received on April 25, 1945 
TO MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
I wish to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your message 
of April 23. 
The text of the announcement which I propose to release 
at the date and time to be indicated by General Eisenhower is 
as follows: 
“The Anglo-American Armies under the command of General 
Eisenhower have met the Soviet Forces where they intended 
to meet—in the heart of Nazi Germany. The enemy has been 
cut in two. This is not the hour of final victory in Europe, but 
the hour draws near, the hour for which all the American 
people, all the British peoples and all the Soviet people have 
toiled and prayed so long. The union of our arms in the heart

210 
of Germany has a meaning for the world which the world will 
not miss. It means, first, that the last faint, desperate hope of 
Hitler and his gangster government has been extinguished. 
The common front and the common cause of the Powers allied 
in this war against tyranny and inhumanity have been demonstrated 
in fact as they have long been demonstrated in 
determination. Nothing can divide or weaken the common 
purpose of our veteran armies to pursue their victorious purpose 
to its final Allied triumph in Germany. Second, the junction 
of our forces at this moment signalizes to ourselves and to the 
world that the collaboration of our nations in the cause of 
peace and freedom is an effective collaboration which can surmount 
the greatest difficulties of the most extensive campaign 
in military history and succeed. Nations which can plan and 
fight together, shoulder to shoulder, in the face of such obstacles 
of distance and of language and of communications as 
we have overcome, can live together and can work together 
in the common labor of the organization of the world for peace. 
Finally, this great triumph of Allied arms and Allied strategy 
is such a tribute to the courage and determination of Franklin 
Roosevelt as no words could ever speak, and that could be 
accomplished only by the persistence and the courage of the 
fighting soldiers and sailors of the Allied Nations. But, until 
our enemies are finally subdued in Europe and in the Pacific, 
there must be no relaxation of effort on the home front in 
support of our heroic soldiers and sailors as we all know there 
will be no pause on the battle fronts.” 
No. 300 
Received on April 26, 1945 
TRUMAN TO J. V. STALIN* 
The United States Minister to Sweden has informed me that 
Himmler, speaking in the name of the German Government in 
the absence of Hitler who is said to be incapacitated, has approached 
the Swedish Government with an offer to surrender 
all the German forces on the Western Front, including Norway, 
Denmark and Holland. 
2. In keeping with our agreement with the British and 
Soviet Governments it is the view of the United States Government 
that the only acceptable terms of surrender are unconditional 
surrender on all fronts to the Soviet Union, Great 
Britain, and the United States. 
3. If the Germans accept the terms of paragraph 2 above

211 
they should surrender on all fronts at once to the local commanders 
in the field. 
4. If you are in agreement with paragraphs 2 and 3 above I 
will direct my Minister in Sweden to so inform Himmler’s 
agent. 
An identical message is being sent to Prime Minister Churchill. 
No. 301 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Your message of April 26 received. Thank you for informing 
me of Himmler’s intention to surrender on the Western Front. 
I think that your contemplated reply to Himmler, which calls 
for unconditional surrender on all fronts, including the Soviet 
front, is absolutely sound. Please act in the spirit of your 
proposal, and as for us Russians, we undertake to continue our 
attacks upon the Germans. 
For your information I have sent a similar reply to Prime 
Minister Churchill who had made the same inquiry. 
April 26, 1945 
No. 302 
Received on April 27, 1945 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
I have sent the following message today to Mr Johnson at 
Stockholm: 
“With reference to your message of April 25, 3 a.m. inform 
Hitler’s agent that the only acceptable terms of surrender by 
Germany are unconditional surrender to the Soviet Government, 
Great Britain and the United States, on all fronts. 
“If the terms of surrender set forth above are accepted, the 
German forces should surrender at once on all fronts to the 
local commander in the field. 
“In all theaters where resistance is continued the Allied 
attack will be vigorously prosecuted until complete victory is 
achieved.” 
TRUMAN

212 
No. 303 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
Your message concerning the instructions you have given to 
Mr Johnson reached me on April 27. Thank you for the news. 
The decision to seek unconditional surrender of the German 
armed forces, adopted by you and Mr Churchill, is to my mind 
the right reply to the German proposals. 
April 28, 1945 
No. 304 
Received on April 28, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
I have received from Prime Minister Churchill a message 
dated April 27, addressed to you and to myself, with respect to 
an orderly procedure for the occupation by our forces of the 
zones which they will occupy in Germany and Austria. 
I am in full agreement with the message referred to above, 
addressed to both of us by Prime Minister Churchill, and I 
will inform the Prime Minister likewise of my agreement 
thereto. 
No. 305 
Received on April 30, 1945 
TO MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
The following is the text of a message I have sent to Prime 
Minister Churchill: 
“I suggest, with reference to Marshal Alexander’s NAF 
934,94 that the announcement of the local surrender of German 
armies in Italy to combined Anglo-American forces be made 
by Alexander at a time that is in his opinion suitable and

213 
correct, and that the first announcement be not made elsewhere. 
“If you agree, please instruct Alexander accordingly.”
TRUMAN 
No. 306 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
I received on April 28 your message expressing agreement 
with the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill, concerning the procedure 
of the occupation of Germany and Austria.95 
The Soviet Supreme Command has given instructions that 
whenever Soviet troops contact Allied troops the Soviet Command 
is immediately to get in touch with the Command of 
the U.S. or British troops, so that they, by agreement between 
themselves, (1) establish a temporary tactical demarcation line 
and (2) take steps to crush within the bounds of their temporary 
demarcation line all resistance by German troops. 
May 2, 1945 
No. 307 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Thank you for communicating to me the text of your message 
to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill, concerning the 
German surrender in Italy. I have nothing against Field Marshal 
Alexander publishing the announcement of the surrender 
as proposed by you. 
May 2, 1945

214 
No. 308 
Sent on May 4, 1945 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
In view of your interest in the Polish question and because 
you are bound to be familiar with Mr Churchill’s message to 
me on the subject, dated April 28, I think it proper to send 
you the full text of my reply to Mr Churchill, despatched on 
May 4. 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO PRIME MINISTER W. CHURCHILL 
I am in receipt of your message of April 28 on the Polish 
question. 
I must say that I cannot accept the arguments put forward 
in support of your stand. 
You are inclined to regard the proposal that the Yugoslav 
precedent92 be accepted as a model for Poland as renunciation 
of the procedure agreed between us for setting up a Polish 
Government of National Unity. I cannot agree with you. I think 
that the Yugoslav precedent is important first of all because 
it points the way to the most suitable and practical solution 
of the problem of forming a new United Government based 
on the governmental agency at present exercising state power 
in the country. 
It is quite obvious that, unless the Provisional Government 
now functioning in Poland and enjoying the support and trust 
of a majority of the Polish people is taken as a basis for a 
future Government of National Unity, it will be impossible 
to count on successful fulfilment of the task set us by the 
Crimea Conference. 
2. I cannot subscribe to that part of your considerations on 
Greece where you suggest three-Power control over the elections. 
Such control over the people of an allied country would 
of necessity be assessed as an affront and gross interference in 
their internal affairs. Such control is out of place in relation 
to former satellite countries which subsequently declared war 
on Germany and ranged themselves with the Allies, as demonstrated 
by electoral experience, for example, in Finland,

215 
where the election was held without outside interference and 
yielded positive results. 
Your comments on Belgium and Poland as war theatres and 
communication corridors are perfectly justified. As regards 
Poland, it is her being a neighbour of the Soviet Union that 
makes it essential for a future Polish Government to seek in 
practice friendly relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R., 
which is also in the interests of the other freedom-loving 
nations. This circumstance, too, speaks for the Yugoslav precedent. 
The United Nations are interested in constant and 
durable friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Hence 
we cannot acquiesce in the attempts that are being made to 
involve in the forming of a future Polish Government people 
who, to quote you, “are not fundamentally anti-Russian,” or 
to bar from participation only those who, in your view, are 
“extreme people unfriendly to Russia.” Neither one nor the 
other can satisfy us. We insist, and shall continue to insist, 
that only people who have demonstrated by deeds their friendly 
attitude to the Soviet Union, who are willing honestly and 
sincerely to cooperate with the Soviet state, should be consulted 
on the formation of a future Polish Government. 
3. I must deal specially with paragraph 11 of your message 
concerning the difficulties arising from rumours about the 
arrest of 15 Poles, about deportations, etc. 
I am able to inform you that the group of Poles mentioned 
by you comprises 16, not 15, persons. The group is headed by 
the well-known General Okulicki. The British information 
services maintain a deliberate silence, in view of his particular 
odiousness, about this Polish General, who, along with the 
15 other Poles, has “disappeared.” But we have no intention 
of being silent about the matter. This group of 16, led by 
General Okulicki, has been arrested by the military authorities 
of the Soviet front and is undergoing investigation in Moscow. 
General Okulicki’s group, in the first place General Okulicki 
himself, is charged with preparing and carrying out subversive 
activities behind the lines of the Red Army, subversion 
which has taken a toll of over a hundred Red Army soldiers 
and officers; the group is also charged with keeping illegal 
radio-transmitters in the rear of our troops, which is prohibited 
by law. All, or part of them—depending on the outcome 
of the investigation—will be tried. That is how the Red Army 
is forced to protect its units and its rear lines against saboteurs 
and those who create disorder. 
The British information services are spreading rumours 
about the murder or shooting of Poles in Siedlce. The report 
is a fabrication from beginning to end and has, apparently, been 
concocted by Arciszewski’s agents.

216 
4. It appears from your message that you are unwilling to 
consider the Polish Provisional Government as a basis for a 
future Government of National Unity, or to accord it the place 
in that Government to which it is entitled. I must say frankly 
that this attitude precludes the possibility of an agreed decision 
on the Polish question. 
May 4, 1945 
No. 309 
Received on May 5, 1945 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
It has been arranged that General Eisenhower will give us 
sufficient advance notice of his proclamation of V.-E. Day so 
that we may coordinate our announcement with his proclamation. 
I shall inform you immediately upon receiving his notification 
in order that it may be possible for us to make simultaneous 
announcements. Do you not agree that it is most important 
that the statements to be made by you and Churchill and 
myself should be made at the same time? 
A similar message is being sent to Churchill. 
No. 310 
Received on May 5, 1945 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
In reply to your message of April 24, on the Polish question, 
I wish to say the following. 
I have received from Prime Minister Churchill a copy of his 
message to you of April 28. Since you are well acquainted with 
the position of the United States Government from the messages 
you have received from President Roosevelt and myself 
I need hardly tell you that I agree with the views set forth in 
Mr Churchill’s message of April 28 in regard to the reorganization 
of the Polish Government. This Government still considers 
that the Crimea decisions constitute a fair basis of settlement 
for the Polish question and should be carried out at 
this time.

217 
The three foreign secretaries in their meetings on the Polish 
matter have not yet succeeded in producing a satisfactory formula. 
I consider it of the utmost importance that a satisfactory 
solution of this problem be worked out at the earliest possible 
moment. 
I must tell you that any suggestion that the representatives 
of the present Warsaw Provisional Government be invited to 
San Francisco,96 conditionally or otherwise, is wholly unacceptable 
to the Government of the United States. For the 
United States to agree to such an invitation would mean to 
accept the present Warsaw Provisional Government as representative 
of Poland. This would be equivalent to abandoning 
the agreement reached in the Crimea. 
No. 311 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A., 
Mr H. TRUMAN 
Your message about announcing V.-E. Day reached me on 
May 5. 
I agree with your proposal for the three of us—you, Mr Churchill 
and myself—simultaneously making an appropriate 
statement. Mr. Churchill suggests 3 p.m. British Double Summer 
Time, which corresponds to 4 p.m. Moscow Time and 
9 a.m. Washington Time. I have notified Mr Churchill that this 
hour suits the U.S.S.R. 
May 6, 1945 
No. 312 
Received on May 7, 1945 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
The following refers to General Eisenhower’s telegram of 
today’s date concerning the timing of the announcement of surrender. 
Assuming that it is agreeable to you, I will announce 
surrender, as recommended by Eisenhower, at 9 a.m. Washington 
Time on Tuesday, May 8.

218 
This is a momentous occasion for the United Nations14 and 
for the world. 
A similar message is going forward to Prime Minister Churchill. 
TRUMAN 
No. 313 
SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr TRUMAN 
I am in receipt of your message of May 7 about announcing 
Germany’s surrender. 
The Supreme Command of the Red Army is not sure that 
the order of the German High Command on unconditional 
surrender will be executed by the German armies on the 
Eastern Front. We fear, therefore, that if the Government of 
the U.S.S.R. announces today the surrender of Germany we 
may find ourselves in an awkward position and mislead the 
Soviet public. It should be borne in mind that the German 
resistance on the Eastern Front is not slackening but, judging 
by intercepted radio messages, a considerable grouping of 
German troops have explicitly declared their intention to continue 
the resistance and to disobey Dönitz’s surrender order. 
For this reason the Command of the Soviet troops would 
like to wait until the German surrender takes effect and to 
postpone the Government’s announcement of the surrender till 
May 9, 7 p.m. Moscow Time.97 
May 7, 1945 
No. 314 
Received on May 8, 1945 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
Now that the Soviet-Anglo-American Forces have beaten 
the armies of the Fascist aggressors into unconditional surrender, 
I wish to express to you and through you to your heroic 
armies the fervent congratulations of our people and their 
Government. We fully appreciate the magnificent contribution

219 
made by the mighty Soviet Union to the cause of civilization 
and liberty. 
You have demonstrated the ability of a freedom-loving and 
supremely courageous people to crush the evil forces of barbarism, 
however powerful. On this occasion of our common victory, 
we salute the people and armies of the Soviet Union, and 
their superlative leadership. 
I will be pleased if you wish to transmit these sentiments to 
your appropriate commanders in the field. 
Harry S. TRUMAN 
No. 315 
MESSAGE FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr TRUMAN 
I thank you with all my heart for your friendly congratulations 
on the unconditional surrender of Hitler Germany. The 
peoples of the Soviet Union greatly appreciate the part played 
by the friendly American people in this liberation war. The 
joint effort of the Soviet, U.S. and British Armed Forces against 
the German invaders, which has culminated in the latter ’s 
complete rout and defeat, will go down in history as a model 
military alliance between our peoples. 
On behalf of the Soviet people and Government I beg you 
to convey my warmest greetings and congratulations on the 
occasion of this great victory to the American people and the 
gallant U.S. Armed Forces. 
J. STALIN 
May 9, 1945 
No. 316 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Your message of May 5 on the subject of Poland received. 
On the previous day I sent you the text of my reply to 
Mr Churchill’s message of April 28 on the same subject. 
I hope you have received that text. 
I think, therefore, that I need not return to the matter. I 
should merely like to add this:

220 
I have a feeling that you are unwilling to consider the Polish 
Provisional Government as a basis for the future Government 
of National Unity and object to the Polish Provisional Government 
occupying in that Government the place to which it is; 
entitled. I am obliged to say that this attitude rules out an 
agreed decision on the Polish question. 
May 10, 1945 
No. 317 
Received on May 17, 1945 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
On April 13 you made to Ambassador Harriman the good 
suggestion that American and Allied representatives go to 
Vienna to study the Vienna zones of occupation, in order that 
agreements on the occupation of Austria now pending in the 
European Advisory Commission98 may be completed. I am 
unable to understand why the Soviet authorities are now refusing 
to permit such representatives to proceed to Vienna, 
contrary to your suggestion. 
An examination and discussion on the spot by the military 
authorities who will later be responsible for the smooth operation 
of the inter-allied administration of Austria would greatly 
facilitate an intelligent arrangement of the Vienna zones. The 
Soviet representative in the European Advisory Commission, 
for example, has recently proposed that the needs of the 
American forces in the line of air communications be met by 
placing under American administration the airport at Tulln, 
twenty kilometers north-west of Vienna, in lieu of an airport 
in Vienna itself. However, neither he nor we know the precise 
dimensions or conditions of this airport, and if we are to give 
his proposal proper consideration we should be permitted to 
survey the airport. 
In view of the fact that the area to be zoned is no longer 
occupied by the enemy, it seems only reasonable to examine 
it, as you suggested, in order to facilitate completion of the 
agreements in the European Advisory Commission. The American 
public would not understand the continued refusal of 
the Soviet authorities to permit this, in spite of your original 
suggestion. 
I hope, consequently, that you will yourself let me know 
whether you will issue to Marshal Tolbukhin the instructions

