[Part 2 -- Chapters II and III]
THE <<NAIM FRASHERI>> PUBLISHING HOUSE
TIRANA, 1982
|
C O N T E N T S | ||
|
II | ||
|
THE BACKSTAGE PLOT OF BERET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
129-222 | |
|
|
THE <<STOJNIC MISSION>> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |
|
The <<Stojnic mission>> in Albania * Nijaz Dizdarevic -- the <<éminence grise>> of Nako Spiru * The Soviet Major Ivanov <<is informed>> about us through Stojnic * The establishment of our main leadership in liberated Berat * Nako Spiru, Koçi Xoxe, Sejfulla Maleshova and Pandi Kristo are engaged in the Titoite plot. Liri Gega in the role of the <<scapegoat>> * Three steps of the <<Stojnic mission>>: first -- the departure of Miladin Popvic from Albania; second -- the split of our Political Bureau; third -- the split of the CC of the CPA and the condemnation of our main leadership * The seeds of disruption and self-exposure are growing behind the <<unity>> of the p}otters * V. Stojnic's discussion -- the Titoite platform for the subjugation of the CPA and the gobbling up of Albania * Tito, the intermediary of the British * The people's revolts in Kosova * Stojnic serves up the idea of the <<Balkan Federation>> headed by Yugoslavia * The bitter fruits of the Berat Plenum. |
| |
|
III | ||
|
TITO'S SECRET AGENCY IN ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
223-270 | |
|
|
<<DEFENCE>> DE JURE IN ORDER TO GOBBLE UP | |
|
Belgrade sent the Albanian-speaking Titoite Josip Djerdja in place of Stojnic * The 7th Cabinet for. . . Albania in the chancellery of the Yugoslav Federation * Why is Tito <<against>> the partitioning of Albania?! * The truth on the Pijade-Tsaldaris negotiations in August 1946 * A <<joke>> between Tito and King Paul about the dividing up of Albania * Debate on the policy of elections to the Constituent Assembly; S. Malëshova: <<We must allow the opposition freedon to take part in the elections independently>>; K. Xoxe: <<The Yugoslav comrades were not afraid to reach agreement even with the bourgeois>>; N. Spiru: <<We have no reason to fear our opponents now>>; The people: <<We prefer not to vote at all rather than vote for the reactionaries.>> * Quarrels break out between the plotters themselves * The 5th Plenum of the CC of the CPA in February 1946 * The theses for the re-examination of the Berat Plenum * Belgrade helping its own agents. | ||
page 129
page 130
increased and tempered its ranks, worked out and consistently followed a clear and correct Marxist-Leninist line in all the fields and, as a result, great victories were achieved.
The strengthening and consolidation of the Anti-fascist National Liberation Front, the organization and strengthening of national liberation councils in villages and cities constitute further evidence of the colossal work and struggle which our Party carried out in that period. The 2nd National Liberation Conference held in Labinot of Elbasan in September 1943 and its very important decisions[1] set the course for all the great and far-sighted work of the Party for the creation of the new state of people's democracy in Albania. The crowning of this work was the organization and holding of the historic Congress of Përmet with complete success in May 1944, a congress which finally accomplished one of the strategic tasks of the Party -- the creation of the new Albanian state of people's democracy.
During this period, in ceaseless clashes with the occupier and the local traitors, the Albanian National Liberation Army rapidly increased its ranks, was armed and tempered in battle, and affirmed itself as an army of the new type. Apart from other things, it successfully withstood one of the heaviest blows of the enemy -- the great nazi Winter Operation of 1943-1944, and in the spring of 1944, on the orders of the General Staff it seized the initiative and launched a counter-offensive. After the creation of a considerable number
page 131
of brigades and other units, which in May 1944 included more than 35 000 fighters in their ranks, apart from the territorial çetas and the armed volunteers in the villages, we went on to the formation of the 1st Shock Division and, a little later, of the 2nd Shock Division of the ANLA. At the end of May 1944 as Commander-in-Chief, I issued the order to the National Liberation Army to launch a general offensive for the complete liberation of Albania from the German occupiers and for the total destruction of the Balli Kombëtar and the Legaliteti and all the other forces of reaction. The flames of the decisive battle swept Albania from south to north. Everything was going well, both on the external front against the Hitlerite forces and on the internal front. The decisive victory was not far off.
Precisely at this period, the efforts and attempts of the Anglo-American allies to interfere savagely in our internal affairs[1], to prevent Albania slipping from their fingers were intensified as never before. However, we defeated these plans of the allies in time. In the future, too; we were to display unrelenting vigilance and care to neutralize the Anglo-American threat. We were to have struggles and battles with them, but in the final analysis, their cause in Albania was lost.
Precisely at these moments when the storm of the war and the revolution in Albania had reached its climax, Tito's emissary Colonel Velimir Stojnic and his aide Nijaz Dizdarevic[2] arrived at our General Staff. Their arrival marked the beginning of one of the most difficult and delicate periods of our wartime and post-war history -- the period of open and secret clashes and conflicts with the Belgrade leadership.
page 132
Thus, for several years on end, the CPA and the Albanian people were to be involved in a new, peculiar war, without artillery and machine-guns, but just as difficult, if not more so, and with more dangerous consequences than the war with weapons against the open enemies.
<<The task of our mission,>> he told us at the first meeting in Helmës, <<is, first, to transmit in a fraternal way to your General Staff the experience of the Yugoslav Staff in connection with big combined operations now that the German troops are withdrawing from Greece; second, to establish regular liaison between the general staffs and armies of our two countries, to examine the possibilities to co-ordinate our actions in large-scale joint operations in the future, and third, to assist in the further organization of the sister army of Albania.>>
Very quickly, however, from the first conversation with this colonel and his main aide Nijaz Dizdarevic, we were to become convinced that their mission was military only in name, in its label and method of operation. Indeed, at the first meeting Stojnic himself told us that he had come also as <<instructor of the CC of the CPY>> attached to our leadership, but we did not accept him in this capacity and he quite openly expressed his annoyance. The truth is that he came for other <<duties>>. Some of them, those most obvious and which, with the level of our knowledge at those moments, we could recognize most readily, we were to understand at that time. The others were to become clear later, when we went back again and again over all those things which
page 133
occurred from the moment the Stojnic team arrived in Albania.
Time was to prove that, above all, the <<Stojnic mission>> was a special mission which was sent by Tito to Albania at the end of the war for sinister political aims, for sabotage and espionage. It came to organize the attack on the CPA and its line, to subjugate the CPA, to turn it into a tool and appendage of the CPY. It came precisely on the eve of the complete liberation of Albania in order to attack the foundations on which the new people's state power was being erected, and to prepare the terrain for turning Albania into the 7th Republic of Yugoslavia.
On account of the special relations we had created with the CPY, we welcomed the new emissary of the Yugoslav leadership warmly and whole-heartedly. He told us about the situation in Yugoslavia, the partisan war and the successes achieved under the leadership of the CPY and Tito. And we, too, at the first meeting, told him in a comradely way about the situation and successes of our army, about the Front and the new people's state power which was being set up.
<<Some other day,>> he said, <<I can also tell you about the organization and experience of our Communist Party.>>
<<We shall be very pleased to hear these things,>> I said. <<Ours is a young party and we need to know the experience of older and bigger parties and to exchange opinions.>>
So, at another meeting, Velimir Stojnic talked to us about the CPY, about its past, as well as about the war and the correct development which it assumed once Josip Broz Tito came to the leadership, and the great authority which the party had won among the people through the heroic war towards victory it was waging under his leadership.
On this occasion, I, too, spoke about the history of our Party from its founding, about how it had extended and the successes it had achieved, etc., etc. As soon as I finished, the colonel threw off his <<military>> role and said:
<<In fact, my main mission is military, but as a party cadre and on the special instruction of the leadership of our
page 134
party, I shall also talk about party matters and everything else,>> and assuming a very serious air, he began to make <<criticisms>> of us over our line and to list the <<mistakes>> which our Party had allegedly committed <<continually>>!