221 
necessary to facilitate a survey by the Allied representatives 
of those areas of Vienna which are now under discussion in 
the European Advisory Commission. 
TRUMAN 
No. 318 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Your message of May 17 about the visit of U.S. and Allied 
military representatives to Vienna received. Actually I had 
agreed in principle to their coming but, of course, I had done 
so on the understanding that by the time they arrived proper 
agreement would have been reached as to the occupation zones 
of Austria and the zones themselves determined by the European 
Advisory Commission.98 As agreed between Mr Churchill, 
President Roosevelt and myself, these matters are wholly 
under the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission. 
That is still my point of view. Hence we could not agree to 
the point about the occupation zones and other points concerning 
Austria being referred to Vienna for consideration. 
I have no objection, however, to U.S. and Allied representatives 
going to Vienna to see for themselves the condition of 
the city and to draft proposals for its occupation zones. Marshal 
Tolbukhin will be instructed accordingly. The understanding 
is that the U.S. military representatives should come to Vienna 
at the end of May or the beginning of June, when Marshal 
Tolbukhin, now en route to Moscow, returns. 
May 18, 1945 
No. 319 
Received on May 20, 1945 
PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
I feel certain that you are as cognizant as I am of the difficulties 
of dealing with the complicated and important question 
with which we are faced by exchanges of messages. Pending 
the possibility of our meeting, I am therefore sending to

222 
Moscow Mr. Harry Hopkins with Ambassador Harriman in 
order that they may have an opportunity of discussing these 
matters with you personally. Mr Hopkins will return immediately 
to Washington following his talks in order that he may 
report to me personally. Mr Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman 
plan to arrive in Moscow about May 26. I would appreciate 
it if you would advise me whether this time meets with 
your convenience. 
No. 320 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
I have received your message about the arrival of Mr Hopkins 
and Ambassador Harriman in Moscow by May 26. I readily 
agree to your suggestion for a meeting with Mr Hopkins 
and Ambassador Harriman. May 26 suits me perfectly. 
May 20, 1945 
No. 321 
Received on May 21, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
FROM THE PRESIDENT 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
I have received your message of May 18 concerning the dispatch 
of Allied representatives to Vienna for the purpose of 
acquainting themselves with the situation there and preparing 
proposals regarding zones of occupation, and I have informed 
our representatives of the dates you suggested. 
TRUMAN

223 
No. 322 
Received on May 21, 1945 
TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
I have been keeping you informed through the Embassy in 
Moscow of the United States position with respect to the interim 
administration of Venezia Giulia. Your Government, in 
particular, was furnished with copies of the recent United 
States and British Notes to Marshal Tito which proposed, in 
accordance with the previous understanding arrived at between 
Marshal Alexander and Marshal Tito in February of this year, 
that the Supreme Allied Commander, in order not to prejudice 
any final disposition of the territory by either of the claimants, 
should exercise control in an area to include Trieste, Monfalcone, 
Gorizia and Pola. 
We have now had a reply from Marshal Tito. This reply is 
entirely unsatisfactory in that he states that his Government 
is not prepared “to renounce the right of the Yugoslav Army 
holding the territory up to the Isonzo River.” With regard to 
the administration of the area he offers a solution which cannot 
be reconciled with the principles we have set forth. Meanwhile, 
the problem of the forces of Marshal Alexander and 
Marshal Tito in undefined areas of occupation and the dual 
nature of the control which is thus created are fraught with 
danger. You will have seen from the communication of Ambassador 
Harriman to Mr Molotov of last March, as well as 
from our recent public statement and from the communication 
to Marshal Tito, that we cannot view this simply as a boundary 
dispute between Yugoslavia and Italy but must look upon it 
as a question of principle which involves the pacific settlement 
of territorial disputes, and the foundation of a lasting peace 
in Europe. Neither now nor in the future will we take or permit 
any action in respect to this territory which does not fully 
take into account the legitimate claims of Yugoslavia and the 
contribution which Yugoslav forces made to the victory over 
Germany, which was won at such great cost to all of us. We 
cannot, however, accept any compromise upon the principles 
of an orderly and rapid settlement, and Marshal Tito is being 
informed to this effect. 
You will agree, I know, that we must stand firm on the issue 
of principle, and I hope that we can likewise count on your 
influence to assist in bringing about the provisional settlement 
outlined in our recent Note to Marshal Tito. Once Field Marshal 
Alexander’s authority has been extended in the section

224 
of Venezia Giulia indicated in our Note and tranquility has 
thus been restored, we could then continue to work toward 
further adjustments of the problem in the spirit of the understandings 
reached at Yalta. 
TRUMAN 
No. 323 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Your message on the Istria-Trieste area reached me on May 
21. A little earlier I received from you, through Mr Kennan, 
the text of a message on the same subject,99 transmitted by 
the U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade to the Yugoslav Government. 
Thank you for the information. 
My views on the substance of the matter are as follows. 
I think you are quite correct in saying that the matter is 
one of principle and that in relation to the Istria-Trieste territory 
no action should be permitted that does not take full 
account of Yugoslavia’s rightful claims and of the contribution 
made by the Yugoslav armed forces to the common Allied cause 
in fighting against Hitler Germany. It goes without saying that 
the future of that territory, the population of which is mostly 
Yugoslav, will have to be determined at the peace settlement. 
However, the point at issue at the moment is its temporary 
military occupation. In this respect account should be taken, 
I believe, of the fact that it was the allied Yugoslav troops who 
drove the German invaders out of the Istria-Trieste territory 
thereby rendering an important service to the common Allied 
cause. By virtue of this circumstance alone, it would be unfair 
and would be a gratuitous insult to the Yugoslav Army and 
people to deny Yugoslavia the right to occupy a territory won 
from the enemy, after their great sacrifice in the struggle for 
the national rights of Yugoslavia and for the common cause 
of the United Nations.14 
The right solution of this problem, in my view, would be 
for the Yugoslav troops and administration now functioning 
in the Istria-Trieste area to stay there. At the same time the 
area should be placed under the control of the Allied Supreme 
Commander and a demarcation line established by mutual 
agreement between Field Marshal Alexander and Marshal Tito. 
If these proposals were accepted the problem of administra

225 
tion in the Istria-Trieste area would likewise find the right 
solution. 
And since Yugoslavs are a majority in the territory and 
even during the German occupation a local Yugoslav administration, 
now enjoying the trust of the local population, began 
to function there, these things should be taken into account. 
The problem of administrative government of the territory 
could be properly solved by subordinating the existing Yugoslav 
civil administration to the Yugoslav Military Command. 
I do hope that the misunderstandings over the status of the 
Istria-Trieste region, which have arisen between the U.S. and 
British Governments, on the one hand, and the Yugoslav Government, 
on the other, will be removed and a happy solution 
found. 
May 22, 1945 
No. 324 
Received on May 23, 1945 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
Your wire concerning Mr Hopkins’ visit has been received, 
and I was most pleased to have it. I think it is wiser that I 
announce publicly his proposed visit to Moscow following his 
departure from the United States rather than risk having it 
leak out and become the subject of speculation in the press. 
Mr Hopkins is planning to leave tomorrow morning, May 23, 
and later in the day I propose to announce to the press that he 
is proceeding to Moscow in company with Ambassador Harriman 
to talk over with you matters now under discussion between 
our two Governments.
No. 325 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
According to information at the disposal of the Soviet Military 
and Naval Commands, Germany, in keeping with the 
instrument of surrender, has delivered her navy and merchant 
marine to the British and Americans. I must inform you that

226 
the Germans have refused to surrender a single warship or 
merchant vessel to the Soviet armed forces, and have sent the 
whole of their navy and merchant marine to be handed over 
to the Anglo-American armed forces. 
In these circumstances the question naturally arises of 
assigning the Soviet Union its share of German warships and 
merchant vessels, as was done with regard to Italy. The Soviet 
Government holds that it can with good reason and in all 
fairness count on a minimum of one-third of Germany s navy 
and merchant marine. In addition I think it necessary for the 
naval representatives of the U.S.S.R. to be enabled to acquaint 
themselves with all the materials pertaining to the surrender 
of Germany’s navy and merchant marine, and with their actual 
condition. 
The Soviet Naval Command has appointed Admiral Levchenko 
and a group of assistants to take care of the matter. 
I am sending a similar message to Prime Minister Churchill. 
May 23, 1945 
No. 326 
Received on May 25, 1945 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT 
I have received your message of May 22 on the question of 
Istria-Trieste and wish to thank you for your expression of 
opinion on this subject. 
No. 327 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
More than eight months have passed since Roumania and 
Bulgaria broke off relations with Hitler Germany, signed an 
armistice with the Allied countries and entered the war on the 
Allied side, against Germany, assigning their armed forces for 
the purpose. They thereby contributed to the defeat of Hitlerism 
and to the victorious conclusion of the war in Europe. The 
Governments of Bulgaria and Roumania have during this time

227 
demonstrated by deeds their readiness to cooperate with the 
United Nations.14 Consequently the Soviet Government deems 
it proper and timely right away to resume diplomatic relations 
with Roumania and Bulgaria and exchange envoys with them. 
The Soviet Government also considers it advisable to resume 
diplomatic relations with Finland, which, fulfilling the terms 
of the armistice agreement, is now taking the democratic way. 
I think it will be possible a little later to adopt a similar decision 
with regard to Hungary. 
I am simultaneously sending a similar message to Mr 
W. Churchill. 
May 27, 1945 
No. 328 
Received on May 30, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
Thanks for your suggestion regarding surrendered German 
ships contained in your message of May 23rd. 
This appears to me to be an appropriate subject for discussion 
by the three of us at the forthcoming meeting at which 
time I am sure a solution which will be fully acceptable to all 
of us can be reached. 
With regard to the available records of the German naval 
surrender, it is my understanding that examination of the 
German files is now being considered by our appropriate commanders 
in the areas concerned. 
No. 329 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Mr Hopkins conveyed to me today your proposal for a 
tripartite meeting. I have no objection to the date—July 15— 
suggested by you. 
May 30, 1945

228 
No. 330 
Received on May 31, 1945 
FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
I have received your message of May 23 and am glad you 
share my conviction that the future of the Venezia Giulia territory 
should be determined during the peace adjustment. 
Only by the maintenance of these principles which take into 
account legitimate aspirations of the peoples concerned can 
we insure for the future peaceful and orderly development. 
Subsequent to the dispatch of my message to you on May 
20 Marshal Tito has informed both the United States and British 
Governments that he agrees to the establishment of Allied 
Military Government under the authority of the Allied Supreme 
Command in the Mediterranean. In order that the Allied 
Commander may fulfill the responsibility we have placed upon 
him in this respect he must have adequate authority to enable 
him to carry out this task and to safeguard the interests of all 
concerned. We must therefore leave to him the determination 
of the method in which civil administration will be carried out 
and the number of Yugoslav troops under his command which 
may be maintained in the area. He is prepared to utilize Yugoslav 
civil administration which in his opinion is working 
satisfactorily but, particularly in centers which are predominantly 
Italian, he must have authority to change administrative 
personnel in his discretion. 
We can, I am confident, work out a solution along these lines 
and I am instructing the American Ambassador in Moscow to 
furnish your Government with the details of the proposal 
which the British and American Governments are presenting 
to Marshal Tito in the confident assurance that we can arrive 
at a satisfactory settlement.

229 
No. 331 
Received on June 2, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
Thanks for your message of May 30 with regard to the date 
of our forthcoming tripartite meeting. 
I have informed Prime Minister Churchill that you and I are 
agreeable to meeting about July 15 in the vicinity of Berlin. 
No. 332 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Your message of June 2 received. 
I have already written to you that I agree to July 15 as a 
perfectly suitable date for the tripartite meeting. 
June 3, 1945 
No. 333 
Received on June 7, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
I have given considerable thought to your message of May 
27 in which you propose that our Governments should establish 
diplomatic relations with Finland, Roumania and Bulgaria 
at this time and with Hungary at a later time. 
The suggestion you have made shows that you feel, as I do, 
that we should endeavor to make the period of the armistice 
regimes as short as possible and also give prompt recognition 
to all efforts which may be made by those countries formerly 
our enemies to align themselves with the democratic principles 
of the allied nations. I agree, therefore, that at the earliest 
feasible time normal relations with these countries should be 
established.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
230 
Accordingly, I am prepared to proceed with the exchange 
of diplomatic representatives with Finland at once because the 
Finnish people, through their elections and other political adjustments, 
have demonstrated their genuine devotion to democratic 
procedures and principles. 
However, I have not found in Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria 
the same encouraging signs. Particularly in the latter 
two countries, I have been disturbed to find governments which 
do not accord to all democratic elements of the people the 
rights of free expression and which in their system of administration 
are, in my opinion, neither representative of or 
responsive to the will of the people. From Ambassador Harriman’s 
note of March 14100 you already know the reasons why 
the United States Government considers that the political situation 
in Roumania should be made the subject of consultation 
among the three principal Allied Governments. You are also 
aware of American concern over the proposed electoral procedures 
and certain other political manifestations in Bulgaria. 
It is my sincere hope that the time may soon come when I 
can accredit formal diplomatic representatives to these countries. 
To this end I am ready at any moment to have my representatives 
meet with Soviet and British representatives in 
order to concert more effectively our policies and actions in 
this area. This would, I think, be a constructive move towards 
the restoration of normal peacetime relations with them as independent 
states ready to assume the responsibilities and 
to share the benefits of participation in the family of nations. 
Prime Minister Churchill is being informed of this message. 
No. 334 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Thank you for your second message about the Istria-Trieste 
area. I have also read Mr Harriman’s Note setting forth the 
proposals of the U.S. and British Governments to the Government 
of Yugoslavia for a settlement.101 
I gather from your communication that agreement has been 
reached in principle between the U.S. and British Governments, 
on the one hand, and the Yugoslav Government, on the 
other, concerning the establishment in the Trieste-Istria territory 
of an Allied Military Administration under the Allied 
Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. I think, however,

231 
that a complete settlement of the situation in Trieste-Istria 
necessitates agreement with the Yugoslav Government also on 
the concrete proposals made by the U.S. and British Governments. 
Now that the Yugoslav Government has consented to the 
establishment of an Allied Military Administration in the 
Trieste-Istria territory it is my hope that nothing will be put 
in the way of Yugoslav interests being fully met and that a 
happy solution will be found to the entire problem of the 
present strained situation in the Trieste-Istria area. 
June 8, 1945 
No. 335 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
I have received your message in reply to my suggestions for 
resuming diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland 
and Hungary. 
It appears from your message that you, too, consider it desirable 
to establish normal diplomatic relations with these countries 
at the earliest possible date. However, I see no reason to 
show any preference in the matter to Finland which, unlike 
Roumania or Bulgaria, did not participate on the Allied side 
in the war against Hitler Germany. Public opinion in the 
Soviet Union and the entire Soviet command would find it 
hard to understand if Roumania and Bulgaria, the armed forces 
of which have played an active part in the defeat of Hitler 
Germany, were to be placed in a less favourable position compared 
with Finland. 
As regards political regimes, the opportunities for the democratic 
elements in Roumania and Bulgaria are not less than, 
say, in Italy, with which the Governments of the United States 
and the Soviet Union have already resumed diplomatic relations. 
On the other hand, one cannot but notice that in recent 
times political development in Roumania and Bulgaria has 
pursued a tranquil course, and I see no signs that could give 
grounds for disquiet over the future development of democratic 
principles in these countries. And so, as I see it, there is no 
need for special Allied measures as far as these countries are 
concerned.

232 
Hence the Soviet Government holds that resumption of 
diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria and Finland 
should not be delayed any longer and that the question of 
Hungary might be considered somewhat later. 
June 9, 1945 
No. 336 
Sent on June 11, 1945 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
The White House, Washington 
On the third anniversary of the Soviet-American Agreement 
on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution 
of the War against Aggression,102 I beg you and the Government 
of the United States of America to accept this expression 
of gratitude on behalf of the Soviet Government and myself. 
The Agreement, under which the United States of America 
throughout the war in Europe supplied the Soviet Union, by 
way of lend-lease,5 with munitions, strategic materials and 
food, played an important role and to a considerable degree 
contributed to the successful conclusion of the war against the 
common foe—Hitler Germany. 
I feel entirely confident that the friendly links between the 
Soviet Union and the United States of America, strengthened 
in the course of their joint effort, will continue to develop for 
the benefit of our peoples and in the interests of durable cooperation 
between all freedom-loving nations. 
J. STALIN

233 
No. 337 
Received on June 12, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
I appreciate deeply your message of June 10 and thank you 
for your attentive interest in our effort to come to a friendly 
agreement with Marshal Tito on the question of military government 
in the Trieste area. 
The agreement signed at Belgrade on June 9 covered the 
concrete proposals of the Governments of Great Britain and 
the United States.103 I agree fully that there should be no delay 
in coming to a firm settlement of the military government 
question and it is to this end that Marshal Alexander’s Chief 
of Staff will meet next week with Marshal Tito’s Chief of 
Staff to work out the details, both military and technical. 
No. 338 
Received on June 15, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
I propose, now that Germany’s unconditional defeat has been 
announced and the Control Council104 for Germany has had its 
first meeting, that we should issue at once definite instructions 
which will get forces into their respective zones and will initiate 
orderly administration of the defeated territory. As to Germany, 
I am ready to have instructions issued to all American 
troops to begin withdrawal into their own zone on June 21 in 
accordance with arrangements between the respective commanders, 
including in these arrangements simultaneous movement 
of the national garrisons into Greater Berlin and provision 
of free access for United States forces by air, road and 
rail to Berlin from Frankfurt and Bremen. 
The settlement of the Austrian problem I consider of equal 
urgency to the German matter. The redistribution of forces 
into occupation zones which have been agreed in principle by 
the European Advisory Commission,98 the movement of the 
national garrisons into Vienna and the establishment of the 
Allied Commission for Austria should take place simultaneously 
with these developments in Germany. I attach, therefore,

234 
utmost importance to settling the outstanding Austrian problems 
in order that the whole arrangement of German and 
Austrian affairs can be put into operation simultaneously. The 
recent visit of American, British and French missions to Vienna 
will, I hope, result in the European Advisory Commission 
being able without delay to take the necessary remaining 
decisions to this end. 
I propose, if you agree with the foregoing, that our respective 
commanders be issued appropriate instructions at once. 
No. 339 
Received on June 15, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
T. V. Soong has left today by plane to proceed to Moscow 
viâ Chungking. 
By the end of June he will arrive in Moscow to discuss the 
details of the arrangements for Soviet-Chinese agreements. 
Instructions have been given Ambassador Hurley to inform 
Chiang Kai-shek on June 15 of the Soviet conditions and to 
make every effort to obtain his agreement therewith. Ambassador 
Hurley is directed to inform the Generalissimo49 that the 
United States Government will support the Yalta Agreement.
105 
No. 340 
PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
I am in receipt of your message about preparations for a 
Soviet-Chinese agreement and your instructions to Mr Hurley. 
Thank you for the steps you have taken. 
June 15, 1945

235 
No. 341 
Received on June 15, 1945 
H. TRUMAN TO J. V. STALIN* 
Please accept from me and on behalf of the Government of 
the United States appreciation of your kind message of June 12. 
I have every confidence that continuation in the future of 
our friendly understanding cooperation will meet the same 
success in preserving peace and international goodwill as did 
our common effort in the war against the Nazis. 
I am looking forward with much pleasure to meeting you 
in the near future and discussing fully our common problems. 
No. 342 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Your message about the withdrawal of Allied troops in Germany 
and Austria into their respective zones received. 
Regretfully I must tell you that your proposal for beginning 
the withdrawal of U.S. troops into their zone and moving 
U.S. troops into Berlin on June 21 is meeting with difficulties, 
for Marshal Zhukov and other military commanders have been 
summoned to the Supreme Soviet session which opens in Moscow 
on June 19, and also to arrange and take part in a parade 
on June 24. Moreover, some of the districts of Berlin have not 
yet been cleared of mines, nor can the mine-clearing operations 
be finished until late June. Since Marshal Zhukov and 
the other Soviet military commanders will not be able to 
return to Germany before June 28-30, I should like the beginning 
of the withdrawal to be put off till July 1, when the commanders 
will be back at their posts and the mine-clearing 
finished. 
As regards Austria, what I have said about summoning the 
Soviet commanders to Moscow and the time of their return to 
their posts applies to that country as well. It is essential, furthermore, 
that in the next few days the European Advisory 
Commission98 should complete its work on establishing the 
occupation zones in Austria and in Vienna. In view of the 
foregoing the stationing of the respective forces in the zones 
assigned to them in Austria should likewise be postponed till 
July 1.

236 
Besides, in respect of both Germany and Austria we must 
establish occupation zones right away for the French troops. 
We for our part shall take proper steps in Germany and 
Austria according to the plan set out above. 
June 16, 1945 
No. 343 
Received on June 19, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
I have received your message of June 16 with regard to 
Allied occupation of agreed zones in Germany and Austria. 
I have issued to the American commander instructions to 
begin the movement on July 1st as you requested. It is assumed 
that American troops will be in Berlin at an early date 
in sufficient numbers to carry out their duties in preparation 
for our meeting. 
No. 344 
Received on June 19, 1945 
H. TRUMAN TO J. V. STALIN* 
I fully agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, to which you 
revert in your telegram of June 9, would be a constructive step. 
Our exchange of messages on this subject shows that our 
Governments may not be approaching the matter in quite the 
same way because the state of our respective relations with 
these various states is not identical. For example, there would 
be no obstacle to the immediate resumption of diplomatic relations 
between the United States and Finland and, as regards 
Roumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, while our general interests 
are the same all around we find that the present situation has 
different aspects in each country. 
I am giving this matter further study. As the most practical 
way of coming to a uniform agreement I therefore propose 
that we discuss it at our forthcoming meeting.

237 
No. 345 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Although the Yugoslav Government has accepted the U.S. 
and British Governments’ proposal concerning the Istria-Trieste 
area, the Trieste negotiations seem to be deadlocked. The main 
reason is that the representatives of the Allied Command in 
the Mediterranean refuse to entertain even the minimum 
wishes of the Yugoslavs, to whom credit is due for liberating 
the area from the German invaders, an area, moreover, where 
the Yugoslav population predominates. This situation cannot 
be considered satisfactory from the Allied point of view. 
Being loath to aggravate relations, I have so far in my correspondence 
refrained from mentioning the conduct of Field 
Marshal Alexander, but now I must stress that in the course of 
the negotiations the haughty tone to which Field Marshal 
Alexander sometimes resorts in relation to the Yugoslavs is 
inadmissible. It is simply intolerable that Field Marshal Alexander 
has, in an official public address, permitted himself to 
compare Marshal Tito with Hitler and Mussolini. That is unfair 
and insulting to Yugoslavia. 
The Soviet Government was also surprised by the peremptory 
tone of the statement which the Anglo-American representatives 
made to the Yugoslav Government on June 2. How 
can one expect to get lasting and positive results by using 
such methods? 
The foregoing compels me to draw your attention to the situation. 
I still hope that as far as Trieste-Istria is concerned, 
the Yugoslavs’ rightful interests will be respected, particularly 
in view of the fact that on the main point the Yugoslavs have 
met the Allies half-way. 
June 21, 1945

238 
No. 346 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
I am in receipt of your message of June 19 about resuming 
diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Finland. 
I see that you are still studying the matter. As for me I maintain 
as heretofore that there is no justification for further delay 
in resuming diplomatic relations with Roumania and Bulgaria. 
June 23, 1945 
No. 347 
Received on June 26, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
Subsequent to the receipt of your message of June 21 with 
reference to the negotiations at Trieste I have been informed by 
the Supreme Allied Commander that these discussions in Trieste 
have been concluded and a supplementary military accord signed. 
The sole purpose of these discussions was to implement the 
military aspects of the political agreement reached between the 
United States, British and Yugoslav Governments on June 9. 
The June 9 agreement embodied the principle that the future 
disposition of the Venezia Giulia territory should be reserved 
for orderly adjustment as a part of the eventual peace settlement, 
and that nothing in the agreement would prejudice or 
affect the ultimate disposal of this territory. 
It was conceded, after agreement had been reached on this 
point, that Yugoslav administration could be established in the 
disputed area up to the limit of the territory necessary to meet 
Allied military requirements. Due regard has been given 
throughout the discussions, both on the government and military 
level, to legitimate interests of both Yugoslav and Italian 
populations as well as to the contribution made by Yugoslavia 
to the elimination of German military power. 
The Allied Commander, as I said in my previous message to 
you on this subject, must have adequate authority in the area

239 
entrusted to him to enable him to carry out his task and to safeguard 
the interests of all concerned. In a like fashion responsibility 
of the Yugoslav Commander has been recognized and 
there has been no effort to interfere with the exercise of his 
responsibility in the region of Venezia Giulia entrusted to him 
east of the agreed line. The Allied Governments must therefore 
insist, particularly since both commanders have agreed that 
they will refrain from any action prejudicing the final settlement, 
that there be no interference with the exercise of their 
responsibility west of the line. 
During the conversations at Trieste it is true difficulties arose 
since it appeared that the Yugoslav authorities did not fully 
appreciate that the fundamental principle of the agreement of 
June 9 was that no action could be permitted which would 
prejudice the ultimate disposal of the area. The Yugoslav military 
commander declined at first to recognize the Allied Commander’s 
authority which was established by Article 3 of the 
Belgrade Agreement103 over administration west of the line. 
This and other acts on the part of local commanders subsequent 
to June 9 have given rise to the impression that the full extent 
of the agreement reached with Marshal Tito and the Belgrade 
Government had not been communicated to these local commanders. 
If there should be any further aspects of the agreement which 
you feel should be considered, we shall have an opportunity at 
our early meeting to discuss this. 
No. 348 
Received on July 5, 1945 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
I am today announcing, in conformity with our understanding, 
that the press will not be allowed at “Terminal”106 and that all 
that will be issued from “Terminal” will be such official communiqués 
as may from time to time be decided upon. 
I am sending Prime Minister Churchill a similar message.

240 
No. 349 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Your message of June 26 concerning Trieste-Istria and Yugoslavia 
to hand. 
In this matter there are of course points that warrant joint 
discussion by us. I am prepared to discuss them when we meet 
in Germany. 
July 6, 1945 
No. 350 
TOP SECRET 
GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
Headquarters Soviet Delegation 
International Conference 
Babelsberg, Germany 
My dear Generalissimo, 
At the present time American air traffic between the U.S. 
and the U.S.S.R. is accomplished viâ Tehran. From the United 
States point of view this is an extremely wasteful use of critically 
needed air transport, in addition to the time lost in travel. 
The U.S. has now established a military transport service 
into Berlin for handling official U.S. traffic which could 
be made available for official Soviet traffic as well. I therefore 
seek your approval to diverting American and Soviet 
traffic now carried through Tehran to a route through Berlin. 
Harry S. TRUMAN 
20 July, 1945

241 
No. 351 
TOP SECRET 
GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
Headquarters Soviet Delegation 
International Conference 
Babelsberg, Germany 
My dear Generalissimo, 
It has become highly desirable because of increasing operations 
of naval and air forces adjacent to Japan and Siberia to 
augment the facilities for the collection and dissemination of 
weather information in Eastern Siberia. The increased services 
should be equally beneficial to the Soviet Union. Weather in the 
Japan and Japan Sea Area is affected not only by weather movement 
from west to east over Eastern Siberia but also by the 
movement associated with typhoons which pass from the Western 
Pacific northward over Japan. 
It is considered that the above urgent needs can best be met 
through expansion of the United States communications net by 
providing equipment and liaison personnel for establishment of 
radio stations and weather controls at Khabarovsk and Petropavlovsk. 
United States personnel would consist of approximately 
60 officers and men at Khabarovsk and 33 officers and 
men at Petropavlovsk. Details of this proposal have been previously 
communicated to the Soviet General Staff. 
Because of the important bearing of weather on current and 
future operations, early accomplishment of these proposed improvements 
is most important. I, therefore, urge your approval 
and the issuance of the necessary instructions for the early completion 
of the detailed arrangements by our respective staffs.107 
Harry S. TRUMAN 
21 July, 1945 
No. 352 
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
An acute coal famine threatens Europe this winter unless German 
coal in substantial quantities can be made available for 
export. Despite our own shortages of coal, internal transportation 
and ocean shipping, we are now shipping coal to Europe

242 
as an emergency measure in order to provide some relief in the 
present crisis. It is obvious, however, that with our large commitment 
of industrial and military resources in the war against 
Japan, the quantities of coal which we can make available to 
Europe will be inadequate to cover pressing European needs. 
To meet these needs all possible measures should immediately 
be taken to increase coal production in Germany and to make 
the maximum quantities available for export. 
In order to avoid delay, I have directed the United States 
Commander-in-Chief to take the necessary measures in his zone 
of occupation. I understand that the British and French Governments 
have issued similar directives to their respective commanders 
in Germany. A copy of the directive to General Eisenhower 
is attached. 
I am most anxious that a common policy in respect to coal 
should be followed by the four occupying Powers, and I have 
therefore instructed General Eisenhower to discuss the policy 
set forth in the above directive at the Allied Control Council104 
at the earliest possible date. I trust that the Soviet Government 
will see their way to joining with us in this policy. It is my 
hope that they will be prepared to instruct their Commanderin-
Chief to take similar action in the portions of Germany occupied 
by Soviet forces, and to proceed with the formulation 
in the Control Council of a coal production and export program 
for Germany as a whole. 
Harry TRUMAN 
27 July, 1945 
DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER OF U. S. FORCES 
IN GERMANY 
Unless large quantities of coal are made available to liberated 
Europe in forthcoming months, there is grave danger of such 
political and economic chaos as to prejudice the redeployment 
of Allied troops and to jeopardize the achievement of the restoration 
of economic stability which is the necessary basis for a 
firm and just peace. Adequate quantities of coal for the greater 
part of Europe cannot, as a practical matter, be obtained from 
any source other than Germany. It is a matter of great urgency 
that Germany be made to produce for export to other European 
nations the coal which they must have to support economic life 
on at least a minimum basis. 
You are therefore directed in your capacity of Commanding 
General of United States Forces in Germany and as United

243 
States member of the Allied Control Council, to take all steps 
necessary to achieve the following objectives: 
1. To make available for export out of the production of the 
coal mines in Western Germany a minimum of 10 million tons 
of coal during 1945, and a further 15 million tons by the end of 
April 1946. 
2. To the extent necessary to accomplish the export of 25 million 
tons of coal at the rate directed, to assign the highest priority 
to all matters pertaining to maximizing the production 
and transportation of German coal, in particular the provisioning 
of mining supplies, transportation facilities, and food supplies 
adequate to maintain mining labor at the requisite level 
of efficiency. This requirement should be subordinate only to 
the civil and military requirements necessary to insure the safety, 
security, health, maintenance, and operation of the occupying 
forces and to insure the speedy redeployment of Allied 
forces from Germany. 
3. To recommend to the Control Council (a) an assignment 
to the production and export of coal from Eastern Germany of 
an urgency as great as that implied in the required export of 
25 million tons of coal from Western Germany by the end of 
April 1946, and (b) the formulation of a coordinated program 
for Germany as a whole covering the production, distribution, 
and export of coal. 
4. To assist in every reasonable way, efforts to maximize the 
production of coal in other zones of occupation than your 
own. 
5. To recommend to the Control Council, and to follow in 
your zone of occupation, the principle that in allocating coal 
within Germany, the export of coal is to take precedence over 
the use of coal for industrial production and civilian purposes 
within Germany to the extent necessary to accomplish the 
export of 25 million tons of coal from Western Germany 
at the rate suggested and to comply with paragraph 3, above, 
subject only to the requirements set out in paragraph 2, 
above. 
It is recognized that the following of this policy during the 
period of critical coal shortage will delay the resumption of 
industrial activity in Germany. It is also recognized that the 
carrying out of the above policies with respect to German coal 
may cause unemployment, unrest, and dissatisfaction among 
Germans of a magnitude which may necessitate firm and rigorous 
action. Any action required to control the situation will be 
fully supported. 
6. To make available to the European Coal Organization full 
and complete details of coal production and coal allocations 
within Germany, in order that the member nations of the Euro