One of the <<main>> criticisms which Velimir Stojnic had brought was the allegation that the line of our Party had <<continually>> vacillated from right to left, and he did not fail to link the <<opportunism>> of our line with the criticisms of Vukmanovic-Tempo. In fact, Tempo had advocated fratricidal war, had advised us to attack the newly emerged Balli Kombëtar and had criticized the efforts of our Party to win misled elements away from the Balli Kombëtar. For his part, Velimir Stojnic accused us of opportunism in our line and <<proved>> this with the fact that representatives of the General Council of the National Liberation Front held talks with representatives of the Balli Kombëtar in the Mukje village near Kruja at the end of July and the beginning of August 1943. At the same time, while describing Mukje as an <<opportunist act>>, using the same <<argument>>, he reproached us for being sectarian, because we had not continued the talks with these collaborators with Italian fascism and traitors to our people.
After listening quietly to this person (whom at that time we considered at least ill-informed about our line), I said to him:
<<Not only are you in contradiction with yourself and with Tempo, but you force me to the conclusion that you don't know the situation in our country. You have to understand that the Balli Kombëtar is the front of betrayal, its chiefs are collaborators with the Italian fascists. From the moment that the Balli Kombëtar was formed our Party appealed to its members to unite against the occupiers. This was not opportunism in our line, but a correct application of the line. The Balli Kombëtar fought us and collaborated with the Italian occupiers. On the eve of the capitulation of Italy new situations were being created in our war, and we had to take advantage of them. To this end, we appealed
page 135
once again to the members of the Balli Kombëtar to join in the war, both against the Italian occupiers who were on the verge of capitulation, and against the new German occupiers. The chiefs of the Balli Kombëtar responded to our call to hold talks and to decide what should be done later. We had our objectives and they had theirs. They came to the talks with us to gain a little credit after the great discredit they had suffered among the people, while, as I said, we set out with the aim of drawing the Balli Kombëtar into the war against the new occupiers, the savage German nazis. If the chiefs of the Balli Kombëtar were to continue to play their old game this time, too, then they would be more thoroughly and finally exposed in the eyes of the people and would be abandoned by the misled elements who comprised the base of that organization. That is why the Mukje Meeting was held. The delegates of our National Liberation Front had been clearly instructed that they were going to Mukje to tell the Balli Kombëtar to join in the war and that beyond this no compromise could be made with them. The chiefs of the Balli Kombëtar had their own plans at Mukje. They not only wanted to create a joint committee, but also wanted parity in the leadership of the Albania of the future. Those who demanded this were those who had collaborated openly with fascist Italy, and they demanded this at a time when they gave no guarantee that they would fight against the Germans and when, amongst other things, they wanted us to accept the thesis of <<greater Albania>> and <<ethnic Albania>>. And the two delegates of our Party fell for the Balli Kombëtar's trap and accepted its demands, because one of them, Mustafa Gjinishi, as it is emerging, was an agent of the British Intelligence Service, and the other, Ymer Dishnica, was an opportunist. Immediately the Party learned of this betrayal by its delegates, it denounced it. Therefore, Comrade Velimir, I tell you that your criticisms of our Party and its leadership either of opportunism or of sectarianism are without foundation.>>
<<I insist that your condemnation of Mukje was sectarian-
page 136
ism,>> repeated Velimir. <<You should have found the language to persuade the chiefs of the Balli Kombëtar.>>
<<Never! That would have been betrayal, betrayal of the Party,>> replied Miladin very angrily. <<Had we done that the Albanian people ought to have lined us up against the wall and shot us. Why did this people and this Party fight? To share power with reaction?>>
The debate flared up and went on for a long time. Velimir, Miladin and I did most of the speaking. Koçi Xoxe sat completely silent, but according to the argument, sometimes went red and sometimes pale, while Nako Spiru had no <<chance>> to engage in the debate: his knowledge of Italian had tied him up with number 2 in the <<Stojnic mission>>, with the clever and cunning Yugoslav Nijaz Dizdarevic, to whom he translated what we said.
<<I do not say you should share power,>> Stojnic replied indignantly to Miladin Popovic. <<You ought to have taken part in the meetings envisaged at Mukje, this is what I want to say. Don't try to conceal your sectarianism. It is blatant!>>
<<In what do you see it?>> I asked him.
<<In what I said about the way you acted with regard to Mukje. But I have other facts, too. Liri Gega and Mehmet Shehu have made your sectarianism obvious. By what name shall we call what they are doing?>>
<<They have their own faults and we have criticized them for these things and we shall look into them more deeply. But don't forget that their close collaborator, indeed, their inspirer in all their distortions and sectarian acts, has been your comrade. Dusan Mugosa.>>
<<Leave Mugosa out of this,>> interrupted Stojnic, <<he belongs to us and we shall look into his work. I am referring to your comrades. In Vlora Liri Gega appoints and removes whoever she likes in the regional committee and the command. At Peqin Mehmet Shehu kills 50-60 ballists from the villages of Lushnja, in the North Liri is brandishing a naked sword.>>
<<You seem to be well-acquainted with our-situation!>> I said with obvious sarcasm.
page 137
<<I believe I am! Indeed, I know it very well!>> replied Velimir Stojnic arrogantly.
<<Comrade colonel!>> I put in in a stern tone there and then. <<We are friends and comrades, we respect and honour your party and fraternal people, but excuse me, it seems to me you are going beyond your military authority, either as a delegate of the Yugoslav General Staff or as a member of another party. Your interference in our affairs is out of place and your tone is unacceptable.>>
<<We are communists, first of all,>> he said backing down a little. <<There is nothing wrong with our talking about these questions. I told you that I have special instructions from Comrade Tito to talk with you about these matters, too.>>
<<All right,>> I said, <<we can talk as communists, but bear in mind where you are speaking and why.>>
<<I beg your pardon,>> he replied, blushing: <<Perhaps I used some ill-considered expression, but you must understand, I say everything in a comradely way, for your benefit, because we are friends. I have no other aim. But let us leave this for today, we'll talk about it more calmly another time.>>
We parted coldly although we smiled and shook hands. However, I could not get what had occurred out of my mind, especially the unexpected accusation of <<sectarianism>>. A year earlier we had made efforts to win the nationalist elements and anyone else to the course of the war against the occupier and for this Tempo accused us of <<opportunism>>, while now, when we had put the Balli Kombëtar firmly in its place, it emerges that we had fallen into <<sectarianism>>. This was intolerable and I said to Miladin:
<<I don't understand this. Do these delegates want to help us or do they want 'to catch' us, or saddle us with a 'mistake' at all costs. . . ?!>>
Miladin forced a smile, slapped me on the shoulder and said nothing. It was a smile which I had rarely seen on the face of my comrade-in-arms and in hardships. In that smile there was despair, regret, and perhaps also suspicion about what the comrades of his Party were pouring out.
page 138
<<Let us fight, let us fight and forge ahead,>> he said, <<and these matters will be cleared up. After all, Tempo and Velo [Velimir Stojnic] and the devil knows who else are neither the CPY, nor the CC of the CPY.>>
<<I wouldn't want to put that in doubt,>> I said.
Those were days full of work, tension and most difficult and varied problems which demanded correct and urgent solutions. During those days and nights, the comrades and I devoted a great part of our time and strength to preparing the strategic and operational plans for the battles which the divisions and other big and small units of our army were waging, or that we planned for them to wage in the general offensive which had been launched. The major problems in the life of the Party, in the army and amongst the civilian population, the problems of the Front and the national liberation councils demanded time and effort from us. Moreover, at the Congress of Përmet we had formed the Anti-fascist National Liberation Committee which performed the functions of the Democratic Government, and the most important thing was that this government was not just a creation on paper or a group of people who had to sit waiting for the day when they would take power.