244 
pean Coal Organization may know the relationship that prevails 
between the level of coal consumption in Germany and the 
level of coal consumption in liberated Europe. 
7. To assign a high priority to the production and export of 
brown coal briquettes and of additional quantities of other coal 
in excess of the 25 million tons specified in paragraph 1. 
8. A similar directive is being issued to the United Kingdom 
and French zonal commanders by their respective Governments. 
No. 353 
TO Mr HARRY S. TRUMAN, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Berlin 
My dear Mr President, 
I have received your message of July 20 about diverting the 
route of U.S. and Soviet traffic from Tehran to Berlin. 
The Soviet Government takes a favourable view of your proposal. 
The appropriate Soviet authorities have been instructed 
to discuss with U.S. representatives the technical problems 
arising out of the proposal. 
J. STALIN 
Berlin, July 29, 1945 
o. 354 
TO Mr HARRY S. TRUMAN, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Berlin 
My dear Mr President, 
Your Memorandum of July 27 about German coal, and the 
copy of your instructions to Gen. Eisenhower, have reached me. 
The important matter of using German coal to meet European 
requirements, raised in your Memorandum, will be duly studied. 
The Government of the United States of America will be informed 
of the Soviet Government’s view on the subject. 
I must say, however, that care should be taken to ensure that 
the measures for exporting the coal do not give rise to disturb

245 
ances of any kind in Germany, to which you draw attention in 

your instructions to Gen. Eisenhower, and I think this is quite 
feasible and essential from the standpoint of the interests of the 
Allied countries. 
J. STALIN 
Berlin, July 29, 1945 
No. 355 
TO GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
Berlin 
My dear Generalissimo Stalin, 
I regret very much to hear of your illness. I hope it is not of 
a serious nature and that you will fully recover at an early date. 
You have my very best wishes. 
Sincerely yours, 
Harry TRUMAN 
Berlin, July 30, 1945 
No. 356 
TO Mr HARRY S. TRUMAN, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Berlin 
My dear Mr President, 
Thank you for your letter of July 30. I feel better today, and 
expect to be able to attend the Conference tomorrow, July 31. 
Very sincerely yours, 
J. STALIN 
Berlin, July 30, 1945

246 
No. 357 
TO Mr HARRY S. TRUMAN, 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Berlin 
My dear Mr President, 
Thank you for sending me your portrait. I shall not fail to 
send you mine the moment I return to Moscow. 
Sincerely yours, 
J. STALIN 
Berlin, July 30, 1945 
No. 358 
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
In response to your suggestion that I write you a letter as to 
the Far Eastern situation, I am attaching a form of letter which 
I propose to send you at your convenience after you notify me 
you have reached an agreement with the Government of China. 
If this is satisfactory to you, you can let me know immediately 
when you have reached such agreement and I will wire you the 
letter, to be used as you see fit. I will also send you by fastest 
courier the official letter signed by me. If you decide to use it it 
will be all right. However, if you decide to issue a statement 
basing your action on other grounds or for any other reason 
prefer not to use this letter it will be satisfactory to me. I 
leave it to your good judgment. 
Harry TRUMAN 
Berlin, July 30, 1945 
GENERALISSIMO J. V. STALIN 
The Soviet Delegation 
Dear Generalissimo Stalin 
Paragraph 5 of the Declaration signed at Moscow October 
30, 1943, by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom and China,60 provides:

247 
“5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace 
and security pending the re-establishment of law and order 
and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will 
consult with one another and as occasion requires with other 
members of the United Nations14 with a view to joint action 
on behalf of the community of nations.” 
Article 106 of the proposed Charter of the United Nations 
provides: 
“Pending the coming into force of such special agreements 
referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council 
enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under 
Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed 
at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult 
with one another and as occasion requires with other members 
of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on 
behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose 
of maintaining international peace and security.” 
Article 103 of the Charter provides: 
“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and 
their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 
Though the Charter has not been formally ratified, at San 
Francisco it was agreed to by the Representatives of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet Government will 
be one of the permanent members of the Security Council. 
It seems to me that under the terms of the Moscow Declaration 
and the provisions of the Charter, above referred to, it 
would be proper for the Soviet Union to indicate its willingness 
to consult and cooperate with other Great Powers now at 
war with Japan with a view to joint action on behalf of the 
community of nations to maintain peace and security. 
Sincerely yours 
July 31, 1945

248 
No. 359 
Received on August 12, 1945 
TOP SECRET FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
In accordance with the message dated August 11, addressed 
by the United States to the Swiss Government for transmission 
to the Japanese Government in reply to the Note received 
from the Swiss Government on August 10, 1945,108 I propose 
that General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, be designated 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to accept, coordinate 
and carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese 
Armed Forces. 
If you will notify me of the designation of the officer you 
wish to act as your representative, I will instruct General 
MacArthur to make the arrangements necessary for your representative 
at the time and place of surrender. 
It is also contemplated that General MacArthur will direct 
the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to have Japanese 
forces in your area of operations surrender unconditionally 
to the Soviet High Commander in the Far East or to his 
subordinate commanders. I am assuming that you are in general 
accord with the above procedure and am issuing preliminary 
instructions to General MacArthur to this effect. Request 
you advise me immediately of your designated representative 
so that I may notify General MacArthur. I suggest that direct 
communication with General MacArthur on each arrangement 
be initiated at once. 
No. 360 
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE 
FROM GENERALISSIMO J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Mr H. TRUMAN 
I have received your message of August 12 about designating 
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers to accept, coordinate and carry 
into effect the general surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces. 
The Soviet Government accepts your proposal and is in 
agreement with the procedure suggested by you which provides 
that General MacArthur shall issue to the Japanese Imperial

249 
General Headquarters instructions concerning unconditional 
surrender of the Japanese troops to the Soviet High Commander 
in the Far East as well. Lieutenant-General Derevyanko has 
been appointed the representative of the Soviet Military High 
Command, and has received appropriate directions. 
August 12, 1945 
No. 361 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
The following message has been sent today to the American 
commanders in the Pacific and Western Pacific areas: 
“The Government of Japan having on 14 August accepted 
the Allied Governments’ demand for surrender, you are hereby 
directed to suspend offensive operations against Japanese military 
and naval forces in so far as is consistent with the safety 
of Allied forces in your area.” 
August 14, 1945 
No. 362 
TOP SECRET FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
I have approved the following general order to General of 
the Army MacArthur covering details of the surrender of 
Japanese Armed Forces: 
GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1. 
1. Military and Naval. 
I. The Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the 
Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender to the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers of all Japanese Armed Forces 
by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its commanders in Japan 
and abroad to cause the Japanese Armed Forces and Japanesecontrolled 
forces under their command to cease hostilities at 
once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present locations 
and to surrender unconditionally to commanders acting 
on behalf of the United States, The Republic of China, The

250 
United Kingdom and the British Empire, and The Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, as indicated hereafter or as may 
be further directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers. Immediate contact will be made with the indicated 
commanders, or their designated representatives, subject to 
any changes in detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers, and their instructions will be completely 
and immediately carried out. 
a. The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air 
and auxiliary forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa 
and French Indo-China north of 16 degrees north latitude 
shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. 
b. The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air 
and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 degrees 
north latitude and Karafuto shall surrender to the Commander-
in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East. 
c. The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air 
and auxiliary forces within the Andamans, Nicobars, Burma, 
Thailand, French Indo-China south of 16 degrees north latitude, 
Malaya, Borneo, Netherlands Indies, New Guinea, Bismarcks, 
and the Solomons, shall surrender (to the Supreme Allied Commander, 
South-east Asia Command, or the Commanding General, 
Australian Forces—the exact breakdown between Mountbatten 
and the Australians to be arranged between them and the 
details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers). 
d. The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air 
and auxiliary forces in the Japanese mandated islands, Ryukyus, 
Bonins, and other Pacific islands shall surrender to the 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. 
e. The Imperial General Headquarters, its Senior Commanders, 
and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main 
islands of Japan, minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south 
of 38 degrees north latitude, and the Philippines shall surrender 
to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific. 
f. The above indicated commanders are the only representatives 
of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrenders, and 
all surrenders of Japanese forces shall be made only to them 
or to their representatives. 
The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders 
its commanders in Japan and abroad to disarm completely all 
forces of Japan or under Japanese control, wherever they may 
be situated, and to deliver intact and in safe and good condition 
all weapons and equipment at such time and at such places 
as may be prescribed by the Allied commanders indicated above. 
(Pending further instructions, the Japanese police force in the 
main islands of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament

251 
provision. The police force will remain at their posts and shall 
be held responsible for the preservation of law and order. The 
strength and arms for such a police force will be prescribed.) 
II. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish 
to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within 
(time limit) of receipt of this order, complete information with 
respect to Japan and all areas under Japanese control, as follows: 
a. Lists of all land, air and anti-aircraft units showing locations 
and strengths officers and men. 
b. Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civil, giving complete 
information as to the number, type, location and condition 
of such aircraft. 
c. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, 
surface and submarine and auxiliary naval craft in or out of 
commission and under construction giving their position, condition 
and movement. 
d. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant 
ships of over 100 gross tons, in or out of commission and under 
construction, including merchant ships formerly belonging to 
any of the United Nations14 that are now in Japanese hands, 
giving their position, condition and movement. 
e. Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps, 
showing locations and layouts of all mines, minefields, and 
other obstacles to movement by land, sea, or air, and the safety 
lanes in connection therewith. 
f. Locations and descriptions of all military installations and 
establishments, including air fields, sea-plane bases, anti-aircraft 
defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent 
and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and 
other fortified areas. 
g. Locations of all camps and other places of detention of 
United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees. 
III. Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will 
insure that all Japanese military, naval and civil aircraft remain 
on the ground, on the water, or aboard ship, until further 
notification of the disposition to be made of them. 
IV. Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels 
of all types will be maintained without damage and will 
undertake no movement pending instructions from the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers. Vessels at sea will immediately 
render harmless and throw overboard explosives of 
all types. Vessels not at sea will immediately remove explosives 
of all types to safe storage ashore. 
V. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled military and 
civil authorities will insure that: 
a. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to move

252 
ment by land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according 
to instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers. 
b. All aids to navigation be re-established at once. 
c. All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pending 
accomplishment of a. above. 
VI. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military 
and civil authorities will hold intact and in good condition pending 
further instructions from the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers the following: 
a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, 
stores and supplies, and other implements of war of all kinds 
and all other war material (except as specifically prescribed in 
Section IV of this order). 
b. All land, water and air transportation and communication 
facilities and equipment. 
c. All military installations and establishments, including air 
fields, sea-plane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval 
bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast 
fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with 
plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and 
establishments. 
d. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, 
testing stations, technical data, patens, plans, drawings 
and inventions designed or intended to produce or to facilitate 
the production or use of all implements of war and other material 
and property used by or intended for use by any military 
or paramilitary organization in connection with its operations. 
VII. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish 
to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within 
(time limit) of receipt of this order, complete lists of all items 
specified in paragraphs a, b, and d of Section VI, above, indicating 
the numbers, types and locations of each. 
VIII. The manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition 
and implements of war will cease forthwith. 
IX. With respect to United Nations prisoners of war and civilian 
internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-controlled 
authorities: 
a. The safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners 
of war and civilian internees will be scrupulously preserved, to 
include the administrative and supply services essential to provide 
adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care until 
such responsibility is undertaken by the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers; 
b. Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations 
prisoners of war and civilian internees together with its equipment, 
stores, records, arms, and ammunition will be delivered

253 
immediately to the command of the senior officer or designated 
representative of the prisoners of war and civilian internees; 
c. As directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers, prisoners of war and civilian internees will be transported 
to places of safety where they can be accepted by Allied 
authorities; 
d. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters will furnish 
to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time 
limit) of the receipt of this order, complete lists of all United 
Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, indicating their 
locations. 
X. All Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil 
authorities shall aid and assist the occupation of Japan and Japanese-
controlled areas by forces of the Allied Powers. 
XI. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and appropriate 
Japanese officials shall be prepared, on instructions from 
Allied occupation commanders, to collect and deliver all arms 
in the possession of the Japanese civilian population. 
XII. This and all subsequent instructions issued by the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Forces or other Allied military 
authorities will be scrupulously and promptly obeyed by 
Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil officials and 
private persons. Any delay or failure to comply with the provisions 
of this or subsequent orders, and any action which the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines to be 
detrimental to the Allied Powers, will incur drastic and summary 
punishment at the hands of Allied military authorities and 
the Japanese Government. 
This order is approved by me with the understanding that 
it is subject to change, both by further instructions issued 
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by changes in matters of 
detail made by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
in light of the operational situation as known by him. The action 
on portions of the order in parentheses is a matter for the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 
August 15, 1945

254 
No. 363 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, H. TRUMAN 
Your message enclosing General Order Number 1 received 
I have nothing against the substance of the order. It is understood 
that the Liaotung Peninsula is an integral part of Manchuria. 
However, I suggest amending General Order Number 1 
as follows: 
1. To include in the area to be surrendered by the Japanese 
armed forces to the Soviet troops all the Kurile Islands which 
according to the three-Power decision taken in the Crimea, are 
to pass into the possession of the Soviet Union. 
2. To include in the area to be surrendered by the Japanese 
armed forces to Soviet troops the northern half of the Island of 
Hokkaido adjoining in the north La Perouse Strait, which lies 
between Karafuto and Hokkaido. To draw the demarcation line 
between the northern and southern halves of Hokkaido along a 
line running from the town of Kushiro on the east coast of 
the island to the town of Rumoe on the west coast of the island, 
including the said towns in the northern half of the island. 
This last point is of special importance to Russian public 
opinion. As is known, in 1919-21 the Japanese occupied the 
whole of the Soviet Far East. Russian public opinion would be 
gravely offended if the Russian troops had no occupation area 
in any part of the territory of Japan proper. 
I am most anxious that the modest suggestions set forth above 
should not meet with any objections. 
August 16, 1945

255 
No. 364 
Received on August 18, 1945 
TOP SECRET 
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
Replying to your message of August 16, I agree to your request 
to modify General Order Number 1 to include all the 
Kurile Islands in the area to be surrendered to the Commanderin-
Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. However, I should 
like it to be understood that the United States Government desires 
air base rights for land and sea aircraft on some one of 
the Kurile Islands, preferably in the central group, for military 
purposes and for commercial use. I should be glad if you would 
advise me that you will agree to such an arrangement, the location 
and other details to be worked out through the appointment 
of special representatives of our two Governments for 
this purpose. 
Regarding your suggestion as to the surrender of Japanese 
forces on the Island Hokkaido to Soviet forces, it is my intention 
and arrangements have been made for the surrender of 
Japanese forces on all the islands of Japan proper, Hokkaido, 
Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, to General MacArthur. 
General MacArthur will employ Allied token forces, which, 
of course, includes Soviet forces, in so much of a temporary occupation 
of Japan proper as he considers it necessary to occupy 
in order to accomplish our Allied surrender terms. 
No. 365 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Your message of August 18 to hand. 
I understand your message to imply refusal to accede to the 
Soviet Union’s request that the northern half of Hokkaido be 
included in the area of surrender of Japanese armed forces to 
Soviet troops. I must say that I and my colleagues had not anticipated 
that such would be your reply. 
2. As regards your demand for a permanent air base on one 
of the Kurile Islands, which, in keeping with the three-Power 
decision taken in the Crimea, are to pass into the possession of