No, we were a government in action, a government which had power over most of Albania and from day to day this power was being extended to the towns, villages and regions which were liberated. On some other occasion I shall relate in detail what an endless field of complex problems was this of the creation, organization and running of the state and what efforts, work, studies and debates we had to carry out. I want to stress only that the situation, the phase which our war had reached, and a series of other circumstances compelled us to think of and be responsible for everything -- from the major problems of the final battle for liberation, from ensuring food and shelter for the population of the liberated zones, and indeed, even unliberated zones, from the organization of the first work of construction to the taking of preliminary measures for the phase when the Party and the people
page 139
would have the whole of Albania free and democratic. In our way, we had the Anglo-American allies, who, like experienced political gamblers, played new cards day after day to lead us up a blind alley, and around us we had internal reaction which saw that it was losing its case and tried to create a thousand obstacles and difficulties for us. Add to this the lack of experience of nearly all of us in the problems of the organization and running of a new state, add the marked lack of cadres, and the picture becomes more or less clear. And precisely in the midst of all this work, with its endless series of difficulties and cardinal, great and little problems, the <<Stojnic mission>> is sent amongst us with its predetermined objectives and aims.
In the first days of September we had gone down to Odriçan (Helmës with its few houses could not shelter all of us), and from there through many ceaseless contacts we led the whole country. The telephone never stopped ringing, radio messages came from all directions, the coming and going of couriers and comrades was uninterrupted. Sometimes, Velimir Stojnic came, too, for a <<consultation>>, for <<assistance>> or simply to say dobar dan.[*] He tried to learn everything and poked his nose everywhere. At one moment, when I was exchanging a couple of words with him in passing, the signals officer came to me and said:
<<Comrade Commander! They report from Gjirokastra that they are going to blow up the Dragot Bridge. German convoys are approaching from the Drino and the Vjosa gorges, and the Dragot Bridge is a key point. They want your opinion.>>
<<In no way!>> I told him. <<Transmit the order immediately not to blow up the Dragot Bridge, but to defend it at all costs.>>
<<Where is this bridge?>> asked Velimir Stojnic all interest immediately.
I went up to the map and pointed it out to him.
<<Why shouldn't it be blown up?!>> he exploded as if a
page 140
wasp had stung him. <<It's an extremely strategic bridge. If the German columns cross it that will open up a lot of trouble for you and also for us. Let the Germans be cut up and wiped out on the other side, otherwise they'll penetrate all through Albania and even into Yugoslavia.>>
<<Don't worry,>> I told him, <<our order is that between Kakavia and Hani i Hotit[1] no German is to be left alive. And if some are left we shall pursue them, hot foot, over our borders.>>
<<Then, why not destroy this bridge?!>> he asked again. <<Blowing it up would greatly hinder their penetration. . .>>
<<Because the time has come when we need the bridges. A good many of them have been and are being blown up by the Germans and the officers of the British missions are astoundingly zealous about blowing up many others. But now that our military forces have all our roads and gorges and mountains under control, to blow up the bridge means to blow up the property of the people in power. You don't realize that the Dragot Bridge is a strategic point for our operations. As to stopping the enemy columns, I must tell you that the Këlcyra Gorge is near the bridge and our forces have made it impassable for the Germans.>>
The chief of the Yugoslav military mission went away displeased. As I said, in fact military problems were not his main mission. But in this aspect, too, those who had sent him had charged him with tasks. One of these was to <<influence>> us so that during this period we would engage the maximum number of German units which were deployed in Albania, or those withdrawing from Greece, in battle on our territory, and hence, not permit the penetration of nazi forces into Yugoslavia As we heard later, on the orders of the Yugoslav General Staff, they had formed a strong defensive curtain on the borders between Greece and Macedonia,
page 141
with the aim of preventing the withdrawal of the Germans in that strategic direction. Thus, Albania remained the only <<door>> for their withdrawal. Hence, through this <<division of doors>> the mortally wounded nazi beast was to pour its final ferocity on our territories and forces.
Naturally, it had never crossed our minds that such a division of roles could be made during the war. We had always fought with all our might and possibilities to kill every nazi wherever we found him, without ever considering that we could make an <<advantageous tactical withdrawal>> into some safe spot in order to leave the enemy to be wiped out by somebody else. All the battles we had waged up till August 1944 had proved this; it was proved to the best, also, by the heroic and uninterrupted fighting of our forces from August to November 1944 and, after the liberation of Albania, by the fact that a good part of these forces continued the hot pursuit of the nazis beyond our state borders into Yugoslavia. In short, for this part of his mission Velimir Stojnic had to exert no effort. He was left free to concentrate on other, more important aspects. And as I said, he began this work as soon as he set foot in Albania.
How did Velimir Stojnic and his associates begin their work? They divided their roles. Velimir posed as <<competent>> on the organization of the army, the party, the state, the security service, education, culture, etc. In a word, he was <<a great brain>> and it was <<a great favour>> that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia did our Party by sending such a man to give us <<experience>>.
For his part, Nijaz Dizdarevic was a real fox; clever, but evil and a dyed-in-the-wool intriguer. The things he knew, he knew thoroughly and expressed well. He had been charged to work with our youth and to organize them in resistance against the Party, if it opposed the implementation of the diabolical plans of the Yugoslavs. Nijaz Dizdarevic not only became the éminence grise * of Nako Spiru, but
page 142
he also played on people's <<heart strings>> in the interests of the Yugoslav UDB. During the plot, he <<fell in love>> with a member of the plenum of the Central Committee of our Party, promised to marry her and, when he had gathered all the information he needed, cleared off and left her.
A few days before the arrival of the <<Stojnic mission>>, a Soviet major, Ivanov, had also come to Helmës. As can be imagined, we welcomed him with open arms and with all the honours befitting the representative of the glorious army of Stalin. But it was regrettable that Major Ivanov should represent such an army as the Red Army. He was a clever, cunning type, and as became apparent later, he, too, had come on a military mission, as well as on other <<special>> missions. I well remember how he sat the whole day near the stairs waiting for Colonel Stojnic, and the fact is that Ivanov was <<informed>> about Albania and us, its fighters, in the light in which Stojnic described us. Regrettably the Soviet Union was being informed about Albania through the eyes of Stojnic, and not only on the eve of liberation, but also for several years afterwards the Soviets were <<acquainted>> with us through the tales that Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and others concocted. At every opportunity Major Ivanov continually boosted Velimir Stojnic and Nijaz Dizdarevic to <<convince>> us that <<the two Yugoslav comrades have capacity>>. In reality, however, Velimir Stojnic was a young ass, a very ordinary person, who had learned a few formulas by rote and could speak only about them, apart from the instructions which they had given him and which he would draw from his briefcase and quote time after time.
The first arguments they had with us, especially the clear-cut objections which Miladin and I raised, completely convinced Velimir Stojnic and Nijaz Dizdarevic that they must set to work at once to bring about radical changes. Velimir Stojnic worked persistently to build up a tense situation. He communicated every day by radio with Tito's
page 143
staff, especially with its organizational secretary -- Rankovic, wherefrom he received instructions about how he should act.
When he saw that Miladin, as a Yugoslav, did not support them in the criticisms they made, but, on the contrary, opposed them, he sought to remove him from the scene and to isolate me from the comrades in order to attack me more easily. And this is what he did. We were still at Odriçan when he managed to get rid of Miladin. He passed on to him Tito's order that <<Miladin should return as quickly as possible to Yugoslavia and present himself to report>>. The villainy of the Velimir Stojnic group went so far that they did not inform me even <<in a comradely way>> about this decision which was taken about a comrade who had worked three or four years with us and had fought together with us. They had instructed Miladin that, when he talked with me about his departure, he must not tell me that they had summoned him to report, but simply that <<they were sending him to work on another task in Yugoslavia.>>
At first, to avoid upsetting me, he did not tell me the truth.
<<But why precisely at these moments?!>> I asked him. <<Just a few more weeks and Albania will be liberated. Let us enter Tirana together once more, not illegally, with bombs and pistols in our pockets, as in 1941 and 1942, but freely, as victors, then you can go. I'll gather the people and say to them: 'You see this chap. He is a Montenegrin, a Yugoslav. But he is ours, he's an Albanian, too. His name is Miladin Popovic, we call him Ali Gostivari. He is our comrade, our brother, a communist who for four years on end, together with us and with you, fought and made sacrifices, grew up with us, and gave everything he had for this victory, for freedom. Now he is going away. All of you should kiss him and wish him good-bye!'>> As I said this Ali Gostivari wept.
<<Listen,>> I said, <<you have to stay a few more weeks to see freedom!>>
page 144
<<I want to so badly, Enver, but. . . I have to go. This is the order from my centre.>>
I sensed that he was hiding something from me. I met Stojnic and asked him in the name of our leadership to intervene with his leadership to postpone the order.
<<That cannot be done,>> said Velimir Stojnic, cold and inexorable. <<Comrade Tito issues an order only once.>>
<<Very well,>> I said, <<but how, by what route, is he to go to Yugoslavia?>>
<<Over the mountains,>> he replied. <<We are still at war.>>
<<No,>> I said, <<we shall not allow this. In 1942 and 1943, when we were illegal, we picked up Blazo and Tempo and sent them on their way by car, when they were fit and well, and we cannot fail to do the same thing for Miladin now that we are almost liberated. You know that he is ill with tuberculosis.>>
<<But what can we do?>> he asked, and added, <<I know only this: he must leave as quickly as possible for Yugoslavia.>>
A plan came to my mind and I sought an urgent meeting with one of the officers of the British Mission. It was the time when the British wanted to be on <<good terms>> with us, so that we would approve their repeated <<variants>> of a landing[1]. At that time we had also reached an agreement with them for a number of seriously wounded partisans to be treated in the allied hospitals in Bari of Italy. The British officer presented himself in the room where I worked.
<<Mister officer,>> I said, <<I want to ask a confidential favour from you.>>
He forgot he was a military man and bowed from <<satisfaction>> that I was giving him the opportunity to do me such a favour.
<<A partisan, a close friend of mine, is very ill. Could you use your possibilities to transport him as quickly as possible to Bari?!>>
<<Of course, tomorrow evening!>> replied the British
page 144
officer very <<readily>> and continued, <<you have given me the opportunity, General, to tell you that I want to discuss something with you.>>
I had taken into account that I would have to pay <<the reckoning>>.
<<The day after tomorrow, in the morning,>> I agreed there and then.
<<All right!>> the British officer clicked his heels together and left.
I met Miladin and Stojnic and said to the latter:
<<Tomorrow evening we are going to send Miladin to Bari under his Albanian name Ali Gostivari. Get in touch with your staff so that they take measures for the Yugoslav representatives attached to the Allied Command in Italy to meet him. From there I believe room will be found for Miladin Popovic in one of the ships or aircraft which link your staff with the Allied Command every day.>>
Velimir Stojnic's face darkened with anger that this matter had been settled so neatly, but he had no way to oppose it. We parted.
Before he left, Miladin was strolling thoughtfully. I caught up with him and when we were approaching the church square in Odriçan he put his arm round my shoulders and said to me:
<<Enver, I didn't tell you yesterday because I didn't want to add to your distress, but you ought to know. I'm going because I'm forced to do so in Tito's name. They're not pleased with my work. But I tell you one thing: this Velimir Stojnic and Nijaz Dizdarevic are behaving like enemies. Watch out for them! I only hope that I reach Yugoslavia alive and I'm able to meet Tito, because I'm not going to keep quiet and let them go undenounced.>>
So they removed Miladin.
Immediately after we farewelled him, I summoned Velimir Stojnic to my office, and asked him the reason for Miladin's departure. He said coldly:
page 176
<<It was an order from Tito that he should return to Yugoslavia.>>
<<I trust,>> I said, <<that Tito has not ordered that this decision about a comrade who worked in these difficult years together with our Party should not be communicated to me.>>
<<Has Miladin informed you about this?>> he asked.
<<He informed me, but it was up to you to do such a thing,>> I said coldly and asked: <<Why was Miladin summoned to Yugoslavia?>>
<<To render account,>> he replied in an arrogant tone.
<<I don't object to his going or to his rendering account about his work to the CC of the CPY,>> I said, <<but I should have been informed. If it is simply a question of 'rendering account',>> I continued, <<Miladin ought first to render account to our Party, where he worked. And I tell you that he worked very well, as an internationalist communist, while you have not acted correctly. This is my view.>>
<<You stick to your view and we shall stick to ours,>> said Velimir Stojnic and we parted, shaking hands coldly.
After this the second step of the <<Stojnic mission,>> began. I was left as the focal point of the attack. Of course, I did not know and those days I did not even realize what was being prepared and hatched up around me, but I could not fail to be aware of the cold atmosphere that was being created.
In the last days of our stay at Odriçan, Velimir Stojnic came to my office and said to me in a serious tone:
<<Comrade General Secretary. . .>>
I understood that he had come on <<party matters>> because he had adopted certain <<special>> rules of protocol in his relations with us: when he came on military matters he began with <<Comrade Commander>>, when he came on <<state matters>> he began with <<Comrade Chairman>>, when he came on party affairs he began with <<Comrade General Secretary>>.
<<Recently we have had a number of discussions but have
page 147
not carried them through to the finish. I think that we ought to go into them thoroughly,>> he said.
<<When the opportunity and possibilities present themselves,>> I replied. <<You realize how busy we are.>>
<<I see that,>> he said, <<but I consider this necessary. These questions are important for your line, for all your work.>>
<<Very well,>> I said. <<As soon as I find the opportunity I shall inform you.>>
<<No, no. I think we should go into them extensively in the Bureau of your Central Committee. Indeed, I find it regrettable that up till now you have not summoned the Bureau to hear me officially.>>
<<The Bureau, Comrade Stojnic,>> I told him, <<meets according to the plan of work it has, according to the problems and conditions which present themselves to us. But I telI you sincerely I have not considered and do not consider it reasonable to summon the Bureau over those matters which you raise.>>
<<This ought to have been done long ago,>> he said in a stern and offended tone. <<As far as I know you are soon to hold a meeting of the Bureau. The comrades have been assembled and indeed I was introduced to Liri Gega who had just arrived from the North.>>
<<It is quite true that we have a meeting of the Bureau,>> I said, <<but it is a meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee of our Party and I tell you frankly that your request to take part in it is out of place and unacceptable.>>
<<Do you mean to say that you are still against my taking part in it?>>
<<You should not even make such requests, which are contrary to the norms of an independent party, irrespective of our fraternal relations.>>
As he stared at me for quite a pause, without speaking. I saw an expression of internal anger and a cynical smile. Then he muttered something and stalked out. What this smile implied I understood as soon as we had begun the meeting of our Political Bureau. We had decided that at this
page 148
meeting we would analyse the more urgent problems of the situation, decide on the work plan of the Bureau for the period up till the liberation of Albania, and the main item, I was to present the main theses of the report which we were to make to the coming plenum of the CC of the Party. Those present at the meeting were Koçi Xoxe, Nako Spiru, Ramadan (Çitaku, Liri Gega and I (two other former members of the Bureau, Ymer Dishnica and Gjin Marku, elected at the 1st National Conference in March 1943, had been expelled from the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the Party some time earlier: Ymer Dishnica for the betrayal he had committed at Mukje with the Balli Kombëtar in August 1943, and Gjin Marku for his almost complete failure to take part in the meetings of the Political Bureau as well as for his notorious compromise with the Germans in Berat in the autumn of 1943).[1]
As soon as we began the meeting of the Political Bureau, Koçi Xoxe got up and said:
<<I propose we should invite the delegate of the Yugoslav leadership, Comrade Stojnic, to take part in this meeting.>>
Ramadan Çitaku and I, and at first Liri Gega, too, totally opposed this. Nako Spiru was in solidarity with Koçi Xoxe. The meeting of the Bureau about the most important current and future problems suddenly became a battle of words:
<<He is chief of the military mission,>> said Ramadan Çitaku, <<why should he come to the Bureau?>>
<<He is the representative of a sister army and a sister party!>> put in Koçi Xoxe.
<<Then let us call Ivanov, too,>> I replied. <<Indeed, accord-
page 149
ing to this logic,>> I added sarcastically, <<we should even invite the Englishman as an observer, he is our ally. . .>>
Tempers blazed and this was completely unexpected and astonishing to me. Never before had such a scene occurred Since we were failing to agree, it was proposed to put the matter to the vote. Unexpectedly Liri Gega raised her hand together with Koçi Xoxe and Nako Spiru. Ramadan &cCedil;itaku and I were left in the minority.
In this way Velimir Stojnic was given the right to take part, discuss and dictate his will in our Political Bureau.