256 
the Soviet Union, I consider it my duty to say the following. 
First, I must point out that no such measure was envisaged by 
the tripartite decision either in the Crimea or at Berlin, nor 
does it in any way follow from the decisions adopted there. Second, 
demands of this kind are usually laid either before a vanquished 
country or before an allied country that is unable to 
defend a particular part of its territory and expresses, therefore, 
readiness to grant its ally an appropriate base. I do not 
think the Soviet Union can be classed in either category. Third, 
since your message furnishes no reasons for the demand that a 
permanent base be granted, I must tell you in all frankness 
that neither I nor my colleagues understand the circumstances 
in which this claim on the Soviet Union could have been conceived. 
August 22, 1945 
No. 366 
Received on August 27, 1945 
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
In response to your message of August 22, 1945, as far as the 
base of the Kurile Islands is concerned, my idea was that use 
of landing rights in the central Kuriles during the occupation 
of Japan would be an important contribution to the cooperative 
action we will be taking in connection with the carrying out of 
the Japanese surrender terms as it would afford another route 
for air connection with the United States for emergency use 
during the period of occupation of Japan. 
I also felt no hesitancy in bringing up the matter of landing 
facilities for commercial use. You evidently misunderstood my 
message because you refer to it as a demand usually laid before 
a conquered state or an allied state unable to defend parts of its 
territory. I was not speaking about any territory of the Soviet 
Republic. I was speaking of the Kurile Islands, Japanese territory, 
disposition of which must be made at a peace settlement. 
I was advised that my predecessor agreed to support in the 
peace settlement the Soviet acquisition of those islands. I did 
not consider it offensive when you asked me to confirm that 
agreement. When you expect our support for your desire for 
permanent possession of all the Kurile Islands, I cannot see why

257 
you consider it offensive if I ask for consideration of a request 
for landing rights on only one of those islands. I consider the 
request for discussion all the more reasonable because of the 
close and cordial relations existing between our two Governments 
and between us personally. While I believe early discussion 
of these matters would be helpful, I will not press it if you 
do not wish to discuss them now. 
No. 367 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr TRUMAN 
I am in receipt of your message of August 27. I am glad that 
the misunderstandings that had crept into our correspondence 
have been dispelled. While not in the least offended by your 
proposal, I was taken aback by it, for, as is now plain, I had 
misunderstood you. 
Of course, I agree to your suggestion for granting the United 
States the right to land on our air fields on one of the Kuriles 
in emergency cases during the period of occupation of Japan. 
I am also in agreement with commercial aircraft being granted 
landing facilities on a Soviet air field on one of the Kuriles. 
In this matter the Soviet Government counts on U.S. reciprocity 
with regard to the right of Soviet commercial planes to land 
on a U.S. air field on one of the Aleutians. The fact is that the 
present air route from Siberia to the United States viâ Canada 
is not satisfactory on account of its great length. We prefer to 
have a shorter route between the Kuriles and Seattle by way 
of the Aleutians as an intermediate point. 
August 30, 1945

258 
No. 368 
TO THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Mr TRUMAN 
On the day of the signing of the instrument of surrender by 
Japan allow me to congratulate you, the Government of the 
United States of America and the American people on the great 
victory over Japan. 
I salute the Armed Forces of the United States of America 
on the occasion of their brilliant victory. 
J. STALIN 
September 2, 1945 
No. 369 
Received on September 6, 1945 
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
Please accept this expression of appreciation by the American 
people and by me of your thoughtful message of congratulations 
on our Allied victory over Japan. 
All the Allies contributed their part to the victory to the extent 
made possible by their available resources and we may 
now all of us look forward to a durable peace and a new prosperity 
in all the peace-loving nations. 
No. 370 
Received on September 10, 1945
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
Thank you for your message dated August 30, receipt of which 
is acknowledged.

259 
No. 371 
HIS EXCELLENCY JOSEPH V. STALIN, 
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES 
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
Moscow 
My dear Generalissimo Stalin, 
Please accept my thanks for that autographed photograph 
which has now arrived safely. I appreciate more than I can say 
the cordiality of the inscription and shall always treasure the 
picture as a happy reminder of very pleasant associations at 
Potsdam. 
Very sincerely yours, 
Harry TRUMAN 
September 14, 1945 
No. 372 
Received on September 22, 1945 
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
I am informed that Mr Molotov is considering withdrawing 
from the Council of Foreign Ministers in London109 because 
of difficulty in reaching an agreement as to the participation 
of France and China in discussions of the Balkan situation. 
I urgently request that you communicate with Mr Molotov 
telling him that because of the bad effect it would have on 
world peace he should not permit the Council to be broken up.

260 
No. 373 
Sent on September 23, 1945 
FROM GENERALISSIMO J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A., Mr TRUMAN 
Your message received. 
I have made inquiries of Molotov but so far have not received 
a reply. After studying the matter I have arrived at the conclusion 
that if it is a question of France and China taking part 
in a Balkans settlement, then, in conformity with the exact 
meaning of the Berlin Conference decision, the two countries 
should not be invited to attend. 
No. 374 
Received on September 23, 1945 
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
Referring to my earlier message. The Secretary of State has 
fully informed me of the difficulty encountered at the Council 
of Foreign Ministers.109 
I agree that under a strict interpretation of the language of 
the Potsdam Agreement, France and China have not the right 
to participate in the consideration of peace treaties unless they 
are signatories to the surrender terms or unless they are invited 
under paragraph 3(2) of the Potsdam Agreement which provides 
that members of the Council other than the signatories 
may by agreement be invited to participate when matters directly 
concerning them are under discussion. 
It is my recollection that at the conference table at Potsdam 
it was agreed during the discussion that members not signatory 
could be present and participate in the discussion but could 
not vote. It seems the first day that the Council met, it was unanimously 
agreed that members not signatories could participate 
in the discussion, but could not vote. If we now change this 
rule and deny France and China because they are not signatories 
to the surrender the right even to discuss a matter in which 
they state they are interested, I fear it will create a bad impression. 
It will be charged that the three Big Powers are denying 
other members of the Council an opportunity even to present 
their views.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
261 
Can we not agree to regard the unanimous action of the Council 
on the opening day as an invitation to France and China to 
participate under the Potsdam Agreement? This is too small a 
matter to disrupt the work of the Council and delay progress 
towards peace and better understanding. 
No. 375 
Sent on September 23, 1945 
FROM GENERALISSIMO J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Your second message about the Council of Ministers109 has 
reached me. 
Today I have received V. M. Molotov’s reply, which says that 
he adheres to the Berlin Conference resolution and considers 
that that resolution should not be violated. For my part I must 
stress that at the Berlin Conference we neither resolved nor 
agreed that members of the Council who had not signed the 
surrender terms could participate in discussions but not vote. 
I think that Molotov’s stand in the sense of strict adherence to 
the Berlin Conference decision cannot make a bad impression 
or offend anyone. 
No. 376 
HIS EXCELLENCY J. V. STALIN, 
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL 
OF PEOPLE’S COMMISSARS 
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
Moscow 
My dear Premier Stalin, 
One of President Roosevelt’s fondest desires was to have a 
painting of you, Mr Churchill and himself placed in the Capitol 
here in Washington as a testimony of the historical importance 
of the meetings at Tehran and Yalta. 
He had discussed the project with Mr Douglas Chandor, an 
artist, who he felt possessed the peculiar kind of gift for doing 
this particular painting better than anyone else. 
Knowing how desirous President Roosevelt was that such a 
painting be made as a worthy addition to the historical me

262 
mentos of this country, I should like to ask if you would be willing 
to sacrifice some of your valued time to allow Mr Chandor 
to come to Moscow to do this painting. 
I have also written to Mr Churchill asking if he, too, could 
spare sufficient time to permit Mr Chandor to paint his picture 
in order to complete this historic work symbolizing the unity 
of our three nations. 
You may be sure that your acquiescence in helping to consummate 
this cherished desire of President Roosevelt would be 
greatly appreciated by me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Harry TRUMAN 
October 11, 1945 
No. 377 
Received on October 24, 1945 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
Mr Byrnes has reported to me upon his return from London. 
I was pleased to learn that on a number of subjects the Council 
of Foreign Ministers109 was in general agreement. I feel that 
at this first meeting the Ministers have made substantial progress. 
I was surprised to learn, however, that not only in private conversations 
between Mr Molotov and Mr Byrnes but also at 
the Council table, Mr Molotov suggested that the United States’ 
policy in regard to the recognition of the Governments of Roumania 
and Bulgaria appeared to be motivated by an unfriendly 
attitude toward the Soviet Union. 
I cannot believe that your Government seriously believes that 
American policy is so motivated. Our policy in regard to the 
recognition of the Provisional Governments of Finland, Poland, 
Hungary and Austria indicates that we are anxious, and are willing 
to go far, to concert our policy with that of the Soviet Union. 
As I endeavored to make clear at the Berlin Conference, our 
Government is only trying to carry out the policy sponsored 
by President Roosevelt and accepted by the three Governments 
at the Yalta Conference. 
Mr Byrnes has also reported to me of the procedural difficulties 
which brought the London Conference to an impasse. It

263 
appears that on September 11 the Council invited members not 
parties to the surrender terms to participate in the discussions 
of the treaties without vote. The procedure, which at the time 
of its adoption was not questioned by any member of the Council, 
was to my mind clearly a proper and permissible procedure 
under the Berlin Agreement. 
Mr Byrnes felt unable to agree to the change in this procedure 
suggested by Mr Molotov on September 22. He rightly felt 
that our Government would not humiliate France and China 
by withdrawing in the midst of the Conference the invitation 
extended to them to participate in the treaty discussion after 
they had already participated in sixteen sessions. 
In an effort to find a solution acceptable to all members of 
the Council, Mr Byrnes stated that he would accept a narrowing 
of the drafting procedure provided it was agreed that the 
Council would call a peace conference of the principally interested 
states as authorized by Article 2 (4) (II) of the Berlin 
Agreement. 
I hope that you will find it possible to accept Mr Byrnes’ proposal. 
I feel that since all of us extended to China and France 
an invitation to participate in the discussion of these treaties 
we should work out a procedure which will insure the convocation 
by the full Council of a peace conference for the consideration 
of the treaties. 
I hope we can reach early agreement on this matter in order 
that the deputies may proceed under clear instructions as to 
their procedure with the important work110 that has been referred 
to them. 
Early settlement of disagreement on peace machinery is essential 
to prevent misunderstanding among the people of both 
our countries which might make future cooperation more difficult. 
I am sure that you will agree with me that the common 
interests of both our countries in the peace are far more important 
than any possible differences among us. 
I am asking Ambassador Harriman, who has been at London 
and is fully acquainted with my views, to bring this personally 
to you so that you will have an opportunity to discuss 
any points about it that are in your mind.

264 
No. 378 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM GENERALISSIMO J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A., Mr TRUMAN 
On October 24 Mr Harriman handed me your message. I had 
two talks with him on matters discussed at the Foreign Ministers’ 
conference in London.109 In the course of the talks I replied 
to all the questions which he, on your directions, raised 
with me. 
October 26, 1945 
No. 379 
Received on November 2, 1945 
PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT 
TO GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
As you know, ever since the time when the late President 
Wilson intimately associated himself with the liberation of 
Czechoslovakia from Hapsburg rule, my country has followed 
with deep and sympathetic interest the struggle of the Czechoslovak 
people for national independence and economic security. 
We have always admired the diligence displayed by the Czechoslovak 
state in constructing democratic institutions and in contributing 
to the peaceful international life in the European family 
of states. 
In the last days of the war, the American army crossed the 
western frontier of Czechoslovakia in the pursuit of our common 
enemy and advanced to a line north of Plzen, while the 
Red Army, fighting valiantly from the East, entered the city 
of Praha. The armies of the Soviet Union and the United States 
thus carried out the liberation of Czechoslovakia. Since the close 
of hostilities, the armed forces of our two countries have remained 
on Czechoslovak territory in order to assist the Czechoslovak 
people in the elimination of the remnants of the Nazi 
forces. 
The continued presence of Allied troops, however, is proving 
to be a great drain on Czechoslovak economic resources and is 
delaying the normal recovery and rehabilitation of this allied 
state which remained longer under Nazi domination than any 
other member of the United Nations.14 I therefore desire to

265 
withdraw the American forces from Czechoslovak territory by 
December 1, 1945. In the absence of a similar intention on the 
part of the Soviet Government, there will still remain in Czechoslovakia 
a large number of Red Army soldiers. I should therefore 
like to propose to you that the Red Army be withdrawn 
simultaneously with our forces. 
Since there is no longer any necessity to protect the Czechoslovak 
people against any Nazi depredations, and since the presence 
of our troops undoubtedly constitutes a drain on their 
economy, I also feel that the American forces should be withdrawn 
as soon as practicable in order to permit the Czechoslovak 
people to reap the full benefits of the assistance being given 
to them by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration59 
and by other agencies. By the simultaneous withdrawal 
of both Soviet and American forces from Czechoslovakia, 
the American people would be assured that the drain on 
Czechoslovak resources had ceased. 
I hope that you can give consideration to my proposal and 
that, in withdrawing our forces simultaneously, we can announce 
to the world our intention of removing an obstacle 
which delays the recovery of the Czechoslovak state. 
No. 380 
PERSONAL AND SECRET 
FROM GENERALISSIMO J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A., 
Mr H. TRUMAN 
I have received your message concerning the withdrawal of 
U.S. and Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. I am sorry to say 
delivery was delayed because of the irregular functioning of 
the airline between Moscow and Sochi due to weather conditions. 
I welcome your proposal for withdrawing the troops in November, 
all the more as it is in full accord with the Soviet plan 
for demobilisation and withdrawal of troops. Consequently we 
may consider that the withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. troops from 
Czechoslovakia will be completed by December 1. 
November 7, 1945

266 
No. 381 
Received on December 9, 1945 
FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN 
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
In approving Mr Byrnes’ suggestion to Mr Molotov that a 
meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries be convened before 
the close of the year, I was not unmindful of the view that no 
meeting should be held until there was greater assurance of 
progress toward agreement on outstanding questions. But I felt 
that at this critical time continued drift and delay would be exceedingly 
unwise. 
I sincerely hope that you will cooperate with me to make the 
meeting a success and to give renewed assurance of the ability 
of the Great Powers to work together. 
I wish very much to have Mr Byrnes convey to you a personal 
message from me. I earnestly hope that you will be able to see 
and talk frankly with him at an early date while he is in Moscow. 
Please let me know whether this will be possible. 
No. 382 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN 
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr H. TRUMAN 
Thank you for your message of December 8, 1945.111 
You may rest assured that I, too, should like to cooperate with 
you so that the forthcoming conference of the three Ministers 
in Moscow will yield the results desired for the benefit of our 
common cause. 
I shall shortly be in Moscow and am willing to talk with 
Mr Byrnes in all candour. 
December 9, 1945

267 
No. 383 
Received on December 19, 1945 
HIS EXCELLENCY, GENERALISSIMO STALIN
Moscow 
Dear Generalissimo, 
It is natural that approaching our common problems from 
different starting points we should at the outset encounter some 
difficulties. But it is becoming increasingly evident that these 
difficulties are assuming exaggerated proportions in the minds 
of our respective peoples and are delaying in many ways the 
progress, which we both desire to expedite, towards peace and 
reconstruction . 
I repeat my assurance to you that it is my earnest wish, and 
I am sure it is the wish of the people of the United States, that 
the people of the Soviet Union and the people of the United 
States should work together to restore and maintain peace. I am 
sure that the common interest of our two countries in keeping 
the peace far outweighs any possible differences between us. 
Secretary Byrnes and I have sought to go as far as we have 
felt able to meet your views with reference to the Allied Council 
for Japan112 and to the Far Eastern Commission,113 and I sincerely 
hope that your Government will accept the proposals 
which we have made. If these proposals are accepted I assure 
you that in carrying them out it is my intention to insist on the 
fullest possible collaboration with the Soviet Union in the implementation 
of the Potsdam Declaration and the Surrender 
Terms for Japan. 
Secretary Byrnes and I have also gone far in an effort to 
meet your views on the future procedure for handling the peace 
treaties, and the difference between us now on this matter is not 
great. In view of our willingness to accept your suggestions as 
to the handling of the preparatory work by the Deputies,110 I 
hope very much that your Government can accept our proposals 
regarding the formal peace conference which will, I am 
sure, help greatly in securing the general acceptance of the work 
of our Deputies by other countries. 
Prompt agreement between us on the procedure for making 
the European peace settlements and on the machinery to govern 
Allied relations with Japan will stop the undermining of confidence 
in the ability of the Great Powers to work together and 
will give renewed hope to a world longing for peace. 
This hope will also be greatly strengthened if your Government 
will join in the proposals to have a commission created