From these moments begins one of the most unpleasant and gravest processes in the life of our Party, the process of the splitting of our Political Bureau, of <<reorganizations>> of it and <<co-options>> to it, and later, of upsetting the whole Central Committee elected in Labinot in March 1943.
To achieve these results Velimir Stojnic had to work carefully, according to a well thought-out plan. As I said, as soon as he arrived in Albania, he began to apply his plan, but it was only in that meeting of the Political Bureau that for the first time I felt that something serious was going on when the place of the <<honoured guest>> was given to Velimir by vote. Immediately after I ended my main contribution, in which I put before the comrades the theses of the report which I was to prepare for the 2nd Plenum of the CC, Stojnic with a certain <<politeness>> sought the right to speak. In a few words he thanked us for the <<honour>> which we did him and the <<trust>> which our Bureau expressed in him by inviting him to this meeting and immediately opened his brief case:
<<From what the Comrade General Secretary said, I realize that this is a very important meeting. By coincidence (!) the things I want to say to you in a fraternal way are completely in conformity with the theme of this meeting, which is to discuss the problems you are going to put before the plenum of your Central Committee.>>
Everything he said in the course of a good two hours (apart from the time required for the translations consisted in essence of theses which completely overturned all that I had
page 150
presented in my opening contribution. In other words, his theses were a complete overturning of the line followed and victories achieved by our Party and at the same time, if they were accepted, were a completely distorted platform for the future. In essence they comprised:
First, a euphoric propaganda of <<the majestic successes>> of the CPY and Tito. He praised Tito to the skies, almost putting him on the same footing as Stalin, and openly implying that <<the Albanians and the Bulgarians are triumphing in the war>> thanks to the great aid of the Yugoslavs.
Immediately after eulogizing Tito, the CPY and their <<brilliant>>, <<creative>> line, etc., Stojnic repeated bluntly and brutally all those things that we had learnt by heart: <<You have not had a clear line>>, <<you have suffered from sectarianism, opportunism and sectarianism again>>.
With these theses Velimir Stojnic aimed to attack the line of our Party throughout the period of the war and to present it as <<unstable, unclear and, especially, sectarian>>.
Second, although the meeting was dedicated to the results of our war, Stojnic passed over this with the odd phrase, indeed in a disdainful tone, and poured out praise solely for the <<experience>>, <<example>> and <<outstanding and great contribution>> of the Yugoslav army.
With such boastful propaganda about their war, Velimir Stojnic aimed to create the impression that our National Liberation War <<was nothing very much>> and <<was not of any great weight in comparison with the war of the peoples of Yugoslavia>>. With this he openly implied that we were indebted to the Yugoslav war for our liberation, and he worked in this direction to create the view that <<our war was simply a war of çetas>>, or even worse, <<a war of terrorists and assassins>>. Hence, he pulled out of his briefcase the old hostile theses of Vukmanovic-Tempo with whom I had always been in open opposition and dispute.
Third, the line of the Party in connection with the Anti-fascist National Liberation Front, according to Velimir, was also a wrong line, a <<sectarian>> line. He went so far as
page 151
to make the accusation in the meeting, <<You have not taken a correct stand towards 'patriotic' chiefs>> (such as Cen Elezi,[1] whom we had not admitted to the Front), and he also repeated what he had pronounced on the first day of his arrival, <<You were wrong not to continue the talks>> with the Ballists at Mukje. Along with this, according to him and those who sent him, we ought to rehabilitate Ymer Dishnica.
Fourth, the organizational line of the Party and the policy of cadres, still according to them, turned out to be <<wrong>>, <<carried out on a personal plane>>, because allegedly we had <<removed devoted comrades from leading functions>>, etc., etc.
As a conclusion, the successes of the CPA were <<petty>>, <<partial>> and <<if the CPA emerged triumphant, this was mostly thanks to Yugoslavia, the CPY and Tito>>. So much for the past. Now what had to be done? These things, according to Stojnic, must be <<put in order>> and to put them in order properly there was no alternative for us Albanian communists but to <<follow the Yugoslav road, the advice and instructions of Tito>>, which Velimir Stojnic had brought. The basic idea was this: <<He who is on this road is a true communist, the others must be got rid of.>>
Summed up very briefly, these were the main primary accusations of Velimir Stojnic and the secret aims which he wanted to achieve by means of them precisely now, on the eve of the complete liberation of Albania, when we were emerging triumphant over the nazi-fascist occupiers, the local traitors and internal reaction.
page 152
I cannot claim that I realized immediately, at this meeting, the extent and depth of the secret aims of the hostile work which Tito's emissaries were organizing against our Party and young state. No, the truth was to emerge clearly later, but I must say that from those moments I was more than conscious of one thing: unjust and unwarranted criticisms and accusations were being made against us.
I awaited the reaction of the comrades, but they had hung their heads and were <<waiting>>. I thought that they must have been dismayed at the way in which Stojnic cancelled out all our work, but since he was our <<honoured guest>> they did not want to oppose him openly at the first meeting. But we were communists and there was no reason for us or the guest to take offence at the truth.
I took the floor again (although it was not up to me alone to speak again), and after thanking Stojnic for their <<interest>> and <<concern>>, etc., I began to go over briefly and refute everything that was incorrect in his <<criticisms>> and accusations about our line and situation.
<<Please don't misunderstand me,>> I continued. <<I don't agree with the 'criticism' which you have made here, not because comradely criticism or advice displeases us, but because the truth is completely different. The comrades will express their opinions and you will be convinced.>>
<<I hope you're right!>> said Stojnic smiling enigmatically. <<We shall hear what the comrades have to say.>>
After a brief silence, that same unpleasant atmosphere which developed in the meeting when we discussed whether or not Stojnic should be admitted to the meeting of our Bureau, built up again.
<<On many points the things which Comrade Colonel Velimir Stojnic mentioned here are contrary to those which Comrade Enver will deal with in the report to the plenum,>> said Koçi Xoxe. <<I say we should not be hasty. Let us reflect on them well and then talk about them.>>
<<Where are we going to find the time to reflect and then talk about them?>> put in Liri Gega there and then, with
page 153
her well-known mania, not only to oppose Koçi Xoxe about the content of everything he said, but also to sneer at him openly over the peculiarities of the <<pure Korça idiom>> in which he spoke.
<<If you had thought a bit, you would not have made all those sectarian bloomers,>> retorted Koçi Xoxe. <<We'll have a good look at your sectarianism in the Bureau.>>
<<Better sectarian than idling your time away,>> Liri snapped back in her usual style, hitting Koçi on a tender spot.
I shall speak later about the Koçi-Liri <<allergy>> and the scenes which frequently took place between them, but here I want to point out that in the past such open quarrels had not occurred in the Bureau, even between them. Mostly they <<reserved>> their spite for each other for their <<leisure time>> or came to complain to me, sometimes together, sometimes individually.
Thus, with verbal thrust and parry, Liri Gega expressed her opinion on the main problem:
<<Has the line of the Party been sectarian or has it not? This is what we should discuss. I personally have acted according to the line. . .>>
I saw Velimir Stojnic beaming as soon as this <<declaration>> of Liri Gega's was translated. He quickly noted it down and nodded his head in approval. In the endless meetings which we were to hold later, when we went down to Berat, this cunning inimical claim of Liri Gega's that <<I have acted according to the line>>, was to be a powerful weapon in the hands of Velimir Stojnic and his collaborators. Liri Gega's flagrant sectarianism (it really was flagrant) was to serve them as the basic <<argument>> to <<prove>> that the line of the CPA had been sectarian!
Throughout the whole debate Nako Spiru was extremely busy. He was rapidly writing goodness knows what in a notebook. Later I was to learn that he kept detailed notes from our meetings written in Italian to hand to his friend Dizdarevic. From that time on this became a permanent <<duty>> of
page 154
Nako and I did not understand how this was done legally and openly before our eyes.
Many years later I was to learn that, amongst other things, the minutes of the 2nd Plenum of the CC of the CPA (the Berat Plenum) written in Italian were found in the Central Archives of the Party. The young comrades who were working with the files of that time asked in astonishment at this <<discovery>>: <<Why these minutes in Italian, why were they translated?!>> When I was told of this I laughed and recalled the tense meetings of the autumn of 1944 and the note books of the <<tireless>> Nako which were filled one after the other. However, the cunning Nako was to manoeuvre beautifully with this <<extra burden>>: in acute situations when it was not in his interest to express his opinion, he buried himself in his <<notes>> and did not raise his head at all.
Nevertheless, his opinion on what should be done was sought, too.
<<When things are prepared well, disagreements are easily resolved,>> he said -- a statement that could have a hundred meanings.
As for Ramadan Çitaku, speaking in his usual slow, calm way, like the men of Kosova (he came from there, hence the pseudonym Baca), he replied:
<<To think before you speak is a good habit, but I want to say one thing: the problem before us is not whether Comrade Enver, on the one hand, or Comrade Velimir, on the other hand, is right. Comrade Enver presented the theses of the main report of the Bureau which will be delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party. These theses are from all of us, because, for better or worse, we have all had our say and have all done the work for the line which we have adopted and which we all know. Therefore, I don't understand why we should take long to give our opinion about whether or not Comrade Velimir's criticisms of the line which we have all endorsed and followed are well based?!>>
This straightforward and logical comment of Ramadan Çitaku's, following the opposition which he had expressed in
page 155
the earlier meeting about the admission of Stojnic to the meeting of the Bureau, certainly put a red ring round the name of Baca in the Yugoslav plotters' notebook. The open interference and pressure which they exerted on the Bureau during October for the expulsion of Ramadan Çitaku from the Bureau of our Central Committee, was not accidental.
Precisely this first meeting of our Bureau in the presence of Velimir Stojnic and his <<theses>> were to serve as an <<official>> platform for the whole series of meetings, discussions and endless quarrels which were to consume valuable hours, days and nights during October and November of that year when we had so much work ahead of us on the eve of Liberation.
In these meetings, <<of course>> the Yugoslav comrade, Tito's delegate, would also take part and would not leave matters simply at what he said at Odriçan, but was to continue his attacks on the line of our Party in the most brutal way, making me <<the main culprit>> for the <<grave errors>> which had allegedly been observed in the line of our Party in the time of the war.
Although he was not outstanding for his <<keen mind>>, as an intriguer and trained agent of Tito and Rankovic he did his work well. Later we were to realize that he did everything according to a scenario carefully prepared in advance by the Yugoslav leadership. This secret scenario was based on two <<weapons>> which the Yugoslavs had in their hands: First, on the trust and respect which our Party nurtured for the CP and the war of the peoples of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Tito. Second, on the work they had begun much earlier to prepare their agency within the leadership of our Party.
As I said above, we were interested in strengthening our internationalist relations with them and, as communist comrades, wanted to benefit from that good experience that might be applicable in our country. But those things which seemed to us incorrect or unsuitable for our conditions, we had not accepted and did not accept. Despite the repeated contradictions we had had with the Yugoslav comrades, we had not
page 156
lost our faith in the CPY and Tito. This was precisely what the Yugoslav leadership had instructed Velimir Stojnic to exploit.
Besides this, the Yugoslavs had long had in their hands detailed information about the main comrades of our leadership, about their level, character, tendencies, temperament, the abilities of each of them and the standing they enjoyed in the Party and among the masses, etc. It was not for nothing that in his letter of September 1942, Tito asked for the biographies of the comrades who were elected to the CC of the Party at the 1st National Conference. Later, Blazo Jovanovic, Vukmanovic-Tempo and others were to supply their leadership with detailed information, gathered in meetings with us or in other, secret ways. The Yugoslav leadership studied this carefully and when the time was approaching to put the finishing touches to the plan of action for the <<Stojnic mission>>, they urgently recalled Dusan Mugosa from Albania, because, as we were told, <<he was charged with another task>>. As has been revealed since, including recent times, Dusan Mugosa under the pseudonym Çalamani had recruited secret agents in the ranks of the cadres, both military and civilian, in the regions where he operated. But let us return to the time of the war when three to four months after the departure of Mugosa, Stojnic arrived in Albania, very well prepared.
In this way, no doubt under orders from Tito and Rankovic, Velimir Stojnic was now putting the information gathered about us to successful use: both to suppress my resistance and that of other sound comrades of the Party and to encourage the anti-party factional work of Sejfulla Malëshova, Koçi Xoxe, Nako Spiru and their associates. Hence, he set about and at Odriçan succeeded in creating the following situation: everything which <<Velo>> said or did <<was right>>, because <<Tito and the CPY said this and whoever opposed it was an enemy and had to be fought>>.
Right from this initial phase of his secret activity, Stojnic succeeded, for the most varied reasons and motives, in
page 157
winning over a number of the main comrades of our leadership. Who were the main ones?
One of them was Sejfulla Malëshova. He is known and I'm not going to give a biography of him, but the fact is that his worth at the time of the war was zero. He did nothing, did not carry out any task with which we charged him, allegedly had ability with the pen but did not produce even one poor leaflet. He was a prime example of laziness. I don't know how and from what source he had gained a reputation as <<a professor of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow>>, because he did not prepare even one lecture. His political ideas on many questions were wrong and markedly liberal. He was a careerist who liked flattery and privileges and was the prototype of a petty-bourgeois. All these characteristics of Sejfulla Malëshova were to the liking of the Yugoslav Velimir Stojnic both for that time and for the future, and therefore he supported him in all sorts of ways. Sejfulla was quick to quarrel with the comrades over any petty thing, over a toothbrush, for example. He was characterized by pronounced conceit. He claimed that he was <<a veteran revolutionary>>, that he had <<come from Moscow>> and that he was <<a professor of Marxist theory>>, therefore he nurtured the idea that he ought to be the undisputed <<chief>> of the Party and the National Liberation War. Since this was not being realized, he was silently in opposition to the Party. He considered me as the person who had occupied the place <<predestined for him even before he set foot in Albania>>. Apart from me, nobody bothered to listen to this megalomaniac. Regardless of all his shortcomings and mistakes and the criticism which I made of him, still my behaviour towards him was correct.
The Yugoslavs had thoroughly apprehended Sejfulla's nature, especially his ambition to be <<party chief>> and had found in him the suitable man, even if only for a period, to develop their work of disruption in our Party and to eliminate me. So, Stojnic and Dizdarevic kept Sejfulla close beside them, cunningly flattered his petty-bourgeois pride and
page 158
even dropped such hints as <<what a pity that with a capacity such as yours, you are still only a candidate member of the Central Committee>>, etc. Hence, very quickly they made Sejfulla their man, maintained close relations with him, set him to work and greatly <<praised>> his <<theoretical abilities>>, especially when Sejfulla viciously attacked the Party over altogether non-existent stands and faults.
Sejfulla Malëshova, as the petty-bourgeois, liberal democrat and Trotskyite he was, was quite incapable of keeping out of the maelstrom into which the Yugoslavs were driving him. From the depth of hostility to which he had sunk he began his base attack against the Party. According to him, <<the real existence and struggle,>> of the Party had begun now <<that Comrade Velimir Stojnic is putting matters in order>>, implying, along with Velimir Stojnic, himself too.
The other element on whom Stojnic relied heavily was Koçi Xoxe. He was an old member of the Korça Group, a small tradesman who was included in the group of workers because he worked as a tinsmith. At first he loved the Party and communism, but was cowardly, made no efforts to extend his horizon and to raise the level of his knowledge, was one of those few workers of Korça in whom arrogance and haughtiness were obvious and who remained, you might say <<illiterate>>. Neither he nor Pandi Kristo made any effort to learn. Koçi Xoxe learned a few isolated things and all the time scribbled a few illegible notes which only he could decipher. Even these he did not write on normal paper but on envelopes. This was a mania of his. However, he did not need much paper, because he wrote little or nothing. Koçi was neither an organizer nor a man of action. He had a great opinion of himself and posed as being everything. His only merit was based on the fact that he was a worker and that is why he had been elected to the leadership and I respected him. I tried to help him, but I also criticized him, because he was not brilliant in anything -- on the contrary.