268 
under the United Nations Organization to inquire into and make 
recommendations for the control of atomic energy in the interest 
of world peace. 
If we can agree on these general points of procedure without 
further delay, we should be able to start discussions on other 
matters as to which it is important in our common interest for 
us to concert our policies. 
I hope very much you will see and talk frankly with Secretary 
Byrnes. He is thoroughly familiar with my purposes and I 
feel certain that if you had a full and frank talk with him it 
would be most helpful.114 
Sincerely yours, 
Harry TRUMAN 
No. 384 
J. V. STALIN TO H. TRUMAN*
MOST SECRET 
My dear Mr President, 
I was glad to receive your message, transmitted to me by Mr 
Byrnes, in which you dwell on the highly important subjects 
that we are now discussing. I agree with you that the peoples 
of the Soviet Union and the United States should strive to work 
together in restoring and maintaining peace, and that we should 
proceed from the fact that the common interests of our two 
countries far outweigh certain differences between us. 
The conference of the Ministers now in session in Moscow 
has already yielded good results. The steps taken by you and 
Mr Byrnes with regard to both Japan and the peace treaties 
have helped in a big way. We may take it that agreement on 
these important points has been reached115 and that the conference 
has done work that will play a prominent part in establishing 
proper mutual understanding between our countries in 
this period of transition from war to peace. 
The subject of atomic energy is still under discussion. I hope 
that on this matter, too, we shall establish unity of views and 
that by joint effort a decision will be reached that will be satisfactory 
to both countries and to the other nations.116 
I take it that you have been informed of my first talk with 
Mr Byrnes. We shall meet for further talks. But even now I feel 
I can say that on the whole I am optimistic as to the results of 
the exchange of views now taking place between us on urgent

international problems, and this, I hope, will provide further 
opportunities for coordinating the policies of our countries on 
other issues. 
I take this opportunity to answer the letter which I recently 
received from you concerning the arrival of the artist Chandor 
in Moscow. I have been away from Moscow for a long time and 
regret to say that in the immediate future I should find it hard, 
in view of my numerous duties, to give any time to Mr Chandor. 
I am, of course, ready to send him my portrait if you think that 
would be suitable in this instance. 
J. STALIN 
December 23, 1945


N O T E S


273 
The figures at the end of each note indicate 
the pages to which the note refers 
1 This Stalin message was followed by talks on August 19, 1941, between 
K. A. Oumansky, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A., and 
Mr Sumner Welles, U.S. Under Secretary of State. Oumansky reported 
the talks to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the 
U.S.S.R. as follows: 
“On behalf of the President Mr Welles gave this reply to my secret 
l e t t e r to the President on Comrade Stalin’s behalf, delivered while 
Mr Roosevelt was on the ocean, concerning Finland. 
“On instructions from the President he, Mr Welles, had a few days 
before invited the Finnish Minister, Procopé, and informed him that, 
according to the information available to the U.S. Government, the 
U.S.S.R. was determined to fight relentlessly against aggression, including 
aggression in the northern sector, and that the Finnish Government 
should have no doubts on the matter. The U.S. Government 
considered, furthermore, that the U.S.S.R. was certain to win in this 
struggle. (Mr Welles made i t clear that he, acting on instructions 
from Mr Roosevelt, had expressed himself in these terms to the Finnish 
Minister so that the Finns should not construe the U.S. démarche 
as an indication of Soviet weakness.) Mr Welles went on to 
tell Procopé that continuation of war by Finland against the U.S.S.R. 
on the side of Germany was not in keeping with the interests of Finland 
and her independence, would be fatal for U.S.-Finnish relations, 
and would deliver an irreparable blow to Finnish popularity in the 
U.S.A. But i f the Finnish Government were to revert to the way of 
peace, then, as f a r as the U.S. Government was aware, the Soviet 
Government would be willing to conclude a new peace treaty with 
t e r r i t o r i a l modifications. When I asked whether he had mentioned 
to the Finn the danger of the U.S.A. severing diplomatic relations 
with Finland, Mr Welles said t h a t , in concurrence with the President, 
he had reserved that until the Finnish Government’s reply was 
received, and that the threat of a rupture, already decided on in 
principle, would be the U.S. Government’s next step.” p. 7 
2 In Placentia Bay (Newfoundland) on August 9-12, 1941, President 
Roosevelt and Winston Churchill held a meeting known as the At

274 
lantic Conference. They discussed further United States and British 
plans in connection with the radical change in the international situation 
following the Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Hitler 
Germany. They coordinated the foreign policies of their two countries, 
and declared their war aims. On August 14, 1941, they adopted 
and made known a joint declaration (the Atlantic Charter), containing 
“certain common principles in the national policies of their respective 
countries”. On September 24, 1941, the Soviet Government 
announced its concurrence with the basic principles of the Atlantic 
Charter. 
At their Atlantic Conference the two leaders discussed the question 
of supplying arms and materiel to the Soviet Union. The joint 
message by Roosevelt and Churchill given between these covers was 
a result of this discussion. p. 7 
3 Harry Hopkins visited Moscow in July 1941 as President Roosevelt’s 
personal representative and was received by J. V. Stalin. pp. 7, 9 
4 That is, the conference between Soviet, British and U.S. representatives 
held in Moscow over September 29-October 1, 1941, to discuss 
reciprocal deliveries of war materials. pp. 9, 10, 11, 12 
5 The writer refers to the Lend-Lease Act, adopted by the U.S. Congress 
on March 11, 1941. The Act empowered the U.S. Government to lend 
or lease to other countries various articles and materials essential to 
their defence, provided their defence was, according to the definition 
of the President, vital to U.S. defence. In November 1941 the Lend- 
Lease Act was extended to include the Soviet Union. pp. 10, 16, 18, 
232 
6 Following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war 
on the USA by Germany and Italy, the USA became a belligerent 
in the Second World War. p. 13 
7 Negotiations were held in Moscow between Joseph Stalin and 
Britain’s Foreign Minister Anthony Eden on December 16-20, 1941 
relating to Anglo-Soviet treaties of wartime alliance against Germany 
and postwar cooperation. The negotiations were broken off due to 
Britain’s refusal to recognise the Soviet western frontier of 1941. p. 14 
8 President Roosevelt had not replied to this Stalin message. p. 14 
9 On June 11, 1942, M. M. Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A. 
and U.S. Secretary of State Hull exchanged Notes to the effect that 
the Agreement Between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the 
U.S.A. on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution 
of the War Against Aggression, signed on June 11, 1942, replaced and 
invalidated the previous agreements between the Soviet and U.S. Governments 
on the same subject, concluded by exchanging messages 
between Roosevelt and Stalin in November 1941 and February 1942. 
pp. 16, 17 
10 The reference is to J. V. Stalin’s message, sent on February 18, 1942 
(see Document No. 14 on pp. 16-17). p. 17 
11 On March 16, 1942, the U.S. Embassy in the U.S.S.R. telephoned the 
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., advising 
that this letter from President Roosevelt had been sent by U.S. diplomatic 
mail, viâ Tehran, in November 1941. The letter, which had

275 
been delayed en route, was delivered on March 15, 1942, to Kuibyshev, 
where the U.S. Embassy was in temporary residence. p. 18 
12 See Document No. 4. (p. 9). p. 18 
13 On June 12, 1942, a Soviet-U.S. Communique was released on the 
Washington visit of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of 
the U.S.S.R.: 
“Complete agreement was reached during the negotiations concerning 
the urgent tasks of opening a second front in Europe in 1942. 
Also discussed were measures to increase and expedite deliveries to 
the Soviet Union of aircraft, tanks and other types of arms from the 
U.S.A. Further, the main problems of cooperation between the Soviet 
Union and the United States were discussed in ensuring peace and 
security for the freedom-loving peoples after the war. Both sides 
were gratified to note that their views coincided on all these questions.” 
p. 21 
14 This term was applied to the countries which had signed the Declaration 
of Twenty-Six States in Washington on January 1, 1942, and 
those which later acceded to the Declaration. pp. 24, 30, 48, 67, 116, 
122, 123, 126, 128, 163, 168, 172, 181, 183, 203, 218, 224, 227, 247, 251, 264 
15 The reference is to a protocol on U.S. and British deliveries of war 
equipment, ammunition and raw materials to the Soviet Union, signed 
on October 6, 1942, and covering the period from July 1, 1942, to 
June 30, 1943. pp. 25, 33, 65 
16 The “visitor” was Prime Minister Churchill, who came to Moscow in 
August 1942 for talks with J. V. Stalin. pp. 26, 27 
17 U.S. marines landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi islands of the Solomon 
group, on August 1942, and consolidated their positions. p. 28 
18 General Hurley delivered this message to J. V. Stalin on November 14, 
1942. pp. 30, 34 
19 See under No. 41 (pp. 30-31) Stalin’s message of October 7, 1942, to 
Roosevelt. p. 33 
20 The Soviet submarine L-16 was sunk in the Pacific on October 11, 
1942, by a submarine of unknown nationality. p. 42 
21 The allusion is to President Roosevelt’s and Winston Churchill’s conference 
in Casablanca (North-West Africa) on January 14-23, 1943. 
p. 46 
22 Rabaul, a town in New Britain, an Island of the Bismarck Archipelago. 
p. 47 
23 The reason for this document being included in the collection is that 
it says it is a joint message from Prime Minister Churchill and President 
Roosevelt. p. 49 
24 The allusion is to the Combined Anglo-American Staffs formed in 
Washington on February 6, 1942, to work on the problems of Anglo- 
American military cooperation. pp. 50, 61, 73, 82, 107, 108, 154 
25 The allusion is to Stalin’s message of May 26, 1943 (see Document 
No. 88, pp. 60-61). p. 64

276 
26 The writer refers to V. M. Molotov, who during his visit to Washington 
in May and June 1942 wa s , for security reasons, known as 
“Mr Brown”. p. 64 
27 See Document No. 70, pp. 46-47. p. 64, 68 
28 The arrangement in force at that time was the protocol mentioned in 
Note 15 above. 
On October 19, 1943, the Governments of Great Britain, the U.S A 
Canada and the Soviet Union signed a new protocol on reciprocal 
deliveries, covering one year—from July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944. 
p. 66 
29 See Document No. 95, p. 66. p. 67 
30 On July 12,1943, U.S. Secretary of State Hull informed A. A. Gromyko 
the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, that the U.S submarine 
Permit had sunk a Soviet trawler in the area of the Aleutians, having 
mistaken it for an enemy ship. Two members of the crew were killed 
the r e s t were picked up by the Americans. On his own behalf 
and on behalf of the U.S. Navy Department Mr Hull expressed deep 
regret at the accident. p. 71 
31 The Italian General Castellano, who on instructions from Marshal Badoglio 
signed the “short terms” for the surrender of Italy on September 
3, 1943. pp. 72, 78, 80 
32 Code name for the Allied invasion of Italy in the Naples area, carried 
out in September 1943. pp. 73, 80 
33 The text of the message from F. D. Roosevelt and W. S. Churchill to 
J. V. Stalin, dated August 19, 1943, was received in the People’s Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. with the following remark 
by British Ambassador Kerr: “The armistice terms referred to 
in paragraph 1(a) above are those of which I informed you in my 
letter of the 3rd August. The terms to be communicated later will 
follow the political, economic and financial terms which were communicated 
by Mr Eden to Monsieur Sobolev on the 30th July.” 
In a letter of August 3, 1943, Mr Kerr communicated the “short 
terms” for the surrender of Italy. The document setting forth the 
“comprehensive terms” for the Italian surrender was transmitted to 
the Soviet Government on July 30, 1943, through the Soviet Embassy 
in London (it was handed by Mr Eden to A. A. Sobolev, the Soviet 
Chargé d’Affaires in Britain). On July 31,1943, the People’s Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. informed the British Ambassador 
that the Soviet Government did not object to the terms and that i t 
had instructed the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Britain to notify 
Mr Eden accordingly. p. 73 
34 The reference should apparently have been made to paragraph I (c). 
p. 74 
35 Code name for the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Churchill, which took place in Washington in May 1943. p. 75 
36 Code name for the Azores. p. 75 
37 That is, at Quebec. p. 76

277 
38 The reference is to a joint message from President Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Churchill, dated August 19, 1943 (see Document No. 102, 
pp. 72-76) . I t was sent to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign 
Affairs of the U.S.S.R. by British Ambassador Kerr on August 20, 
1943, with some omissions. The supplements and corrections to the 
text came in on August 22. The f u l l text of the message appears 
under No. 102. p. 77 
39 The allusion is to the “short” and “comprehensive” terms for the surrender 
of Italy. The “short terms” consisted of eleven articles bearing 
chiefly on military matters. On August 3, 1943, British Ambassador 
Kerr communicated the text of the “short terms” to the Soviet Government, 
advising i t that they had already been sent to General Eisenhower 
against the eventuality of the Italian Government directly 
approaching him with a request for armistice. 
On August 26, 1943, the British and U.S. Ambassadors handed to 
the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. the full 
text of the “comprehensive terms” for the Italian surrender, consisting 
of forty-four articles which contained not only military provisions, 
but also political, economic and financial stipulations bound up 
with the surrender. On August 27, 1943, the People’s Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. notified the British and U.S. Ambassadors 
that the Soviet Government agreed to the “comprehensive 
terms” for the surrender of Italy and empowered General Eisenhower 
to sign those terms on behalf of the Soviet Government. 
On September 1, 1943, the British Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. informed 
the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. 
that the “short terms”—with the addition of Article 12, which read: 
“Other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature, with 
which Italy would be bound to comply, will be transmitted at a later 
date”—had been communicated to the Italian Government. The Ambassador 
pointed out that the Italian Government could send a representative 
authorised to sign only the “short terms”. He asked to 
be advised whether the Soviet Government’s agreement to the signing 
of the “comprehensive terms” for the surrender of Italy applied 
to the “short terms” as well. On September 2, 1943, the Soviet Government 
answered in the affirmative. On September 3, 1943, the 
“short terms” were signed in Sicily by General Castellano on behalf 
of Italy and General Bedell Smith acting on behalf of the United 
Nations. The “comprehensive terms” were signed on Malta on September 
29, 1943, by Marshal Badoglio and General Eisenhower on 
behalf of Italy and the United Nations respectively. p. 80 
40 Article 10 of the “short terms” for the surrender of Italy read: 
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces reserves to himself 
the right to take any measures which, in his opinion, may be necessary 
for the protection of the interests of the Allied forces or for the 
prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government bind themselves 
to take such administrative or other actions as the Commander-in- 
Chief may require, and in particular the Commander-in-Chief wi l l 
establish an Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian 
territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the 
Allied nations.” p. 81 
41 On August 31,1943, Stalin wrote to Churchill, then staying with Roosevelt 
as follows: “I am for having the French Committee of 
National Liberation represented on the commission for negotiations

278 
with Italy. If you consider it advisable you may say so on behalf of 
our two Governments.” p. 83 
42 The reference is to the message received from President Roosevelt on 
September 11, 1943 (see Document No. 114 on p. 85) and the one 
from Prime Minister Churchill, dated September 10, 1913. p. 86 
43 The allusion is to the “Instrument of Surrender of Italy”, received in 
the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. from the 
British and U.S. Embassies on August 26, 1943. In President Roosevelt’s 
message of October 5, 1943, it was a question of changing the 
following passage in the “Instrument”: 
“Whereas the Italian Government and the Italian Supreme Command 
acknowledge that the Italian forces have been totally defeated 
and that Italy can no longer carry on the war against the United 
Nations and have accordingly unconditionally requested a suspension 
of hostilities; and whereas the United States and the United Kingdom 
Governments acting on behalf of the United Nations are willing to 
lay down the terms on which they are prepared to suspend hostilities 
against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany 
and her allies are not obstructed, and that Italy does not assist these 
powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these Governments; 
the following terms have been presented by . . . . . . 
duly authorised to that effect; and have been accepted by . . . . . . 
representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and 
air forces, and duly authorised to that effect by the Italian Government: 
“1. ( a ) The Italian land, sea and a i r forces wherever located 
hereby surrender unconditionally.” p. 88 
44 On October 2, 1943, A. A. Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the 
U.S.A., transmitted to the U.S. State Department the Soviet Government’s 
proposals for the agenda of the forthcoming conference of 
the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S A and Britain in 
Moscow. The Soviet Government proposed in particular “measures 
to shorten the duration of the war against Germany and her allies 
in Europe. 
“What is meant here are pressing measures by the Governments 
of Great Britain and the U.S.A. already in 1943 to ensure the invasion 
of Western Europe by the Anglo-American armies across the Channel, 
measures which, together with the powerful blows to be delivered 
by the Soviet troops to the main German forces on the Soviet- 
German front, would effectively sap Germany’s military-strategic 
position and drastically shorten the duration of the war.” pp. 89, 90 
45 The reference is to the following letter: 
“The British Ambassador, Mr Kerr, has informed the Soviet Government 
that the British Government would like the representatives 
of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain on the military-political 
commission to hand to the French Committee of National Liberation 
on behalf of their Governments, identical Notes formally inviting a 
representative of the Committee to take part in the work of the 
commission. The dr a f t Note submitted by the British Government 
says concerning the terms of reference of the military political commission 
that the representatives of the three Governments and the 
French Committee of National Liberation would give joint or separate 
advice to the three Governments or the Liberation Committee, 
but would not be empowered to take final action, i t being under