The Titoites had been working on him for a long time through Vukmanovic-Tempo, since he came to Albania and
page 159
took Xoxe with him on his <<Balkan>> travels to Greece. As I said, at that time I saw nothing wrong in Tempo's association with Koçi Xoxe and agreed that they should go together to Greece twice, because of the additional fact that Xoxe knew the Greek language and originated from Negovan. However, Koçi Xoxe returned from Greece completely the man of Tempo and the Yugoslav secret agency.
All the time he was in prison we had respect for Koçi. When he came out of prison and worked together with me in the leadership we were disillusioned. We sent him with the task of leading the struggle in Korça; he kept himself busy with <<the base and the rear>> and concerned himself with the clothing that was gathered in Lavdar and Punëmira. There he was given every opportunity to work, to create and to organize, but he proved to be an undistinguished comrade of the leadership and made no concrete contribution to the work of the Party, let alone that of the army. With the conceit and pretensions he had, it was inevitable that he would cultivate a great internal discontent. Of course, Tempo was well aware of his spiritual state and it was well known also to Velimir Stojnic who took him over, worked on him, urged him in the direction we mentioned above and made him a weapon against our Party and against me personally. Brainwashed and inflated in this way, Koçi Xoxe emerged as one of the <<persecuted proletarians>> and <<one of the men of the Party with a proletarian heart and great value for the Party>>.[1]
The third person whom Stojnic managed to win over was Nako Spiru.
Nako was unlike the other two from a number of aspects. He was intelligent, clear on the line, courageous and a good organizer. I liked and respected him and, after the death of Qemal, recommended him to replace Qemal in the Youth
page 160
Organization and in the leadership of the Party. I continually consulted with Nako, because most of the time we were together. At all times he was in the effective leadership.
However, just as much as the other two, Nako Spiru was a petty bourgeois in his spirit and he had a number of very marked negative traits. He was extremely ambitious and inclined to intrigues. He had gossip and criticism, both justified and ill-founded, on the tip of his tongue. He did not fail to encourage those he liked to advance and to praise them, he was a person who played favourites and worked to fulfil the great desire he had to surround himself with people who listened to him, obeyed him and carried out the orders he gave. Nako was extremely inquisitive and rummaged around to discover the pettiest personal facts about anyone. Many a time when he came and told me petty personal details, which were none of our business, about this or that person, I was astonished at him and criticized him.
<<Where do you hear these things, Nako?>> I asked him reproachfully.
<<I have my methods and my people who keep me in formed,>> he replied.
All these were dangerous tendencies for a communist and a leader and apart from other things, as a result of these tendencies, Nako became involved in that dirty anti-party work which Tito's emissaries hatched up.
The Yugoslavs knew these serious defects and came to know them better. Velimir Stojnic and especially his aide, Nijaz Dizdarevic, who was allegedly engaged with the work of the youth, fostered these ambitions in him and compromised him very gravely. They went so far that Nako Spiru was to send Tito and the CC of the CPY secret reports written in his own hand, reports which they used against him later as pressure and some of which they published, including those parts in which, while describing <<the deplorable situation of our war, the mistakes and bad situation in the Party>>, he attacked me, put the blame on me and sought their aid to ensure that
page 161
I was removed from the post of General Secretary of the Party. This is how far this comrade went in his anti-party work. The Yugoslavs, carefully studying Nako's careerist tendencies, his petty-bourgeois desire for power, his spirit as a carping critic, flattered his pride and ambition and encouraged him in all these directions. Nako was to associate himself with their <<criticism>> and <<accusations>> of our line, not because he was <<mistaken>> in his evaluation of the line. In the Yugoslavs' <<accusations>> Nako saw the possibilities for power which were being opened up. If the past line were to be rejected as <<incorrect>>, the main bearer of that line, the General Secretary of the Party, would be rejected, too. Who would take his place?! Obviously, he who contributed most to blackening the past and who would win the affection and gratitude of the Yugoslavs in this way. Because this is how he judged matters, Nako was to involve himself with all his might in the plot, brutally trampling, not only on the Party, but also on the sacrifices of his own life in the 3 to 4 years of the war.
These then were the three main brigands whom the Yugoslavs, through their emissary Stojnic, were now to unleash in all their ferocity against the line of the Party and against the indisputable victory which we had achieved and were achieving in the war.
Naturally, the portrait which I painted above of these elements could never have been made or even imagined with this clarity at Odriçan or even later when we went down to Berat. Irrespective of those shortcomings with which I was acquainted, I considered these people as comrades and treated them as comrades of the leadership of the Party in every step and action which we took. That is why, when I heard the gravest opinions and accusations against the Party from their own mouths, I was taken aback and felt that I was facing a group of comrades who were placing themselves en bloc against the line of the Party and personally against me, the General Secretary. Naturally, I did not realize immediately that we were faced with an organized plot. These three com-
page 162
rades of the leadership disguised everything with their <<concern>> to <<examine the issues>>, to <<evaluate the past correctly>>, to learn from <<the experience and comradely criticism of the Yugoslav brothers>>, to <<eliminate the mistakes>>, to <<proceed better in the future>>, to come before the Central Committee as <<clearly as possible>> with <<principled criticism and self-criticism>>, indeed with <<Bolshevik>> criticism and self-criticism, etc. In short, all of them were to vow from start to finish that they were acting solely for <<the good of the Party>>, for <<its salvation>> (!). In fact, however, all these vows about <<the good of the Party>> were a bluff, a mask to conceal the plot which had been hatched up to the detriment of the Party behind my back and the backs of all the other comrades who remained in sound principled positions.
In this meeting of the Political Bureau in which Stojnic launched his accusations, Liri Gega took part, too, but it was her <<bad luck>> to be used by the Yugoslav agency as the <<scapegoat>>. As I mentioned above, during his <<service>> in the region of Vlora in the spring and summer of 1943, Dusan Mugosa became well acquainted with Liri Gega, took note of her many weaknesses, especially her ambitious and careerist spirit, and kept close to her to foster these shortcomings in the interest of his work as an agent. To give the devil his due, Mugosa carried out this dirty anti-party work with Liri Gega and with a number of others in masterly fashion. The sectarian actions which were recognized and had already been condemned by our Party were, in the first place, the fruit of the work of Dusan Mugosa as an agent, in which his <<pupil>> and agent Liri Gega displayed obvious zeal.
For these things, Dusan Mugosa deserved the heaviest condemnation, but in fact he did not leave Albania under a cloud. On the contrary, after performing the role with which his leadership had charged him, by recruiting and fouling whomever he could. Duqi cleared out and left our Party a <<heritage>> of <<mistakes of sectarianism>> which the leadership of the CPY now needed to accuse the leadership of our Communist Party of being <<incompetent>> and <<sectarian>>.
page 163
But in order to make these <<accusations>> stick and seem to have a concrete basis, the Yugoslavs now had to <<attack>> their loyal agent Liri Gega, even if only temporarily, as <<the embodiment of the sectarian line of the CPA>>. The wide-ranging attack which was made on our Communist Party was hidden behind <<Liri's mistakes>>.
All this painful anti-party history was to take place during the months of October and November in the liberated city of Berat where we arrived, as far as I remember, a few days after the <<platform>> meeting at Odriçan.
We had virtually liberated the south of Albania. Thus, the General Staff had come down to the liberated city of Berat and there we prepared the strategic plan of the assault for the liberation of Tirana. A little before we entered Berat, the German rearguard which was encircled by our forces shelled the city. A number of houses were destroyed, but no one was killed. This attack was like the last gasp of an asthmatic, because freedom had already triumphed in these parts. From here we dispatched the orders for military opera-
page 164
tions to divisions, brigades and other territorial units, which were to assemble and begin the assault on the capital and, after they liberated it, to pursue the enemy hotly until the complete liberation of Albania. I was in Berat when I received the news about the liberation of our beloved capital city, and a little later, the news of the liberation of virtually all Albania. From Berat I issued the order to some other brigades of our triumphant army to cross our state borders and advance into Yugoslavia. There these brigades, together with two other brigades of our army (the 5th and 3rd), which had received orders to cross the border in September and had liberated most of Kosova, were to continue the war against the German nazis, fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Yugoslav partisan comrades I instructed our partisans that they must fight unsparingly in complete unity with the Yugoslav partisans and in an internationalist spirit for the liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia. And the Albanian partisans made the word of their Communist Party a reality. They fought with great heroism in Kosova, Montenegro, Sandjak, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia and Macedonia. In these battles hundreds of our partisans were killed and thousands wounded. But the Titoites trampled with both their feet over their heroism and blood and repaid us with hostility and plots against our Party and our socialist Homeland. Nevertheless, we carried out an internationalist duty, and irrespective of what happens, the peoples of Yugoslavia will never forget this sacrifice which the Albanian people made for them.