279 
stood as a matter of course that they would not interfere with the 
military functions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. 
“This is to advise you for your information that in its reply to the 
British Government, dated October 14, the Soviet Government signified 
its agreement to a representative of the French Committee being 
formally invited to participate in the military-political commission. 
“As regards specifying the terms of reference of the militarypolitical 
commission, the Soviet Government has proposed amending 
the British formula for the formal invitation in the sense that the 
military-political commission shall direct and coordinate the activity 
of a l l military agencies and any civil authorities of the Allies 
concerned in armistice matters and implementation of the armistice 
and, accordingly, the military-political commission may also from 
time to time issue instructions and directions for the Italian Government 
and, in similar circumstances, for the Governments of other 
Axis countries, it being understood that military-operational matters 
come fully within the jurisdiction of the Allied Commanders-in- 
Chief.” p. 93 
46 The allusion is to the following Memorandum, which Mr. Hamilton, 
U.S. Chargé d’Affaires, handed to A. Y. Vyshinsky, Deputy People’s 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., on October 14, 1943: 
“Recently, the Government of the United States has received requests 
from the Chinese Government and from the Brazillan Government 
that they be accorded representation on the Political and 
Military Commission which is being set up at Algiers. The Government 
of the United States has likewise received similar requests from 
the Greek Government and from the Yugoslav Government. While 
certain disadvantages might be presented by such expansion in the 
size of the Commission, the Government of the United States is of 
the opinion that it is desirable to have these Governments represented 
on the Commission and the Government of the United States 
suggests that favorable consideration be given to their requests. The 
Government of the United States would appreciate receiving the 
views of the Soviet Government on the question of granting the requests 
made by the four Governments mentioned. 
“The foregoing is communicated to the Soviet Government by direction 
of the President.” p. 93 
47 The conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the 
U.S.A. and Britain held in Moscow between October 19 and 30, 1943. 
p. 94 , 101, 107 111, 115, 117, 118, 121, 122 
48 This message was handed to J. V. Stalin by U.S. Secretary of State 
Hull. p. 95 
49 Chiang Kai-shek. pp. 100, 160, 234 
50 The allusion is to the letter from the People’s Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs of the U.S.S.R. to Mr Hamilton, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in 
the U.S.S.R., of November 22, 1943. It ran: 
“Just now Marshal Stalin i s a t the front, but he has informed 
me that he will be at the appointed place not later than November 
28 or 29. Kindly convey this to the President.” p. 101 
51 This document was handed to Stalin by Roosevelt a t Tehran on 
November 29, 1943. pp. 102, 103

280 
52 The writer is referring to F. D. Roosevelt’s message to J. V. Stalin 
of December 3, 1943, which appears in this volume under No. 146 
(pp. 103-104). p. 106 
53 Code name for the crossing of the Channel and the invasion of 
France, carried out by Allied forces in June 1944. pp. 108, 109, 110, 121, 
131, 132, 136 
54 Code name for the landing on the south coast of France, carried out 
by the Allies on August 15, 1944. pp. 108, 109, 110 
55 The reference i s to the Statement of the Soviet Government Concerning 
Soviet-Polish Relations, published on January 11, 1944, and 
the TASS Communication on the statement of the Polish Government 
in London, published on January 17, 1944. 
The Soviet Government statement on Soviet-Polish relations said 
the following on the question of Polish frontiers: 
“Poland’s eastern frontiers may be worked out with the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Government does not regard the 1939 frontiers as 
immutable. Corrections may be introduced in Poland’s favour in the 
sense that districts where Poles are in the majority should go to 
Poland. The Soviet-Polish frontier could run approximately along 
the so-called Curzon Line adopted in 1919 by the Supreme Council 
of Allied Powers, with the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia 
going to the Soviet Union. Poland’s western frontiers must be 
extended to include the old Polish lands formerly seized by Germany, 
for without this the Polish people will not be united in their 
own state. Furthermore, the Polish state will then get a much needed 
outlet to the Baltic sea. The Polish people’s just desire to be fully 
united in a strong and independent state must be recognised and 
supported.” p. 112 
56 The allusion i s to the following letter, dated January 23, 1944: 
“Your Note of January 19 reached me through Soviet Ambassador 
Gromyko on January 22. 
“I have already conveyed my reply to Mr Harriman orally, and 
now advise you in writing that, while thanking you for your readiness 
to mediate, I must say to my regret that conditions for mediation 
are not ripe yet. 
“Judge for yourself. 
“The Soviet Government made concessions by declaring the 1939 
frontier to be subject to revision and proposed the Curzon Line as 
the Soviet-Polish frontier. Ye t the Polish Government in London 
reacted by evading the question of the Curzon Line and i s using 
official documents to propagate the idea that the frontier established 
under the Riga Treaty is immutable. 
“The Soviet Government severed relations with the Polish Government 
in London because of the latter ’s participation in the Hitl 
e r i t e slander over the ‘Katyn massacre’. At that time the Polish 
Government was headed by General Sikorski. The Mikolajczyk Government, 
instead of dissociating i t s e l f from the fascist act of the 
Sikorski Government, declared that it would continue Sikorski’s policy, 
and the Mikolajczyk Government far from disavowing i t s Ambassadors 
in Mexico and Canada and its supporters in the U.S.A. (the 
Matuszewski group), who are engaged in a campaign openly hostile 
to the Soviet Union, is actually abetting them. 
“It will be seen from these facts that the Polish Government in 
London has called on the U.S. and British Governments to mediate,

281 
not with a view to reaching agreement with the Soviet Government, 
but in order to aggravate the conflict and involve the Allies in i t , 
for it is obvious that in the absence of a common basis for agreement 
negotiation and mediation are doomed to fail. 
“The Soviet Government would not like the friendly mission of 
mediation to be exposed to the threat of inevitable failure. 
“That is why I believe conditions are not yet ripe for negotiation 
and mediation. 
“As I see i t , a radical improvement of the composition of the 
Polish Government, one that would exclude the pro-fascist imperialist 
elements and include democratic elements, a point that I made to 
Mr Harriman orally, could provide a favourable basis both for the 
re-establishment of Soviet-Polish relations and settlement of the 
frontier question and for fruitful mediation.” p. 112 
57 The Curzon Line, conventional name for the line recommended by 
the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers on December 8, 1919, as 
Poland’s eastern frontier. The Curzon Line derived from the decision 
of the delegations of the principal Allied Powers, who considered it 
necessary to include only ethnographically Polish regions in the territory 
of Poland. On July 12, 1920, the British Foreign Secretary, 
Curzon, sent a Note to the Soviet Government proposing a line approved 
by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers m 1919 as the 
eastern frontier of Poland. In the Note i t said: “This line runs approximately 
as follows: Grodno-Jalovka-Nemirov-Brest-Litovsk-Dorohusk-
Ustilug, east of Grobeshov-Krilov and thence west of Rava- 
Ruska, east of Pryemysl to Carpathians.” On August 16, 1945, a treaty 
signed in Moscow defined the Soviet-Polish frontier, according to 
i t s terms the frontier as a whole was established along the Curzon 
Line, with certain departures in favour of Poland. pp. 112, 119, 124, 
139, 172, 201 
58 The Soviet-Polish peace treaty was signed in Riga on March 18, 1921. 
Under i t the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia were ceded 
to Poland. p. 112 
59 The agreement constituting the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA) was signed by representatives of 
44 countries in Washington on November 9, 1943. A. A. Gromyko 
signed it on behalf of the Soviet Union. UNRRA was to render relief 
to countries that had suffered in the Second World War, and was 
to assist them in rehabilitating their economy. UNRRA was dissolved 
in 1947. pp. 116, 265 
60 The writer is referring to the Declaration of Four Nations on General 
Security, signed in Moscow on October 30, 1943, by representatives 
of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain and China and saying that the 
four Governments recognised the necessity of establishing a t the 
earliest possible date a universal international organisation for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. pp. 117, 246 
61 See Document No. 158. pp. 110-111 
62 The writer has in mind the memorandum “Fundamentals of Our 
Program for International Economic Cooperation”, which U.S. Secretary 
of State Hull submitted to the Moscow Conference of the 
Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain on 
October 22, 1943. p. 122

282 
63 The reference is to the statement which the British Ambassador to 
the U.S.S.R. made on March 19, 1944, insisting, on instructions from 
Prime Minister Churchill, that the Soviet Government should reach 
agreement with the Polish emigre Government along the lines proposed 
by Mr Churchill, that is, by postponing settlement of the Soviet-
Polish frontier t i l l the armistice conference. The Ambassador 
contended that i f the Soviet Government’s point of view, stated in 
the course of the Anglo-Soviet discussions of the Polish question 
namely, that the Polish-Soviet frontier should follow the Curzon 
Line, became known to public opinion there would be general disillusionment 
both in Britain and in the United States. Soviet rejection 
of the Churchill proposal he said might give rise to difficulties 
in Anglo-Soviet relations, cast a shadow on the carrying out of the 
military operations agreed at Tehran and complicate the prosecution 
of the war by the United Nations as a whole. p. 124 
64 The reference is to the letter which the People’s Commissar for Foreign 
Aff a i r s of the U.S.S.R. sent to the U.S. Ambassador in the 
U.S.S.R. on March 7, 1944. It ran: 
“I hereby consider i t necessary to communicate to you the reply 
of the Soviet Government with regard to the conference to be convened 
by the International Labour Organisation next April. 
“The International Labour Organisation, being an institution of 
the League of Nations, comes under the latter ’s political and administrative 
control. Since for some time past the Soviet Union has not 
been in relationship with the League of Nations, the Soviet Government 
does not find it possible for Soviet representatives to attend the 
conference to be convened by the International Labour Organisation. 
Moreover, the Soviet Government holds that the said International 
Organisation lacks the authority needed to fu l f i l the tasks arising 
from international cooperation in the sphere of labour, a matter 
which in present circumstances calls for more democratic forms of 
organisation of international cooperation in that sphere.” p. 127 
65 On February 21, 1944, A. A. Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the 
U.S.A., asked President Roosevelt’s aid in obtaining visas for a visit 
to the Soviet Union for Rev. Orlemanski, a Catholic priest, Chairman 
of the KoSciuszko Polish Patriotic League, who wished to visit Polish 
patriots in the Soviet Union and the KoSciuszko Polish Division, and 
for Professor Oskar Lange of Chicago and Columbia Universities 
who wanted to travel to the Soviet Union in connection with Polish 
aff a i r s . Both Orlemanski and Lange had applied to the Consulate 
General of the U.S.S.R. in New York for visas. pp. 127, 128, 131 
66 On April 10, 1944, General Deane, head of the U.S. Military Mission 
and General Burrows, head of the British Military Mission, notified 
Marshal Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, that 
the British and U.S. High Commands planned to launch a cross- 
Channel operation on May 31, 1944, it being understood that the date 
might be shifted two or three days one way or the other depending on 
weather and tide. p. 129 
67 Code name for the date of the Allied invasion of Europe across the 
Channel. p. 132 
68 The scroll reads as follows: 
“In the name of the people of the United States of America, I 
present t h i s scroll to the City of Stalingrad to commemorate our 
admiration for i t s gallant defenders whose courage, fortitude, and 
devotion during the siege of September 13, 1942 to January 31, 1943 
will inspire forever the hearts of all free people. Their glorious vic

283 
tory stemmed the tide of invasion and marked the turning point in 
the war of the Allied Nations against the forces of aggression. 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
May 17th, 1944 
Washington, D.C.” p. 133 
69 The scroll reads as follows: 
“In the name of the people of the United States of America, I 
present t h i s scroll to the City of Leningrad as a memorial to i t s 
gallant soldiers and to i t s loyal men, women and children who, 
isolated from the r e s t of their nation by the invader and despite 
constant bombardment and untold sufferings from cold, hunger and 
sickness, successfully defended their beloved city throughout the 
critical period September 8, 1941 to January 18, 1943, and thus symbolized 
the undaunted spirit of the peoples of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and of a l l the nations of the world resisting 
forces of aggression. 
Franklin D. ROOSEVELT 
May 17th, 1944 
Washington, D.C.” pp. 133, 165 
70 On June 26, 1944, U.S. Ambassador Harriman handed this message 
from President Roosevelt and the scrolls to J . V. Stalin to be presented 
to Stalingrad and Leningrad in commemoration of the heroic 
defence of the two cities. p. 134 
71 That is, Winston Churchill. pp. 144, 175, 182 
72 Oskar Lange lived in the U.S.A. at the time. p. 145 
73 The meeting at Dumbarton Oaks of delegates of the Soviet Union, 
the U.S.A. and Britain from August 21 to September 29, 1944, was 
concerned with establishing the United Nations Organisation. 
pp. 149, 150, 151, 154, 163, 168 
74 The joint message from Stalin and Churchill, dated October 10, 1944 
(see No. 232 pp. 154-155) was handed under this number to Roosevelt 
by the British Diplomatic Service. p. 155 
75 The writer is referring to the plan for establishing under international 
control a zone comprising the Ruhr, Westphalia and the Saar. The 
plan was put forward by Mr Churchill and Mr Eden during discussions 
with J. V. Stalin in Moscow in October 1944. p. 161 
76 The reference is to the “Proposals for the Establishment of General 
International Organization”, a document drawn up at the Dumbarton 
Oaks Conference in 1944. 
Section A of Chapter VIII of the document ran: 
“PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
“1. The Security Council should be empowered to investigate any 
dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or 
give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance 
i s likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security.

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284 
“2. Any state, whether member of the Organization or not, may 
bring any such dispute or situation to the attention of the General 
Assembly or of the Security Council. 
“3. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely 
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security 
should obligate themselves, first of all, to seek a solution by negotiation, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or 
other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council 
should call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means. 
“4. If, nevertheless, parties to a dispute of the nature referred to 
in paragraph 3 above fail to settle i t by the means indicated in that 
paragraph, they should obligate themselves to refer it to the Security 
Council. The Security Council should in each case decide whether or 
not the continuance of the particular dispute is in fact likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
accordingly, whether the Security Council should deal with the dispute, 
and, if so, whether it should take action under paragraph 5. 
“5. The Security Council should be empowered, at any stage of a 
dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above, to recommend 
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. 
“6. Justifiable disputes should normally be referred to the international 
court of justice. The Security Council should be empowered 
to refer to the court, for advice, legal questions connected with other 
disputes. 
“7. The provisions of paragraph 1 to 6 of Section A should not 
apply to situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international 
law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
state concerned.” 
Paragraph 1 of Section C of Chapter VIII read: 
“1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating 
to the maintenance of international peace and security as are 
appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies 
and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles 
of the Organization. The Security Council should encourage 
settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or 
by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned 
or by reference from the Security Council.” p. 163 
77 On December 20, 1944, U.S. Ambassador Harriman informed the 
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. that this 
message had been sent by President Roosevelt on December 16 b ut 
had not been delivered to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow until December 
20 owing to disturbances during transmission. 
The words in parentheses (second paragraph of Document No. 248) 
were added by the U.S. Embassy to the U.S.S.R., whose Note contained 
the text of the message. p. 165 
78 That i s , the Polish Committee of National Liberation, whose seat 
was in Lublin, Poland. pp. 165, 172 
79 The reference is to Section D, Chapter VI, of the “Proposals for the 
Establishment of General International Organization,” drafted at the 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The section reads as follows: 
“PROCEDURE 
“1. The Security Council should be so organized as to be able to 
function continuously and each state member of the Security Counc 
i l should be permanently represented a t the headquarters of the

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285 
Organization. I t may hold meetings a t such other places as in i t s 
judgement may best facilitate i t s work. There should be periodic 
meetings at which each state member of the Security Council could 
i f i t so desired be represented by a member of the government or 
some other special representative. 
“2. The Security Council should be empowered to s e t up such 
bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of 
its functions including regional subcommittees of the Military Staff 
Committee. 
“3. The Security Council should adopt its own rules of procedure, 
including the method of selecting its President. 
“4. Any member of the Organization should participate in the 
discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever 
the Security Council considers that the interests of that member 
of the Organization are specially affected. 
“5. Any member of the Organization not having a seat on the 
Security Council and any state not a member of the Organization, if 
it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, 
should be invited to participate in the discussion relating to the 
dispute.” p. 169 
80 Code name for the conference of the leaders of the three Allied 
Powers—the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Britain—held in the Crimea 
in February 1945. p. 175 
81 The allusion is to the conference mentioned in Note 80 above. p. 177 
82 The Soviet Government reacted favourably to the request for 
permission to base U.S. air force on Komsomolsk and Nikolayevsk. 
p. 177 
83 That i s , the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic, which 
at that time had its seat in Lublin, Poland. pp. 178, 192 
84 The Soviet Government replied favourably to the request contained 
in the Memorandum. pp. 179, 180 
85 There were landing fields in the Poltava area which the U.S. Air 
Force used in 1944 and 1945 for bomb raids on enemy territory. pp. 184, 
185 
86 The San Francisco Conference was held between April 25 and 
June 26, 1945, to elaborate the Charter of the future international 
organisation for the maintenance of peace and security. pp. 187, 189, 193 
87 On March 16, 1945, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of 
the U.S.S.R. sent a l e t t e r to the U.S. Ambassador, which read as 
follows: 
“With reference to your letter concerning the Berne negotiations, 
which reached me on March 16, please be advised of the following: 
“On March 12 l a s t you informed me that the German General 
Wolff , and Dolmann and Simmer who were accompanying him, had 
arrived in Berne on March 9 to discuss with United States and British 
Army representatives the surrender of the German armed forces 
in Northern Italy. You also informed me that Field Marshal Alexander 
had been instructed to send his officers to Berne to meet the persons 
mentioned, and you asked for the Soviet Government’s views on 
the matter. 
“On the same day, March 12, I informed you that the Soviet Government 
had no objections to negotiations with General Wolff at 
Berne, provided Soviet officers representing the Soviet Military Com

286 
mand took part. In giving this reply, the Soviet Government had no 
doubt that the United States Government would react positively to 
its proposal for the participation of Soviet officers in the negotiations 
with the German General Wolff at Berne, and there and then named 
its representatives. 
“Today, March 16, I am in receipt of a letter from you which shows 
that the United States Government is barring the Soviet representatives 
from the Berne negotiations. The U.S. Government’s refusal to 
admit Soviet representatives to the Berne negotiations came as a 
complete surprise to the Soviet Government and i s inexplicable in 
terms of the relations of alliance existing between our two countries 
In view of this the Soviet Government finds i t impossible to assent 
to discussions at Berne between representatives of Britain and the 
United States, on the one hand, and of the German commander, on 
the other, and insists on the discussions already begun at Berne being 
discontinued. 
“The Soviet Government insists, furthermore, that henceforward 
separate negotiations by one or two of the Allied Powers with German 
representatives without the participation of the third Allied 
Power be precluded.” 
On March 22, 1945, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of 
the U.S.S.R. sent to the U.S. Ambassador a letter reading as follows: 
“Acknowledging receipt of your letter of March 21, 1945, regarding 
the Berne meeting between the German General Wolff and staff officers 
of Field Marshal Alexander, I hereby declare that I see no justification 
for your statement to the effect that the Soviet Government 
has a wrong view of the purpose of the contact a t Berne between 
the German General Wolff and Field Marshal Alexander’s representatives, 
for what we have in this case is not an erroneous notion of 
the purpose of the contact nor a misunderstanding, but something 
worse. 
“It appears from your letter of March 12 that the German General 
Wolff and those accompanying him came to Berne to negotiate with 
representatives of the Anglo-American Command the capitulation of 
the German forces in Northern Italy. The Soviet Government’s proposal 
that representatives of the Soviet Military Command should take 
part in the negotiations was rejected. 
“The result is that negotiations have been going on for two weeks 
at Berne, behind the back of the Soviet Union which is bearing the 
brunt of the war against Germany, between representatives of the 
German Military Command, on the one hand, and those of the British 
and U.S. Commands, on the other. The Soviet Government considers 
this absolutely impermissible and insists on its statement, set forth in 
my letter of March 16 last.” p. 188 
88 The Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.A., A. A. Gromyko, headed the 
Soviet Delegation at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of the U.S.S.R. 
the U.S.A. and Britain, held in August and September 1944 to discuss 
the establishment of the United Nations Organisation. p. 189 
89 The Declaration of Liberated Europe was adopted a t the Crimea 
Conference of the leaders of the three Allied Powers—the Soviet Union 
the U.S.A. and Britain—in February 1945. p. 192 
90 The allusion i s to the government crisis in Roumania in February 
1945, occasioned by the terror policy of the Radescu Government 
which was incompatible with the principle of democracy. The crisis 
was overcome by forming a new government under P. Groza on 
March 6, 1945. p. 192

287 
91 The reference is to the commission set up at the Crimea Conference 
of the leaders of the three Allied Powers—the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. 
and Britain—in February 1945. The commission was composed of the 
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. 
and British Ambassadors to the U.S.S.R. It was empowered to consult 
in Moscow primarily with members of the Polish Provisional Government 
and with other Polish democratic leaders both from Poland 
and abroad with an eye to reorganising the Polish Provisional Government 
on a broader democratic basis to include democratic leaders 
from Poland proper and Poles from abroad. pp. 192, 200, 204 
92 See paragraph 5 of the Stalin message of April 7, 1945 (Document 
No. 289, pp. 200-202). pp. 205, 208, 214 
93 This document was handed to V. M. Molotov by H. S. Truman in 
Washington. p. 208 
94 Field Marshal Alexander’s reports were thus franked.p. 212 
95 The reference is to the following message from W. S. Churchill to 
J. V. Stalin: 
“The Anglo-American armies will soon made contact in Germany 
with Soviet forces, and the approaching end of German resistance 
makes it necessary that the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union decide upon an orderly procedure for the occupation by 
their forces of zones which they will occupy in Germany and in Austria. 
“2. Our immediate task i s the final defeat of the German army. 
During this period the boundaries between the forces of the three 
Allies must be decided by the Commanders in the field and will be 
governed by operational considerations and requirements. It is inevitable 
that our armies will in this phase find themselves in occupation 
of territory outside the boundaries of the ultimate occupational zones. 
“3. When the fighting is finished, the next task is for the Allied 
Control Commissions to be set up in Berlin and Vienna, and for the 
forces of the Allies to be re-disposed and to take over their respective 
occupational zones. The demarcation of zones in Germany has already 
been decided upon and i t i s necessary that we shall without delay 
reach an agreement on the zones to be occupied in Austria a t the 
forthcoming meeting proposed by you in Vienna. 
“4. It appears now that no signed instrument of surrender will be 
forthcoming. In this event the governments should decide to set up 
at once the Allied Control Commissions, and to entrust to them the 
task of making detailed arrangements for the withdrawal of forces to 
their agreed occupational zones. 
“5. In order to meet the requirements of the situation referred to in 
paragraph 2 above, namely the emergency and temporary arrangements 
for tactical zones, instructions have been sent to General 
Eisenhower. These are as follows: 
“‘a) To avo id confusion between the two armies and to prevent 
either of them from expanding into areas already occupied by the 
other, both sides should halt as and where they meet, subject to such 
adjustments to the rear or to the flanks as are required, in the opinion 
of local commanders on either side, to deal with any remaining opposition. 
“‘b) As to adjustments of forces after the cessation of hostilities in 
an area, your troops should be disposed in accordance with military 
requirements regardless of zonal boundaries. You will, in so far as

288 
permitted by the urgency of the situation, obtain the approval of the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to any major adjustment in contrast 
to local adjustments for operational and administrative reasons.’ 
“6. I request that you will be so good as to issue similar instructions 
to your commanders in the field. 
“7. I am sending this message to you and President Truman simultaneously. 
“27th April, 1945.” p. 213 
96 The allusion is to the possibility of inviting Poland to the conference 
for drafting the Charter of the future international organisation for 
the maintenance of peace and security, which took place in San 
Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945. p. 217 
97 In connection with this message A. A. Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador 
to the U.S.A., received a letter from President Truman dated May 
8, 1945, and reading as follows: 
“Please inform Marshal Stalin that his message to me was received 
in the White House at one o’clock, this morning. However, by the 
time the message reached me, preparations had proceeded to such an 
extent that i t was not possible to give consideration to a postponement 
of my announcement of the German surrender.” p. 218 
98 The European Advisory Commission (EAC) was constituted by the 
Governments of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain under a decision of the 
Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference (October 19-30, 1943). It consisted 
of representatives of the three Powers. The purpose of the EAC 
was to study European problems designated by the three governments 
relating to termination of hostilities, and to give the three 
governments joint advice on these problems. On November 11, 1944 
the Governments of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain invited the Provisional 
Government of the French Republic to participate in the work 
of the European Advisory Commission with headquarters in London 
as its fourth permanent member. The EAC was dissolved in August 
1945. pp. 220, 233, 235 
99 The reference is to a letter from the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in the 
U.S.S.R. to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. 
dated May 15, 1945, conveying the text of the instructions which the 
U.S. Government had given to its Ambassador in Belgrade. The latter 
was instructed to inform the Yugoslav Government that the United 
States Government expected it to agree immediately to the Allied 
Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean establishing control over 
the area which was to include Trieste, Gorizia, Monfalcone and Pola, 
the lines of communication running through Gorizia and Monfalcone 
to Austria, as well as the area extending east of that line far 
enough to make possible the exercise of proper administrative control, 
and also that the Yugoslav Government would issue appropriate instructions 
to the Yugoslav forces in that area to cooperate with the 
Allied Commanders in establishing military administration in that 
area under the Allied Commander. pp. 221, 224 
100 A letter written by the U.S. Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. to the People’s 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on March 14, 1945 
proposed that the representatives of the Soviet, U.S. and British Government 
should discuss the situation in Roumania with a view to 
arriving at genuinely concerted policies and procedures “in assisting 
the Roumanians to solve their pressing political problems.” p. 230

289 
101 The reference i s to the l e t t e r which the U.S. Ambassador in the 
U.S.S.R. sent to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the 
U.S.S.R. on May 30, 1945. It contained the texts of a Note and of a 
military agreement between the Anglo-American Command in the 
Mediterranean and Tito, sent to the U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade for 
the Yugoslav Government. p. 230 
102 The Agreement between the Soviet and United States Governments 
on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the 
War Against Aggression was signed in Washington on June 11, 1942. 
p. 232 
103 On June 9, 1945, an agreement was signed in Belgrade between the 
U.S., British and Yugoslav Governments for a provisional military 
administration in Venezia Giulia. pp. 233, 238 
104 The Allied Control Council was constituted under agreements relating 
to the administration of Germany concluded by representatives 
of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Britain and France in Berlin on June 5, 1945. 
The purpose of the Council, which consisted of representatives of the 
four Powers, was the practical exercise in Germany of a single and 
agreed Allied policy in the period of occupation. pp. 233, 241 
105 The writer has in mind the Crimea Conference agreement on Far Eastern 
matters, reached between the three Great Powers on February 11, 
1945. p. 234 
106 Code name for the Berlin Conference of the leaders of the three Powers—
the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain—held in July- 
August 1945. p. 239 
107 The U.S. President’s request, outlined in his message of July 21, 1945, 
was granted by the Soviet Government. U.S. aerological stations were 
set up in Khabarovsk and Petropavlovsk. The purpose of the stations 
was to transmit weather reports to the U.S. naval and air forces operating 
against Japan. Both stations were dismantled in December 
1945, after the war against Japan. p. 241 
108 On August 10,1945, the Japanese Government submitted to the Governments 
of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A., Britain and China the following 
statement: 
“The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated 
in the Joint Declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 
26t h , 1945 by the heads of the Governments of the United States, 
Great Britain and China, and later subscribed by the Soviet Government, 
with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise 
any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty 
as a sovereign ruler. 
“The Japanese Government hope sincerely that this understanding 
i s warranted and desire keenly that an explicit indications to that 
effect will be speedily forthcoming.” 
On August 11, 1945, the U.S. Department of State sent the reply of 
the Governments of the U.S.A., the Soviet Union, Great Britain and 
China to the Japanese Government’s statement of August 10. It read 
as follows: 
“With regard to the Japanese Government’s message accepting the 
terms of the Potsdam proclamation but containing the statement

290 
‘with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise 
any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as 
Sovereign Ruler’, our position is as follows: 
“From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and 
the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers; who will take such steps 
as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. 
“The Emperor will be required to authorise and ensure the signature 
by the Government of Japan and Japanese Imperial G.H.Q. of 
the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam 
Declaration, and shall issue his commands to al l the Japanese 
military, naval, and air authorities, and to all the forces under their 
control wherever located, to cease active operations and surrender 
their arms, and to issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander 
may require to give effect to the surrender terms. 
“Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall 
transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, 
as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transport. 
“The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance 
with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed 
will of the Japanese people. 
“The armed forces of the Allied Powers will remain in Japan unt 
i l the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration are achieved.” 
The reply was transmitted to the Japanese Government through 
the Swiss Government. p. 248 
109 The reference is to the first session of the Foreign Ministers’ Council of 
the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Britain, France and China held in London on September 
11-October 2, 1945. The Council was formed by decision of 
the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain 
(July 17-August 2, 1945). pp. 259, 260, 261, 262, 264 
110 The allusion is to the preparation of the draft peace treaties with Italy, 
Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland by the Deputy Foreign 
Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Britain, the U.S.A. and France. pp. 263, 267 
111 The reference is to the message received on December 9, 1945 (see 
Document No. 381 on p. 266). It was conveyed to the People’s Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. by the U.S. Embassy in the 
U.S.S.R. in a Note dated December 8, 1945. p. 266 
112 The Allied Council for Japan—an international body constituted under 
an agreement reached at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers 
of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain (December 16-26, 1945). The 
Council consisted of four members (one each from the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. 
and China, and one member representing Britain, Australia, New 
Zealand and India). The Supreme Commander of the allied occupation 
troops in Japan was obliged to consult with the Allied Council on 
occupation policy in Japan. The Council became inoperative in April 
1953. p. 267 
113 The Far Eastern Commission—an international body formed to work 
out agreed decisions ensuring the fulfilment by Japan of its commitments 
under the surrender terms signed on September 2, 1945. The 
Commission was constituted under an agreement reached at the Moscow 
Foreign Ministers’ Conference (December 16-26, 1945). It consisted 
of representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain, China, France, the 
Netherlands Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and the Philippines. 
It was joined by representatives of Pakistan and Burma in 1949.

On April 25, 1952, the United States unilaterally announced the dissolution 
of the Commission. p. 267 
114 This message was handed to J. V. Stalin by U.S. Secretary of State 
Byrnes. p. 268 
115 The conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. 
and Britain, which sat in Moscow from December 16 to 26, took decisions 
concerning a Far Eastern Commission and an Allied Council for 
Japan, and the drafting of peace treaties with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Finland. p. 268 
116 The conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. 
and Britain, held in Moscow between December 16 and 26, 1945, resolved 
to submit to the United Nations General Assembly recommendations 
for a United Nations commission to explore problems arising 
from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters. p. 268


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