There in liberated Berat we had decided to work out and solve a series of important tasks which were to remain in history as outstanding events for those moments and for the future. One of these was the preparation of the report for the meeting of the Anti-fascist National Liberation General Council which was to be held before the Plenum of the CC of the Party and the drafting of other relevant documents. This meeting of the Council, which we held with complete success, had great historic importance, because there the Anti-fascist Committee was turned into the Democratic Government of Albania. Thus, on the eve
page 165
of Liberation the country had its democratically elected government. This government was the main executive and order issuing organ of our people's state power established by the people through struggle on the ruins of the state power of the enemy classes defeated together with the occupiers.
Another important task was, without doubt, the preparation for the 2nd Plenum of the CC of the Party, a job which, as I said, we had begun at Odriçan, but which, after the interference and <<theses>> of Velimir Stojnic, was in an impasse and dragging on and on with endless discussions and debates.
During our stay in Berat we had placed the centre of the General Staff in the house of the beys of Vrioni, where we had our offices and where I slept. The other comrades were billeted in other houses of the city. These comrades, such as Nako, Koçi, Sejfulla, turned up once a day, with their hands in their pockets, inquired whether there was any news from the military zones and wandered off again. We had charged Pandi Kristo with the task of <<military security>>, but later it was realized that he busied himself with other work of <<security>>. He observed what was done at the Staff, who came and went, what was discussed, and this he reported to Koçi and Velimir Stojnic. Pandi was one of those elements who was implicated up to his neck in the plot at Berat. He was a nullity from every point of view and, apart from the fact that he came from the ranks of <<proletarians>> (in fact, he had been an apprentice), there was nothing brilliant about his past, either. From time to time he boasted of being a <<veteran>> element of the Communist Group of Korça, but all of us knew very well that in 1935, when the Trotskyite faction of Niko Xoxi emerged in this group and opposed the correct line and directives of Comrade Ali Kelmendi, Pandi Kristo was one of the few to associate himself with the factionalist Niko Xoxi. After the deserved denunciation of the faction, Pandi <<withdrew>> from it, <<admitted>> his grave mistake, and united with the sound part of the group. However, he did not rid himself of his old vice of engaging in factionalist activity. Especially after the spring of 1943 he joined up
page 166
with the other Xoxe, Koçi, turned into a blind follower of his and, consequently, placed himself in the service of that agency which had recruited Koçi Xoxe -- the Yugoslav agency. All through the years of the war he had gone almost <<unnoticed>> and he began to move and show up in the autumn of 1944, precisely when Koçi Xoxe and Stojnic considered it in order to activize him for their sinister aims.
As for Liri Gega, she stayed <<closer>> to me, impelled by other motives and for other objectives. She thought that rank and positions were shared out in my office and she aimed to grab a big slice for herself. She made herself quite ridiculous with her desire for the limelight. At times she would come to me with a piece of paper in her hand:
<<Have a look at this!>> she said proudly. <<I've drafted two laws. If you agree, we can print and distribute them>>.
<<Take them to Doctor Nishani[1] to see,>> I replied ironically. <<He and the comrades with him know about these matters.>>
<<Let us approve them in the Bureau first,>> insisted Liri, <<and send them to the Doctor all ready.>>
It would simply turn back to the work I had in front of me and Liri would go out. A little later she would come back with another <<proposal>>. One day she stopped me in the street when I was going with Nako and Koçi to see the hall where, shortly after this, we were to hold the meeting of the Anti-fascist National Liberation General Council.
THE BACKSTAGE PLOT OF BERAT
The <<Stojnic mission>> in Albania * Nijaz Dizdarevic -- the <<éminence grise>> of Nako Spiru * The Soviet Major Ivanov <<is informed>> about us through Stojnic * The establishment of our main leadership in liberated Berat * Nako Spiru, Koçi Xoxe, Sejfulla Malëshova and Pandi Kristo are engaged in the Titoite plot. Liri Gega in the role of the <<scapegoat>> * Three steps of the <<Stojnic mission>>: first -- the departure of Miladin Popovic from Albania; second -- the split of our Political Bureau; third -- the split of the CC of the CPA and the condemnation of our main leadership * The seeds of disruption and self-exposure are growing behind the <<unity>> of the p}otters * V. Stojnic's discussion -- the Titoite platform for the subjugation of the CPA and the gobbling up of Albania * Tito, the intermediary of the British * The people's revolts in Kosova * Stojnic serves up the idea of the <<Balkan Federation>> headed by Yugoslavia * The bitter fruits of the Berat Plenum.
The period from August 1943, when Vukmanovic-Tempo departed, until August 1944, when Velimir Stojnic arrived, is one of the stormiest and most brilliant periods in the history of our Party and the National Liberation War in Albania. During this time our Communist Party further
[1]
This conference dealt with the strengthening of the democratic people's power as a fundamental question. It approved the Constitution and the rules of the national liberation councils, elected the new National Liberation General Council, publicly denounced the compromise the representatives of the General Council, Ymer Dishnica and Mustafa Gjinishi (secret agent of the British Intelligence Service -- see: Enver Hoxha, <<The Anglo-American Threat to Albania>>, Tirana 1982, pp. 173-224, Eng. ed.) had reached with the representatives of the Balli Kombëtar in Mukje, Kruja district, in opposition to the instructions they had received, and decided on the thorough exposure of the hostile activity of the Balli Kombëtar.
[1]
See Enver Hoxha, <<The Anglo-American Threat to Albania>>, Tirana 1982, pp. 334-352, Eng. ed.
[2]
Where this Velimir Stojnic has ended up today we do not know, and we have never heard his name again after the notorious activity he carried on in Albania, while Nijaz Dizdarevic, after being a bow-tied diplomat in Paris, later an ambassador with a string of tranquillity beads in Algeria, was lately chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission in the Yugoslav Federal Skupstina. (Author's note.)
The <<Stojnic mission>>
Velimir Stojnic came to Albania in the end of August 1944 as chief of the Yugoslav military mission attached to our General Staff.
* good morning (Serb. in the original).
[1]
Respectively the south-easternmost and north-westernmost extension of the border of Albania.
* (French in the original).
[1]
See footnote 1, p. 131 of this book.
[1]
In September-October 1943, Gjin Marku, commander of the partisan forces of the Berat region, without notifying the General Staff and contravening the line of the CPA, allowed the German forces to enter freely into Berat which was already liberated by the forces of the National Liberation Army. This act without precedent in Albania was condemned by the Party as a very serious fault.
[1]
Element from the gentry of Dibra, opponent of the Party and the National Liberation Front. In the autumn of 1944, through the intervention of Velimir Stojnic on behalf of this old agent of the kraljs of Serbia, under the pretext that he <<had not been so active as the other reactionary chiefs against the National Liberation Movement>>, Cen Elezi was admitted to the ranks of the National Liberation Front. After the establishment of the people's state power, Cen Elezi was to put his activity at the service of the reactionary policy of the Anglo-Americans and the remnants of reaction in Albania.
[1]
Later, Rankovic, the Yugoslav counterpart of Koçi Xoxe, did not fail to recommend Koçi Xoxe even to Stalin as <<a leader with a proletarian spirit>>, <<the most resolute>> and <<the most clear>> in the leadership of the CPA (!), etc.
On the eve of the plot
The establishment of the main leadership of the Party, the Anti-fascist General Council and the General Staff in the liberated city of Berat, after about four years of fighting and battles in the difficult conditions of illegality, showed that decisive historic moments for our country had arrived. The National Liberation War was being crowned with major successes. The correct Marxist-Leninist line of the Party was leading our people towards the final victory. The love and trust of the people and the partisans for the Party was great and deeply implanted in their hearts, because it was the Party which educated them, organized them, armed them and led them into the war and to victory.